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THE

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF

ARISTOTLE.
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TRANSLATED,

WITH NOTES, ORIGINAL & SELECTED; AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION; AND QUESTIONS FOR THE USE OF STUDENTS.

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MDCCCLIII.
TO THE READER.

In giving to the public this translation of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, the Translator acknowledges the obligations he is under to former versions. He has not hesitated to adopt such portions of them as appeared to him to convey accurately the meaning of the author, whilst he has entirely retranslated such as he thought failed in this respect. Every passage, however, has been in all cases carefully compared with the original. The text generally followed has been that of Cardwell, but Bekker's has been also consulted, and his readings adopted wherever they appeared preferable.

The notes are partly original, partly selected. It has been the object of the Translator not to overburthen the text with them, but only to give as many as he thought necessary to render the subject intelligible, and to explain or illustrate such difficulties as were incapable of being removed by translation. The Analysis and Questions, which are added, were thought likely to be a valuable assistance to the student.

It is hoped that this work will be found useful to that numerous class of readers who, though unacquainted with the language of ancient Greece, are anxious to study the works of the best writers of antiquity in, as nearly as possible, their own words.

For such further information as is not contained in the notes, the reader is referred to the commentaries of Michelet,
the notes of Cardwell, the edition of the eighth and ninth books by Fritsch, Brewer's edition of the Ethics, Blakesley's Life of Aristotle, the philosophical articles in the *Encyclopaedia Metropolitana*, Whately's *Logic*, and Ritter's *History of Philosophy*, in which latter work will be found an able and lucid analysis of the Ethics of Aristotle, as well as a complete investigation of all the systems of the ancient philosophers. The ingenious and able defence of the sophists in the eighth volume of Grote's *History of Greece* may be advantageously studied with reference to the bearing of their doctrines on the subject of ethical philosophy.

*Translated by A. J. W. Morrison.*
ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION.

ETHICS, according to the theory of Aristotle, formed but a subdivision of the great and comprehensive science of politics. Man is a political or social being; that science, therefore, which professed to investigate the subject of human good, would study the nature of man, not only as an individual, but also in his relation to his fellows, as a member of a family, and as a member of a state, or political community.

Aristotle, therefore, following out this view, divides politics into three parts: Ethics, Economics, and Politics strictly so called. Ethics, therefore, or the science of individual good, must be the groundwork of the rest; families and states are composed of individuals; unless, therefore, the parts be good, the whole cannot be perfect. The development, therefore, of the principles of man's moral nature must necessarily precede, and be an introduction to an investigation of the principles of human society. This is the place which ethical science occupies in Aristotle's system; it is the introduction to politics, or the science of social life.

It is plain, from these considerations, that ethics, according to Aristotle, form a subdivision of a great practical subject; he does not therefore consider it necessary to examine into the abstract nature of good, but only to pursue the investigation so far as it relates to man. So utterly unconnected with his subject does he consider any ideal or absolute standard of good, that he even denies that the knowledge or contemplation of it can be in any way useful to the study of that good which falls within the province of human nature, and is therefore attainable by man. In this, as well as in many other respects, the practical nature of his
mind is strongly contrasted with the poetical idealism of his great master Plato.

The foundation of Aristotle’s system of ethics is deeply laid in his psychological system. On the nature of the human soul the whole fabric is built up, and depends for its support. According to our author, we are born with a natural capacity for receiving virtuous impressions, and for forming virtuous habits; and his conception of the nature of this capacity is so high a one, that he does not hesitate to term it “natural virtue.” We are endowed with a moral sense (αἰσθησις), a perception of moral beauty and excellence, and with an acuteness on practical subjects (διευνόης), which, when cultivated, is improved into φρόνημα (prudence or moral wisdom). From all these considerations, therefore, it is plain that, according to Aristotle, virtue is the law under which we are born, the law of nature, that law which, if we would attain to happiness, we are bound to fulfill. Happiness, in its highest and purest sense, is our “being’s end and aim;” and this is an energy or activity of the soul according to the law of virtue: an energy of the purest of the capacities of the soul, of that capacity which is proper and peculiar to man alone; namely, intellect or reason. Designed, then, as man is for virtuous energies, endowed with capacities for moral action, with a natural taste and appreciation for that which is morally beautiful, with a natural disposition or instinct, as it were, to good acts; virtue, and therefore happiness, becomes possible and attainable. Had this not been the case, all moral instruction would be useless. That for which nature had not given man a capacity would have been beyond his reach; for that which exists by nature can never by custom be made to be otherwise.

But this natural disposition or bias is, according to Aristotle, a mere potentiality; it is possessed, but not active, not energizing. It is necessary that it should be directed by the will, and that the will in its turn should be directed to a right end by deliberate preference; i.e. by moral principle. From his belief in the existence of this natural capacity, and this bias or inclination towards virtue, and moreover from his believing that man was a free and voluntary agent, Aristotle necessarily holds the responsibility of man. Man has power over his individual actions to do
or to abstain. By repeated acts, habits are formed either of virtue or vice; and, therefore, for his whole character when formed, as well as for each act which contributes to its formation, man is responsible. Not that men have always power over their acts, when their character is formed; but what he contends for is, that they have power over them whilst their moral character is in process of formation; and that, therefore, they must, in all reason, be held responsible for the permanent effects which their conduct in particular acts has produced, and which they must at every step have seen gradually resulting.

What then is virtue? In the solution of that part of this question which has not already been answered, the practical nature of Aristotle's mind is exhibited in an eminent degree. It has been seen that it is a habit, that it is based upon the natural capacities of the human soul, that it is formed and established by a voluntary agent acting under the guidance of deliberate preference or moral principle. But to these conditions it is also necessary to add, what is the end or object at which the habit is to aim.

Experience, then, that great practical guide in human affairs, teaches us what that end is. An induction of instances shows that it is a mean between excess and defect; not, indeed, an absolute mean, but a relative one; that is, one relative to the internal moral constitution, and to the external circumstances and condition, of the moral agents. Of this relative mean, each man must judge for himself by the light of his conscience, and his moral sense, purified by moral discipline, and enlightened by education. The moral philosopher can only lay down general principles for man's guidance, and each individual man must do the rest. The casuist may profess to be more particular, he may profess to lay down accurate special rules of conduct, which will meet every individual case, but his professions will be unfulfilled: he will, from the very nature of the subject, which, being a moral one, will not admit of mathematical exactness, fail of making morals a definite and exact science. There must, and will always be, room left for the moral sense and practical wisdom of each individual, to exercise in each case of moral action its judicial functions. If, in this case, or in any other, you deal with men in this way, you are dealing
with them as children; and, therefore, according to Aristotle's views, as being incapable of perfect moral action.

The discussion of these virtues or mean states, both moral and intellectual, forms, it will be found, a very important portion of this treatise. We shall find, amongst them, many virtues which belong to man in his political rather than in his individual character:—magnificence, that virtue of the rich, which to an Athenian mind appeared nearly akin to patriotism:—the social qualities, which we should scarcely in these days formally elevate into the rank of virtues, but which, nevertheless, practically, we value almost as highly, and which contribute so much to the happiness of every-day life:—justice, not only that universal justice which implies the doing to every one according to the laws of God and man, and therefore is synonymous with virtue, but also that particular virtue which is more especially exercised by one who is intrusted by the constitution of his country with administrative or executive authority:—and, lastly, friendship, that law of sympathy, and concord, and love between the good and virtuous, clearly and inseparably connected with—nay, based upon, originating in, and springing out of—a reasonable self-love, which is not, indeed, strictly speaking, a virtue, but indispensable to virtue and human happiness.

Friendship is a subject on which the mind of Greece especially loved to dwell. It pervades many of her historical and poetical traditions; it is interwoven with many of her best institutions, her holiest recollections. In one of its forms, that of hospitality, it was the bond which united Greeks in one vast family, as it were, even in times of bitter hostility. No Greek, therefore, could have considered that a moral philosopher had fully accomplished his task, and finished his work, if the discussion of this subject had not formed part of his treatise. And when we find that Aristotle places friendship so high, as to say that its existence would supersede and render unnecessary even justice, and that the true friend loves his friend for that friend's sake, and for that motive alone, it seems to approach in some degree to the Christian rule of charity, which teaches us to love our neighbour as ourselves,—to that love which, based on principle, and not merely on instinct, is on divine authority said to be "the fulfilling of the law."
In the practical consideration of each individual virtue, Aristotle necessarily treats of moral and intellectual virtue separately from each other; but we must not suppose, for that reason, that he thought they could exist separately. According to his view, moral virtue implies the due regulation of our moral nature, with all its appetites, instincts, and passions; and this state only exists when they are subordinate to the dominion and control of the reasoning faculties. Again, the reason does not act with all the vigour of which it is naturally capable, unless our moral nature is in a well-regulated state. Hence the different parts of human nature reciprocally act and react upon each other, every good resolution carried into effect, every act of self-control and moral discipline, increases the vigour of the pure reason, and renders the highest faculty of our nature more and more able to perform its work. Again, the more powerful the reason becomes, the fewer external obstacles, such as vice presents to its energies, the intellect meets with, the more effectually does it influence the moral nature, and strengthen, confirm, and render permanent the moral habits. Thus continence is gradually improved into temperance; and if human nature were capable of attaining perfection, man would attain to that ideal standard which Aristotle terms heroic virtue.

But this is above human nature, and is impossible to attain, just as its opposite, brutality, is never found, so long as human nature continues in its normal condition, but only in cases where bodily mutilation, or moral perversion, or the influence of barbarism, has so far degraded the human being, that he may be considered as having entirely ceased to be a man.

There is another important subject connected with morals of which it was absolutely necessary for Aristotle to treat fully. Pleasure, as a motive to action, had been so interwoven with other philosophical systems, that the disciple of the Aristotelian ethical philosophy could not be content without the place which it ought to occupy being accurately defined. Pleasure, then, had been held by Plato and others to be a motion or a generation, and therefore of a transitory or transient nature: this Aristotle denies, and affirms it to be a whole, indivisible, complete, perfect, giving a perfection, a finish, as it were, to an energy; being, as he says in order
to illustrate its nature, what the bloom is to youth. But if so, pleasure must be active, energetic; it cannot be simply rest: and yet the testimony of mankind, if we observe what they propose to themselves as pleasure, would be in favour of the notion of its being rest, in some sense or other. How, then, were these apparent inconsistencies to be reconciled? In the following manner. It is rest as regards the body, but energy as regards the mind. It is an activity of the soul—not a mere animal activity. This distinction enables us to mark the difference between true and false pleasures. Those which are consequent upon the mere activity of our corporeal nature are low and unreal; those which attend upon the energies of our intellectual nature are true and perfect, and worthy of the dignity of man.

But as happiness is an energy or activity of the soul according to its highest excellence, and that this must be that which is the characteristic property of man, namely, pure intellectual excellence, it is evident that contemplative happiness is superior to every other kind, and constitutes the chief good of man. Although happiness must be sought for and arrived at by the formation of habits of practical virtue, still all other virtues must be pursued with a view to the final gratification of our intellectual nature; the end of the cultivation of all virtue is to fit us for the pure and unmixed enjoyment of contemplation. Contemplative enjoyment is the most perfect, most permanent, and most independent of external helps and appliances.

If, then, after all that has been said respecting moral practical virtue, contemplation is the end and object of man, his chief good, his highest happiness, why has Aristotle said so much of the practical nature of human happiness? why has he attributed so much importance to the formation of the moral character? why has he left the subject of contemplative happiness to be briefly discussed at the very conclusion of his treatise?

The answer to these questions is plain. Until the moral character is formed, man is unfit, not only for the enjoyment, but also for forming a correct conception and appreciation of the happiness which is derived from contemplation. Place before his eyes in the commencement of his search after happiness intellectual contemplation, as the end at which he
is aiming, and he would neither be able to understand its nature, nor estimate its value. It is by the gradual perfection of our moral nature, and by this method only, that we are brought into that state in which the intellectual principle is able to act purely and uninterruptedly. The improvement of our moral and intellectual faculties will go on parallel to one another. Every evil habit conquered, every good habit formed, will remove an obstacle to the energy of the intellect, and assist in invigorating its nature. Begin with contemplation, and we shall neither find subjects for it, of a nature sufficiently exalted to insure real happiness, nor be in a condition to derive happiness from such subjects, if suggested to us. Begin with moral training, and we shall attain to higher capacities for intellectual happiness, whether derived from the contemplation of abstract truth, or of the perfections and attributes of the Deity. The Christian philosopher will easily understand the value of this method of teaching; for he knows that it is revealed to us, that in divine things moral training is the way to intellectual cultivation, that the heart is the way to the understanding—"If any man will do God's will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." (St. John vii. 17.) It is plain that, in this respect, the way which the heathen moralist has pointed out to the attainment of happiness is that which is most in accordance with the principles of human nature, and therefore with the laws of Him who is both the author of revelation, and of the moral constitution of man.

It only remains now to point out how Aristotle connects the subject of ethics with that of which he considers it a subordinate division; namely, politics. The idea of a state implies a human society united together upon just, moral, and reasonable principles. These principles are developed and displayed in its institutions; its end and object is the greatest good of the body corporate; and, therefore, so far as it can be attained consistently with this primary end, the greatest good of each family and individual. Now, on the morality of the individual members, the morality, and there-

* We may see from this bow far the Aristotelian theory of happiness and man's highest good harmonizes with that of Plato, and, at the same time, bow far more practical is the method which Aristotle recommends for the attainment of it.
fore the welfare and happiness, of the body depends; for as in a state, i.e. a free state, the source of power is ultimately the people, on the moral tone of the people, the character of the institutions framed by their representatives must depend. Hence a state must recognize the moral culture and education of the people as a duty. Private systems of education may, doubtless, possess some advantages, such as their superior capability of being moulded and adapted to the particular circumstances of individual cases, but still they are inferior to a public one, in uniformity, in the power of enforcing their authority, and in producing great and extensive results. As, therefore, the elements of moral virtue must be inculcated and implanted by moral education, the individual has a right to demand that provision be made for this by well-regulated public institutions, and, in order to attain such institutions, the science of politics or social life must be investigated or systematized. But besides, in order even to secure the advantages of private education, whatever these advantages may be, it is necessary that every one who would conduct and administer such a system efficiently should study the general political principles of education, and thus endeavour to fit himself for legislating respecting them. On all accounts, therefore, the study of morals is not complete, unless that of politics is superadded, and the latter study should be pursued, not only by the statesman, but by the private citizen.

The above general outline of Aristotle's ethical system, in which the several parts are designedly not presented to the view in the order in which he has treated them, but displayed in their relative bearings upon each other, will, it is hoped, be sufficient to prepare the mind of the student for the accurate analysis of each chapter separately which follows.
BOOK I.

Introductory.—A question lies at the very threshold of the investigation; namely, whether there is any chief good (sumnum bonum), and if there is, whether it be, or can be brought within the reach of the capacities of man. Having answered these questions in the affirmative, Aristotle proceeds to show what its nature and essence is. That all, or nearly all, agree in calling it happiness, is clear; but this is not enough; it must be defined, its properties analyzed, its nature explained. After, therefore, examining and stating what opinions have been generally held respecting it, as well popularly as by philosophers, he proceeds to define and explain his own idea respecting it, and to defend the accuracy of his views by comparing it with those of others. Certain questions arising out of the method of discussion which he has pursued, but of no practical importance, such, for example, as the well-known saying of Solon, are briefly alluded to; and respecting them he comes to no very satisfactory conclusion. And, lastly, the theory which he has adopted leads him to state, in a few words, the general principles of man's psychical constitution.

I.—1. Every art, system, course of action, and deliberate preference, aims at some good.

Hence the good is defined "that which all aim at."

2. There are differences of ends; namely, energies and works.

3, 4. The ends of the master-arts are more eligible than the ends of those subordinate to them.

5. This is the case, even though the end of the master-art is an energy, and that of the subordinate art a work.

II.—1. There is some end of human action which is desired for its own sake.

3, 4, 5. It is the end of that which is the master-science in the highest sense; i.e., the political.

The political science proved to be the chief science by several reasons and examples.

2. The knowledge of the end useful.
6. The subject of "the end" belongs to moral, and therefore to political philosophy.

III.—1, 2. We must not expect too great accuracy in subjects of moral investigation.

3. These subjects having to do with contingent matter, the conclusions arrived at must be of the same kind.

4, 5. The student, therefore, must be one who is willing to be content with this method of proof, and therefore must be an educated person.

6. He must, therefore, not be young, because the young are inexperienced in the affairs of life.

7. By the word young is meant young in character.

6. The object of this treatise is not knowledge, but practice.

IV.—1. What is the aim of the political science, and the highest of all good?

2. All agree in calling it happiness, but differ as to its definition.

3, 4. Popular and philosophical theories on the subject are at variance.

Certain notions respecting it, including that of the "idea," enumerated.

4. Aristotle proposes to consider the most reasonable.

5, 6. Of the two methods of arguing; namely,—The synthetical and analytical; Aristotle chooses the latter, for the following reasons:

6. Things are known in two ways: (1.) Absolutely; (2.) Relatively to ourselves.

In morals we must begin with the things known to ourselves; i.e. the phenomena, and work backwards from facts to causes; sometimes it is even sufficient to know the facts without the causes.

7. The student of ethics should listen to the advice of Hesiod.

V.—1. The majority derive their notions respecting happiness from the lives they lead.

2. These are four:—(1.) The vulgar. (2.) The active. (3.) The contemplative. (4.) The money-getting.

3. The vulgar consider that happiness consists in sensual pleasure.

This is the life of the brute creation.
4, 5. The active think happiness is honourable distinction.
This is not the chief good,
(1.) Because it resides in the honourers rather than in
the honoured.
(2.) Because it is sought for the sake of virtue.
6. Is virtue then the chief good?
No, for a man may possess virtue, and yet not live an
active life.
7. The contemplative life is omitted, and reserved for the
last book.
8. The money-getting think wealth is happiness.
(1.) This life does violence to our natural constitution.
(2.) Money is useful as a means, but is not an end.
VI.—1. The chief good is not the ideal good.*
Aristotle apologizes for denying the truth of Plato’s theory.
2. Plato did not allow the existence of ideas of things in
which we predicate priority and posteriority.
The good is predicated in these.
3. A universal idea could be predicated in only one
category.
The good is predicated in all the categories.
4. Of things under one idea there is but one science; of
goods there are many sciences.
5. The ideal good, and the good of which it is the idea,
must be in their essence identical.
6. The theory, therefore, of the Pythagoreans and of
Speusippus is far more reasonable.
7, 8. It may be objected to Aristotle’s argument, that
goods are of two kinds: those "per se," and those "propter
alia." Now Plato’s theory applies to the former.
9, 10. To this it may be answered—(1.) That even goods,
"per se," do not come under our definition. (2.) If the
species contain under it no individuals, the theory is foolish.
11. Why then is the term "good" applied to all goods?
Probably from analogy.

* In the original, two words of very similar meaning are made use of,
namely, ἴδια and ἴδος. Now ἴδια is the original archetypal form, which,
according to Plato, existed from all eternity: ἴδος is the existing form
or resemblance to the ἴδια, which is visible to us. Although the eternal
nature of the Platonic ἴδια forbids us to call it an abstract idea, yet the
relation between ἴδια and ἴδος is precisely that which subsists between
the abstract and concrete.
12—16. After all, if there was an ideal good, it would be practically useless.

VII.—1—3. Happiness has been shown to be the chief good, as being the end of the master-science.

It is now proved to be so, because it is the end of all human actions.

4, 5. There are three kinds of ends, of which the last is that which is sought for its own sake alone, and happiness is this.

6, 7. Happiness is also the chief good, because it is self-sufficient.

8. Its definition arrived at in the following manner:—

Happiness is the virtue of man, quod man.

We shall discover man's virtue by seeing what his ἡπόγον ia.

9, 10. His ἡπόγον must be something peculiar to him.

This is the practical life of a being which possesses reason.

11. Such a being may be either obedient to reason, or have it and use it.

We must, therefore, take that which is in energy, i.e. activity.

12—16. The work of a good man, therefore, is an energy according to virtue; if there are more virtues than one, according to the best virtue.

Lastly, must be added the condition “in a perfect life.”

Hence the definition of happiness:—“An energy of the soul according to the best virtue in a perfect life.”

VIII.—1. Aristotle confirms the correctness of his definition of happiness by comparing it with the opinions of his predecessors.

2. Goods have been divided by the Pythagoreans into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. The goods of the soul have been always considered the highest.

3. Aristotle defines happiness as a good of the soul.

4. The happy man has been said to live well, and to do well.

The definition of Aristotel is almost identical.

5—8. Others have said that either one virtue or all virtue is happiness.

Aristotle says that happiness is not only virtue, but a virtuous energy.
9, 10. A fourth class have made pleasure happiness.
Aristotle makes happiness in its essence, and "per se," pleasant.

11. The energies of virtue, in fact, unite in themselves all the qualities enumerated in the Delian inscription.

12—14. External goods cannot make one happy, but it is impossible, or at least not easy, to perform virtuous energies without a certain quantity of them.

IX.—1. Is happiness got by learning, or habit, or exercise, or by the allotment of God, or by chance?

2. Whether it is the gift of God, does not belong to the present inquiry.

3. It is at any rate certain that it can be attained by learning and care.

4—6. It cannot come by chance: (1.) Because nature effects her work by the best means. (2.) From its very definition. (3.) It is the end of the political science.

7. Brutes cannot be called happy.
Nor children except from hope.

8. Why βίος τελειος is added.

X.—1. The necessity of adding the condition ἐν βίῳ τελειῷ leads to the consideration of Solon's saying that we ought to look to the end of life.

2. The saying of Solon: may be taken in two senses:
(1.) A man is happy when he is dead.
(2.) He may then be safely said to have been happy.
The first of these involves an absurdity.

3, 4. The second leads to further questions:
(1.) May not a man be called happy whilst alive?

* In adding the condition ἐν βίῳ τελειῳ to his definition of happiness, Aristotle seems to have been animated by an earnest desire to invest happiness with a property of permanence, fixedness, and stability. He wished to represent the happy man as beyond the reach of any liability to change. He saw that this was impossible in the case of human beings, but there is nothing unphilosophical in assuming a theoretical standard of this kind, even though practically unattainable, any more than there is in physics in laying down the laws of matter and motion. In morals we are well accustomed to recognize the principle that perseverance to the end in a course of obedience is required in order to obtain our final reward.

"When the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, all his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned," &c.—Ezek. xviii. And again, "He that endureth unto the end, the same shall be saved."—Matt. x.
(2.) Are not the dead affected by the fortunes of the living?

5. With regard to the first of these, it is absurd to be able to say that a man has been happy, and yet not to be able to say so when he is actually enjoying that happiness.

6—13. But is external prosperity a part of happiness? It is, but only to a certain extent; for virtuous energies are very independent of it, and more permanent than anything.

14. Therefore, whilst a happy man energizes, he may be pronounced happy, quid man.

Xl.—1, 2. As to the second question, Aristotle decides that a man may be said to be unhappy on account of the misfortunes of his descendants.

3, 4. Or he may really be affected by them in a slight degree, in the same way as horrors, not acted, but related, affect us at the theatre.

5. But still they cannot make the happy miserable, or the miserable happy.

Xii.—1. Philosophers divided goods into honourable, praiseworthy, and ἰνώμες.

Happiness cannot be a ἰνώμες, because ἰνώμες can be abused.

2—4. It cannot belong to the class of things praised, because praise implies reference to a higher standard.

There cannot be a higher standard than the chief good.

5. Therefore happiness belongs to things honoured.

Xiii.—1—4. As happiness is an energy of the soul according to virtue, we must know, (1) what virtue is; (2) what the soul is.

5, 6. The soul is divided first into two parts, the rational and the irrational.

7—9. The irrational into the vegetative and the appetitive.

10—14. The rational soul into the properly rational, and that which obeys reason.

According to another principle of division, the part obedient to reason may be considered as belonging to the irrational soul.

15. Virtue is therefore twofold:—

(1.) Intellectual, belonging to the rational soul.

(2.) Moral, belonging to that which obeys reason.
BOOK II.

Introductory.—Aristotle has prepared the student for the contents of this book, which consist of an inquiry into the origin and nature of moral virtue; firstly, by defining happiness as an energy of the soul according to virtue; and, secondly, by dividing the virtues into moral and intellectual, in accordance with his assumed division of the human soul. The consideration of the moral virtues takes precedence of that of the intellectual, because the formation of moral habits, and the consequent acquisition of moral virtue, must be the first step to the unimpeded energy of the intellect, and therefore to the attainment of intellectual virtue. It will be observed, that, as the foundation on which to build up his moral system, Aristotle assumes the existence in man of certain capacities for virtue, which he denominates, at the conclusion of the sixth book, φύσεως ἀρετῆς (natural virtue). These he conceives may be improved by education and matured by habit, and thus become "virtue proper." Thus, although man does not by nature possess virtuous habits, or even the commencements of these habits, still he is capable of receiving virtuous impressions by instruction, and of forming habits by performing acts of virtue and obedience. Thus, according to Aristotle, "Virtue is the law of our nature, under which law we are born." The order in which the questions connected with the subject of moral virtue are treated of, is

1. The means by which virtue is attained.
2. Its nature and definition.
3. An induction of particular instances.

I.—1. Intellectual virtue is principally (though not entirely, for there is such a thing as "genius") produced and increased by teaching.
2, 3. Moral virtue, as its etymology implies, by habit. Moral virtue is not innate—

1. Because that which is innate cannot be changed by habit.
4. (2.) In things innate, the capacities exist in us prior to the energies; in virtue, the case is the reverse.

5. (3.) The practice of legislators bears testimony to the truth of this statement.

6. (4.) Two opposite effects, virtue and vice, are due to one and the same cause, but natural causes cannot produce opposite effects.

7—9. Hence we must prefer energies of a certain quality, as on them the character of the habits depends.

II.—1, 2. Assuming for the present that moral acts must be done according to the dictates of right reason, and reserving that subject for the sixth book, let us consider the nature of the acts themselves.

3, 4. Warning the student again not to expect too much exactness in ethics.

5—7. Looking at the question practically, we may observe—

(1.) That acts, which avoid excess and defect, produce virtue, whilst excess and defect destroy it.

8, 9. (2.) Those acts which produce virtue are in their turn produced by virtue.

III.—1. Pleasure and pain are the tests of moral habits being formed or not, because moral virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains. This position is proved in the following way:

(1.) Because men commit sin for the sake of pleasure, and abstain from what is right through dread of pain.

2. From this first reason Aristotle infers the justice of Plato’s remark on the importance of a sound early education.

3. (2.) Virtue is conversant with actions and feelings, and these are attended with pleasure and pain.

4. (3.) Punishments cure by pain, and cures are effected by contraries.

(4.) Through the pursuit of pleasures and pains, habits are made better or worse.

5. Hence virtue has been thought by some to be ἀράθεια.

6. (5.) Pleasure and pain are, after all, the final causes of choice and aversion.

7. (6.) Our ideas of pleasure and pain have from childhood become as it were ingrained in our nature.
8. (7.) We make, more or less, pleasure and pain the rule of our actions; and on these our habits depend.

9, 10. (8.) Virtue is shown in struggling with difficulty, and nothing is so difficult to resist as pleasure.

IV.—1. It may be asked, what is meant by saying that we become just by performing just actions; are we not then already just, as in the case of the arts?

This question is answered—

2. (1.) By observing that this is not the case in the arts, for a man is not a grammarian, unless he speaks grammatically, because he understands the rules of grammar.

3. (2.) Because the cases are not parallel; as in the arts we only consider the excellence of the production, in morals we look to the character and motives of the person.

The three requisites, then, for a moral act are

(1.) Knowledge,

(2.) Deliberate preference on its own account,

(3.) Fixedness and stability.

4—6. A man, therefore, is called virtuous if he acts on virtuous principles; and to do this requires practice.

7. The masses, however, think that theory without practice will be sufficient to make them virtuous.

V.—1—4. What, then, is the genus of virtue? In that division of the soul in which moral virtue resides, there are only three properties; namely, passions, capacities, and habits.

5, 6. Now virtue and vice are not passions.

(1.) Because we are not called good or bad for our passions.

(2.) We are not praised or blamed for them.

(3.) Virtue implies deliberate preference, passion does not.

(4.) We are said to be moved by our passions, but disposed by virtues or vices.

7. They are not capacities.

(1.) For the first and second reasons given above.

(2.) Because our capacities are innate.

8. Therefore virtue must be a habit.

VL—1, 2. What is the differentia of virtue?
All excellence makes that of which it is the excellence good, and also its ἔργον.
This is seen to be the case in the arts.
Therefore, the case must be the same with moral excellence, i.e. virtue.
3. Now, everything continuous and divisible implies more, less, and equal.
4, 5. The equal is the mean between the other two, and is either absolute or relative.
6. Now, every scientific man will seek the relative mean, and avoid the extremes.
7. If this is the case in art and science, a fortiori, virtue will do the same.
8. In actions and feelings, there are an excess, a mean, and a defect, and the mean is relative.
9. Again, we may be wrong in many ways; but there is only one right way: now, this right way is the mean, and the wrong ways are the excess and defect.
10. Virtue, therefore, is "habit founded on, and exercising deliberate preference, in a mean relative to ourselves, defined by right reason, and according to the definition of a man of moral wisdom."
11. Hence, in its essence, virtue is a mean, but if considered with reference to the standard of excellence, it is the highest extreme (ἀριστήτης).
12—14. It must be remembered, however, that some actions and feelings do not admit of a mean, and are therefore in all cases blame-worthy.

VII.—1. This chapter contains a catalogue of particular examples illustrating the general principle.
2. (1.) Courage is a mean, on the subject of fear and confidence, between rashness and cowardice.
3. (2.) Temperance a mean on the subject of some pleasures and pains, but especially pleasures, between intemperance and a nameless extreme.
4. (3.) Liberality on the subject of money, between prodigality and illiberality.
5. (4.) Magnificence, only on matters of great expense, between vulgar ostentation and meanness.
6. (5.) Magnanimity, on the subject of great honours, between empty boasting and little-mindedness.
7—9. (6.) A nameless virtue, on the subject of small honours, between ambition and the absence of it.

10. (7.) Meekness, between irascibility, or passion, and insensibility to the feeling of anger.

11—16. (8.) Three several virtues; namely—

(a.) With respect to truth; truthfulness, between arrogance and false modesty.

(b.) With respect to “the pleasant” in amusement, graceful wit, or easy pleasantry, between ribaldry or buffoonery and clownishness.

(c.) With respect to “the pleasant” in the intercourse of life; friendship, between flattery and the being over-complaisant and moroseness.

17—19. (9.) Two mean states in the feelings.

(a.) Modesty, between bashfulness and impudence.

(b.) Indignation, between envy and malevolence.

VIII.—1—4. The extremes are in opposition to each other, and the mean to both.

5, 6. But the extremes are more repugnant to each other than each of them is to the mean.

7—9. This may take place either from the nature of the means themselves, or from the constitution of the person.

IX.—1, 2. Aristotle recapitulates briefly the description of moral virtue, and states that therefore it is difficult of attainment. Hence he gives three useful practical rules for arriving at the mean.

3. (1.) Go farthest from that extreme which is most opposed to the mean.

4. (2.) Struggle against that to which you have the strongest propensity.

5. (3.) Beware of pleasure.

6—8. As it is difficult to hit the mean exactly, slight deviations are pardonable. No exact casuistical rules can be laid down: our moral sense must be our guide.

BOOK III.

Introductory. — The principle of all moral action is ἡμοῖαντες, i.e. what is commonly termed moral choice, or the deliberately preferring one act or one course of action
to any other, on sound moral grounds, under the direction of right reason. It is this which determines the moral quality of an act; it is the principal part of the differential property which distinguishes the habit of virtue from another. Hence Aristotle now proceeds to treat of this subject, and other subjects immediately and intimately connected with it.

Now of these, the first, and most important, as lying at the very threshold of the investigation, is the freedom of the human will. On the establishing of this doctrine depends the whole question of human responsibility, and yet it is a doctrine which Aristotle could not assume at once, because views had been held respecting it which required refutation. Socrates had held that all the virtues were sciences; therefore, that vice was the result of ignorance; that no one sins contrary to knowledge; and therefore, that vice is involuntary. Plato held that virtue was voluntary, because the natural bias of the will was towards good, but that a vicious state was an unnatural one—a morbid action, as it were, and therefore involuntary.

Aristotle agreed with Plato so far as to maintain that a bias towards virtue is the normal condition of the will. He saw, also, that when habits are formed, they are often beyond our power, because they have become a second nature; and that the reason why we are responsible for them is because we are responsible for the original formation of them; but still he believes that the will is necessarily free.

He supports this view by many arguments, and amongst them, by the common-sense view of the case, as shown in the practice of legislators. His argument is somewhat of the same kind as that of Bishop Butler (Analogy, Part I. c. vi.), where he says, that whatever our abstract opinion may be respecting the doctrine of necessity as influencing practice, there can be no doubt that men deal with one another as if they were free agents, nor could civil society hold together on any other principles. Educate a child in the principles of fatalism, and however delighted he may be at first with his freedom from responsibility, he would soon discover the error in which he had been brought up, immediately he came abroad into the world, and would do somewhat very soon, for which he would be delivered over into the hands of civil justice.
The third book commences with an analysis of the nature of the ἱκόνων and ἱκονισμόν; Aristotle then proceeds to discuss the subject of προαιρεσίς. Next, as προαιρεσίς is subsequent to the deliberative process, deliberation is next treated of; and lastly, the subject of the will. These points occupy the first five chapters; and here Michelet considers the first part of the treatise to terminate. He divides the Ethics into three parts; the first of which treats of the summum bonum; the second, of the virtues in detail; the third, of the instrumentals to virtue.

I.—1. The consideration of the voluntary and involuntary necessary.

(1.) Because voluntary acts are praised or blamed; involuntary acts pardoned or pitied.
(2.) Because it will be useful to legislators to do so.

2. Involuntary acts are of two kinds—

(1.) τὰ βια. (2.) τὰ ὕγνοια.

By βια is meant that of which the principle or cause is external.

3, 4. There are also acts of a mixed nature. For example, those which we do from fear of greater evils.

5, 6. These acts most resemble voluntary acts, because the principle of action is in the agent.

7, 8. But abstractedly they are perhaps to be considered involuntary.

These acts are, according to circumstances, praised, blamed, or pardoned.

9. There are some acts which nothing should induce us to do.

10. But it is difficult to decide in many cases what we ought to prefer to do, and still more so to abide by our decisions.

11. The points of difference between these acts and voluntary and involuntary acts further considered.

12. Everything which we do for the sake of the pleasant and the honourable is voluntary.

13. Acts done through ignorance (ἐν ὕγνοια) are either non-voluntary or involuntary.

14. If repented of, they are involuntary.

15, 16. Ignorance of the principles of justice and expediency (ἐγνώμων) is always held as voluntary and inexcusable.
17—20. Cases of ignorance brought forward which are pardonable if followed by repentance.

21. The voluntary is defined as that of which the principle is in the agent knowing the circumstances of the act.

22—24. That acts done under the influence of passion and anger are not involuntary, proved by six reasons.

II.—1. Deliberate preference (προαιρεσις) must be considered, because it is the moral principle which determines the moral quality of an act.

2. It is a species of the voluntary.

3. It is not desire—

(1.) Because irrational beings participate in desire and anger, but not in προαιρεσις.

(2.) Because the incontinent man acts from desire, and not from προαιρεσις; the continent from προαιρεσις, and not from desire. Therefore they can be evidently separated.

(3.) They are often opposed.

(4.) Desire, and not προαιρεσις, has to do with pleasure and pain.

4. Still less is it anger, for the same reasons.

5. It is not volition, though it approaches very near it.

(1.) Because we wish for impossibilities.

(2.) We wish things which are not in our own power.

6. (3.) Volition is for the end, and not the means.

It is not opinion simply,

7. (1.) Because opinion is of things eternal and impossible.

(2.) Its quality is determined by truth and falsehood, not by virtue and vice.

It is not some particular opinion, because

* The following table will explain the division of acts adopted in this chapter:

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<tr>
<td>Done knowingly.</td>
<td>Done through ignorance of the principle.</td>
<td>By ignorance of the principle.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repeated of (Involuntary).</td>
<td>Not repeated of (Non-voluntary).</td>
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8. (1.) Moral character is determined by our προαιρεσίς.
9. (2.) We deliberately prefer to take a thing or not; we form an opinion as to its nature.
   (3.) Προαιρεσίς is praised for the rightness of its object; δόξα for its truth.
10. (4.) We form opinions respecting subjects we do not know.
   (5.) Some persons form good opinions, but exercise a bad προαιρεσίς.

11. The definition, therefore (nominally), of the object of προαιρεσίς is a voluntary act which has been previously the object of deliberation.

III.—1. The object of deliberation is that about which a reasonable man would deliberate.

2. 3. No one deliberates about things eternal, or about those which come to pass by nature, necessity, or chance.
   Nor about everything human, if it is not brought about by our own agency.
   Nor about the exact sciences.
   But besides the three principles of causation—nature, necessity, and chance—there is a fourth; namely, mind or intellect.

4. 5. The object of deliberation, therefore, is that which comes to pass through this fourth cause, which is in our power, and which is uncertain as to its event.

6. We also deliberate about means, not ends.

7. If there are more means than one, deliberation determines which is the better.
   If only one, it determines how it can be done by this, and so it goes backwards by an analytical process until it either meets with an impossibility, or the first cause, which is the first step in the constructive process.

8. It is, therefore, a species of investigation.

9, 10. We deliberate sometimes about the instruments; sometimes the use of them.

11, 12. Deliberation and deliberate preference differ in that we are not obliged after all to choose the means respecting which we have deliberated, but if we do choose them, we are exercising προαιρεσίς, and therefore its definition is the deliberate desire of things in our power.
IV.—1, 2. Volition is of the end, but is its object the
good or the apparent good?
3. The good man wishes for the real good. The bad man
for that which he thinks good.
4. The case is analogous to that of the senses.
5. The above constitutes the principal difference between
the good and the bad man.
6. In determining what they ought to wish for, the masses
are deceived by pleasure.
V. 1, 2. If the end is the object of volition, and the means
the object of deliberation and deliberate preference, the acts
respecting them must be voluntary; now with these acts vir-
tuous energies are conversant, therefore virtue is voluntary.
Therefore vice is voluntary; for, if we can do, we can
abstain.
If vice is not voluntary,
3. (1.) We must deny that man is the origin of his
actions.
4, 5. (2.) The principles would be in our power, and the
acts which result from them would not be.
The practice of legislators confirms Aristotle's view.
6. They even punish ignorance itself if self-caused.
8. If it be objected that the guilty person could not pay
attention enough to understand the law, the answer is, that
vice has caused the inability.
9—11. Moreover, vicious acts, which are in our power,
produce vicious habits, and therefore we are responsible for
them.
12, 13. (3.) Bodily faults which are in our power are
blamed, and no others; therefore vice, being
blamed, must be considered as in our power too.
14. If it be objected that all aim at what they think good,
but have not power over the conception which they form of it,
the answer is, if we are the causes of our habits, we are also
of our imaginations.
15. If it be objected that vice is involuntary, because it is
owing to ignorance of the end, the answer is, that in that
case virtue is involuntary.
16. Besides, if the notion we form of the end is due to
nature, still the means are in our power.
17, 18. If virtue is voluntary, vice must be so.
19, 20. Still, habits, when formed, are not so much in our power as the acts were.
VI. — 1. Courage is a mean state on the subjects of fear and confidence.
   Fear is defined "The expectation of evil."
   2. Now some evils, such as disgrace, we ought to fear.
The brave man can have nothing to do with these.
   3, 4. Others, again, we ought not to fear; as poverty, &c.; still he who is fearless of these evils is not termed brave,
except metaphorically.
   5. The brave man, therefore, has to do with the most terrible of all things, i.e. death.
   6—8. Yet not with all kinds of death, but only death in battle.
   Still the brave man will be fearless in sickness or in a storm at sea, but not from the same cause that sailors are.
VII. — 1, 2. Things terrible are of two kinds.
   (1.) Ψ&epsi;i;&nu;̄ρ&omicron;&omicron;νον. (2.) Κα&omicron;&nu;̄ρ&omicron;&omicron;νον.
   Every man of sense will fear the former.
The latter differ in magnitude.
   3. And may be feared too much or too little.
   4. The brave man fears or feels confidence at what he ought, as he ought, when he ought, and for the right motive.
   5. This motive is τ&omicron; ψαλ&omicron;ν.
   He who is in the extreme of fearlessness may be called ἄναλγητος.
   7. He who is in the extreme of confidence, δρασ&omicron;ς.
   8. He who is in the extreme of fear, ἀειλ&omicron;ς.
   9, 10. The brave man, the coward, and the rash, are all conversant with the same things.
   11. Suicide is the act of a coward.
VIII. — 1—4. There are five other forms of courage.
   (1.) Political courage.
The motive of this is not the abstractedly honourable, τ&omicron; ψαλ&omicron;ν; but honourable distinction, τήμη.
The difference between this and real courage is exemplified by a comparison between the conduct of regular troops and that of a native militia.
   8—10. (3.) Courage arising from anger.
This is not for the sake of the right motive, but in obedience to the dictates of an irrational passion.

11.—13. (4.) The courage of the sanguine.
Their courage is based upon like motives with that of the experienced.
In unexpected perils it often fails.
14, 15. (5.) The courage of the ignorant.*
This is even worse than that of the sanguine; for when they find they are deceived in their estimate of the danger, they fly.

IX.—1. Courage has more to do with fear than confidence.
2, 3. It is painful and more difficult to attain than temperance.
Not but that its end is pleasant, although the means to that end are painful.
4, 5. The fact that the brave man feels pain, not only does not diminish, but rather increases his reputation.
6. It is plain, therefore, that it is not possible to energize with pleasure in all the virtues.
7. Though mercenaries are less brave, still they may be the best fighters.

X.—1. Courage and temperance are first discussed, because they are the virtues of the irrational part of the soul.
Temperance is a mean state on the subject of pleasure.
2, 3. Pleasures are of two kinds.
(1.) Those of the soul.
(2.) Those of the body.
4—10. Temperance belongs to the latter.
But not to those of sight, hearing, or smell, except accidentally, nor of taste, except in a slight degree.
11. It has to do with the pleasures of touch.
Touch belongs to us not so far forth as we are men, but so far forth as we are animals, and therefore is the lowest of the senses.
12. Even the more liberal pleasures of touch are those which are excluded from those with which temperance and intemperance are conversant.

XI.—1—3. Desires are of two kinds.

* Ο τοῖς ἀλλοις ὀμοθεῖα μὴ ἔρασις, λογισμὸς ἦ δὲ κενὸν φίλοι.—
Thuc. ii. 40. See also Herod. vii. 49.
(1.) Common and natural.
(2.) Peculiar and acquired.
In the former, errors are seldom met with.
In the latter, they are frequent.
The intemperate are in excess under all circumstances.
If the desires are wrong, they delight in them.
If the desires are innocent, they delight in them more than they ought.
4, 5. The difference between temperance and courage consists in the relation which they respectively bear to pains.
   For example, a man is called brave for bearing pain, but temperate for not feeling pain at the absence of pleasure.
6. The character which is in the defect as to pleasure has no name, because it is never found.
7, 8. The chapter concludes with the character of the temperate man.

XII.—1. Intemperance seems more voluntary than cowardice, and therefore more blameworthy.
(1.) Because fear gives a shock to the natural character, and throws it off its balance.
2, 3. (2.) Though cowardice as a habit is more voluntary than intemperance, still particular acts of cowardice are less voluntary.
4. The term ἱκολασία, because of its etymological meaning, is applied to the faults of children metaphorically, because desires and children require κολασίς.
5—7. Since desires, if not controlled, will increase, the part of the soul in which they reside should be obedient to reason, and be in harmony with it.

BOOK IV.

Introductory.—This book requires but few words by way of introduction. It consists of a continuation of that subject which Aristotle touched upon briefly in outline in the second book, and commenced in detail in the sixth chapter of Book III. The virtues investigated here are magnificence, liberality, magnanimity, and φιλοτιμία in the best acceptation of the term. Meekness, the three social virtues,
and the sense of shame, which Aristotle decides is to be considered as a passion or feeling, rather than a virtue.

The second book of the Rhetoric, and the characters of Theophrastus, should be compared with the discussion of the moral virtues in this book.

I.—1. Liberality is a mean on the subject of possessions or property.

Property is that, the value of which is measured by money.

2. The extremes are illiberality and prodigality.

The epithet prodigal is sometimes applied to the intemperate.

3. This application of the term is incorrect.

4. Liberality has more to do with giving than with receiving.

   (1.) For the former is the use of money, the latter only the way of acquiring it.

   (2.) It is more honourable to do than to receive good.

   (3.) To abstain from receiving is easier than to give; and those who abstain from receiving are rather praised for justice.

5, 7. The motive of liberality is ἔρωταὶ καλῶν.

The liberal will give to proper objects, and in proportion to his means.

8. The liberal will not receive from improper sources, nor be fond of asking favours, nor be carelessly extravagant.

9. Though the liberal man will not look overmuch to his own interest, still his profuseness will be proportioned to his means.

10. Those who inherit wealth are most liberal.

It is not easy for the liberal man to be rich.

11. Therefore men sometimes upbraid the unfairness of fortune.

12. The liberal differs from the prodigal.

Kings cannot be prodigal.

13. The liberal differs from the prodigal in receiving.

The relation of the liberal man to the feelings of pleasure and pain.

14. Definition of the extremes.

15. Prodigality shown to be better than illiberality.

16, 18. Prodigals are often guilty of meannesses in order to supply resources for their extravagance, and are generally intemperate.
19. Illiberality is incurable.
25. Illiberality is worse than prodigality, and is the extreme to which men are most liable.

II. 1. Magnificence is appropriate expenditure in great matters.
2. Propriety depends—
   (1.) On the relation of the expense to the expender.
   (2.) On the object of the expense.
   (3.) On the quantity expended.
3. The defect is meanness, the excess, bad taste and vulgar profusion.
4. Magnificence implies in some degree science.
5. The motive is τὸ καλὸν.
6. The magnificent man will d fortiori be liberal.
7—12. The poor man cannot be magnificent.
13, 14. The extremes described.
These two habits, though vicious, are neither hurtful, nor very disgraceful.

III. 1. The nature of magnanimity in the abstract discovered from considering it in the concrete.
The magnanimous man is “He who, being worthy, estimates his own worth highly.”
2. He whose worth is low, and who estimates it lowly, is a modest man.
3, 4. The extremes are the vain man and the little-minded.
5. The magnanimous man, as to his merits, is in the highest place, as to his estimate of himself, in the mean.
6. He is conversant with honour.
7. He must be a good man.
8. Magnanimity is an ornament of the virtues.
The magnanimous man will accept honour from the good with moderate gratification, but not from others.
9. In success or failure, he will behave with moderation.
10, 11. Instances of good fortune are thought to contribute to magnanimity; but without virtue men may be supercilious, but they cannot be magnificent.
12—19. The character of a magnificent man will dis-
play itself in his views and conduct as to all the virtues, and even in his gait, voice, and manners.

20, 21. The little-minded and vain are not vicious; but rather, the former idle, the latter foolish. The little-minded are the worst of the two, and much opposed to the mean state.

IV.—1. There is a nameless virtue, the object-matter of which is small honours.

It bears the same relation to magnanimity which liberality does to magnificence.

2. It is nameless, because we use the term φλογημία sometimes as praise, sometimes as reproach.

3. As the mean is as it were vacant, the extremes appear to contend for the middle place.

V.—1. Meekness is a mean state which has anger for its object-matter.

Its extremes are irascibility and insensibility to anger.

2. The characteristic of the meek is propriety as to the feeling of anger under all circumstances.

3. Insensibility to anger is blameworthy and slavish.

4. The excess cannot exist in all the categories, as the evil would then destroy itself.

The different varieties of irascibility are—

5. 8. The choleric, the bitter, and the ill-tempered.

Irascibility is most opposed to the mean.

Although a precise rule cannot be laid down, still slight transgressions are not blamed.

VI.—3. In the social intercourse of life, there is a virtue which, though nameless, may be called friendliness.

It may be defined as friendship, minus the feeling of affection.

1, 2. The characters in the extremes are—

(1.) Ἀρεωκος, men-pleasers, or the over-complaisant.

(2.) Δύναμλοις, the cross and quarrelsome.

4, 5. This virtue is true politeness, or good-breeding; it avoids giving pain, it aims at giving pleasure. The polite man will regulate his behaviour towards persons of different ranks by a regard to propriety.

He will only inflict pain for the sake of giving greater pleasure.

6. He who aims solely at giving pleasure is Ἀρεωκος.
He who does so from selfishness is κουλαζ.

VII.—1, 2. The virtue which has truth for its object-
matter has no name, but it may be called truthfulness.

3. The excess is arrogance, the defect false modesty.
The former is more blameable than the latter.

4, 5. Truthfulness does not mean truthfulness in con-
tracts, for that is justice, but in all words and actions, even
those which are of slight importance.
The truthful rather inclines to the defect than the excess,
as being better taste.

6, 7. Arrogance for the sake of honour, not so blameable
as for the sake of money.

8. The falsely-modest have more refinement than the
arrogant.

9. False modesty sometimes proceeds from arrogance.

VIII.—3. In periods of relaxation, the social virtue is
graceful, or polished wit, or easy pleasantry (εὐτραπελία).

1, 2. The extremes are buffoonery and clownishness.

4. Tact peculiarly belongs to the mean habit.
The difference between polished wit and the reverse may
be seen in the wit of the old and new comedy.

5. The εὐτράπελος will jest, but he will jest as a gentleman
ought, and not so as to pain or disgust any one. He will
have tact and good taste.

6. The buffoon will sacrifice himself or anybody to a
joke.
The clownish will neither jest himself, nor be amused with
the jests of others.

IX.—1. The sense of shame is rather a passion or feeling,
than a virtue.

Its physical effects are somewhat like those of fear.

2. It is especially suitable to youth.

An older person ought to do nothing to be ashamed of.

3. The feeling of shame is no proof of a man being good.
Hypothetically it may be a worthy feeling.

Because shamelessness is bad, it does not follow that the
sense of shame is a virtue.

4. In like manner, continence, properly speaking, is not a
virtue, but a kind of mixed virtue.
BOOK V.

Introductory.—The analysis of a subject by contemplating its ideal nature is a course by no means suited to the practical turn of Aristotle's mind. He prefers, therefore, generally speaking, to consider virtues, not in the abstract, but in the concrete, as the quality of an act, or as the characteristic of a moral agent. In this way he proceeds to treat of justice and injustice. He first investigates the nature of just and unjust actions, and of the just and unjust man, and thus arrives at his definition and description of justice and injustice. Of course, it is plain, from the nature of moral habits, that the knowledge of the principles of one contrary, namely, justice, conveys to us an acquaintance with the principles of the other contrary, injustice.

Now a man is termed unjust, for two reasons:—Firstly, as being a transgressor of the law, whether that be the written or the unwritten; and, Secondly, as being unequal or unfair, as taking more of good, and less of evil, which comes to the same thing, than he has a right and title to. Hence injustice, and therefore justice, is of two kinds: (1) a habit of obedience to law; (2) a habit of equality.

Now, as law, in the most comprehensive acceptation of the term, implies the enactment of all the principles of virtue which are binding on mankind as members of a social community (which, be it remembered, Aristotle considers their proper normal condition), the only difference between universal justice (1) and universal virtue is, that the habit of obedience to the fixed principles of moral rectitude is, when considered absolutely, termed virtue, when considered relatively to others, justice.

This universal justice is not the justice which Aristotle considers in this book; as of course it forms the subject-matter of his whole treatise (at least the whole of that division of it which treats of moral virtue), if we take into consideration the additional condition of "relation."

Particular justice, which he does investigate, is of two kinds, distributive and corrective. The former is a virtuous
habit, which, strictly speaking, can only be exercised by man in his capacity as a free citizen intrusted with political functions, either legislative or executive, for it deals with the distribution, according to merit, of the public rewards and punishments of a state. But the exercise of this virtue is by no means so limited as this idea of it would lead us at first sight to suppose. For, in the first place, in the free states of Greece, every citizen was, to a certain extent, intrusted with these functions, which is not the case under the modern system of political institutions; and, in the second place, analogically, the same principles, mutatis mutandis, will regulate our conduct in the distribution of rewards and punishments, towards children, dependants, and so forth.

Besides, it is scarcely conceivable in how many instances a man is called upon to act as a judge, and to exercise his judicial functions as a divider and distributor of honours and rewards, of censures and of punishments, and thus to keep in mind the principles which Aristotle here lays down of equality and impartiality.

When we contemplate justice as one of the divine attributes, it is distributive justice to which we allude. God will, and always has, dealt with mankind on principles of justice, which are in accordance with, and proportioned to, the position amongst created beings in which he has himself placed him. He is the distributor of rewards and punishments to every man according to his works, the punisher of the ungodly, the rewarder of them that diligently seek him. He doubtless weighs well, with that strict and unerring justice of which Omniscience alone is capable, the circumstances and privileges of each individual, according to that analogy which is implied in the following words of inspiration:—“To whom much is given, from him much shall be required.”

The second division of particular justice may also be viewed in two lights. Firstly, as that habit by which the state, either by criminal or civil processes, corrects the inequalities which unjust conduct produces between man and man; and, Secondly, as the habit, the observance of which prevents individuals from violating the principles of equality which we are bound to observe in our dealings or intercourse with each other.
We may illustrate the nature of corrective justice by reference to our own judicial system in the following way:—In civil actions, such as for assault, seduction, &c., the amount of the injury inflicted is estimated in the form of damages. The defendant is presumed to have more than he ought, and the plaintiff less by this amount, and the equality is restored by the former paying to the latter the damages assessed by the jury. In criminal cases—the state, and not the person against whom the offence has actually been committed, is considered the injured party. A certain diminution has taken place in the public security of life and property, and the balance is restored by the penalty, either as to person or property, which the law inflicts.

There still remain to be considered the principles of commutative justice; but these Aristotle has not laid down quite so clearly as he has those of the other two divisions. He, evidently, as far as can be seen from the fifth chapter, considers it as a branch of corrective justice, but, at the same time, as regulated in some degree by the principles of distributive justice also. Equality is maintained by an equivalent payment for the commodities exchanged or purchased; and, therefore, arithmetical proportion is observed, as in corrective justice; but this equivalent is estimated, and the commodities and the parties compared, according to the law of geometrical proportion.

There is one point which requires observation as presenting an apparent difficulty. How is it that Aristotle considers natural justice as a division of political justice, whereas it might be supposed that the immutable principles of justice were implanted in, and formed a part of man's nature, antecedently even to any idea of his social condition as a member of political society? The answer to this question is, that the natural state of man is his social condition. Under any other circumstances, it would be in vain to look for the development of any one of his faculties. The history of the human race never presents man to us except in relation to his fellow-man. Even in savage life, the rude elements of civil society are discoverable. If we could conceive the existence of an individual isolated from the rest of his species, he would be a man only in outward form, he would possess no sense of right and wrong, no moral senti-
ments, no ideas on the subject of natural justice. The principles of natural justice are doubtless immutable and eternal, and would be the same had the man never existed; but as far as man is concerned, the development of them must be sought for in him as we find him; that is, in his social condition, and no other.

In the tenth chapter Aristotle treats of equity, the principles of which furnish the means of correcting the imperfections of law. These imperfections are unavoidable, because, from the nature of things, the enactments of law must be universal, and require adaptation to particular cases.

I.—1, 2. Justice is roughly defined as the habit from which men are apt to perform just actions and entertain just wishes.

Injustice is the contrary habit.

3, 4. The same capacity and science comprehends within its sphere contraries, but a habit cannot be of contraries.

And if we know the things connected with a habit, we know the habit itself.

5—7. Therefore, if we know what ἄκουν means, we know what δίκαιον and δικαιοσύνη mean.

Now, ἄκουν implies the unlawful and the unequal.

Therefore, the just is the lawful and the equal.

8—11. The object of the law is to direct and enforce virtue.

12—14. Therefore, justice, which has to do with law, is perfect virtue, considered not absolutely, but relatively.

II.—1—5. Besides this universal justice, there is a particular justice also, which is violated when the law is broken for the sake of gain.

It differs from universal justice as a part from a whole.

6, 7. The consideration of universal justice is dismissed.

8. 9. Particular justice is of two kinds.

(1.) Distributive of the honours, &c. of the state.

(2.) Corrective, in transactions between man and man.

Transactions are twofold—voluntary and involuntary.


The equal is a mean between more and less.

Therefore the just is a mean.

2. It is conversant with four terms at least, two persons and two things.
3—7. Distributive justice pays respect to the relative merits of the persons, and in it geometrical proportion is observed.

IV.—1—3. The province of corrective justice, is transactions of all kinds.
In it no respect is paid to persons.
The object of it is to remedy inequalities of loss and gain.
Under these terms are included all cases of wrong; as the doer of a wrong may be considered as a gainer, and the injured party a loser.
The proportion observed is arithmetical.
4. The corrective just is a mean between loss and gain.
5. The judge is a living personification of the principle.
6, 7. From his remedying inequality according to the rule of arithmetical proportion, arises the etymology of the term δίκαιον.
8—10. The method of determining the mean explained and illustrated.

V.—1. The Pythagoreans were wrong in considering retaliation (ἀπλωτή) as justice.
That it is not distributive justice, is self-evident.
It is not corrective justice, because in many cases it would be unjust.
2. By retaliation (κατ' ἀναλογίαν) civil society is held together.
3. This proportion is attained by what Aristotle terms diametrical conjunction.
And equality is produced by observing the relative proportion between persons and things.
4. This cannot be effected without a common measure.
5—9. This common measure is demand, or its substitute, money.
10—12. It is the least fluctuating standard of value, and a pledge that we can at any time get what we want.
14, 15. Justice differs from all the other virtues in the following respect; that they are mean states, whereas in justice ῥό δίκαιον is itself the mean.
In conclusion, Aristotle defines justice and injustice.
VI.—1, 2. It does not follow that a man is unjust because he commits an unjust act.
3. Political justice is that which exists between members
of a free community, and this, as well as abstract justice, is the object of Aristotle's investigation.

7. Justice in the cases of master and slave, father and child, is not the same as political justice; but that between husband and wife most resembles it.

VII.—1. Political or social justice is of two kinds.

(1.) Natural. (2.) Legal.

The former is everywhere the same, the latter is arbitrary.

2, 3. They are wrong who hold that all things just are matters of law, and that there is no natural unchangeable principle of justice.

4. Legal justice depends upon agreement, and varies in different countries, like their measures of corn and wine.

5, 6. Before a thing is committed, it is unjust (δικαιών); when committed, it is an act of injustice (δικαιήμα); so likewise, a just act is δικαιουπράγμα, the correction of an unjust act, δικαιώμα.

VIII.—1, 2. The justice or injustice of an act is determined by its being voluntary or involuntary.

3—6. A voluntary act is that which is done knowingly, not by compulsion nor by accident.

7. Voluntary acts are done from deliberate preference, or not.

8, 9. If a hurt takes place accidentally, it is an accident. If without wicked intent, it is an error.

10. If knowingly, but without previous deliberation, it is an unjust act.

11, 12. If a man acts on προαιρεσις, he is an unjust man.

13. He who acts justly on προαιρεσις is a just man.

IX.—1. Can a man be injured with his own consent?

2. The same question may arise as to being justly dealt with.

3, 4. Is he who has suffered an injury always necessarily injured?

5. Can a man injure himself?

6—8. These questions are answered at once, by stating, that, in order that a man may be injured, the condition is requisite, that the hurt should be inflicted against his will.

The case of the incontinent man, who often harms himself, constitutes no objection.

9. Does he who has awarded too great a share, or he who receives it, commit the injury?
Does he who awards too little to himself injure himself?
10. The second question is already answered by the fact that the harm he suffers is not against his will.
11—14. To the first the answer is, that it is the distributor, and not the receiver, who acts unjustly.
The receiver does unjust acts, but does not act unjustly.
He who decides through ignorance is unjust in a certain sense.
15, 16. People are apt to think that the practice and knowledge of justice are easy.
This is not the case.
17, 18. For in estimating the justice or injustice of an action, we must look not to the act, but the habit.
X.—1, 2. How is it if equity differs from justice, that it as well as justice is praiseworthy?
3—7. Although they differ, they are not opposed; the fact being, that equity corrects the errors of law, which errors are unavoidable, because the general enactments of the law will not always apply to particular cases.
8. The equitable man is one who does not push the letter of the law to the furthest or the worst side, but is disposed to make allowances.
XI.—1, 2. Although it has been already proved that a man cannot injure himself, Aristotle adduces additional arguments in support of this position.
In universal justice he cannot, because to do what the law forbids is an offence against the law, not against himself.
For example, suicide is an offence against the law.
3—5. Four reasons are also given to prove that a man cannot injure himself in particular injustice.
6, 7. Is it worse to injure or to be injured?
Both are bad; but to injure is the worse, as implying depravity; but, accidentally, to be injured may be worse.
8, 9. Metaphorically a man may be said to injure himself, because we may imagine a kind of justice subsisting between the two parts of his soul.
BOOK VI.

Introductory.—In this book Aristotle has two objects in view: to treat of the intellectual virtues, and to show the relation in which right reason stands to moral virtue. According to the definition which he gave of moral virtue, the intellect is the directing and governing power, to whose dictates and suggestions the other parts of man's nature must be obedient, and right reason and the possession of an intellectual virtue (φρόνησις) has the province of deciding the relative mean, which constitutes the characteristic of virtuous habits.

Now, referring to the division of the soul in the first book, we find that one part is purely rational. The object-matter of this part of the soul is truth: truth in necessary, and truth in contingent matter. The habits of mind which contemplate truth in necessary matter are, that which takes cognizance of principles (νοῦς), and that which takes cognizance of deductions from principles (ἐξωτήρημα). These two combined make up σοφία, which implies a perfect knowledge of scientific truth. In contingent matter, the habit which takes cognizance of moral truth is φρόνησις, and that which operates upon truth as related to productions is τεχνή.

These, then, are the five intellectual habits which Aristotle considers it necessary to discuss as connected with the subject of ethics. Of course, it must not be supposed that this discussion will embrace the whole of Aristotle's psychological system, as this must be sought for in his Treatise on the Soul.

1.—1—3. Since we ought to choose the mean, and since right reason determines what that mean is, we must investigate the subject of right reason.

4. The soul has been supposed to consist of two parts: the rational, in which the intellectual virtues reside; the irrational, which is the seat of the moral virtues. The rational part is subdivided into the ἐπιστημονικόν, which contemplates necessary matter, and the λογισμικόν, which contemplates contingent matter.
By λογισμός Aristotle means deliberative, for no one deliberates respecting necessary matter.

Right reason must be the virtue of one of these parts. In order, therefore, to see what it is, we must ascertain what is the ἐργον of each.

II.—1, 2. There are three principles or functions of the soul which influence moral action and truth.

These are sensation, intellect, and appetite.

Now sensation is the origin of no moral action. The origin of moral action is προαιρεσίς, which is made up of ὥφισις and λόγος. If, therefore, the action is virtuous, the ὥφισις must be right, and the λόγος true.

Therefore truth is the ἐργον of the reasoning or deliberative part.

3. It is evident that truth is the ἐργον of the scientific part.

4, 5. Practical intellect, and not pure intellect, is the motive principle of moral action.

6. Nothing past is the object of deliberate preference.

III.—1. There are five habits by which the soul arrives at truth,—art, science, prudence, wisdom,* and intuition.

2. Science is conversant with things eternal, immutable, and is acquired by learning.

3. We learn by means of induction and syllogism.

To know a subject scientifically, we must not only know facts, but also the logical connection between them, and the first principles from which they are derived.

4. Therefore science is “a demonstrative habit.” But in order to make the definition complete, all those other parts of it must be added which are given in the Later Analytics, I. 1, 2.

IV.—1, 2. Contingent matter may be either made or practised.

Therefore there must be two habits conversant with contingent matter; namely, a practical habit joined with reason, and a productive habit joined with reason.

* Although σοφία is sometimes translated science, and doubtless it does imply that knowledge of abstract truth which is implied by that term, I have preferred, on the whole, translating it wisdom, because wisdom is used by old English authors in the same way in which σοφία is used by the Greeks, to express skill in the arts.—See Exodus xxxvi. 1.
The latter of these is art.
3. Art is conversant with three processes: production, contrivance, and contemplation as to the mode of contriving and producing.
4. A relation subsists between chance and art.
   Art is defined "a habit of making, joined with true reason."
V.—1. According to his common practice, Aristotle investigates what prudence is, by considering it in the concrete.
The prudent man is one who is apt to deliberate respecting that which is his interest.
2. The matter of φρόνησις differs from that of ἐπιστήμη.
   Prudence, therefore, is a true habit joined with reason, and practical, having to do with the subjects of human good and evil.
4. This definition is illustrated by the examples of Pericles and others, and also by the etymology of σωφροσύνη.
5. It is clear that intemperance destroys φρόνησις, although it may not pervert our ideas on scientific subjects.
   Prudence differs from art.
6. (1.) Because in prudence there are no degrees of excellence, in art there are.
   (2.) Because in art voluntary error is better, in prudence worse.
   Prudence, finally, must be something more than a mere habit joined with reason; for such habits can be forgotten, prudence cannot.
VI.—1. There must be a habit which takes cognizance of those first principles from which science draws its conclusions.
   It cannot be science, for that is a demonstrative habit.
   It cannot be art or prudence, because they are conversant with contingent matter.
2. It cannot be wisdom, because wisdom demands demonstration.
   Therefore it must be νοης (intuition).
VII.—1. In the arts, by the term wisdom (σοφία) we mean skill.
   But there is a general sense of the term, as well as this special one.
2, 3. Wisdom is the most accurate of all knowledge.
   It knows the principles, and the facts deduced from them.
   It is, therefore, intuition and science combined together.
It surpasses political science or prudence, (1) inasmuch as the subjects with which it is conversant are superior to man. 

(2.) Because its subjects are invariable.

(3.) Because, in a certain sense, even brute animals may be said to be prudent.

4. 5. Wisdom is superior to the science of social life, because, though man may be superior to all other animals, still there are many other things more divine than man.

Wisdom, therefore, is science, combined with intuition.

Hence Anaxagoras, Thales, &c., are called wise, but not prudent.

7. Prudence must have a knowledge of particulars as well as of universals.

8. Nay, particulars may possibly be even more important than universals.

VIII.—1. Political prudence and prudence are the same habit, but they differ, in that the object of the former is the good of the state, that of the latter the good of the individual.

2. There are various species of prudence, which are best exhibited in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prudence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual prudence, (properly termed prudence).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, (properly called political).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3, 4. Prudence properly relates to our own affairs, and hence politicians are sometimes called busy-bodies. But still the happiness of the individual is so intimately involved with the good of his family and his country, that we cannot be devoted to the one to the exclusion of the others.

5, 6. Prudence is not easy to acquire; in proof of which we may adduce the fact that young men may become μάρτυρες, but not easily ψυχρά. Besides, the possibility of error is twofold,—in the universal and the particular.
Prudence is not science; because science is conversant with universals, prudence with particulars.

These particulars are not the first principles from which scientific conclusions are deduced, of which νοεῖ takes cognizance, but (ἐσχάρα) the last results at which we arrive after deliberation, which are perceived by common sense. Therefore prudence is opposed to intuition.

IX.—1. Prudence implies deliberation, which is a kind of investigation.

Good deliberation is not science; because no one investigates what he knows.

2. It is not happy conjecture; for this is quick, whereas deliberation requires time.

It is not, therefore, sagacity.

3. It is not opinion.

It is a correctness; not of science, because in science there can be no error, and therefore no correctness.

Nor of opinion; because the correctness of opinion is truth.

4. It is a correctness of διάρωσις, not simply, but of the intellect pursuing a deliberative process.

5—8. In what, then, does correctness of deliberation consist?

(1.) The goodness of the end.
(2.) The propriety of the mean.
(3.) The sufficiency of the time.

9. Hence Aristotle derives his definition of εὐδοκία.

X.—1. Intelligence is not identical with science or opinion; for if it were, as all men are capable of acquiring science and forming opinions, all men might be intelligent; but this is not the case.

2—5. It is not conversant with the objects of science, but with those of prudence.

It differs from prudence, in that prudence dictates and prescribes, intelligence judges and decides.

XI.—1. Candour (γνώμη) is the correct decision of the equitable man.

Fellow-feeling (συγγνώμη), the correct discriminating candour of the equitable man.

* The ἄρχαι, or principia scieni, are those first principles which are incapable of demonstration. The principia agendi are ἐσχάρα, or the last results of deliberation.
2—4. Εἰπολία, σίνεις, γνώμη, and νοῦς, or αἰσθησις (which here means practical common sense, the habit which takes cognizance of the practical extremes), are the practical habits, and all tend to the same point, and are usually found combined in the same person. As the practical habits seem not to be the result of teaching, but rather of observation, they have been thought natural gifts.

5. This view is corroborated by the fact that they seem peculiarly to belong to certain periods of life.

6. Hence we ought to pay attention to the sayings of the old, even though undemonstrated; because experience has sharpened their powers of observation.

XII.—1. A question might arise as to the utility of wisdom and prudence; for

(1.) Wisdom does not contemplate the means of human happiness.

2. (2.) If prudence is merely knowledge, that alone will not give us virtuous habits.

3. (3.) Prudence is useless to whose who already possess virtue, and also to those who have not acquired it; for they can listen to the instructions of those who have.

(4.) It seems absurd that prudence, the inferior, should dictate to wisdom, the superior.

4. To these doubts and questions, it may be answered—

(1.) That these virtues, because they are virtues, would be eligible for their own sake, even if they produced no effect.

(2.) They do produce an effect, as being the formal cause of happiness.

5. (3.) Man’s ἰργον is accomplished by means of prudence and moral virtue.

6, 7. (4.) Virtue makes the deliberate preference correct; but the acts in which the moral principle is developed are directed by some other faculty.

8. This faculty is δεινότης (cleverness). If its aim is bad, it becomes παρουργία (craft).

9. It is not prudence, but is improved and educated into prudence.

Now, when we act morally, we always act upon a syllogism.
Our major premise is—Such and such a thing is the end; our minor—This act is such and such a thing.

Now, prudence supplies the middle term; and yet no one but the good man, whose moral vision is not distorted by depravity, can discern it.

Therefore virtue and prudence are inseparably connected.

XIII.—1. Now, as prudence is to cleverness, so is natural virtue to virtue proper, i.e. perfected and matured.

2. Natural virtue exists in children, but without intellect (νοῦς); it is blind, and may stumble and fall.

Add νοῦς, and it becomes virtue proper.

3, 4. As virtue proper cannot be formed without prudence, Socrates and others supposed that the virtues were prudences. They were partly right and partly wrong. They thought the virtues were simply intellectual processes. Aristotle says they are joined with reason.

5. Prudence, therefore, and moral virtue, are inseparable, but when we say this, we mean virtue proper, for the natural virtues are separable.

Aristotle again repeats his former answers to Questions (1) and (2), and answers Question (4), by saying that prudence prescribes and dictates, not to wisdom, but for the sake of it.

BOOK VII.

Introductory.—According to the division adopted by Michelet, Aristotle here commences the third part of his treatise; namely, that which treats of the instrumentals to virtue. Up to this point he has contemplated the virtues, both moral and intellectual, theoretically as perfect, and as if mankind were capable of attaining moral and intellectual perfection. This is, of course, the most philosophical way to investigate the moral laws of man's nature, as well as the physical laws by which the material universe is governed. But before the results to which we arrive can be reduced to practice, they, in both cases, require to be modified by facts and by experience.

Now, whether man can or cannot attain to perfect virtue, there can be no doubt that if he aims at happiness, he must
endeavour to do so. He must labour to form imperfect habits of virtue in his onward course towards the acquisition of perfect virtue. He must earnestly strive to improve them day by day, and thus gradually approach nearer and nearer to the standard of absolute perfection, which is coincident with the idea of perfect virtue. Now, in order to this, he must strive to form habits of self-control; he must struggle against the obstacles which the infirmities of his natural constitution place in his way; he must master as well as he can his passions, which, by their strength and evil bias, lead him astray from the right path.

The imperfect habit of self-restraint which man will thus form, and which, by perseverance, he will improve and strengthen, is termed by Aristotle ἐγκρίτεια (continence), to distinguish it from σωφροσύνη (temperance), which implies that the bad passions and appetites are entirely overcome, and are completely under the control of right reason.

The imperfect habit, then, is evidently instrumental, and necessarily instrumental, to the formation of the perfect one; and to the investigation of the nature of this habit, and the subjects related, Aristotle devotes this book.

We must next inquire with what view Aristotle has introduced here the subjects of heroic virtue and brutality. There is no point which he so earnestly endeavours to impress upon his hearers as this, that the subject of ethical philosophy is human happiness, and virtue and vice, so far as they come within the province of man, and so far as his moral nature is capable of them. But as there are beings whose nature is superior to that of man, that is, the Deity, and, according to the popular belief (which he always considers deserving of respect and consideration), demi-gods and heroes, so are there human beings who, by defect of nature, or early depravity, have become degraded below the rank which man occupies amongst created beings.

The virtue which belongs to the former Aristotle designates heroic virtue; the vice which characterizes the latter he terms brutality. The discussion of these must not be, of course, considered as forming part of Aristotle's ethical system, but rather as questions of curiosity parallel to his examination of man's moral habits, and helping to illustrate and throw light on their nature.
The attempt which Socrates and his followers made to establish the purely intellectual nature of moral virtue, the exactness and mathematical certainty of moral science, and of the reasoning processes by which its facts and phenomena are demonstrated, causes another question to arise connected with the subject of continence. This is, whether the incontinent man acts contrary to knowledge.

These two dogmas are directly contradictory to the moral theory of Aristotle, and, notwithstanding what he says in the conclusion respecting the superiority of the happiness and satisfaction derived from intellectual contemplation, he is consistent in combating them throughout.

I.—1, 2. There are three forms of what is to be avoided in morals—vice, incontinence, and brutality.

Three contrary to these to be sought—virtue, continence, heroic virtue.

3. Heroic virtue and brutality are extremely rare. The latter is generally found amongst savages, and those suffering from disease or maiming.

4. Aristotle, in treating of continence and patience, incontinence and effeminacy, states and discusses the opinions generally entertained, and then examines and solves difficulties.

5. The opinions commonly held are seven in number; these he enumerates and afterwards discusses in the subsequent chapters.

II.—1. He first discusses Opinion III.; namely, how one who forms a right conception can be incontinent.

Socrates thought it absurd that, if a man had knowledge, anything else should master him.

2. Others thought that an incontinent man might possess not knowledge, but opinion.

If they mean a weak opinion, and his desires are strong, then to yield is pardonable; but incontinence is blameable, and nothing blameable is pardonable.

3. If not a weak opinion, or knowledge, they must mean prudence (this is Opinion VI.) ; but it is impossible, according to Aristotle's theory already laid down, for the same man to be prudent and incontinent.

4. If the continent man resists strong and bad desires, he is not the same as the temperate man (this is Opi-
tion IV.) if he resists weak ones, there is nothing great in so doing.

5. If continence is the same as perseverance in every opinion, it would sometimes be bad, and incontinence would be good. (Opinion II.)

6. Again, if, by sophistical reasoning, a man is led to admit premises and therefore is forced to admit, but cannot approve of the conclusion, he would be considered incontinent, because unable to refute the argument.

7. Thirdly. If this is the case, incontinence, together with folly, would make up virtue.

8. Fourthly. On this supposition, incontinence would be incurable, and therefore worse than intemperance, which cannot be the case.

These four arguments refute Opinion II.

9. If temperance and continence are conversant with everything, what is meant by simple continence? (Opinion VII.)

III.—1—4. Certain questions are here proposed, of which the first and most important is answered in the following manner. That the temperate and the continent are conversant with the same object-matter, but they differ in their relation to it.

The temperate and intemperate act from deliberate preference; the incontinent knows what is right, but does not pursue it.

5. As to the question whether the incontinent acts contrary to knowledge, it may be said that knowledge implies either the possession only, or the possession and use of it.

6. In the syllogisms of moral action, there are two premises, the universal and the particular. Now, a man may possess both, but only use the universal.

7. There is also a difference in the universal: it may relate partly to oneself, partly to the matter in hand. If the particular to be attached to the universal, as a minor to a major premise, relates to oneself, then the knowledge of the major involves that of the minor; if it relates to the matter in hand, this knowledge is not implied: in the one case it would be strange that a man possessing knowledge should act wrong; in the other it would not.

8. Again, some obstacle, such as sleep, madness, to which passion is similar, may prevent knowledge from acting.
9. We must not suppose that the utterance of moral sentiments is a proof of knowledge exerting itself.

10, 11. The question may also be considered physically, that is, according to the principles on which the mind carries on its operations.

As we always act on a syllogism, suppose, for example, the presence in the mind of the minor premise, “This is sweet,” the knowledge of which we gain by αἰσθησις (sensation, either mental or bodily). To this we may apply, as a major premise, “Everything sweet is pleasant,” instead of one which forbids self-indulgence. The consequence is, that if we are under the influence of desire or appetite, we act wrong. Had we applied the other major premise, we should have acted right. Hence it is desire, and not the opinion to which we have logically come, which opposes right reason. In other words, in the case of incontinence, desire resists reason, and is victorious; whereas, if it had not been for desire, we should have come to a right conclusion, and acted in obedience to the dictates of reason.

12. Brutes, therefore, cannot be incontinent, because they act from instinct, and not from a reasoning process.

13, 14. How the incontinent is to regain the knowledge he has lost, Aristotle considers a question for the physiologist. (The term “physics,” as used in this chapter, of course includes metaphysics.)

IV.—1. Is there such a thing as incontinence “simply” or “absolutely”? (Opinion VII.)

It is plain that the continent and patient are so with respect to pleasures and pains.

2. The causes of pleasures are of two kinds:—

(1.) Necessary. (2.) Unnecessary.

When a man is incontinent with respect to the latter, we add the difference, as, for instance, we say—

3. Incontinent of anger, of gain, &c. The term incontinence is applied analogically.

4. Those who are incontinent in bodily enjoyments, we call incontinent simply.

A proof of this is, that it is only this incontinence which is blamed as a vice, and not as an error.

5. Another proof is, that, with respect to these pleasures, men are called effeminate (μαλακοὶ).
Deliberate preference makes the difference between intemperance and incontinence.

6. The degree of intemperance is inversely as the strength of the temptation.

7. Pleasant things may be arranged under three heads:—
   (1.) Those which are in their nature eligible.
   (2.) The contrary to these.
   (3.) Those which are between both.

8. The incontinent with respect to the first and second kind are not blamed for desiring them, but for excess in so doing.

9. Still, as these pleasures are not vicious, the excess, though blameable, does not amount to vice.

The term incontinent is applied because of the similarity of the affection, just as we may call a man a bad physician, although we would not call him a bad man.

V.—1—3. Things pleasant are divided in the following way:—

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4—8. No one would call him incontinent in whom nature or custom is the cause of his diseased state; such a man, strictly speaking, is not vicious, but vitiated, and his state is a morbid one.

9. If he does conquer his brutal inclination, he is only called continent metaphorically.

VI.—1—3. Incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire.

   (1.) Because anger does appear to listen to reason, but listens imperfectly; whilst desire rushes to enjoyment, in obedience to mere instinct.

4, 5. (2.) Anger is more natural, and therefore more pardonable, than desire, even when carried to excess.

6. (3.) Anger is open in its attacks, desire is insidious, and therefore more unjust.
7. (4.) The feeling of anger is attended with pain, and is not accompanied with wanton insolence; but the gratification of lustful desires is attended with pleasure, and implies wanton insult also.

8. The object-matter of continence is the bodily pleasures which are proper to man. The term cannot be applied to brutes, because they, like insane persons, have no deliberate preference.

9. Brutality is, morally considered, not so bad as vice, but it is more terrible; because it implies the entire absence and want, not the corruption of the best principle.

VII.—1. The incontinent is he who is disposed to yield to such pleasures as most men are superior to.

The continent is superior to those pleasures to which most men yield.

Substitute pains for pleasures, and the former case is that of the effeminate, the latter that of the patient.

The moral character of most men is something between these two.

2. He who pursues pleasure in excess, or avoids bodily pain from deliberate preference, is intemperate.

He is incapable of repentance, and therefore incurable.

3. The incontinent and effeminate are not so bad as the intemperate.

4, 5. Continence is opposed to incontinence, patience to effeminacy. Patience implies resistance, continence victory; therefore continence is better than patience.

6. To yield to excessive pleasure and pain is by no means astonishing, but pardonable.

But to yield to pleasures and pains which most men resist, is astonishing.

7. He who is devoted to sport is effeminate, rather than intemperate.

8. There are two sorts of incontinence; namely, weakness and precipitancy.

9. The latter is that to which the quick and choleric are liable.

VIII.—1. Intemperance is not inclined to repentance, incontinence is; therefore the former, like chronic diseases, is incurable, the latter, like acute diseases, is curable; the latter is unperceived, the former not so.
2. Of incontinent persons, of ἴκοσανος are the better.

3. Incontinence is not vice absolutely, but only in a certain sense, because the principle of moral action is not corrupted.

4, 5. The intemperate acts from a perverted principle, and his state, therefore, is a hopeless one.

IX.—1. The question (II.) is again considered; namely, whether the continent man is identical with him who abides by his opinion.

The answer is, that those are absolutely continent or incontinent who abide by a true opinion, those who abide by an opinion of any kind are only accidentally so; i.e., whether they are or are not, must be decided by the result.

2. There is a class of persons called obstinate; they resemble in some measure the continent, but they really differ, in that, even contrary to the suggestions of reason, they, influenced by pleasure, abide by their opinion.

The continent may be persuaded to change, the obstinate never.

3. There are three kinds of obstinate persons:—

(1.) The self-opinionated.
(2.) The uneducated.
(3.) The clownish.

4. There are also some who depart from their opinions on right grounds, e.g., for the sake of honourable pleasures; these cannot be called incontinent.

5. Since the defect as to the desire of bodily pleasures is rare, continence is thought to be opposed to incontinence, and temperance to intemperance.

6. The temperate and continent, and also the intemperate and incontinent, have points in common, although in reality they are distinct.

X.—1. A man cannot be both prudent and incontinent.

(1.) Because prudence implies goodness.
(2.) Because the prudent man not only knows what is right, but is apt and inclined to practise it.

2. Cleverness, as it does not imply προανάγεστρικη, is consistent with incontinence.

The incontinent is like a man who possesses knowledge, but is under the influence of sleep or wine. He acts voluntarily, but is not vicious absolutely. He is not unjust.
resembles a state which has good laws, but does not use them.

4, 5. Of the two kinds, precipitancy is more curable than weakness; and incontinence, which is the result of custom, than that which is the result of nature.

As the concluding chapters of this book most probably belong to the Eudemean Ethics, and the subject of pleasure is discussed fully in Book X., no analysis is given of them.

BOOK VIII.

Introductory.—In popular language, the expression "a state of nature," is usually applied to man in a savage state; this, however, is by no means a correct or philosophical use of the term. The real natural state of man is, as Aristotle truly asserts, the social state. In no nation was the principle of social union more powerfully exemplified than it was amongst the Greeks. Their associations for uniting the whole race under one common name, their public games periodically recurring, their Amphictyonic institutions, which existed amongst them in the times of the earliest traditions, are instances, on a vast scale, of an "esprit de corps," so to speak, a tendency to unite closely together, on the principle of community of interest. Founded as these unions were on the ties of race and blood, and consecrated by religious ceremonies and observances, in which only those of the same race and kindred could participate, they appealed to the same principles of human nature which hold together families and relations. They were not merely like the alliances between modern states, grounded upon motives of expediency and policy, but, theoretically at least, they implied affection; they were, in fact, international friendships.

Again, the intercourse which was kept up between the several states of Greece by means of πρῶτεροι and ἅθελοπρῶτεροι, originated in the same mutual feeling towards each other, and was a development of the same principle of international goodwill. It is customary to compare this institution of the ancient Greeks to the consulate of modern times.
Doubtless the object and effect produced are the same; namely, the protection of foreigners; but still the appointment of an officer to reside in a foreign country, whose duty it is to watch over the interests of his own countrymen, would give a very inadequate idea of the Greek system. The Greek πρὸξενος was one whose sacred duty it was to welcome as a friend and a brother the citizens of a foreign state, whose occupations called him to a land of strangers. And these duties, as in the case of the ἰδελοπρὸξενος, were often voluntarily undertaken.

Lastly, within the states of Greece themselves, the associations which existed for the purposes of mutual combination were innumerable, and exercised, sometimes for good, but far more frequently for evil, a great influence over the political constitution of the different states. The ἄραμοι or ἱστατία were clubs instituted, some for charitable, others for convivial purposes. Another class (ἐμπορικαὶ) were for commercial purposes; and the Σίαιοι were of a religious nature. But whatever the primary objects of these combinations or unions may have been, they were generally of a political nature, and, so far as the testimony of history goes, their tendency was generally prejudicial to good order and government; they were, in fact, antagonists, and formidable ones, to constituted authority. Thucydides (Book III. c. 82), when speaking of the terrible results of the Corcyrean sedition, when moral and political corruption raged throughout the states of Greece, and utterly disorganized society, mentions that irrational audacity was commended as ἀνὴρία φιλείαρος, meaning a devotion to those unions which, at that period of political convulsion, usurped the place of genuine patriotism.

Pisander, too, at a later period of Greek history (B.C. 411), made these unions instrumental in effecting the political changes which he contemplated. Thirlwall says (History of Greece, vol. iv. p. 26), “In most of the Greek states, the ambition of individuals, or the conflict of parties, had given rise to a number of private associations, for purposes either mainly or wholly political, some attached to a single leader, others united by the common interests of the members. These clubs were of long standing in Athens. Cimon had formed one, which rallied round him as its centre, attracted not more, perhaps, by his fortune and abilities than by his
principles, shared the reproach which he incurred by his partiality for Sparta, and proved its devotedness to his person at the battle of Tanagra. It seems to have been by means of a similar union that Thucydides, the rival of Pericles, endeavoured to defeat the attempt of Hyperbolus. It was on his command over such associations, that Alcibiades relied for the accomplishment of his ambitious designs.

"But there appear to have been many political clubs at Athens, which did not acknowledge any chief, but merely aimed at certain objects in which all the members were equally concerned. The defective administration of justice exposed unprotected individuals to vexation and wrong, but enabled a number who combined their fortunes and credit, the more easily to shield each other, or to strike a common enemy. Another end for which such coalitions were formed, was to control the elections for offices of trust and power, either with a view to self-defence, or to the extension of their influence.

"In every case both the object and the means, if not positively illegal, were such as the law did not recognize; the mutual attachment of the associates was stronger than the ties by which they were bound to the state, and even those of blood; and the law of honour, which generally prevailed amongst them, required that they should shrink from no sacrifice, and from no crime, which the common interest might demand. These associations, therefore, were hot-beds of seditious and revolutionary projects; and Phrynichus found it easy to engage them on his side; and, before he left Athens, he had organized an extensive conspiracy among them for the immediate subversion of the democratical government."

The above brief view of the state of feeling and habit prevalent in Greece, in all ages, on these important points, will account for the way in which Aristotle treats the subject of friendship. It will, hence, be seen why he discusses it not only as a virtue of private individuals, but in relation to social communions of different kinds, and even to the theory of civil government itself.

The place which friendship occupies in ethics is, firstly, as being instrumental to moral virtue, as supplying oppor-
tunities for the most satisfactory exercises of virtuous energies, and performance of relative duties; and, secondly, as being absolutely necessary to the happiness of man, which cannot be complete, unless his amiable affections and social sympathies are satisfied.

I.—1—3. The subject of friendship is introduced, because—
(1.) It is either a virtue or conjoined with virtue.
(2.) It is most necessary to life, to young and old, rich and poor.
4. (3.) The principles of friendship are innate.
5. (4.) It is the bond of social communities.
(5.) It supplies the place of justice.
6. (6.) It is not only necessary, but honourable.
7, 8. According to custom, Aristotle states the opinion generally entertained respecting friendship.

Some say it originates in resemblance.
Others from physical causes.

Heraclitus, for example, asserts it is due to contrariety of physical constitution. Empedocles to similarity.

He dismisses the discussion of physical questions, and confines himself to moral ones, and proposes to inquire—
(1.) Can all be friends, or is it impossible for bad men be so?
(2.) Are there more kinds of friendship than one?

II.—1, 2. We must discover what is the object of friendship.
It is (1.) The good.
(2.) The pleasant.
(3.) The useful.

Is it then the good, or the apparent good?
Abstractedly, it is the good; relatively to the individual, it is the apparent good. This distinction, however, will make no difference.

We cannot use the term friendship of fondness for inanimate things; because friendship must be reciprocal.

3, 4. Unless reciprocity exists, the feeling is goodwill.

Friends, therefore, must feel goodwill to each other, both parties must be aware of the feelings of each other, and they must wish good to each other for one of the three reasons above mentioned.

III.—1. There are three kinds of friendship, corresponding to the three objects.
2. Friendship for the sake of the useful is not real friendship. The same is the case with respect to that for the sake of the pleasant.

3. These two kinds of friendship are easily dissolved.

4—6. The former generally is found to exist between the old, the latter between the young.

For this reason the young are apt to be in love.

They quickly form and quickly put an end to their friendships.

7, 8. The friendship between the good and virtuous is respect.

The virtuous are good both absolutely and relatively, and as they are likewise mutually pleasant, their friendship therefore comprehends all the essentials of friendship, and consequently is permanent.

9, 10. Such friendships are rare, as they require time and intimacy.

IV.—1, 2. The friendships for the sake of the pleasant and the useful resemble true friendship, because the good are pleasant and useful to each other.

3. Friends for the sake of the useful cease to be so when the usefulness ceases.

4. For these motives bad men may be friends.

5. The friendship of the virtuous is alone superior to calumny.

6. False friendships are only called so from analogy.

7. The same persons are rarely friends for the sake both of the pleasant and the useful, for these qualifications are seldom found combined.

V.—1. As in virtues some are called good according to the habit, others according to the energy, so in friendship, absence does not destroy it, but only impairs the energy.

2. If the absence be long, forgetfulness is the result.

The old and morose are not inclined to friendship.

3. Those who do not live together and are not intimate may be said to resemble those who have goodwill rather than friendship.

The friendship of the good, therefore, is friendship in the highest sense.

4. The feeling of fondness resembles a passion, friendship itself a habit.
The good when they love their friend love that which is good to themselves.

VI. 1, 2. The old and the morose are less suited than others to friendship, but still they are perfectly capable of entertaining goodwill.

3. It is impossible to entertain true friendship for many, because—

(1.) It resembles an excess of feeling, and this can only be felt towards one object.

(2.) It requires experience and intimacy.

We may be friends with many διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον and διὰ τὸ ἄξιον.

4. The friendship διὰ τὸ ἄξιον most resembles true friendship.

That διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον is that of tradesmen.

5. The happy and prosperous require pleasant friends, and not useful ones.

6. Men in power require friends of both kinds, because the two qualities are seldom found in the same person.

The good man combines both; but he will not be a friend to a man in power unless he is his superior in goodness, so as to produce equality between them.

7. The false friendships bear the name of friendship, from their resemblance to the true; again, they are unlike friendship in point of permanence and stability.

VII. 1, 2. There is also friendship between persons who are unequal.

In the subdivision of this kind of friendship, the relative duties are different, but the necessary equality is produced by the person who is inferior in merit being superior in strength of affection.

3. The idea of equality in justice and friendship differs.

In justice, equality in proportion to merit is considered first, and equality in quantity second; in friendship, the reverse.

4. The necessity of a certain equality is plain, from the fact that, where the difference of rank is very great, friendship does not exist.

5. Hence a question has arisen, whether men really wish to their friends the greatest goods, because, if they get the greatest goods, they would lose their friends.
VIII.—1–3. The love of honour leads the majority to wish to be loved rather than to love; therefore the majority love flattery, for being loved resembles being honoured, although in reality it is better.

4. But, notwithstanding this prevalent notion, friendship really consists in loving rather than in being loved.

This is proved by the strength of maternal affection.

5. As, therefore, the essence of friendship is the feeling of affection, by the superior strength of this feeling any inequality which exists between parties may be readily remedied.

This stability is insured between the good, because equality and similarity, especially in goodness, are the essentials of friendship.

6. The bad, on the contrary, have no stability.

7, 8. The friendship for the sake of the useful is based upon the possession of contrary qualities, because the one party has what the other wants.

9. But though, in a certain sense, the contrary wants the contrary, what it really wants is the mean, for this is “the good.”

IX.—1. Every community implies a principle of justice as well as a principle of friendship.

These principles are co-extensive.

2. For example, the relative rights, as well as the affections between parents and children, brothers, &c. differ, and they are in direct proportion to each other.

3. All communities come under and form parts of the social community, whatever may be the motives for which the association is formed.

Even the social community has been supposed to be the result of some mutual compact for the sake of mutual benefit.

4, 5. At any rate, all communities or associations are formed with a view to advantage or pleasure.

Corresponding friendships will accompany these communities.

X.—1–5. There are three kinds of political constitutions and three corruptions of them.

(1.) Monarchy.
(2.) Aristocracy.
(3.) Timocracy.

Of these, monarchy is the best, and timocracy the worst.
The three corruptions are—
(1.) Tyranny.
(2.) Oligarchy.
(3.) Democracy.

Of these, tyranny is the worst, and democracy the least bad.

6. Resemblances to these constitutions may be found in domestic life.

The relation between a father and his children is like that between a king and his subjects.

7. That between a master and his slaves is like a tyranny. That between husband and wife resembles an aristocracy. This relation, if the husband is overbearing, degenerates into one which resembles an oligarchy.

8. The relation between brothers is like a timocracy. The state of families without a master is like a democracy.

XI.—1, 2. In each of these forms, there is a friendship co-extensive with the just in each.

The friendship between a king and his subjects is like that between a father and his children, only that the latter is superior in the amount of benefits conferred.

3. The friendship between husband and wife is the same as in an aristocracy.

4. The friendship in a timocracy is like that between brothers, and also that between companions.

5. There is but little friendship in the corrupt forms, as there is but little justice.

In a tyranny there is least of all, perhaps none.

6, 7. In like manner, there is none between master and slave, so far forth as he is a slave, although there may be, so far forth as he is a man.

In a democracy there is most friendship, because equals have many things in common.

XII.—1. All friendships are based upon community, which is either natural or by compact.

Civil communities exist in virtue of a compact.

2—4. The friendships between relatives are by nature, and all depend upon the parental.

The love of parents is stronger than that of children, because children are, as it were, part of themselves, and it has also existed for a longer time.
5. Brothers love one another, because they are sprung from the same parents. The friendship of brothers resembles that between companions. The friendship between all other relations is owing to the same cause.

6. The friendship of children towards their parents, and of men towards the gods, is, as it were, towards something superior.

7. The friendship between man and wife owes its origin to nature; but besides, they marry for the sake of mutual help and comfort.

This friendship unites the useful, the pleasant, and, if the parties be virtuous, the good.

8. Children are a common good, and therefore a bond of union between man and wife.

XIII.—1, 2. In equal friendships, disputes arise almost exclusively in those friendships which are for the sake of the useful.

3, 4. In friendship for the sake of the pleasant, disputes are ridiculous.

5. Friendship for the sake of the useful is of two kinds. (1.) Moral. (2.) Legal.

6. Moral friendship is not upon settled specified terms, legal is.

In it a man gives as to a friend, but still he expects to receive an equivalent.

7. Indeed, it is the duty of the receiver of a kindness to make a return, if he is able to do so.

8. He must measure the value of the favour received, and estimate the kindness of the giver, and make his return accordingly.

9. The conclusion to which Aristotle comes appears to be that the benefit conferred on the receiver must be the measure. In friendships for the sake of virtue, the measure is the προαίρεσις of the giver.

XIV.—1, 2. In unequal friendships, disputes arise, because each thinks he has less than his due.

* Compare Malachi xi. 10: "Have we not all one Father?—hath not one God created us? Why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother?"
Both appear to be right; both ought to get more, but not more of the same thing.

The superior should get more honour, the needy more profit.

3. This rule is observed in political communities.

4. Every man must make his return according to his ability. More than this, friendship cannot demand.

In some cases, an adequate return cannot be made, as, for instance, to parents.

Hence it may be lawful for a father to disown his son, but not for a son to disown his father.

BOOK IX.

Introductory.—In this book Aristotle completes his investigation of the subject of friendship. He commences it with a continuation of the discussion respecting the means of preserving and preventing the dissolution of unequal friendships. He devotes a chapter (chapter iv.) to the casuistical consideration of certain relative duties, and another (chapter iii.) to the enumeration of those cases in which friendships may or may not be dissolved.

He then proceeds to the consideration of an important branch of the subject; namely, the connection and relation which subsists between the love of others and the love of ourselves. A reasonable self-love, totally different and distinguishable from selfishness, he considers as the source and origin of a real love of others. The former is indispensable to the existence of the latter. The good man will feel a right and proper regard for his own best and highest interests, and this same regard he will entertain towards his friend, as towards another self. The standard of his affection for his friend will be the same as that by which the Gospel requires us to measure our love towards all mankind, when we are bid "to love our neighbour as ourselves." As none but a good man can entertain a real friendship, so he alone is capable of loving himself, in the true sense of the term; and, conversely, since none but a good man can entertain towards himself those qualities which are the developments
of friendship,—namely, beneficence, good-will, and sympathy,—therefore none but the good can really be friends. The other questions which are considered in this book are of minor interest and importance, but are incidental to, and naturally arise out of it.

I.—1. All dissimilar friendships are rendered equal, and therefore preserved by proportion.

2. 3. Complaints arise from three causes:
   (1.) That there is not a sufficient return of affection.
   (2.) That the person who loves does not perform his promises.

4. (3.) When what is received differs from what was expected.

5. 6. As to the question, "Who is to fix the value of the return?" the opinion of Aristotle is, that the receiver ought to do so.

7. When no agreement has been made, the return must be estimated by the deliberate intention of the giver.

8. When an agreement has been made, the return should be such as both parties think fair.

If this cannot be, the receiver should value it at as much as he thought the favour worth before it was conferred upon him.

II.—1, 2. No accurate rules can be laid down as to our relative duties towards relations and friends.

It is clear, however, that we should, generally speaking, repay kindnesses, rather than do kindnesses to those who have not done them to us.

3—5. Cases however may occur in which this rule will not hold good, because the latter may be more honourable.

6. We ought to render to all their due.

7. We ought to assist our parents rather than any other persons, and pay them the respect due to them.

8. We ought to pay respect to the aged.

9. With this view, we ought to compare the claims of relatives, fellow-citizens, &c.

To do this in the case of relatives, is easy; in the case of others, it is difficult.

III.—1. When may friendships be dissolved?

(1.) When the motives for the sake of which they were formed cease.
2. (2.) When parties are deceived as to the real motives which led to the friendship.

3, 4. (3.) If one party becomes wicked, and his wickedness is incurable.

5, 6. When one party remains the same, and the other becomes far better, and the difference becomes excessively great, sympathy is impossible, and therefore they cannot really be friends; but still the one who has improved must remember their former intimacy, and feel goodwill towards the other as towards a friend.

IV.—1. The real source of friendship for others is the feelings of a man towards himself.

A friend has been defined in various ways; but the necessary qualities which all these definitions involve, are beneficence, good-will, and sympathy.

2—5. Now, all the feelings contained in these definitions are entertained by a good man towards himself.

By “self” is meant each man’s intellectual part, or thinking principle.

A friend is a second self.

6. Aristotle dismisses the question as to whether there be such a thing as friendship towards one’s-self.

7. He asserts that, though the feelings spoken of exist in many, although they are bad, still they cannot possibly exist in those who are utterly bad. They cannot love themselves really, because they are at variance with themselves.

They choose the pleasant rather than the good, which is their true interest.

8. They hate life, and destroy themselves.

They shun their own thoughts, and seek, for the sake of distraction, the society of others.

They have no sympathy with themselves.

They look back upon their past pleasures with pain.

They are full of remorse.

They have no friendly feeling towards themselves.

In order to escape this wretchedness, their only way is to flee from wickedness, and to strive to become good.

V.—1. Goodwill resembles, but is not identical with, friendship;

For it is felt towards those whom we do not know.


It is not affection, φιλήσεις; for it has no intensity, nor desire, and may be felt on a sudden.

2. It is the beginning and origin of friendship, as sight is the beginning of love.

3. It is impossible to feel friendship without goodwill.

4. So that it may be defined friendship in a state of inactivity, which by intimacy becomes true friendship.

5. It is entertained on account of virtue, or goodness.

VI.—1. Unanimity (ὁμοσύνον) differs from unity of opinion (ὁμοσύνωσις), in being between persons known to each other, and on practical matters.

2. Especially on those which are important, and of common interest.

3. There is no unanimity when two persons covet the same thing; but the reverse.

4. It is therefore political friendship.

It exists between the good, for they wish and desire in common the just and expedient.

5. It cannot exist between the bad, because they only agree in shunning duty, and in coveting personal advantage.

VII.—1. The love felt by benefactors is stronger than that felt by the benefited.

2. Most people think the reason for this is, because the benefactor, like a creditor, wishes for the safety and prosperity of his debtor, with a view to repayment.

3. This, Epicharmus would say, is looking to the bad side of human nature; nevertheless, it is not unlike human nature.

4, 5. However, the true reasons are,

(1.) That the benefactor looks upon the person benefited as his work, and men love their own works, as proofs of energy, and therefore of existence.

6. (2.) The benefactor gets honour, the benefited only advantage; and honour is preferable to advantage.

7. (3.) The pleasure derived from the honourable is permanent, that derived from the useful is transitory.

8. (4.) To love is an active feeling, to be loved passive.

(5.) All love that best which has cost them trouble.

VIII.—The difficulty of deciding whether we ought to
love ourselves or others best, arises from not distinguishing between proper and improper self-love.

The popular opinion is, that the bad man does nothing without reference to self.

The good man acts for the sake of the honourable, and passes over his own interests.

2. On the other hand, it is said that a man should love his greatest friend best; now, the best friend a man has is himself; therefore, he ought to love himself best.

4—7. Now, improper self-love, or selfishness, causes a man to give to himself more than his share of money, or distinctions, or bodily pleasures, in fact, of the gratifications of the irrational part of his nature.

True self-love desires the honourable, and to be virtuous, and to gratify the ruling part of his nature, i.e. the intellect.

8. For the intellectual part especially constitutes what we call "self."

9. Now, all praise him who is particularly earnest in performing virtuous and honourable acts.

10. Therefore, the good man must be a self-lover, but the wicked man ought not to be so.

11. The good man will sacrifice everything for the sake of appropriating to himself the greatest share of the honourable (τὰ καλὰ).

12. Hence, he will sacrifice even life itself in the cause of his country.

13. Therefore, reasonable self-love is right, but selfishness is wrong.

IX.—1. Some have said that the happy man does not need friends, because he has all he wants, and needs no one to provide more for him.

2. But yet it seems absurd to give a man all other goods, and deny him the greatest of all goods.

Besides, a good man will want persons to do good to.

3. Hence, it has been asked, when do we most need friends?

* See Bishop Butler's Analogy, Part I. chap. i. "On a Future State," where he shows that the living agent or sentient being, which each man calls himself, is related to the body merely as to a system of instruments organs destitute of perception, which convey perceptions to the perceiving and reflecting powers.
In prosperity, for us to help them, or in adversity, for them to help us?

4. It also seems absurd, when man is a social being, to make the happy man a solitary being.

The happy man, therefore, does need friends.

5. The mistake of the generality seems to be, that they think only of useful friends.

Now, the happy man will not want either useful or pleasant friends.

6. But he will want virtuous friends; because he delights in contemplating good actions, and such actions as his own; and we can better contemplate a friend’s actions than we can our own.

7. Again, a solitary life is burthensome; and it is not easy to energize constantly by one’s self.

8. Let the question now be examined physiologically.

That which is naturally good is good and pleasant to the good man.

Therefore, life is good and pleasant to the good man.


10. When we speak of life, we do not mean a depraved and corrupt one, but the life of the good and happy.

11, 12. Therefore, the consciousness of living and existing must be pleasant to a good man.

Now, a friend is a second self.

13, 14. Therefore, the perception of a friend’s existence is the perception of our own.

Therefore, it is good and pleasant.

Therefore, it is good to have friends, and consequently even a happy man will need good friends.

X.—1. Should we, then, have many friends, or, as in the case of hospitality, should we not be without, but still not have too many?

2. Of useful friends we certainly must not have many, for it is troublesome to requite many favours.

3. Of pleasant friends, a few are sufficient, like sweetening in our food.

To the number of virtuous friends there must be also some limit, as the numbers of a political community must be limited.
4. Perhaps the best limit is the greatest number with whom we can associate.
   Besides, we ought to remember that our friends ought to be friends to each other, and that we ought to sympathize with them all in joys and sorrows.
   These considerations will also tend to limit the number.
5. It is as impossible to be strong friends with many as to be in love with many.
6. All celebrated friendships have been between two.
   In a political sense only, can we have many friends.
   We must be content with a few virtuous friends, because it is even impossible to meet with many.
   XI.—1. Friends are needful, both in prosperity and in adversity.
   In the latter, we require useful friends, in the former, virtuous ones.
   In adversity, they are more necessary, in prosperity, more honourable.
2. The sympathy of friends is also pleasant in adversity.
   How it comes to pass that sympathy lightens the weight of sorrow, it is unnecessary to inquire; the fact is certain.
3. The presence of friends, when we are in misfortune, causes a mixed feeling. We are pleased and comforted by their sympathy, but we are pained by seeing them grieved by our misfortunes.
4. Therefore, the manly character will be cautious of thus causing pain to his friends, the effeminate will delight in having others to mourn with him.
5. In prosperity, friends make our time pass pleasantly, therefore, in prosperity we should be glad to invite them, in adversity reluctant.
6. When friends are in trouble, we should go to them gladly.
   When they are in prosperity, we should go to them willingly, if we can forward any object they have in view, but reluctantly, if we go to enjoy their good fortune.
   XII.—1. As the sight of the beloved object is most desirable to lovers, so society is most desirable to friends.
   Again, a friend is a second self; as, therefore, the perception of our own existence is desirable, so is the perception of the existence of a friend.
2, 3. In whatever pursuit a man thinks the enjoyment of life consists, this pursuit he likes to enjoy with his friends.
4. Hence, the friendship of bad men becomes depraved, that of good men good, by intercourse.
5. By associating together, good men mutually correct and improve each other.

BOOK X.

Introductory.—There are two objects which Aristotle has in view in making pleasure the subject of a great part of this his concluding book. The first is to examine, and refute when erroneous, the various opinions which Plato and other philosophers had held respecting it; and the second, to show the exact place which pleasure occupies in relation to virtue and human happiness. This he can now safely do, without any risk of his hearers being misled by false notions and incorrect estimates of its nature and value. He has insisted on a moral preparation and discipline of the habits as the only road to happiness; and, therefore, the student may now be informed that pleasure, such pleasure as he is now fitted by moral discipline to appreciate and enjoy, shall be the reward of his endeavours, and the adjunct of that happiness which he has been seeking by the only road which could really lead to its attainment.

Aristotle shows that pleasure is not “per se” an evil, because the grounds on which it may be considered to be so only belong to those of a grosser corporeal kind, and not to the purer enjoyments of the ruling part of man’s nature, the intellect. By another series of arguments, he also proves, on the other hand, that though a good, it is not the chief good.

The connection between happiness and pleasure may be briefly expressed in the following words:—Happiness is an energy, and every energy is completed and rendered perfect by the pleasure peculiar to it. It is plain, that, although pleasure perfects the energy, and is therefore an adjunct to it, it is not itself an energy or activity, for it is not in
any way an act either of the perceptive or the reasoning faculties.

From this definition of pleasure, we can see how Aristotle, in the next division of this book, arrives at the conclusion that the highest human happiness must be sought for in intellectual contemplation, and that it will be inseparably united with pleasure of the highest kind. It is plain, also, that he arrives at it by the safest and most practical road.

In order that man’s divinest and purest nature, the intellectual, may energize independently and without impediment, his moral nature must have been brought into its highest condition; but when this is the case, the intellect is capable of exercising its powers, that is, it is capable of the act of contemplation. Now happiness has been laid down to be an energy according to the most perfect virtue; and this must be the virtue of the highest faculties which man possesses, namely, the intellectual. But every energy is perfected by its own peculiar pleasure, and therefore the most perfect energies must be accompanied by the highest pleasures.

I.—1, 2. Pleasure is, more than anything else, intimately bound up with the nature of man; and one of the principal parts of education is to instil right notions respecting its nature.

3. For this reason, as well as because of the erroneous views prevalent respecting it, this subject ought not to be passed over.

4. The evil of erroneous views may be seen in the following example:—Suppose a teacher of morals censures pleasure, and is then seen to desire it, this inconsistency entirely destroys his influence and authority.

II.—1—3. Eudoxus thought that pleasure was the chief good, because—

(1.) All creatures seek it.
(2.) Pain, its contrary, is universally avoided.
(3.) It is eligible for its own sake.
(4.) If added to any other good, it makes it more eligible.

The excellence of his moral character gave weight to his assertions.

4. Argument (4) proves that pleasure is a good, but not the chief good.
5. By an argument similar to argument (4), Plato proved that pleasure was not the chief good; for he said that a pleasant life became more eligible by the addition of moral wisdom.

6. That pleasure is a good, because all aim at it, is a valid argument, although this does not prove that it is the chief good. Had it only been said that irrational creatures sought pleasure, an objection might have been made to the argument, but not when rational beings are included.

7. Again, there is no force in the objection, "that because pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is a good." Of course it is not necessarily so; but still it is a probable argument, and experience supports it.

III.—1. Plato says, pleasure is not a good, because it is not a quality; but, for the same reason, neither happiness nor the energies of virtue would be qualities.

2. Again, he says, that good is definite, but that pleasure admits of degrees.

If this objection applies to the act of being pleased, it equally applies to justice, and all the moral virtues.

3. If it is meant to apply to pleasure abstractedly, then the distinction is forgotten between mixed and unmixed pleasures, for the unmixed are definite, i.e. capable of being defined.

But, after all, health is definite, and admits of degrees; why then should not pleasure be definite, and admit of degrees also?

4. Again, it is said pleasure is a motion and generation, and motions and generations are imperfect.

It is not a motion, for quickness and slowness belong to every motion.

5, 6. But although we can become pleased quickly or slowly, we cannot feel pleasure quickly or slowly.

7. It cannot be a generation, because that which is generated is resolved into the same elements which produced it.

Now those sensations which pleasure generates, pain destroys.

Again, it is said pain is a want, pleasure the supply of that want.

8. But those wants are corporeal; therefore, if pleasure
were the supplying of them, the body would feel the pleasure; but it is the mind, and not the body which feels it.

The truth is, when the want is supplied, pleasure is felt.

9, 10. Besides, there are many pleasures which neither imply a want to be satisfied, nor a pain to be removed.

11. If reprehensible pleasures be brought forward in proof, it may be answered, that they are not really pleasures.

12. Or it may be answered, that the eligibility of pleasures depends upon whence they are derived.

13. Or we may say that pleasures differ in kind.

14. This may be illustrated by the difference between a friend and a flatterer.

15, 16. Again, experience proves that pleasures differ; for we should not choose to be children all our lives, even if the pleasures of children were the highest possible.

And, on the other hand, we should be anxious for some things, even if they brought no pleasure.

17. It is clear, therefore,

(1.) That pleasure is not the chief good.
(2.) That some pleasures are eligible, and therefore goods; but that others are not so.

IV.—1. Pleasure is, like the act of vision, perfect at any moment.

2. For this reason, it is not a motion; as a motion is imperfect at any separate moment of time.

3, 4. This may be illustrated by the process of constructing a building.

5, 6. One cannot form any idea of motion, except as connected with place, as well as time.

But motion is more properly treated of at length in Aristotle's Physics.

7—9. The same arguments which prove that pleasure is not a motion also prove that it is not a generation.

10. There is an appropriate pleasure attendant upon every act of perception (αἴσθησις), every operation of the intellect employed either in the investigation of the truth (ἐνίκανον), or in the contemplation of truth (Ṣwpta).

The perfection of pleasure will depend upon the perfect state of the faculty or habit, and the perfect nature of the object on which it energizes or is active.

To make up a perfect energy, therefore, there are three
requisites: a perfect faculty, a perfect object, a perfect attendant pleasure.

11—14. Pleasure, therefore, as the final requisite, perfects the energy, not as an efficient, but as a formal cause, not as an inherent habit, but as the bloom completes the beauty of those who are in the prime of life.

The reason why we cannot feel pleasure continually is, that the sense of enjoyment, like other faculties, flags and wearsies and becomes blunted, and requires novelty to excite it.

15, 16. It matters not whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life.

This is, at any rate, plain, that life is energy, that pleasure renders our energies perfect, and therefore gives perfection to our life.

V.—1, 2. Pleasures differ in kind, because—

(1.) The energies which they perfect differ.

3, 4. (2.) The appropriate pleasure contributes to increase each energy; the connection, therefore, must be so close, that if the energies differ, the pleasure must likewise.

5—8. (3.) Energies are hindered, and the pleasures resulting from them destroyed, by pleasures arising from other sources. Nay, opposite pleasures act like pains.

9—11. (4.) Energies differ in quality; therefore the attendant pleasures differ also. It may be observed, that in their nature, as well as in point of time, the pleasures are more closely connected with the energies than with the desires, so that they are sometimes, though imperfectly, confounded with them.

12, 13. Different animals, as well as men under different circumstances, have each their proper pleasure, as they have each their proper energy.

14—16. True pleasure, therefore, is that which appears so to the good man; and those which attend the energies of the perfect and happy man are properly the pleasures of man.

VI.—1. Recapitulating what has been said before on the same subject, Aristotle asserts that happiness is—

2, 3. An energy, eligible for its own sake, and therefore according to virtue.
4, 5. That it does not consist in amusement, although the popular opinion respecting it would lead us to suppose so, because—

6, 7. (1.) The best men do not think so.
8, 9. (2.) Amusement or relaxation is not an end, but a means.
10. (3.) Serious pursuits are held to be better than amusements.
11. (4.) If happiness were mere amusement, a slave could be happy.

VII.—1. If happiness is an energy according to virtue, it must be according to the highest virtue.
 This must be the virtue of the best part of man.
 That is, the intellect.
 The highest happiness, therefore, is the contemplative.

2. This energy is—
   (1.) The noblest.
   (2.) The most continuous.
   (3.) The pleasantest.
   (4.) Self-sufficient.

Not but what it will require the necessaries of life, but it does not, like the moral virtues, require persons to energize upon.

6. (5.) It is loved for its own sake.
7, 8. (6.) It is consistent with leisure.
9. Now the active virtues are displayed in politics or war.
 These allow of no leisure; and we do not choose all this troublesome occupation for its own sake.

All this being the case, perfect happiness is ζωοπια.

10—14. Though this happiness is beyond man, yet, as there is in him something divine, he ought to aspire to the satisfaction of this divine nature, and not to mind only earthly things because he is mortal. He should remember that this principle is his "self," and though it may be

* Bishop Butler, when speaking of that which constitutes each man's "self," uses similar language, doubtless influenced by the same mode of thought as Aristotle. He says,—"Persons can trace up the existence of themselves to a time when the bulk of their bodies was extremely small, in comparison of what it is in mature age." This leads him to observe, "That we have no means of determining by experience what is the certain bulk of the living being each man calls himself; and yet till it be determined that it is larger in bulk than the solid elementary particles of matter, which there is no ground to think any natural power can dis-
small in size as compared with his bodily frame, yet it
immeasurably surpasses it in value.

VIII.—1—3. The happiness resulting from moral virtue
is of a secondary kind, because—

(1.) Moral virtues belong to our compound nature, nay,
some seem to be the consequence even of our
corporeal nature, and to be connected with the
passions.

4. Whereas intellectual virtue is separate and distinct.

5. (2.) Intellectual happiness requires external good far
less than moral happiness, for the latter requires
means, resources, and occasions for its exercise.

6, 7. (3.) The perfection of a moral act consists not only
in the moral principle from which it proceeds, but
also in the act itself.

Now, for the perfection of an act, external means are
needed.

To contemplation, these are even impediments; nor are
they required by the contemplative man, except so far forth
as he is man.

8—11. The happiness of contemplation is that which
Aristotle supposes the gods enjoy, as he conceives it ridicu-
losous that they should be represented as engaged in pursuits
which give scope and opportunity for exercising the moral
virtue.

12, 13. The lower animals are incapable of true happi-
ness, because they are incapable of contemplation; therefore,
as far as contemplation extends, so far does happiness.

14, 15. Although the happy man, so far as he is man,
requires a certain portion of external good, nevertheless, he
does not want much—a competence is sufficient. He should
have "neither poverty nor riches;" he need not be lord of
earth and sea; as private individuals are at least quite as
capable of honourable acts as men in power.

16, 17. The opinions of Solon and Anaxagoras seem to
be perfectly consistent with those of Aristotle.

18. If arguments agree with facts, the corroborative testi-
mony borne to their correctness by the opinions of philoso-
phers ought to have weight.

19, 20. As contemplation is most probably the occupa-
sion, there is no sort of reason to think death to be the dissolution of
it."—Analogy, Part I. chap. i.
tion of the gods, he is most likely to be a favourite of heaven, who, in his occupations and enjoyments, resembles them; so that, on these grounds, the wise man is the happiest man.

IX.—1, 2. Moral precepts, and a knowledge of the theory of virtue, are insufficient to make men virtuous, and yet, as has been said, the object of moral science is not knowledge, but practice.

3—5. Ethical instruction has power over generous and liberal minds, but not over the minds of the masses, who are influenced by fear rather than by reason.

6. Now men are made good by nature, reasoning, and teaching.

Over nature we have no power, and reasoning and teaching exercise an influence only over minds cultivated for their reception by the moral cultivation of the habits, and thus instilling right principles, and correct views respecting the government of the passions, and on the subject of pleasure and pain.

7, 8. The moral character, therefore, must be formed by education, and this education ought to be enforced by law.

9—11. Nor is education and discipline necessary only so long as we are children, but throughout the whole of our lives. Hence it is thought that exhortations to virtue are the duty of legislators, as much as the punishment of evil-doers, and the entire banishment of the incorrigible from the community.

12, 13. Paternal or individual authority has no power to enforce its decrees, but the law has, and men are willing to acknowledge the supremacy of law, although they will not submit to individuals.

Therefore, the state ought to undertake education, and in this follow the very rare example of Lacedæmon and a few other states.

14—16. If the state neglects the duty, it devolves upon the parent.

In order, therefore, for him to qualify himself, he should make himself acquainted with the principles of legislation, for the same laws which regulate public systems would be also applicable to private ones.

17, 18. There are advantages in private education; such as the force of filial duty, and the power of adapting the system to particular cases.
19—21. A man may certainly legislate for particular cases, even without scientific knowledge; but nevertheless a theoretical study of the general principles of legislation will make him a better educator.

22—28. How, then, is the science of legislation to be acquired?

The sophists profess to teach it, but have no experience or practical knowledge.

The statesman has practical knowledge, but he either does not understand teaching, or at least he does not profess to teach.

29. Is it then sufficient to study digests and collections of laws? No; unless the student has experience and knowledge enough to guide him in determining which laws are best, and which, therefore, ought to be selected.

He must by habit have acquired the power of forming a correct judgment of the relative merits of laws and institutions.

30, 31. Now, this subject has been neglected by previous writers; therefore Aristotle proposes, in a treatise on politics,

(1.) To explain what former writers have correctly laid down.

(2.) To examine what are the causes of the preservation and destruction of commonwealths.

(3.) To determine what is the best form of polity.
THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF ARISTOTLE.

BOOK I.—CHAP. I.

What "the Good" is, and what the different kinds of Ends.

Every art and every scientific system, and in like manner every course of action and deliberate preference, seems to aim at some good; and consequently "the Good" has been well defined as "that which all things aim at."

But there appears to be a kind of difference in ends; for some are energies; others again beyond End, differ; some being

"Aristotle in his ethical system takes somewhat lower ground than Plato, inasmuch as the latter investigates what is good,—the former what is good for man; nevertheless, owing to this very difference, the system of Aristotle is more practical than that of Plato. The chief good is considered by Aristotle to be the end of the political science, by which he understands that science, the object of which is all that relates to the welfare of man. It therefore branches out into three divisions:—Ethics, which treat of the good of the individual; Economics, of the good of a family; Politics, properly so called, of the good of a state. Aristotle was the author of three ethical treatises:—(1.) The Nicomachean Ethics, so called either because he dedicated them to his son Nicomachus, or because Nicomachus arranged the MS. which his father left: Cicero appears to have considered Nicomachus the author. (2.) The Eudemian, which were arranged and published by his pupil Eudemus. (3.) The "Magna Moralia." It is not improbable that the two latter treatises were compiled from the notes of Aristotle's pupils."
these, certain works; but wherever there are certain ends besides the actions, there the works are naturally better than the energies.

3. Now since there are many actions, arts, and sciences, it follows that there are many ends; for of medicine the end is health; of ship-building, a ship; of generalship, victory; of economy, wealth. But whatever of such arts are contained under any one faculty, (as, for instance, under horsemanship is contained the art of making bridles, and all other horse furniture; and this and the whole art of war is contained under generalship; and in the same manner other arts are contained under different faculties;) in all these the ends of the chief arts are more eligible than the ends of the subordinate ones; because for the sake of the former, the latter are pursued. It makes, however, no difference whether the energies themselves, or something else besides these, are the ends of actions, just as it would make no difference in the sciences above mentioned.

The term energy, which I have retained as the translation of ἐνέργεια, requires some explanation. Energy, then, implies an activity or active state; it is opposed to δύναμις, i.e. capacity, faculty, potentiality, inasmuch as the latter may be dormant, and though capable of improvement, may be left unimproved; and it is possible for a thing to have the capacity of being, and yet not to be: as, for example, a coal has the capacity for burning, and yet it may perhaps never do so. Energy implies actual and active existence, not a mere possible or potential one. It is opposed to ἱκτις, habit, because by means of it habits are acquired and formed.

Hence we can see the difference between an energy and a work (ἱ��作) when considered as ends or final causes of action. Whenever we enter upon a course of action, we have one of two objects in view,—either the action itself, or some production or work to which it leads. For example, a painter paints either merely for the sake of painting, feeling an actual delight in this active exertion of his faculty for its own sake, or in order to produce a picture; in the former case, his end (τέλος) is an energy, in the latter a work. An energy, therefore, is perfect and complete, and has its end in itself, it looks to nothing further, it is eligible for its own sake; and hence seeing, contemplating, being happy, &c., are energies.
CHAP. II.

What is "the good" of Man.

If, therefore, there is some end of all that we do, which we wish for on its own account, and if we wish for all other things on account of this, and do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for thus we should go on to infinity, so that desire would be empty and vain), it is evident that this must be "the good," and the greatest good. Has not, then, the knowledge of this end a great influence on the conduct of life? and, like archers, shall we not be more likely to attain that which is right, if we have a mark? If so, we ought to endeavour to give an outline at least of its nature, and to determine to which of the sciences or faculties it belongs.

Now it would appear to be the end of that which is especially the chief and master science, and this seems to be the political science; for it directs what sciences states ought to cultivate, what individuals should learn, and how far they should pursue them. We see, too, that the most valued faculties are comprehended under it, as, for example, generalship, economy, rhetoric. Since, then, this science makes use of the practical sciences, and legislates respecting what ought to be done, and what abstained from, its end must include those of the others; so that this end must be the good of man. For although the good of an individual and a state be the same, still that of a state appears more important and more perfect both to obtain and to preserve. To discover the good of an individual is satisfactory, but to discover that of a state or a nation is more noble and divine. This, then, is the object of my treatise, which is of a political kind.
CHAP. III.

That Exactness depends on the nature of the subject. What are the qualifications of the Ethical Student.

1. The subject would be sufficiently discussed, if it were explained so far as the subject-matter allows; for exactness is not to be sought in all treatises alike, any more than in all productions of mechanic art. But things honourable and things just, the consideration of which falls within the province of political science, admit of such vast difference and uncertainty, that they seem to exist by law only, and not in the nature of things. Things good have also a similar uncertainty, because from them calamities have befallen many. For some, we know, have perished through wealth, and others through courage. We must be content, then, when treating of, and drawing conclusions from such subjects, to exhibit the truth roughly, and in outline; and when dealing with contingent matter, to draw conclusions of the same kind.

4. According to the same rule ought we to admit each assertion; for it is the part of an educated man to require exactness in each class of subjects, only so far as the nature of the subject admits; for it appears nearly the same thing to allow a mathematician to speak persuasively, as to demand demonstrations from an orator.

5. Now each individual judges well of what he knows, and of these he is a good judge. In each particular science, therefore, he is a good judge who has been instructed in them; and universally, he who has been instructed in all subjects. Therefore a young man is not a proper person to study political science, for he is inexperienced in the actions of life: but these are the subjects and grounds of this treatise. Moreover, being inclined to follow the dictates of passion, he will listen in vain, and without benefit,
since the end is not knowledge, but practice. But it makes no difference, whether he be a youth in age, or a novice in character; for the defect arises not from age, but from his life and pursuits being according to the dictates of passion; for to such persons knowledge becomes useless, as it does to the incontinent; but to those who regulate their appetites and actions according to reason, the knowledge of these subjects must be very beneficial. Concerning the student, and in what manner he is to admit our arguments, and what we propose to treat of, let thus much be preaced.

CHAP. IV.

What the highest Good is. False opinions of men concerning it. Whether we should argue Analytically or Synthetically.

But let us resume the subject from the commencement. Since all knowledge and every act of deliberate preference aims at some good, let us show what that is, which we say that the political science aims at, and what is the highest good of all things which are done. As to its name, indeed, almost all men are agreed; for both the vulgar and the educated call it happiness: but they suppose that to live well and do well are synonymous with being happy. But concerning the nature of happiness they are at variance, and the vulgar do not give the same definition of it as the educated; for some imagine it to be an obvious and well-known object—such as pleasure, or wealth, or honour; but different men think differently of it: and frequently even the same person entertains different opinions respecting views.

Such passages as these are proofs of what was stated in note (a); viz., that the system of Aristotle is more practical than that of Plato. It was this eminently practical turn of mind which led him to make his principal object not so much philosophical speculation, as the induction of facts and phenomena, and the definition of terms.
it at different times; for, when diseased, he believes it to be health; when poor, wealth; but, conscious of their own ignorance, they admire those who say that it is something great, and beyond them. Some.

4. again, have supposed that, besides these numerous goods, there is another self-existent good, which is to all these the cause of their being goods.\(^d\) Now, to examine all the opinions would perhaps be rather unprofitable; but it will be sufficient to examine those which lie most upon the surface, or seem to be most reasonable.

5. Let it not, however, escape our notice, that arguments from principles differ from arguments to principles; for well did Plato also propose doubts on this point, and inquire whether the right way is from principles or to principles; just as in the course from the starting-post to the goal, or the contrary.\(^e\) For we must begin from those things that are known; and things are known in two ways; for some are known to ourselves, others are generally known; perhaps, therefore, we should begin from the things known to ourselves.

6. Whoever, therefore, is to study with advantage the things which are honourable and just, and in a word the subjects of political science, must have been well and morally educated; for the point from whence we must begin is the fact, and if this is satisfactorily proved, it will be unnecessary to add the reason.\(^f\) Such a student either possesses, or would

\(^d\) Aristotle is here referring to Plato's theory of ideas or original achetypal forms, which he discusses more at length in chap. vi.

\(^e\) The geometrical and algebraic processes furnish us with excellent illustrations of synthetical and analytical reasoning; i.e. of reasoning ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐκ τὰς ἀρχὰς. In the former we assume certain fixed principles, the axioms, &c., and from them deduce new results; from them we proceed to others, and so on. In the latter we assume the result as given, and from those conditions investigate what causes, i.e. what values, of the unknown quantity will produce it.

\(^f\) Aristotle, in his Analytics, tells us there are four subjects of investigation; viz., ὅτι, ὅτι ἢ ὅτι, ἢ ὅτι, ὅτι ἢ ὅτι. The knowledge of the ὅτι constitutes the difference between
easily acquire, the principles. But let him who possesses neither of these qualifications, hear the sentiments of Hesiod:

"Far does the man all other men excel, 
Who, from his wisdom, thinks in all things well, 
Wisely considering, to himself a friend, 
All for the present best, and for the end. 
Nor is the man without his share of praise, 
Who well the dictates of the wise obeys: 
But he that is not wise himself, nor can 
Hearken to wisdom, is a useless man."


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CHAP. V.

That Happiness is neither Pleasure, nor Honour, nor Virtue, nor Wealth.

But let us return to the point where we commenced this digression; for men seem not unreasonably to form their notion of "the good," and of happiness, from observing the different lives which men lead. The many and most sordid class suppose it to be pleasure, and therefore they are content with a life of enjoyment.

For there are three kinds of lives which are most prominent—first, that just mentioned; secondly, the political; and, thirdly, the contemplative.

Now, the vulgar appear entirely slavish, deli- rately preferring the life of brutes; but they find a Opinion of reason for what they do, because many persons in oi πολλοί. positions of authority are led by the same passions as Sardanapalus.

But those who are educated, and fond of active pursuits, suppose it to be honour, for this may be Of χαρίν- almost said to be the end of political life; but it πείς and πρακτικοί. appears to be too superficial for the object of our empirical and scientific knowledge, as empirics know the fact ἦν, but not the reason ἦν ἦν ἦν.

οἱ χαριντες,—hommes instruits (Michelet).
inquiry; for it seems to reside rather in those who confer, than in those who receive, honour: but we have a natural conception, that "the good" is something peculiarly one's own, and difficult to be taken away. Moreover, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may believe themselves to be good; at any rate they seek to be honoured by wise men, and by their acquaintances, and on account of virtue: it is plain, therefore, that, at least in their opinion, virtue is superior. But perhaps it may rather be supposed that virtue is the end of the political life; but this appears too incomplete, for it seems possible for a man, while in possession of virtue, either to sleep or be inactive through life; and besides this, to suffer the greatest misfortunes and calamities. But no one would pronounce a man happy who lives such a life as this, unless he were defending a favourite hypothesis. Enough, therefore, of these things; for we have treated of them sufficiently in our encyclical works.

7. The contemplative life is the subject of future consideration. But the money-getting life does violence to our natural inclinations; and it is obvious that riches are not the good which we are in search of; for they

a The Stoics did defend this paradox, affirming that virtue or wisdom constituted happiness, even in the midst of the greatest misfortunes. See Horace, Sat. I. 3.

1 The philosophers of antiquity had necessarily two methods of teaching, the one esoteric or acroamatic, addressed to those who pursued science in a philosophic spirit; the other exoteric or encyclic, adapted to those who were going through a course or curriculum of general study. The exoteric treatises therefore would, generally speaking, embrace the usual subjects of Athenian liberal education; but as the distinction is one depending on the method of treatment rather than on the subject-matter, the same subjects might be treated either esoterically or exoterically, according to circumstances. The definition given by Cicero (de Finibus, v. 5) is not correct.

a The meaning of the term $βιοντης$, as applied to the money-getting life, is evidently that it does violence to our natural instincts, which lead us to look upon money as a means, and not an end; whereas the man who devotes himself to getting money generally learns to consider it as an end.
are merely useful, and for the sake of some other end. One would therefore rather suppose, that "the good" is one of the ends before mentioned, for they are loved on their own account; but even they do not appear to be so, although many arguments have been expended upon them. Let these things be dismissed from our consideration.

CHAP. VI.

That "the Good" is not a universal, according to one idea. 1

But perhaps it would be better to examine the 1. theory of a universal good, and to inquire what is Plato's doctrine of idea.

1 Previous to examining the nature of the doctrine itself, it is important to observe that Aristotle does not attempt to discuss the truth or falsehood of the Platonic doctrine of the idea generally; but that the only object which he has in view is to prove that the chief good is not an idea.

Hence he assumes as true, certain acknowledged positions in the Platonic theory, and shows that these are inconsistent with the belief in the ideal nature of the ἀγαθόν. After having done this, he dismisses the subject with the remark that such a view would be utterly unpractical; whereas something practical is the object of his investigation. Let us now proceed to examine what the Platonic doctrine of the idea is. According to Plato, the sensible is in a state of continual change, and consequently the sensible is not the true. But the object of true science is to investigate what each thing is of itself absolutely (τὸ αὐτὸ ἰκαστοῦ, τὸ αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ). Hence he assumed that there existed from all eternity certain archetypal forms immutable and absolutely existent; and that all else which exists, either physically or metaphysically, is only real so far as it participates in them (μετὰ, εἰκόνων ἰχθεί). These forms are the "ideas" and the idea may be defined, "That which makes everything which is, to be what it is," or "whatever exhibits an eternal truth, which forms the basis of the mutability of the sensible." These were the types (παραδείγματα) after which God made all created things, impressing their likeness upon matter (ἡμέρα), which was itself also eternal, formless, yet fitted to receive form. From the universal nature of the ἰδέα, it follows that there must be ideas of all abstract qualities, such as the good, the beautiful, the evil, health, strength, magnitude, colour; also of all sensible objects, such as a horse, a temple, a cup, a man; even of each
meant by it, although such an inquiry involves difficulties, because men who are our friends have introduced the doctrine of ideas. But perhaps it would seem to be better, and even necessary, at least for the preservation of truth, that we should even do away with private feelings, especially as we are philosophers; for both being dear to us, it is a sacred duty to prefer truth.

2. But those who introduced this doctrine, did not suppose ideas of those things in which they predicated priority and posteriority, and therefore they did not establish an idea of number. But the good is predicated in substance, in quality, and in relation. But the self-existent and the essence are naturally prior to that which is related; for this is like an offshoot, and an accident of the essence; so that there cannot be any common idea in these.

3. Again, since the good is predicated in as many ways as being (for it is predicated in essence, as God and intellect; and in quality, as the virtues; and in quantity, as the mean; and in relation, as utility; and in time, as opportunity; and in place, as a habitation, and so on), it is evident, that it cannot be anything common, universal, and one: for the individual man; e.g., Socrates and Simmias. It is evident, therefore, that we must not confound the Platonic idea with what we mean by abstract ideas, which are properties, accidents, &c. drawn off from objects, and contemplated separately; as, e.g., we may contemplate the scent or colour of a flower. Each of these, according to the Platonic theory, would have its corresponding "idea;" but still, as we have shown, there are other ideas which are not abstract. Nor did Plato teach that the idea is arrived at by abstraction or generalization; it is self-existent, eternal, and becomes known to us in our present condition by reminiscence; having been previously known to us in a former state of being.

As Plato held with the Pythagoreans that number and the elements of number were the elements of all things, therefore the ideas must be identical with numbers. In order, therefore, to understand the assertion that Plato did not form an "idea" of numbers, we must be careful to distinguish between the ideal numbers (δρομοὶ εἰδητικοὶ) and the numbers which admit of continuation (συνειδητοί), which are the mathematical; to the latter Aristotle refers in this passage. See Brewer's Ethics, Appendix, pp. 451-2.
it would not have been predicated in all the categories, but in one only. Also in the same category, there would then be some one science of all goods; but now there are many sciences, even of goods which fall under the same category; as, for instance, under the category of opportunity; for in war there is the science of generalship, but in disease, that of medicine; and again, in the category of the mean, in diet, there is the science of medicine; in labours, that of gymnastics.

But one might doubt as to what they mean by the term self-anything, since in self-man and man there is one and the same definition of man; for as far as they are man, they will not differ. But if so, neither will the good and the self-good differ, so far as they are good; nor yet will the self-good be more a good from being eternal; if the white which is of long duration is not whiter than that which lasts but for a day.

But the Pythagoreans seem to speak more plausibly on the subject when they place unity in the co-ordinate series of goods; whom Speusippus also seems to have followed.

The subject, however, may be discussed in another point of view; and what has been said.

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* The categories are certain principles of classification, and are ten in number; viz. substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, time, place, situation, possession. See on this subject Whateley's Logic.

* The Pythagoreans held that there were ten universal principles, which are exhibited in the following co-ordinate columns or συστοιχία:—

| πάντας      | ἀκρον      |
| ἀποκριτών   | ἀρτιον      |
| ἤν         | πληθος      |
| ἔξοιμα     | ἀριστερα    |
| ἀριστερα   | ἑν         |
| ἑρμοῦν     | οἰνοβιον    |
| ἐθνὸς     | καρπολον    |
| φῶς         | σεός        |
| ἀγαθὸν    | κακὸν       |
| τετράγωνον  | ἐτιρήμησις  |
admits of dispute, because our arguments are not applicable to every good; but those things which are pursued and loved on their own account, are predicated under one species, whilst the things which produce these, or in any way preserve them, or prevent the contrary, are said to be goods on account of these, and after another manner. It is evident, then, that goods may be so called in two ways; some on their own account, the others on account of the former. Having, therefore, separated those which are good on their own account, from those which are useful, let us consider whether they are predicated under one idea.

9. Now, what kind of goods may we assume to be goods on their own account? May we assume all those which are pursued even when alone, such as wisdom, sight, and some pleasures and honours, for these, even if we pursue them on account of something else, one would nevertheless class among things good on their own account; or is there nothing else good per se besides the idea? so that, in this view of the subject, the doctrine of the idea is without foundation. But if these also belong to the class of goods on their own account, the definition of good must necessarily show itself to be the same in all these; just as the definition of whiteness in snow, and white lead; but of honour, and prudence, and pleasure, the definitions are distinct and different in the very point which constitutes them goods. The good, therefore, is not anything common under one idea.

10. In what sense, then, is the term good predicated of these different things? for they are not like things which are homonymous accidentally; is it because they all proceed from one, or tend towards one good? or is it not rather predicated analogically? For as in the body sight is a good, so is intellect in the soul; and, in like manner, different things are goods under different circumstances.

11. But perhaps these questions should be dismissed for the present, for it would more properly belong
to another branch of philosophy to discuss them minutely. The same observation may be applied to the doctrine of the idea; for if there is some good predicated in common, or something separate, independent by itself, it is obvious it would neither be practical nor capable of being acquired by man; but something of this kind is the object of our present inquiry.

Perhaps, however, some might think that it were well to know it, with a view to those goods which are to be possessed and acted upon; for having this as a pattern, we shall better know the goods which are relatively to ourselves; and if we know them, we shall obtain them. Certainly this position has some plausibility, but it appears to be at variance with the sciences; for all of them, although aspiring after some good, and seeking to supply that which is deficient, omit the knowledge of this; and yet, that all artists should be ignorant of an aid of such consequence, and never inquire for it, is not at all reasonable. It is likewise difficult to say how a weaver or carpenter would be benefited with reference to his own art, by knowing the self-good; and how will he who has contemplated the idea itself be a more skilful physician, or a more able general? for the physician does not appear to regard health in this manner, but the health of man, or rather, perhaps, that of a particular individual; for he cures individual cases. Let it be sufficient, then, to have said so much on these subjects.

In this point the opinion of Cicero is at variance with that of Aristotle, for he believed that an artist would derive practical benefit from the mental contemplation of ideal excellence. —Vide Cic. Orat. c. 2.
CHAP. VII.

What is the End of all Human Actions.

1. Now let us again return to the good we are in search of, and inquire what it is; for it seems to be different in different courses of action and arts; for it is different in the art of medicine, in generalship, and in like manner in the rest. What then is the good in each? Is it not that, for the sake of which the other things are done? Now in the art of medicine this is health; in the art of generalship, victory; in architecture, a house; in different arts, different ends. But in every action and deliberate preference, it is the end; since for the sake of this all men do everything else. So that, if there is any end of all human actions, this must be the practical good; but if more ends than one, these must be it. By a different path, therefore, our argument has arrived at the same point; and this we must attempt to explain still farther.

3. Since ends appear to be more than one, and of these we choose some for the sake of others, as, for instance, riches, musical instruments, and universally all instruments whatever, it is plain that they are not all perfect. But the chief good appears to be something perfect; so that if there is some one end which is alone perfect, that must be the very thing which we are in search of; but if there are many, it must be the most perfect of them. Now we say, that the object pursued for its own sake is more perfect than that pursued for the sake of another; and that the object which is never chosen on account of another thing, is more perfect than those which are eligible both by themselves, and for sake of that other: in fine, we call that completely perfect, which is always eligible for its own sake, and never on account of anything else.
Of such a kind does happiness seem in a peculiar manner to be; for this we always choose on its own account, and never on account of anything else. But honour, and pleasure, and intellect, and every virtue we choose partly on their own account (for if there were no further advantage to result from them, we should choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, because we suppose that we shall attain happiness by their means; but no one chooses happiness for the sake of these, nor in short for the sake of anything else.

But the same result seems also to arise from self-sufficiency, for the perfect good appears to be self-sufficient; but we attribute self-sufficiency not to him who leads, for himself alone, a solitary life, but to him who lives also for his parents and children, and wife, and, in short, for his friends and fellow-citizens; since man is naturally a social being. Some limit, however, must be assigned; for, if we go so far as to include parents and descendants, and the friends of friends, we may go on to infinity. But this must be made the subject of future investigation. We define the "self-sufficient" as that which, when separated from everything else, makes life eligible, and in want of nothing; and such we suppose the nature of happiness to be; and moreover, we suppose it the most eligible of all things, even when not reckoned together with any other good; but more eligible, doubtless, even when reckoned together with the smallest good; for the part added becomes an excess of good; but of two goods the greater is always more eligible. Happiness, then, appears something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end of all human actions.

But, perhaps, to say that happiness is the greatest good, appears like stating something which is already granted; and it is desirable that we should explain still more clearly what it is. Per-
any work or course of action, the good and excellence of each appears to consist in their peculiar work; so would it appear to be with man, if there is any peculiar work belonging to him. Are there, then, certain peculiar works and courses of action belonging to the carpenter and shoemaker; and is there no peculiar work of man, but is he by nature without a work? or, as there appears to be a certain work peculiarly belonging to the eye, the hand, and the foot, and, in fine, to each of the members, in like manner would not one assume a certain work besides all these peculiarly belonging to man?

10. What, then, must this peculiar work be? For life man appears to share in common with plants; but his peculiar work is the object of our inquiry: we must, therefore, separate the life of nutrition and growth. Then a kind of sensitive life would next follow; but this also he appears to enjoy in common with the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, therefore, a certain practical life of a being which possesses reason; and of this one part is, as it were, obedient to reason, the other as possessing it, and exercising intellect. But this life also being spoken of in two ways [according to energy and according to habit], we must take that according to energy; for that appears to be more properly so called. Now if the work of man is an energy of the soul according to reason, or not without reason; and if we say that the work of man, and of a good man, is the same generically, as in the case of a harper, and a good harper (and so, in short, in all cases, superiority in each particular excellence being added to each particular work); for it is the work of a harper to play, of a good harper to play well: and if we assume the peculiar work of man to be a kind of life, and this life an energy of the soul, and actions performed with reason; and the peculiar work of a good man to be the same things done well, and honourably; and everything to be complete according to its proper excellence: if, I
repeat, these things are true, it follows, that man’s chief good is “an energy of the soul according to virtue;” but if the virtues are more than one, according to the best and most perfect virtue; and besides this, we must add, in a perfect life: for as ἰν βίον neither one swallow, nor one day, makes a spring; so neither does one day, nor a short time, make a man blessed and happy.

Let this then be the good in its general outlines; 13. for it is necessary, perhaps, first to sketch, then afterwards to complete the drawing. But it would seem to be incumbent upon every one to improve and distinctly delineate the figures which are correctly sketched, and time would seem to be the discoverer of such features as these, or at least a good assistant; whence also proceed the improvements in the arts; for it is the duty of every one to supply deficiencies. But it is necessary to bear in mind what has been mentioned already, and not to demand exactness equally in all subjects, but in each according to its subject-matter, and just so far as is appropriate to the system to which it belongs: for the carpenter and geometrical examine a right angle with different views; the one, so far as it is useful for his work, whilst the other investigates its nature and properties; for his object is the contemplation of the truth, for he is a contemplator of the truth. In the same manner, then, must we act in all other instances, that the mere accessories may not become more numerous than the works themselves. Nor, indeed, is the cause to be required in all cases alike; but it suffices in some, as for instance, in first principles, that their existence διότι be clearly shown; but the existence is the first and the principle.

Now of principles some are perceived by induction, others by sensation, others by a certain habit, and different principles in different ways; but we

1 By a perfect life (βίον τίλειον) Aristotle meant, first, the development of life to the highest degree of perfection; and, secondly, consistency from the beginning to the end.
must endeavour to trace each of them in the manner in which they are formed by nature; and we must use our utmost endeavours that they be well defined, for that has great weight in the discussions which follow. For the principle seems to be more than the half of the whole, and many of the subjects of our inquiry seem to become clear by means of this.

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CHAP. VIII.

That the Ancients agree with Aristotle on the subject of Happiness.

1. But we must consider the subject of happiness not only as regards the conclusion which we have drawn, and the premisses from which our arguments are derived, but also as regards the statements of others concerning it; for all the properties of a thing accord with the truth; but the truth is at once discordant with falsehood.

2. Now, goods being divided into three classes, and some being called external, others said to belong to the soul, and others to the body, we call those belonging to the soul, the superior, and good, in a higher sense than the others; but we assume, that the actions and energies of the soul belong to the soul. So that our assertion would be correct, according to this opinion at least, which is ancient, and allowed by philosophers, that certain actions and energies are the end; for thus it becomes one of the goods of the soul, and not one of the external ones.

3. Also, that the happy man lives well, and does well, harmonizes with our definition; for we have almost defined happiness as a kind of well living, and well doing.

* This threefold division of goods is due to the Pythagoreans, and was adopted by the Peripatetics.—See Cic. Acad. i. 5; Tusc. v. 85. Brewer.
Again, all the qualities required in happiness appear to exist in our definition; for to some it seems to be virtue, to others prudence, and to others a kind of wisdom: to some, again, these, or some one of these, with pleasure, or at least, not without pleasure; others, again, include external prosperity: but of these opinions, many ancient writers support some; a few celebrated philosophers the others; but it is reasonable to suppose that none of these have totally erred, but that in some one particular, at least, they are for the most part right.

Now with those, who say that it is every virtue, or some virtue, our definition accords; for this virtue belongs the energy. But perhaps it makes no slight difference whether we conceive the chief good to consist in possession, or in use; in habit, or in energy. For it is possible, that the habit, though really existing, should cause the performance of no good thing; as in the case of a man who is asleep, or in any other way is incapable of acting: but that the energy should do so is impossible; for of necessity it will act, and will act well. But as in the Olympic games, it is not the most beautiful and the strongest who are crowned, but those who engage in the conflict (for some of these are the conquerors); thus it is those only who act aright, who obtain what is honourable and good in life. Moreover, their life is of itself pleasant; for to be pleased, is one of the goods of the soul; but that is to every man pleasant, with reference to which he is said to be fond of such a thing; as, for example, a horse to the man who is fond of horses, and a spectacle to the man who is fond of spectacles; in like manner also, things just to the lover of justice; and, in a word, virtuous things to the lover of virtue.

* These primary opinions respecting happiness our author also enumerates in his Eudemian Ethics. The first he refers to Socrates, Plato, and some others; the second to Socrates, the third to Thales and Anaxagoras. Amongst those who added external happiness, he mentions Xenocrates.—Zell, quoted by Cardew.
10. Now the things that are pleasant to the generality of mankind, are at variance with each other, because they are not naturally pleasant; but things naturally pleasant, are pleasant to those who are fond of that which is honourable; and such are always the actions according to virtue; so that to these men they are pleasant, even of themselves. Their life therefore stands in no need of the addition of pleasure, as a kind of appendage or amulet, but possesses pleasure in itself; for, besides what has been said, the man who does not take pleasure in honourable actions, has no title to be called good; for neither would any person call that man just, who takes no pleasure in acting justly; nor that man liberal, who takes no pleasure in liberal actions; and in the other cases in like manner. But if this is the case, the actions of virtue must be pleasant of themselves; and yet they are also good and honourable, and each of these in the highest degree, if, indeed, the good man judges rightly concerning them; but he judges as we said.

Happiness, therefore, is the best, the most honourable, and the most pleasant of all things; and these qualities are not divided, as in the Delian inscription: "That which is most just is most honourable, and health is the most desirable, and the obtaining what we love the most pleasant." for all these qualities exist in the best energies; and these, or the best one of them, we say that happiness is. But, nevertheless, it appears to stand in need of the addition of external goods, as we said; for it is impossible, or not easy, for one who is not furnished with external means, to do honourable actions; for many things are done, as it were, by means of instruments, by friends, by money, or

1 Περιακτα were amulets suspended by the women round the necks of children, to protect them against enchantment.—Victor.

2 The same sentiment occurs in the Creusa of Sophocles:—

Κάλλιστον ἵστι τοιχίκιον περιάκταν,
Λαυρίστον δὲ ζεύν ἄνοσον ἱδίστον δ' ὑπερ
Πάριστι ληψίς, ἐν ἵρῇ μεν᾽ ἡμῖραν.
political influence. And if deprived of some things, men sully their happiness, as, for instance, of noble birth, good children, or beauty: for the man of deformed appearance, and of ignoble birth, and the solitary and childless man, is not at all likely to be happy; and still less perhaps is he likely to be so whose children or friends are utterly wicked, or have been good, and are dead. As, therefore, we said, there seems to be need of the addition of this sort of external prosperity; whence some people set down good fortune as synonymous with happiness, and others virtue.

CHAP. IX.

How Happiness is acquired.

Hence also a question is raised, whether happiness is acquired by learning, by habit, or by exercise of any other kind; or whether it is produced in a man by some heavenly dispensation, or even by chance. Now, if there is any other thing which is the gift of God to men, it is reasonable to suppose that happiness is a divine thing else, inasmuch as it is the best of human things. But this, perhaps, would more fitly belong to another kind of investigation: but, even if it be not sent from heaven, but is acquired by means of virtue, and of some kind of teaching or exercise, it appears to be one of the most divine of things; for the prize and end of virtue seems to be something which is best, godlike, and blessed. It must also be common to many; for it is possible, that by means of some teaching and care, it should exist in many every person who is not incapacitated for virtue. But if it is better that people should be happy by these means, than by chance, it is reasonable to suppose it is so, since natural productions are produced in the best way in which it is possible for
them to be produced; and likewise the productions of art, and of every efficient cause, and especially of the best cause. But to commit the greatest and the noblest of things to chance would be very inconsistent. Now the thing we are at present in search of receives additional clearness from the definition; for happiness has been said to be a kind of energy of the soul according to virtue; but of the remaining goods it is necessary that some exist in it, and that others should be naturally assistant and useful, instrumentally. But this will agree with what we stated in the beginning; for we set down the end of the political science as the good; and this devotes its principal attention to form the characters of the citizens, to make them good, and dispose them to honourable actions.

7. It is with reason, then, that we do not call an ox, a horse, or any other beast, happy; for none of them are able to participate in this kind of energy. For this cause, also, a child cannot be called happy; for from his time of life he is not yet able to perform such actions; but those who are so called, are called happy from hope; for, as we said, there is need of perfect virtue, and of perfect life. For the changes of life are numerous, and the accidents of fortune various; and it is possible for the man in the enjoyment of the greatest prosperity to become involved in great calamities in the time of his old age, as is related in the story of Priam, in the Iliad; and no man will call him happy, who has experienced such misfortunes, and died miserably.

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**CHAP. X.**

*Solon's Opinion discussed. The relation of external prosperity to Happiness.*

1. Are we, then, to call no other man happy as long as he lives, but is it necessary, as Solon says, to look
to the end! But if we must lay down this rule, is he then happy when he is dead? Or is this altogether absurd, especially in us who assert happiness to be a kind of energy? But if we do not call the dead man happy, and even Solon does not mean this, but that a person might then securely call a man happy, as beyond the reach of evils and misfortunes, even this assertion admits of some dispute. For if there is some good and evil to the man who is alive, and who is not aware of it, there may be supposed to be some to the dead man also, as honours and dishonours, and the good and evil fortunes of children and descendants generally. But this too occasions some difficulty; for when a man has lived happily till his old age, and has died in the same manner, it is possible that various changes may happen to his descendants, and that some of them

The story of Solon and Croesus is too well known to render it necessary to do more than refer the reader to Herod. book i. c. 32.

What the opinion of Aristotle was respecting the condition of the soul after death is difficult to determine, even from his treatise De Animâ; and still more so from the brief and incidental way in which he introduces the subject in this book, and in Book III. c. vi. In fact, in both places he appears to assume the views popularly held, those vague and undefined instincts which dictated such passages as—

Ωτε το γενέσθαι
Τιμᾶς προσάπτειν, οί τις ἔστι λεῖλος χάος.

Soph. Elect. 348,

and to reason on them without entering into the question of their truth or falsehood. It is evident that there is a vast difference between a belief in the immortality of the soul, and a belief in the permanence of its personal identity hereafter. The former doctrine could scarcely be denied by the philosopher who held that the human soul was "particula divinae animae;" but as after death it might be reunited to the essence of which it had been previously a part, it was quite possible to hold such a belief, and yet to have no personal interest in a future state.

On the whole subject of the opinions of ancient philosophers respecting the condition of the soul after death, see a most able note to Lecture III. of Humphrey's Hulsean Lectures for 1849; and on the particular views of Aristotle, see also Archbishop Whately's Peculiarities of the Christian Religion, page 120.
should be good, and enjoy a life according to their deserts, while others obtain the contrary one; but it is clearly possible for them, taking into consideration the distance of time, to stand in every imaginable relation towards their parents. Now it would be absurd, if the dead man were to participate in their changes, and be at one time happy, and then again miserable; and it would also be absurd, that the fortunes of children should not, in any instance, or at any time, reach to and affect the parents.

But we must return to the doubt originally started; for perhaps from its solution the present question might receive elucidation. Now, if it is necessary to look to the end, and then to call every man happy, not because he is, but because he has been, happy, how can it be otherwise than absurd, if, when he is happy, the thing which really exists in him shall be unable to be truly said of him, because we do not choose to call living men happy on account of the changes of life, and because we have in our minds conceived happiness to be something permanent, and by no means easily admitting of change, and because good and evil fortune come frequently round to the same persons? for it is clear, that if we constantly attend to the chances of fortune, we shall frequently call the same man at one time happy, and at another miserable, exhibiting the happy man as a kind of chameleon, and as placed upon an insecure foundation.

6. Or is this following of the accidents of fortune in no way right? for goodness and badness do not depend upon these, but human life, as we said, stands in need of external goods as additions; but virtuous energies are the essential constituents of happiness, and the contrary energies of the contrary to happiness. But the question we have just started bears testimony to the definition; for stability does not exist in any human thing so much as in virtuous energies; for these seem to be more permanent even than the sciences, and the most honourable of these are like-
wise the most stable, because happy men most frequently and most constantly pass their lives in them; for this seems to be the reason why there is no forgetfulness of them. Therefore, the thing which we are in search of will exist in the happy man, and throughout his life he will be of this character; for he always, or most of all men, will live in the practice and contemplation of virtuous actions, and he will bear the accidents of fortune most nobly, and in every case, and altogether suitably, as a man in reality good, and a faultless cube. But since the accidents of fortune are numerous, and differ in greatness and smallness, small instances of good fortune, and likewise of the opposite, clearly will not influence the balance of life; but great and numerous accidents, if on the side of good fortune, will make life more happy, for they naturally unite in giving additional embellishment, and the use of them becomes honourable and good; but if they happen on the other side, they crush and spoil the happiness; for they bring on sorrows, and are impediments to many energies. But nevertheless, even in these, the honourable is conspicuous, whenever a man bears with equanimity many and great misfortunes, not from insensibility, but because he is high-spirited and magnanimous.

But if the energies are the essential constituents of the happiness or the misery of life, as we said, no happy man can ever become miserable; for he will never do hateful and worthless actions; for we conceive that the man who is in reality good and wise, bears every accident of fortune in a becoming manner, and always acts in the most honourable manner that the circumstances admit of, just as the good general makes the most skilful use of the army he has, and the good shoemaker of the skins that are given him makes the most elegant shoe, and all

*A good man is compared to a cube, as being the emblem of perfection: Ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ τίτλοι.—Arist. Rhet. iii. 11. Similarly Horace says "in scipeo totus, teres, atque rotundus," Serm. ii. 7.
11. other artificers in the same manner. But if this is the case, the happy man can never become miserable; yet he would not be perfectly blessed, if he were to be involved in calamities like Priam's. Not that for this reason he is variable, or easily liable to change; for he will neither be moved from his happiness easily, nor by common misfortunes, but only by great and numerous ones; and after these, he cannot become happy again in a short time: but if he does at all, it will be after the lapse of some long and perfect period of time, having in the course of it successfully attained to great and honourable things. What then hinders us from calling that man happy, who energizes according to perfect virtue, and is sufficiently furnished with external goods, and that not for a short time, but for the full period of his life? Or must we add, that he is to go on living in the same manner, and die accordingly? since the future is to us invisible. But happiness we set down as in every way and altogether the end, and perfect. But if this be true, we shall call those men blessed amongst the living, in whom the things we have mentioned exist, and will continue to exist, but only blessed as men. And let these subjects have been thus far defined.

CHAP. XI.

That the Good or Ill-fortune of Descendants and Friends contributes somewhat to Happiness, and the reverse.

1. But it appears a very unfriendly idea, and one contrary to universal opinion, to suppose that the fortunes of descendants and friends do not in the smallest degree affect the dead man. But since the accidents of fortune that occur are numerous, and

* ἱσανῶς ἐκχορηγημένον, literally sufficiently equipped to act his part on the stage of human life; one duty of the χορηγὸς being to dress the characters suitably to their parts.
differ in various ways, and some of them come more home, and others less, it seems to be a tedious and endless task to discuss them individually; but perhaps it would be sufficient if what we say were said generally and in outline.

If, then, as in the case of misfortunes occurring 2. to one's self, some have weight and influence in life, while others appear lighter; the same exactly is the case with those which happen to all our friends. But it makes a great difference whether each misfortune happen to living or to dead persons; much greater difference than it makes in a tragedy, whether atrocious and horrible crimes are supposed to have been committed previously, or form part of the action of the play. We may then, in this way, 4. come to a conclusion respecting the extent of this difference; or rather, perhaps, respecting the answer to the question about the dead, and their participation in good and its opposites; for it appears from these observations, that, even if anything reaches them, whether good or evil, it must be weak and small, either absolutely, or relatively to them; or, if not this, it must be of such extent and description as not to make those happy who are not already happy, nor to deprive those who are happy of their happiness. Therefore the good fortune of their friends 5. seems in some degree to affect the dead, and in like manner their ill fortunes; but only in such a manner and to such an extent as neither to make the happy unhappy, nor to do anything else of this kind.

7 In the prologues of many Greek tragedies, previous events are related, which form part of the plot without forming part of the action of the drama. To these the words of Horace will apply:—

"Sequiam irritat animus demissa per aureas,
Quam quae sunt oculis subjecta fidibus."—A. P. 181.
See on this subject Cic. de Sen. xxiii.
CHAP. XII.

That Happiness belongs to the class of things Honourable, and not of things Praised.

1. These points being determined, let us next consider happiness, whether it be one of things praised or rather of things honourable; for it is clear that it is not one of the faculties. Now, everything that is praised seems to be praised because it is of a certain character, and has a certain relation to something; for we praise the just man, and the brave man, and the good man generally, and virtue, on account of their works and actions; and the strong man, and the good runner, and every one else whom we praise, because he naturally is of a certain character, and has a certain relation to something that is good and excellent.

2. But this is clear from the praises that are given to the gods; for they appear ridiculous when referred to us; but this happens because praises are bestowed relatively to some standard, as we said. But if praise belongs to things of this kind, it is clear that it does not belong to the best things, but something greater and better is bestowed upon them, as also seems to be the case: for we predicate blessedness* and happiness of the gods, and of the most godlike of men; and likewise of the most godlike of goods; for no man praises happiness as he would justice, but calls it blessed, as being something more divine and excellent.

3. But Eudoxus also appears to have pleaded well for the claim of pleasure to the highest place; for he thought that its not being praised, when it was one of the goods, proved it to be superior to all things praised; but God and the highest good are of this

4. The term μακάριος, in Latin "beatus," applies to perfect happiness; hence, in both the Greek and Latin churches, these words have been used to express the happiness of the saints; e.g., δ. μακάριος Παῦλος, Beata virgo, &c.; whereas, εὐδαιμον (felix) applies to such happiness as it is possible for a mortal to attain to.
kind, for everything else is referred to these; for praise is of virtue, for from this man are able to perform honourable actions; but encomiums are of works, as well bodily as mental. But to discuss these matters with exactness belongs perhaps more properly to those who study encomiums; but for our purpose it is clear, from what has been said, that happiness is one of things honourable and perfect. And this seems to be the case, from its being a principle; for, for the sake of this all of us do everything else; but we assume the principle and the cause of goods to be something honourable and divine.

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CHAP. XIII.

Concerning the Divisions of the Soul, and concerning Virtue.

But since happiness is a certain energy of the soul according to perfect virtue, we must next consider the subject of virtue; for thus, perhaps, we should see more clearly respecting happiness. But he who in reality is skilled in political philosophy, appears to devote the principal part of his study to this; for he wishes to make the citizens good and obedient to the laws; but we have an example of this in the legislators of the Cretans and Lacedæmonians, and any others who may have become like them. But if this is the peculiar study of political philosophy, it is clear that the investigation would be consistent with our original plan.

We must therefore next examine virtue, that is to say, of course, human virtue; for the Why human which we were in search of is human good, man virtue. and the happiness, human happiness; but by human happiness we mean, not that of the body; but that of the soul; and happiness, too, we define to be an energy of the soul. But if these things are true, it is evidently necessary for the political philosopher to have some knowledge of what relates to the soul; just as it is necessary for
the man who intends to cure the eyes, to study the whole body; and still more, in proportion as political philosophy is more honourable and excellent than the science of medicine; and the best educated physicians take a great deal of pains in acquiring a knowledge of the human body.

5. The student of political philosophy must therefore study the soul, but he must study it for the sake of these things, and only so far as is sufficient for the objects which he has in view; for greater exactness requires more labour perhaps than the subject in hand demands. But some things are said about it sufficiently in my exoteric discourses; and these we must make use of: as, for instance, that one part of it is irrational, and the other possessing reason. But whether these things are really separate, like the members of the body, and everything that is capable of division; or whether, being by nature indivisible, they are only in word two, as in a circumference the convex and concave side, matters not for our present purpose.

6. But of the irrational part, one division is like that which is common, and belonging to plants; that, I mean, which is the cause of nourishment and growth: for a person might assert that such a faculty of life as this exists in all beings that are nourished, even in embryos, and the very same in perfect beings: for it is more reasonable to call it the same than any other. The excellence of this part, therefore, appears common to other beings, and not peculiar to man; for this part of the soul, and its faculties, seem to energize principally in sleep; but the good and the bad man are in sleep least distinguishable; whence men say, that for half their lives there is no difference between the

7. Virtue does not belong to this.


9. Happy and the miserable. But it is reasonable that this should be the case; for sleep is the inaction of the soul, so far forth as it is called good or bad; except if some emotions in a small degree reach it, and in this manner the visions of good men become better than those of the generality. But
enough of these things; we must therefore put aside the part which consists in nourishment, since it has naturally no connection with human virtue.

Now another natural power of the soul appears to be irrational, but to participate in reason in some sort; for we praise the reason of the continent and incontinent man, and that part of the soul which is endowed with reason; for it exhorts us aright, and to the best actions. But there seems to be in man something else by nature contrary to reason, which contends with and resists reason. For, in reality, just as the paralyzed limbs of the body, when we intend to move them to the right hand, are turned aside the opposite way to the left, so it is with the soul; for the impulses of the incontinent are directed towards the contraries. But in the case of the body we see the part that is turned aside, in the soul we do not see it; but perhaps we must no less believe that there is in the soul something contrary to reason, which opposes and resists it; but how it differs it matters not. But this part also seems, as we said, to partake of reason; at least in the continent man it obeys reason; but in the temperate or brave man it is perhaps still more ready to listen to reason: for in them it entirely agrees with reason.

The irrational part therefore appears to be two-fold; for the part which is common to plants does not at all partake of reason; but the part which contains the desires and the appetites generally in some sense partakes of reason, in that it is submissive and obedient to it. Thus, in fact, we say that a man has regard for his father and friends, but not in the same sense in which we use the expression \( \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \nu \varepsilon \chi \xi \nu \nu \) in mathematica. But the giving of advice, and all reproaching and exhorting, prove that the irrational part is in some sense persuaded by reason. But if it is necessary to say that this has reason likewise, the part which has reason will be twofold also; one

\[ \text{There is an ambiguity in the original which does not exist in the translation, as } \lambda \omicron \gamma \omicron \omicron \nu \varepsilon \chi \xi \nu \nu \text{ means, (1) to pay regard to, (2) to bear a ratio to, in the mathematical sense.} \]
15. part properly and in itself, the other as though listening to the suggestions of a parent.\footnote{The soul is considered by Aristotle as the only cause and principle of all the phenomena of physical and intellectual life, \( \psi\nu\chi\eta \) therefore includes "animus" and "anima." His division of \( \psi\nu\chi\eta \) may be explained by the two following tables:—}

But virtue also is divided according to this difference; for we call some of the virtues intellectual, others moral—wisdom, and intelligence, and prudence, we call intellectual, but liberality and temperance, moral; for when speaking of the moral character of a man, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is meek or temperate; but we praise the wise man also according to his habits; but praiseworthy habits we call virtues.

\footnote{The second table must be adopted if the rational part is subdivided.}
BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

How Virtue is produced, and increased.

VIRTUE being twofold, one part intellectual and 1. the other moral, intellectual virtue has its origin and increase for the most part from teaching; therefore it stands in need of experience and time; but moral virtue arises from habit, whence also it has got its name, which is only in a small degree altered from ἱθὸς. a Whence it is also clear, that not one of the moral virtues springs up in us by nature, for none of those things which exist by nature experience alteration from habit; for instance, the stone which by nature goes downwards could never be accustomed to go upwards, not even if one should attempt ten thousand times, by throwing it up, to give it this habit; nor could fire be accustomed to burn downwards; nor could anything else which has one natural bent get another different one from habit. The virtues, then, are produced in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but, we being

The origin and increase of intellectual and moral virtue.

2. Moral virtue is not innate. (1.) Because it can be altered.

a Anglicē “habit.” ἱθὸς is the result of the accumulation of habits, i.e. character. Plato taught that the moral virtues were not generated in us either by nature or by learning, but were divinely bestowed. The Stoics rejected the twofold division of the soul and of virtue, mentioned in Book I., and asserted that they were all sciences. Hence Cicero says (de Off. lib. iii.), temperantia est scientia. They believed, however, that the virtues were acquired; for that there were innate in us certain common ideas (κοιναί ἄρχονται), certain “seeds of virtue,” and “lights of nature,” which could be cultivated and brought to perfection. Aristotle, on the other hand, denied the existence of innate ideas, and compared the soul to a blank tablet, on which nothing was inscribed except τὸ φυσικὸς, i.e. natural inclination.
naturally adapted to receive them, and this natural
capacity is perfected by habit. Further, in every
case where anything is produced in us naturally,
we first get the capacities for doing these things, and
afterwards perform the energies; which is evident
in the case of the senses; for it was not from fre-
quently seeing or frequently hearing that we got
the senses, but, on the contrary, we had them first,
and then used them, and did not get them by
having used them. But we get the virtues by
having first performed the energies, as is the case also
in all the other arts; for those things which we
must do after having learnt them we learn to do by
doing them; as, for example, by building houses men
become builders, and by playing on the harp, harp-
players; thus, also, by doing just actions we become
just, by performing temperate actions, temperate,
and by performing brave actions we become brave.

5. Moreover, that which happens in all states bears
testimony to this; for legislators, by giving their
citizens good habits, make them good; and this is
the intention of every lawgiver, and all that do
not do it well fail; and this makes all the differ-
ence between states, whether they be good or bad.

6. Again, every virtue is produced and corrupted
from and by means of the same causes; and in
like manner every art; for from playing on the
harp people become both good and bad harp-
players; and, analogously, builders and all the
rest; for from building well men will become good
builders, and from building badly bad ones; for if
this were not the case, there would be no need of
a person to teach, and all would have been by
birth, some good and some bad. The same holds
good in the case of the virtues also; for by per-
forming those actions which occur in our inter-

b Actions produce contrary moral effects. Two men en-
genred in the same pursuits, exposed to the same temptations,
may become, the one virtuous, the other vicious. In the
order of nature, causes act uniformly, they cannot produce
opposite effects; therefore, virtue does not come by nature.
course with other men, some of us become just and some unjust; and by acting in circumstances of danger, and being accustomed to be fearful or confident, some become brave and others cowards. The same thing is true in cases of desire and anger; for some become temperate and mild, and others intemperate and passionate—one class from having behaved themselves in such cases in one way, and the other class in another. In a word, the habits are produced out of similar energies; therefore, the energies which we perform must be of a certain character; for, with the differences of the energies the habits correspond. It does not therefore make a slight, but an important, nay, rather, the whole difference, whether we have been brought up in these habits or in others from childhood.

CHAP. II.

That Excess and Defect destroy Virtue, but that being in the mean preserves it.

Since our present treatise is not for the purpose of mere speculation, as all others are, for the object of our investigation is not the knowing what virtue is, but to become good (since otherwise there would be no use in it), it is necessary to study the subject of actions, and how we must perform them; for these have entire influence over our habits to cause them to become of a certain character, as we have said. Now, to say that we must act according to right reason is a general maxim, and let it be assumed; but we will speak hereafter about it, and about the nature of right reason, and its relation to the other virtues. But this point must first be fully granted, that everything said on moral sub-

* Aristotle discusses the nature of right reason (ὁφθής λόγος) in the sixth book.
jects ought to be said in outline, and not with exactness; just as we said in the beginning, that arguments must be demanded of such a nature only as the subject-matter admits; but the subjects of moral conduct and of expediency have no stability, just as also things wholesome. But if the treatment of the subject generally is of this nature, still less does it admit of exactness in particulars; for it comes under no art or set of precepts, but it is the duty of the agents themselves to look to the circumstances of the occasion, just as is the case in the arts of medicine and navigation. But although the subject before us is of this description, yet we must endeavour to do the best we can to help it.

4. This, then, we must first observe, that things of this kind are naturally destroyed both by defect and excess (for it is necessary in the case of things which cannot be seen to make use of illustrations which can be seen), just as we see in the case of strength and health; for too much as well as too little exercise destroys strength. In like manner drink and food, whether there be too little or too much of them, destroy health, but moderation in quantity causes, increases, and preserves it. The same thing, therefore, holds good in the case of temperance, and courage, and the other virtues; for he who flies from and is afraid of everything, and stands up against nothing, becomes a coward; and he who fears nothing at all, but goes boldly at everything, becomes rash. In like manner, he who indulges in the enjoyment of every pleasure, and refrains from none, is intemperate; but he who shuns all, as clowns do, becomes a kind of insensible man. For temperance and courage are destroyed both by the excess and the defect, but are preserved by the mean.

5. But not only do the generation, and increase, and destruction of these originate in the same sources and

4 This assertion must be limited to the moral virtues, of which he is now about to treat, as in the intellectual virtues there can be no excess, it being impossible to carry intellectual excellence to too high a point.
through the same means, but the energies also will be employed on the same; for this is the case in other things which are more plain to be seen; as in the case of strength, for it is produced by taking much food and sustaining many labours; and the strong man is more able to do these things than any other person. The case with the virtues is the same; for by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and when we have become so, we are best able to abstain from them. The same also is the case with courage; for by being accustomed to despise objects of fear, and to bear them, we become brave, and when we have become so, we are best able to bear them.

CHAP. III.

That Virtue is concerned with Pleasures and Pains.

But we must make the pleasure or pain which follows after acts a test of the habits; for he who abstains from the bodily pleasures, and in this very thing takes pleasure, is temperate; but he who feels pain at it is intemperate; and he who meets dangers and rejoices at it, or at least feels no pain, is brave; but he who feels pain is a coward; for moral virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains; for by reason of pleasure we do what is wicked, and through pain we abstain from honourable acts. Therefore it is necessary to be in some manner trained immediately from our childhood, as Plato says, to feel

* For example, circumstances of danger produce, improve, and educate courage; and it is in the same circumstances that the energies of the brave man are called forth and exerted.

" This is another instance of the practical turn of Aristotle's mind. We can scarcely have a more useful test. So long as any uneasiness or pain is felt at doing any action, we may be quite sure that the habit is imperfectly formed.

* Plato (de Leg. ii.) says, λίγω τοιν τών παιδιών παιδικήν εἶναι πρώτην αἰσθήσεως, ἤδονὴν καὶ λυπήν.
pleasure and pain at proper objects; for this is right education. Again, if the virtues are conversant with actions and passions, and pleasure and pain are consequent upon every action and passion; on this account, also, virtue must be conversant with pleasures and pains. Punishments also, which

4. are inflicted by means of pleasure and pain, indicate the same thing; for they are kinds of remedies, and remedies naturally work by contraries. Again, as we said before, every habit of the soul has a natural relation and reference to those things by which it naturally becomes better and worse. But habits become bad by means of pleasures and pains, by pursuing or avoiding either improper ones, or at improper times, in improper ways, or improperly in any other manner, which reason determines.

5. Hence some have even defined the virtues to be certain states of apathy and tranquillity; but not correctly, in that they speak absolutely, and not in relation to propriety of time or manner, and so on through the other categories. Therefore virtue is supposed to be such as we have said, in relation to pleasures and pains, and apt to practise the best things; and vice is the contrary.

6. These subjects may also become plain to us from the following considerations. Since there are three things which lead us to choice, and three to aversion,—the honourable, the expedient, and the pleasant; and three contraries to them,—the disgraceful, the inexpedient, and the painful; on all these subjects the good man is apt to be right in his actions, and the bad man is apt to be wrong, and especially on the subject of pleasure; for this is common to all living creatures, and accompanies all things which are the objects of choice; for both the honourable and the expedient appear pleasant.

7. Again, from our infancy it has grown up with all of

\[ h \] The Cynics, and after them the Stoics and Epicureans, adopted this theory of virtue; it is probable that Aristotle is here alluding to it as an opinion held by Socrates.
us; and therefore it is difficult to rub out this affection, which is, as it were, engrained in our very 3.
existence. Again, we make pleasure and pain the rule of our actions, some of us in a greater, some in less degree. For this reason, therefore, it is necessary that our whole business must be with these subjects; for, to feel pleasure or pain, properly or improperly, makes no slight difference to our actions. Again, it is more difficult to resist pleasure 9.
than anger, as Heraclitus says, and both art and excellence are always conversant with that which is more difficult; for excellence in this case is superior. So that, for this reason also, the whole business of virtue, and political philosophy, must be with pleasures and pains; for he who makes a proper use of these will be good, and he who makes a bad use will be bad. Now on the point that 10.
virtue is conversant with pleasures and pains, and that it is increased and destroyed by means of the same things from which it originally sprung, when they are differently circumstanced; and that its energies are employed on those things out of which pain.
it originates, let enough have been said.

CHAP. IV.

*That Men become just and temperate by performing just and temperate Actions.*

But a person may be in difficulty as to what we 1.
mean when we say that it is necessary for men to become just by performing just actions, and temperate by performing temperate ones;¹ for if they

¹ The ethical student of course will not fail to consult on this subject Bishop Butler's Analogy; he will there observe not only the parallelism between his moral theory and that of Aristotle, but also the important distinction which he draws between practical habits and passive impressions. "In like manner," he says, "as habits belonging to the body are produced by external acts, so habits of the mind are produced by
do just and temperate actions, they are already just and temperate; just as, if they do grammatical and musical actions, they are grammarians and musicians. Or, is this not the case in the arts also? For it is possible to do a grammatical action accidentally, or at another’s suggestion. A man, therefore, will only then be a grammarian, when he not only does a grammatical action, but also does it grammatically, that is, in accordance with the grammatical science, which he possesses in himself.

3. Again, the case is not similar in the arts and in the virtues, for the productions of art have their excellence in themselves. It is enough, then, that these should themselves be of a certain character; but acts of virtue are done justly and temperately, not, if they have themselves a certain character, but if the agent, being himself of a certain character, perform them: first, if he does them knowingly; then if with deliberate choice, and deliberate choice on their own account; and, thirdly, if he does them on a fixed and unchangeable principle. Now as to the possession of all other arts, these qualifications, with the exception of knowledge, do not enter into the calculation; but towards the possession of the virtues, knowledge has little or no weight; but the other qualifications are not of small, but rather of infinite importance, since they arise from the frequent practice of just and temperate actions.

4. Acts then are called just and temperate, when they are such as the just or temperate man would do; but he who performs these acts is not a just and temperate man, but he who performs them in such a manner as just and temperate men do the exertion of inward practical principles; i.e. by carrying them into act, or acting upon them;—the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity. But going over the theory of virtue in one’s thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it, may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible; i.e. form a habit of insensibility to all moral considerations. For from our very faculty of habits, passive impressions, by being repeated, grow weaker.”—Anal. Part I. ch. v
them. It is well said, therefore, that from performing just actions, a man becomes just; and from performing temperate ones, temperate; but without performing them no person would even be likely to become good. But the generality of men do not do these things, but taking refuge in words, they think that they are philosophers, and that in this manner they will become good men; and what they do is like what sick people do, who listen attentively to their physicians, and then do not attend to the things which they prescribe. Just as these, then, will never be in a good state of body under such treatment, so these will never be in a good state of mind, if this is their philosophy.

CHAP. V.

What is the "Genus" of Virtue. That it is a Habit.

But we must next find out what the genus of virtue is. Since, then, the qualities which have their origin in the soul are three,—Passions, Capacities, and Habits,—Virtue must be some one of these. By passions, I mean, Desire, Anger, Fear, Confidence, Envy, Joy, Love, Hatred, Regret, Emulation, Pity; in a word, those feelings which are followed by pleasure or pain; by capacities, those qualities by means of which we are said to be able to be under the influence of these passions; as those by means of which we are able to feel anger, pain, or pity; by habits, those by means of which we are well or ill disposed with relation to the passions; "Eficet ac with relation to being made angry, if we feel

k Cicero, giving a short analysis of the doctrines of the Old Academy and Peripatetics ( nihil enim inter Peripateticos et illam veterem Academiam differebat), thus describes their doctrine of moral virtues:—"Morum autem putabant studia esse et quasi consuetudinem (Itheta) : quam partim exercitationis assiduitate, partim ratione formabant ; in quibus erat philosophia ipse. In qua quod inchoatum est neque absolutum progressio quaedam ad virtutem appellatur : quod autem absolutum, id est virtus, quasi perfectio naturae."—Acad. i. 5. "Brewer.
angrty too vehemently or too remissly, we are ill disposed; if we do it moderately, well disposed; and in like manner with relation to the others.

5. Neither the virtues, therefore, nor the vices are passions; because we are not called good or bad according to our passions, but according to our virtues or vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed according to our passions (for the man who fears or is angry, is not praised; nor is the man who is simply angry, blamed; but the man who is angry in a certain way); but according to our virtues and vices, we are praised or blamed. Again, we feel anger and fear without deliberate preference; but the virtues are acts of deliberate preference, or at any rate, not without deliberate preference. But besides these things, we are said to be “moved” by our passions, but we are not said to be moved, but in some way to be “disposed,”¹ by our virtues and vices. For these reasons, also, they are not capacities; for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for our being able to feel passions simply. And again, we have our capacities by nature; but we do not become good or bad by nature; but of this we have already spoken. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor capacities, it remains that they are habits. What, therefore, the “genus” of virtue is, has been sufficiently shown.

¹ Aristotle (Categ. c. vi. 4) thus explains the difference between disposition (διάθεσις) and habit (εἶκος):—“Habit is more lasting and more durable than disposition. The former term applies to the sciences, virtues, &c.; the latter to such states as are easily and quickly changed; as heat and cold, sickness and health.” This verbal argument is an indication of the importance which the Aristotelian philosophy attaches to language. Verbal arguments are seldom very conclusive, but as doubtless words are the signs of things and ideas, there are instances, like the present, in which such arguments are of some value. The definition of terms was Aristotle’s passion. The following is, according to Asparius, quoted by Michelet, the relation between δυνάμεις, ἰσθισμα, and εἶκος. “Facultas a natura insita jam est potentia quaedam, sed nondum vobis, ut loquimur, potentia, cujas ex ipso vigore operatio profusat; hanc demum potentiam philosophus habebat vocat.”
CHAP. VI.

That Virtue is a mean state, and how it is so.

But it is necessary not only to say that virtue is a habit, but also what sort of a habit it is. We must say, therefore, that every virtue makes that of which it is the virtue to be in a good state, and makes its work good also; for instance, the virtue of the eye makes both the eye and the work of the eye good; for by the virtue of the eye we see well. In like manner, the virtue of a horse makes a horse good, and good in speed, and in carrying its rider, and in standing the attack of the enemy. If, then, this is the case in all instances, the virtue of man also must be a habit, from which man becomes good, and from which he will perform his work well. But how this will be, we have already stated. And again, it will be made manifest in the following manner, if we investigate the specific nature of virtue. Now, in all quantity, continuous or divisible, it is possible to take the greater, the less, or the equal; and these either with relation to the thing itself, or to ourselves; but the equal is some mean between excess and defect. But by the mean This is with relation to the thing itself, I mean that which is equidistant from both of the extremes, and this is one and the same in all cases; but by the mean, with relation to ourselves, I mean that which is neither too much nor too little for us. But this is not one and the same to all; as, for example, if ten is too many, and two too few, six is taken for the absolute mean, for it exceeds two as much as it is exceeded by ten. But this is the mean according to arithmetical proportion. But the relative mean

* The word ἀρετή means not only moral virtue but the excellence and perfection of anything whatever. Thus Cicero says (de Leg. i. 8): "Est autem virtus nihil aliud quam in se perfecta et ad summum perducta natura."

* See Book II. ch. ii.
is not to be taken in this manner; for it does not follow, that if ten pounds are too much for any person to eat, and two pounds too little, the training-master will prescribe six pounds; for perhaps this is too much or too little for the person who is to eat it. For it is too little for Milo, but too much for one just commencing gymnastics; and the case is similar in running and wrestling. Thus, then, every person who has knowledge shuns the excess and the defect, but seeks for the mean, and chooses it; not the absolute mean, but the relative one.

6. If, then, every science accomplishes its work well, by keeping the mean in view, and directing its works to it (whence people are accustomed to say of excellent works, that it is impossible to take anything away, or add anything to them, since excess and defect destroy the excellence, but the being in the mean preserves it), and if good artisans, as we may say, perform their work, keeping this in view, then virtue, being, like nature, more accurate and excellent than any art, must be apt to hit the mean. But I mean moral virtue; for it is conversant with passions and actions; and in these there is defect and excess, and the mean; as, for example, we may feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and, in a word, pleasure and pain, both too much and too little, and in both cases improperly. But the time when, and the cases in which, and the persons towards whom, and the motive for which, and the manner in which, constitute the mean and the excellence; and this is the characteristic property of virtue.

7. In like manner, in actions there are excess and defect, and the mean; but virtue is conversant with passions and actions, and in them excess is wrong, and defect is blamed, but the mean is praised, and is correct; and both these are properties of

* The story of Milo is well known:—

"Remember Milo’s end,

Wedged in the timbers which he strove to rend."

_Roscommon._
virtue. Virtue, then, is a kind of mean state, being at least apt to hit the mean. Again, it is possible to go wrong in many ways (for evil, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, is of the nature of the infinite, but good of the finite); but we can go right in one way only; and for this reason the former is easy, and the latter difficult; it is easy to miss a mark, but difficult to hit it; and for these reasons, therefore, the excess and defect belong to vice, but the mean state to virtue; for, "we are good in one way only, but bad in all sorts of ways."

Virtue, therefore, is a "habit, accompanied with deliberate preference, in the relative mean, defined by reason, and as the prudent man would define it." It is a mean state between two vices, one in excess, the other in defect; and it is so, moreover, because of the vices one division falls short of, and the other exceeds what is right, both in passions and actions, whilst virtue discovers the mean and chooses it. Therefore, with reference to its essence, and the definition which states its substance, virtue is a mean state; but with reference to the standard of "the best" and "the excellent," it is an extreme. But it is not every action, nor every passion, which admits of the mean state; for some have their badness at once implied in their name; as, for example, malevolence, shamelessness, envy; and amongst actions, adultery, theft, homicide. For all these, and such as these, are so called from their being themselves bad, not because their excesses or defects are bad. In these, then, it is impossible ever to be right, but we must always be wrong. Nor does the right or wrong in such cases as these depend at all upon the person with whom, or the time when, or the manner in

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" See the co-ordinate catalogue of goods adopted by the Pythagoreans, given p. 11.

" The original expression, here translated "substance," is ῥό ἰ ῦν ἵνα; literally, "the being what it is." This is equivalent to "substance or essential nature."
which, adultery is committed; but absolutely the
doing of any one of these things is wrong. It
would be equally absurd, then, to require a mean
state, and an excess, and a defect, in injustice, and
cowardice, and intemperance. For thus there would

14. be a mean state of excess and defect, and an excess
of excess, and a defect of defect. But just as there
is no excess and defect of temperance and courage
(owing to the fact that the mean is in some sense
an extreme), so neither in the case of these is
there a mean state, excess, or defect; but however
they be done, sin is committed. For, in a word,
there is neither a mean state of excess and defect,
nor an excess and defect of a mean state.

CHAP. VII.

An Enumeration of Mean Habits.

1. But it is necessary that this should not only be
stated generally, but that it should also be applicable
to the particular cases; for in discussions on subjects
of moral action, universal statements are apt to be
too vague, but particular ones are more consistent
with truth; for actions are conversant with par-
ticulars; but it is necessary that the statements
should agree with these. These particulars, then,

2. we must get from the diagram.* Now, on the
subject of fear and confidence, courage is the mean
state. Of the persons who are in excess, he who is
in the excess of fearlessness has no name; but
there are many cases without names; and he who
is in the excess of confidence, is called rash; but
he who is in the excess of fear, but in the defect
of confidence, is cowardly.

3. On the subject of pleasures and pains (but not all
pleasures and pains, and less in the case of pains

* Probably some diagram to which he referred during the
oral delivery of his lectures.
than pleasures), temperance is the mean state, and
intemperance the excess. But there are, in fact,
none who are in the defect on the subject of
pleasures; therefore these also have no name; but
let them be called insensible.

On the subject of the giving and receiving of
money, liberality is the mean state, and the excess
and defect, prodigality and illiberality. But in
these, the excess and defect are mutually contrary
to each other; for the prodigal man is in the
excess in giving money, but is in the defect in re-
ceiving; but the illiberal man is in the excess in
receiving, but in the defect in giving. Now, there-
fore, we are speaking on these points as in an out-
line, and summarily, because we consider this suffi-
cient; but afterwards more accurate distinctions shall
be drawn respecting them.

But on the subject of money there are other dis-
positions also: magnificence is a mean state; but
the magnificent man differs from the liberal man;
for one has to do with great things, the other with
small ones; the excess is bad taste and vulgar pro-
fusion, the defect shabbiness. But these differ from
the vices which are related to liberality; but their
points of difference shall be stated hereafter.

On the subject of honour and dishonour, mag-
nanimity is the mean; the excess, a vice called
empty vanity; the defect, meanness of spirit.

But as we said that liberality, when compared
with magnificence, differed from it in being con-
cerned with small things, so there is a kind of feeling
which, being itself about small honour, has the same
relation to magnanimity, which is about great ho-
nour; for it is possible to desire honour as we ought,
and more than we ought, and less than we ought.
Now he who is in the excess in the desire of honour
is called ambitious, and he who is in the defect
unambitious, but he that is in the mean has no
name; and the dispositions are likewise nameless,
except that of the ambitious, which is called ambi-
tion; and from this cause the extremes claim the
9. middle place. And we sometimes call him who is in the mean ambitious, and sometimes unambitious; and sometimes we praise the ambitious man, and sometimes the man who is unambitious. But hereafter the reason why we do this will be explained; but now let us go on speaking of the others in the way in which we have begun.

10. There are also on the subject of anger an excess, a defect, and a mean state; but since they may be said to be nameless, and as we call him who is in the mean meek, we will call the mean meekness; but of the extremes, let him who is in excess be called passionate, and the vice passion; him who is in defect insensible to anger, and the defect insensibility to anger.

11. There are also three other mean states, which are somewhat alike, but yet differ from each other; for they all have to do with the intercourse of words and actions; but they differ, in that one respects truth, the other two pleasantness; and of this there is a subdivision, namely, pleasantness in sport, and pleasantness in all things which concern life. We must therefore treat of these also, in order to see more distinctly that the mean state is in all cases praiseworthy, and the extremes neither right nor praiseworthy, but blamable. Now the greater number of these likewise are nameless; but we must endeavour, as in the other cases, to make names ourselves, for the sake of clearness and perspicuity. On the subject of truth, therefore, let him who is in the mean be called truthful, and the mean truthfulness; but the pretence to truthfulness on the side of excess is arrogance, and he who has it is arrogant; that on the side of defect is false modesty, and the person falsely modest. On the subject of pleasantness in sport, he who is in the mean is a man of graceful wit, and the disposition graceful wit;* the excess ribaldry, and the person ribald; he who is in defect

* Πραξικεπίλα See note to translation of Rhet. c. ii. 12, p. 152.
a clown, and the habit clownishness. With respect to the remaining pleasantness, namely, in all things which concern life, he who is pleasant as he should be is friendly, and the mean state friendliness; he who is in excess, if it be done without any object in view, is over-complaisant, if for his own advantage, a flatterer; but he who is in the defect, and in all cases unpleasant, is quarrelsome and morose.

But there are also mean states both in the passions and also in cases which concern the passions; for modesty is not a virtue; and yet the modest man is praised; for in this case also there is one who is said to be in the mean, another in the extreme, of excess (as the bashful, who is ashamed at everything); the man who is deficient in shame, or does not feel it at all, is impudent; but he who is in the mean is modest. But indignation is a mean state between envy and malevolence; but these affections are concerned with the pain and pleasure which are felt at the circumstances of our neighbours; for he who is apt to feel indignation, feels pain at those who are undeservedly successful; but the envious man, going beyond him, feels pain at every one's success; and the malevolent man falls so far short of being pained, that he even rejoices. But in another place, also, we shall have an opportunity of speaking of these things, and on the subject of justice also, since the word is used not in one sense only. Afterwards we will divide these subjects, and state respecting each in what way they are means. We will in like manner treat of the intellectual virtues.

1 On the subject of indignation (νέμον) see Rhetoric, Book II. ch. ix.

2 Justice is treated of in Book V. The view which Aristotle there takes of it is exactly that which we should expect of one who considers ethics as a branch of political science, for it will be seen that he considers Justice as a link between Ethics and Politics, the connecting virtue between the individual and the social community.
CHAP. VIII.

How Virtues and Vices are opposed to one another.

1. But since there are three dispositions,—two vicious, one in excess and the other in defect, and one virtuous, namely, the mean state, they are all in some sense opposed to each other; for the extremes are opposed both to the mean state and to each other, and the mean state to the extremes. For as

2. the equal when compared with the less is greater, and when compared with the greater is less; so the mean states when compared with the defects are in excess, and when compared with the excesses are in defect, both in the passions and in the actions; for the brave man in comparison with the coward appears rash, and in comparison with

3. the rash man a coward. In like manner also the temperate man in comparison with the insensible is intemperate, and in comparison with the intemperate is insensible; and the liberal man in comparison with the illiberal is prodigal, and in comparison with the prodigal is illiberal.

4. Therefore those who are in the extreme thrust away from them him who is in the mean state, each to the other, and the coward calls the brave man rash, and the rash man calls him a coward; and so

5. on in the other cases. But though they are thus opposed to each other, there is a greater opposition between the extremes one to the other, than to the mean; for these stand further apart from each other than from the mean; just as the great is further from the small, and the small from the great, than either from the equal. Again, there appears in some extremes some resemblance to the mean, as rashness seems to resemble courage, and prodigality liberality; but there is the greatest dissimilarity between the extremes. Now things that are furthest apart from each other are defined to be
opposites; so that those that are further off are more opposite. But in some cases the defect is more opposed to the mean, and in some cases the excess; as, for example, rashness, which is the excess, is not so much opposed to courage as cowardice, which is the defect; and insensibility, which is the defect, is less opposed to temperance than intemperance, which is the excess.

But this happens for two reasons; the first from the nature of the thing itself; for from one extreme being nearer and more like the mean than the other, it is not this but its opposite which we set down as most opposite; as, since rashness appears to be nearer and more like courage than cowardice, and cowardice less like than rashness, we oppose cowardice to courage rather than rashness, because those things that are further from the mean appear to be more opposite to it. This, therefore, is one reason arising from the nature of the thing itself; the other originates in ourselves; for those things to which we are more naturally disposed, appear to be more contrary to the mean; as, for instance, we are more naturally disposed to pleasures, and therefore we are more easily carried away to intemperance than to propriety of conduct. These, then, to which the inclination is more decided, we call more opposite; and for this reason, intemperance, which is the excess, is more opposite to temperance.

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CHAP. IX.

How we shall arrive at the Mean and at Excellence.

Now that moral virtue is a mean state, and how, and that it is a mean state between two vices, one on the side of excess, and the other on the side of defect; and that it is so from being apt to aim at the mean in passions and actions, has been sufficiently proved. It is therefore difficult also to be 2.
good; for in each case it is difficult to find the mean; just as it is not in every man's power, but only in the power of him who knows how, to find the centre of a circle; and thus it is easy, and in every man's power, to be angry, and to give and spend money; but to determine the person to whom, and the quantity, and the time, and the motive, and the manner, is no longer in every man's power, nor is it easy; therefore excellence is rare, and praise-worthy, and honourable. It is therefore needful for him who aims at the mean, first to keep away from that extreme which is more contrary; like the advice that Calypso gave:

"Keep the ship clear of this smoke and surge."

For of the extremes, one is more and one less erroneous.

4. Since, then, it is difficult to hit the mean exactly, we must, as our second trial, choose the least of these evils; and this will be best done in the manner which we have stated. But it is necessary to consider to which of the vices we ourselves are most inclined; for some of us are naturally disposed to one, and some to another; and this we shall be able to discover from the pleasure and pain which arise in us. But it is necessary to drag ourselves away towards the opposite extreme; for by bringing ourselves far from the side of error, we shall arrive at the mean; as people do with crooked sticks to make them straight. But in every case we must be most upon our guard against what is pleasant, and pleasure, for we are not unbiassed.

Aristotle has here evidently quoted from memory, and substituted Calypso for Circe. See Hom. Od. xii. 219.

"Bear wide thy course, nor plough those angry waves,
Where rolls yon smoke, yon trembling ocean raves."

Pope.

The proverb "κατὰ τὴν διένερτον πλοῦν" is thus explained by the Scholiast to the Phædo of Plato:—"Those who fail in their first voyage, make secure preparations for their second."

"δίκαιος" literally, unbribed. The origin of this word is unknown, except so far as that it is derived from δίκα, ten.
judges of it. Just, then, as the Trojan elders felt respecting Helen,7 must we feel respecting pleasure, and in all cases pronounce sentence as they did; for thus, by "sending it away," we shall be less likely to fall into error. By so doing, then, to speak summarily, we shall be best able to hit the mean. But perhaps this may be difficult, and especially in particular cases; for it is not easy to define the manner, and the persons, and the occasions, and the length of time for a person to be angry; for we sometimes praise those who are in the defect, and call them meek; and sometimes those who are easily angered, and call them manly. But he who transgresses the right a little is not blamed, whether it be on the side of excess or defect, but he who does it too much; for he does not escape notice. But it is not easy to define verbally how far, and to what point, a man is blamable, nor is anything else that is judged of by the common feeling and sense of mankind easy to be defined; but such questions as these belong to particular cases, and the decision of them belongs to moral perception. What we have said hitherto, therefore, proves, that the mean state is in every case praiseworthy, but that we must incline sometimes towards excess, and sometimes towards deficiency; for thus we shall most easily hit the mean and that which is excellent.

7 See Hom. Iliad, iii. 158.

"What winning graces! what majestic mien!
She moves a goddess, and she looks a queen!
Yet hence, O heaven! convey that fatal face,
And from destruction save the Trojan race."

Pope's Homer, iii. 207.
BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

What is the Voluntary, and what the Involuntary.

1. Since, then, virtue is conversant with passions and actions, and praise and blame are bestowed on voluntary acts, but pardon, and sometimes pity, on those which are involuntary, it is perhaps necessary for those who study the subject of virtue to define what is the voluntary and what is the involuntary. It is moreover useful to legislators, for the regulation of rewards and punishments.

2. Now, it appears that those things which are done by constraint, or through ignorance, are involuntary; and that is done by compulsion, of which the principle is external, and is of such character that the agent or patient does not at all contribute towards it; as, for example, if the wind should carry a man anywhere, or persons having supreme authority over him. But all those actions which are done through the fear of greater evils, or because of something honourable,—as if a tyrant, having in his power our parents and children, should order us to do some base deed, and they

- Since those actions are voluntary of which the principle is in the agent, he not being ignorant of the particular circumstances, an act is involuntary if one of the two conditions which constitute voluntariness is wanting. If the agent knows the circumstances, but the principle is external, the act is done by compulsion; if the principle is internal, but the agent is ignorant of the circumstances, it is done through ignorance. Aristotle has omitted the third kind of involuntary actions, viz., where both conditions are wanting; e.g. where there is an external force, such as sleep, insanity, drunkenness, impelling us to act by means of ignorance of the circumstances.—Michelet.
in the case of our obedience should be saved, but in the case of our refusal should be put to death,—it admits of a question whether they are involuntary or voluntary. Something of this kind happens likewise in the case of throwing things overboard in a storm; for, abstractedly, no one voluntarily throws away his goods, but for his own and his companions' safety every sensible man does it.

Such actions as these, therefore, are of a mixed character; but they resemble voluntary acts most, for at the time of their performance they are eligible, and the end of the action depends upon the time of performance. An act, therefore, is to be called voluntary and involuntary at the time when a man does it. But he does it voluntarily, for the principle of moving the limbs, which are used as instruments, rests in such actions with the man himself; and where the principle is in himself, the doing or not doing the actions is in himself also. Such actions as these, therefore, are voluntary, but abstractedly they are perhaps involuntary, for no person would choose anything of the kind for its own sake. In such acts as these people are sometimes even praised, whenever they undergo anything disgraceful or painful for the sake of great and honourable consequences, but if it be the reverse, they are blamed; for to undergo very disgraceful things for no honourable or adequate cause is a mark of a worthless man. But in some cases praise is not bestowed, but pardon, when a man does what he ought not to do, owing to causes which are too strong for human nature, the pressure of which no one could support. But there are some things which it is wrong to do, even on compulsion, and a man ought rather to undergo the most dreadful sufferings, even death, than do them; for the causes which compelled the Alcmæon of Euripides to kill his mother appear ridiculous.

*This play of Euripides being lost, it is not known what the ridiculous causes are to which Aristotle alludes.
10. But it is sometimes hard to decide what kind of thing we ought to choose in preference to another, and what thing in preference to another we ought to undergo; and still more difficult is it to abide by the decisions we make; for, for the most part, what we are expecting is painful, and what we are compelled to do is disgraceful; and hence praise and blame are bestowed with reference to our being or not being compelled. Now, what kind of things are to be called compulsory? Are they, absolutely, all those in which the principle is external, and to which the doer contributes nothing? But those acts which abstractedly are involuntary, but which, in the present case, and in preference to these things, are eligible, and of which the principle is in the doer, are abstractedly involuntary, but in this case, and in preference to these things, voluntary; nevertheless they more resemble voluntary acts, for actions are conversant with particulars, and particulars are voluntary.

11. But it is not easy to lay down a rule as to what kind of things are eligible in preference to other things, for there are many differences in particulars. But if any one should say that pleasant and honourable things are compulsory, for, being external, they force a person to act, everything would in this way be compulsory; for, for the sake of these things, everybody does everything; and those who act from constraint, and involuntarily, do it painfully; but those who act for the sake of pleasure and honour do it pleasantly; consequently, it is ridiculous for a man to complain of external circumstances, and not himself, who has been a willing prey to such things; and to call himself the cause of his honourable acts, and pleasure the cause of his dishonourable ones. Now, the compulsory appears to be that of which the principle is external, and to which the person compelled contributes nothing.

12. But that which is through ignorance is in all cases non-voluntary; but only that which is followed by
pain and repentance, is involuntary; for he who has done any action through ignorance, and who feels no annoyance at it, did not indeed do it voluntarily, inasmuch as he did not know it; nor, on the other hand, did he do it involuntarily, inasmuch as he feels no pain at it. Now, of the two kinds of people who act through ignorance, he who feels repentance appears to be an involuntary agent; but he who feels no repentance must be called, since he is not of the same character, by a different name—non-voluntary; for, since there is a difference, it is better that he should have a name of his own.

But there seems to be a difference between acting through ignorance, and acting ignorantly; for he who is under the influence of drunkenness or anger does not seem to act through ignorance, but for one of the motives mentioned, not knowingly but ignorantly; for every vicious man is ignorant of what he ought to do, and from what he ought to abstain; and through such faulty ignorance men become unjust and altogether depraved. But the meaning of the term “involuntary” is not if a person is ignorant of what is expedient, for ignorance in principle is not the cause of involuntariness, but of viciousness; nor is ignorance of universals the cause of involuntariness (for on account of such ignorance we are blamed), but ignorance of particulars in the circumstances of the action; for in these cases we are pitied and pardoned, for he who is ignorant of any of these things acts involuntarily. Perhaps, then, it would be no bad thing to define what these circumstances are, and how

By the expression “acting ignorantly” (ἀγνωστώ) is meant ignorance of the principle. This is considered by all moralists and jurists voluntary, and therefore blameable, as it is assumed that all persons are, or ought to be, acquainted with the principles of right and wrong, and with the law of the land. To act “through ignorance” (ὅτι ἀγνωστώ) signifies ignorance of the fact. If an action of this kind is followed by repentance, Aristotle calls it involuntary (ἀκούσιον), and therefore considers it excusable; but if not repented of, he terms it non-voluntary (οὐκ ἀκούσιον), and pronounces it unpardonable.
many there are of them, and who the person is who acts, and what he does, and about what and in what case he does it; and sometimes with what, as the instrument; and from the motive, as safety;

and in what manner, as gently or violently. No person except a madman could be ignorant of all these particulars; and it is clear that he cannot be ignorant of the agent, for how could he be ignorant of himself? But a man might be ignorant of what he does, as those who say that they had forgotten themselves, or that they did not know that they were forbidden to speak of it, as Æschylus said respecting the mysteries; or that, wishing to exhibit an engine, he let it off by mistake, as the man

let off the catapult. Again one might fancy one's son an enemy, as did Merope; and that a sharpened spear was rounded at the point, or that a stone was pumice; and, striking a person in order to save him, might kill him, and wishing to show a hit, as boxers do when they spar, might strike a person. Ignorance, therefore, being possible on all these circumstances connected with the act, he who was ignorant of any one of these, seems to have acted involuntarily, and particularly in the principal circumstances; but the principal circumstances appear to be those of the act itself, and the motive. But though involuntariness is said to consist in such ignorance as this, still the act must be painful, and followed by repentance.

Definition of the voluntary.

18. A Greek scholiast says, that Æschylus, in five of his tragedies, spoke of Demeter, and therefore may be supposed in these cases to have touched upon subjects connected with the mysteries; and Heraclides of Pontus says, that on this account he was in danger of being killed by the populace, if he had not fled for refuge to the altar of Dionysus, and been begged off by the Areopagites, and acquitted on the grounds of his exploits at Marathon.

19. The Cresetheus of Euripides is mentioned by Aristotle in his Poetics; in the dénouement Merope recognizes her son when on the point of killing him.
that of which the principle is in the doer himself, having a knowledge of the particulars, namely, the circumstances of the act; for perhaps it is not correct to say that the acts of anger or desire are involuntary. For if so, in the first place, no other living creature except man, and no children, will be voluntary agents; and in the second place, we may ask the question, is no one of the acts of desire or anger, which we do, done voluntarily? or are the good ones done voluntarily, but the bad ones involuntarily? or is it not ridiculous to make such distinctions, when the cause of both is one and the same? Perhaps, too, it is absurd to call objects of proper desire involuntary; and in some cases it is right to be angry, and some things it is right to desire, as health and learning; but things involuntary seem to be painful, whilst things done from desire are pleasant. Again, what is the difference with respect to involuntariness between the faults that are committed on principle and in anger? for both are to be avoided; and the irrational passions appear to be no less naturally belonging to man; and therefore irrational actions equally belong to him. It is absurd, therefore, to call these actions involuntary.

CHAP. II.

What is the nature of deliberate Preference.

The nature of the voluntary and the involuntary having been described, the next thing is, that we should examine the object of deliberate preference; for it appears to be most intimately connected with virtue, and even more than actions to be a test of character. Now, deliberate preference appears to be voluntary, but not the same as "the voluntary," but "the voluntary" is more extensive: for both children and other beings participate in
the voluntary, but not in deliberate preference; and we call sudden and unpremeditated acts voluntary, but we do not say that they were done from deliberate preference. But those who say that it is desire, or anger, or volition, or any opinion, do not seem to speak correctly. For deliberate preference is not shared by irrational beings; but desire and anger are; and the incontinent man acts from desire, and not from deliberate preference; and the continent man, on the other hand, acts from deliberate preference, and not from desire. And desire is opposed to deliberate preference, but not to desire; and desire is conversant with the pleasant and painful, but deliberate preference with neither. Still less is it anger; for acts done from anger do not at all seem done from deliberate preference. Nor yet is it volition, although it appears to approach very near it; for there is no deliberate preference of impossibilities; and if any person should say that he deliberately preferred them, he would be thought a fool; but there is volition of impossibilities, as of immortality. And there is volition about things which cannot by any possibility be performed by one's self; as, that a particular actor, or wrestler, should gain the victory; but no person deliberately prefers such things as these, but only such things as he thinks may come to pass by his own agency. But, further, volition is rather of the end, and deliberate preference of the means; for instance, we wish to be in health, but we deliberately prefer the means of becoming so; and we wish to be happy, and say so; but it is not a suitable expression to say, we deliberately prefer it; for, in a word, there appears to be no deliberate preference in matters which are out of our power.

7. Nor yet can it be opinion; for opinion seems to be about all objects, and on things eternal and impossible, just as much as on things which are in our own power; and opinions are divided according to their truth and falsehood, not according to
vice and virtue; but the contrary is the case with deliberate preference. But, perhaps, no one says why not it is the same as opinion generally; but it is not even the same as any particular opinion; for we get our character from our deliberate preference of things good or bad, and not from our opinions. And we deliberately prefer to take a thing, or not to take it, or something of this kind; but we form an opinion as to what a thing is, or to whom it is advantageous, or how; but we do not form an opinion at all about taking or not taking it; and deliberate preference is rather praised for its being directed to a right object, or for being rightly directed, but opinion, for its being true. And we deliberately prefer those things which we most certainly know to be good, but we form opinions about those things which we do not know for certain. And it does not appear that the same people are the best both in forming opinions, and in exercising deliberate preference; but some are good in opinion, but through vice prefer not what they ought. But whether opinion arises before deliberate preference, or whether it follows upon it, matters not; for this is not the point which we are investigating, but whether it is the same with any opinion. What, then, is its genus, and what its species, since it is not any of the things we have mentioned? It seems, in fact, voluntary; but not everything which is voluntary is the object of deliberate preference, but only that which has been previously the object of deliberation; for deliberate preference is joined with reason and intellect; and its name seems to signify that it is somewhat chosen before other things.

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**CHAP. III.**

**Respecting Deliberation, and the Object of Deliberation.**

But do men deliberate about everything, and is everything an object of deliberation, or are there things...
some things about which there is no deliberation? But perhaps we must call that an object of deliberation, about which, not a fool or a madman, but a reasonable man would deliberate. About things eternal no man deliberates, as about the world, or the diagonal and the side of a square, because they are incommensurable; nor yet about things in motion, which always go on in the same manner, whether it be from necessity, or nature, or any other cause, as the solstices and the sunrise; nor yet about things which are different at different times, as droughts and showers; nor about things accidental, as the finding of a treasure; nor yet about everything human, as no Lacedemonian deliberates how the Scythians might be best governed; for none of these things could be done through our own agency. But we deliberate about those subjects of action which are in our own power; and these are the cases which remain; for the principles of causation appear to be, Nature, Necessity, and Chance; and, besides these, Mind, and all that takes place through the agency of man. But each individual man deliberates about those subjects of action which are in his own power. And respecting the exact and self-sufficient sciences, there is no deliberation; as respecting letters, for we do not doubt how we ought to write. But we deliberate about all those things which happen by our own means, and not always in the same manner; as about the art of medicine, of finance, and the art of navigation, more than gymnastics, inasmuch as it is less exactly described; and likewise about the rest; and more about the arts than the sciences; for we debate more about

1 The diagonal and side of a square are incommensurable; for let the side = a, then the diagonal = 2·a, and 2 cannot be expressed by a finite number.

2 We debate more about the arts than the sciences, because the former are concerned with contingent matter, the latter with necessary matter. Still, however, the Greeks divided the sciences into akribes and stoixastikai, and of these the latter
them. But deliberation takes place in the case of things that generally happen, but respecting which it is uncertain how they may turn out, and in which there is indefiniteness. But we take advice of others on great matters, because we distrust ourselves, as unable to decide with sufficient accuracy. And we do not deliberate about ends, but about means; for the physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor the orator whether he shall persuade, nor the lawgiver whether he shall make good laws, nor anybody else about the end; but having determined on some end, they deliberate how and by what means it may be effected.

And if it appears that it may be done by more means than one, they next deliberate by which it may be done most easily and honourably; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this, and by what means this can be effected, until they arrive at the first cause, which is the last in the analysis; for he who deliberates appears to investigate and analyze the subject like a mathematical problem, in the way that we have mentioned. Now, not all investigation seems to be deliberation, as the investigations of mathematics; but every deliberation is an investigation; and the last thing in the analysis is the first in the execution. And if men come to an impossibility, they leave off deliberating; as, for example, if money is necessary, but it is impossible to get it; but if it appears possible, they set about acting. For those things which can be done through our own agency are possible; for those things which happen by means of our friends, happen in some sense through our own agency; for the principle is in ourselves. But sometimes the instruments, and sometimes the use of them, are the subject of investigation, and in like manner in the other categories, sometimes we investigate by whose as-alone are capable of being made the subjects of deliberation. See on the subject of deliberation, Rhet. Book I. c. iv.
existence, and sometimes how, or by what means. Therefore, as we have said, it seems that man is the origin of all actions; but deliberation is about those subjects of moral conduct which are in one's own power; but actions are for the sake of other things.

10. The end, therefore, cannot be a subject of deliberation, but the means; nor yet are particulars the object of deliberation; as whether this is a loaf or whether it is baked as it ought; for these points belong to the province of sensual perception, and if a man is always deliberating, he will go on for ever. Now, the object of deliberation and that of deliberate preference are the same, except that the object of deliberate preference has already been restricted in its meaning; for that which after deliberation is preferred, is an object of deliberate preference; for every person ceases to deliberate how he shall act, when he refers the principle to himself, and his ruling part; for it is this which deliberately prefers. But this is clear from the ancient forms of government also, which Homer mentions in his poems;\(^\text{h}\) for the kings used to refer to the people those measures which they had decided to be preferable. Now, since the object of deliberate preference is the object of deliberation and of desire, and for things in our own power, it follows that deliberate preference is the deliberate desire of things in our power; for having made our decision after deliberation, we desire according to our deliberation. Now, let deliberate preference have been sufficiently described in outline, and its object stated, and that it is respecting the means.

\(^{h}\) See for example Hom. II. ii. 66, Pope's translation.

"Th' assembly placed, the king of men expressed
The counsels lab'ring in his artful breast.
Friends and confederates! with attentive ear
Receive my words, and credit what you hear."

The illustration of which Aristotle here makes use reminds us of the psychical theory of Plato: for he compares the rational part of the soul to kings, as though it possessed a divine right of ruling and advising; and the appetitive part to the people, whose duty it is to listen and obey.
CHAP. IV.

Respecting Volition, and the object of it.

That volition is of the end, has been stated; but 1. to some it appears to be of the good, and to others of the apparent good. Now the conclusion to which they come who say that the object of volition is the good, will be, that what he wishes who chooses incorrectly, is no object of volition at all (for if it is to be an object of volition, it must also be good; but it might be, if it so happens, bad); but according to those who, on the other hand, tell us that the object of volition is the apparent good, there will be no natural object of volition, but only that which seems to each person to be so; and different things appear so to different persons, and as it might happen, contrary things.

Now if these accounts are unsatisfactory, must 3. we then say that, abstractedly, and in reality, the good is the object of volition, and to each individual, that which to him appears to be so? That the good man's object of volition is the real good, but the bad man's anything which he may happen to think good? Just as in the case of the body, 4. those things are wholesome to persons in a good state of body, which are in reality wholesome, but different things to persons diseased; and likewise things bitter and sweet, and warm and heavy, and everything else; for the good man judges everything rightly, and in every case the truth appears so to him; for there are certain things honourable and pleasant in every habit. And perhaps the principal difference between the good and the bad man is that the good man sees the truth in every case, since he is, as it were, the rule and measure of it. But the generality of mankind 6. seem to be deceived by pleasure; for it appears to be the good, though it is not so; and therefore...
men choose what is pleasant, under the idea that it is good, and avoid pain, as an evil.

CHAP. V.

That Virtues and Vices are voluntary.¹

1. Now the end being an object of volition, and the means objects of deliberation and deliberate preference, the actions which regard these must be in accordance with deliberate preference, and voluntary; and the energies of the virtues are conversant with these. And virtue also must be in our own power; and in like manner vice: for wherever we have the power to do, we have also the power not to do; and wherever we have the power not to do, we have also the power to do. So that if it be in our power to do a thing, which is honourable, to leave it undone, which is disgraceful, will be in our power likewise; and if it be in our power to leave a thing undone, which is honourable, to do it, which is disgraceful, is in our power likewise. But if the doing things honourable and disgraceful be in our power, and the abstaining from them be likewise in our power (and this is the meaning of being good and bad), then the being good and bad will be in our power also.

3. But as to the saying, that "No person is willingly wicked, nor unwillingly happy," it seems partly true, and partly false; for no one is unwillingly happy; but vice is voluntary. Or else we must contradict what we have just said, and

¹ The freedom of the will in the case of vice as well as virtue, forms a most important subject of investigation, because, although Greek philosophers generally allowed that virtue was voluntary, still Socrates held that vice was involuntary. The reader is recommended to study attentively, in connection with this part of the subject, Butler's Analogy, Part I. c. vi., "On the opinion of necessity as influencing practice;" and also his Sermons on Human Nature.
deny that man is the origin and the parent of his actions, as of his children. But if this appear true, and we have no other principles to which we may refer our actions than those which are in our own power, then those things, the principles of which are in our own power, are themselves also in our own power, and voluntary: and testimony seems to be borne to this statement both by private persons individually, and by legislators themselves; for they chastise and punish those who do wicked deeds, unless they do them upon compulsion, or through an ignorance for which they are themselves to blame; and they confer honour on those who do good actions, with a view to encouraging the one and restraining the other. And yet no person encourages us to do those things which are neither in our own power, nor voluntary, considering it not worth while to persuade us not to be hot, or cold, or hungry, or anything of this kind; for we shall suffer them all the same. For they punish people even for ignorance itself, if they appear to be the cause of their own ignorance; just as the punishment is double for drunken people; for the principle is in themselves, since it was in their own power not to get drunk, and this is the cause of their ignorance. And they punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws, which they ought to know, and which is not difficult; and likewise in all other cases in which they appear to be ignorant through negligence, on the ground that it was in their own power not to be ignorant; for they had it in their own power to pay attention to it. But perhaps a person is unable to give his attention; but they are themselves the causes of their inability, by living in a dissipated manner; and persons are objection.

1 Ignorantia juris nocet, ignorantia facti non nocet, is a well-known axiom of jurists.

1 Reason and revelation alike teach us the awful truth that sin exercises a deadening effect on the moral perception of right and wrong. Ignorance may be pleaded as an excuse, but not that ignorance of which man is himself the cause. Such ignorance is the result of willful sin. This corrupts the
themselves the cause of their being unjust, by performing bad actions, and of being intemperate, by passing their time in drinking-bouts and such-like; for energies of any description make men of such a character: but this is clear from those who practise any exercise or course of conduct; for they

9. continue energizing. Now, to be ignorant that by energizing on every subject the habits are produced, shows a man to be utterly devoid of sense. And further, it is absurd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions does not wish to become unjust, or that the man who does intemperate actions does not wish to become intemperate. But if any one without involuntary ignorance does those acts, from doing which he will become unjust, he must be unjust voluntarily; nevertheless, he will not be able to leave off being unjust, and to become just, when he pleases; for the sick man cannot become well, even though it so happen that he is voluntarily ill, owing to an incontinent life, and from

10. disobedience to physicians. At the time, therefore, it was in his own power not to be ill, but when he has allowed himself to become ill, it is no longer in his own power; just as it is no longer in the power of a man who has thrown a stone, to recover it; and yet the throwing and casting it was in his own power; for the origin of the action was in his own power; and thus in the beginning it was in the power of the unjust and the intemperate man not to become such; and therefore they are so voluntarily; but when they have become so, it is no longer in their own power to avoid being so.

11. But not only are the faults of the soul voluntary, but in some persons those of the body are so likewise, and with these we find fault; for no person finds fault with those that are ugly by nature, but only with those who are so through want of moral sense, hardens the heart, destroys the power of conscience, and afflicts us with judicial blindness, so that we actually lose at last the power of seeing the things which belong unto our peace.
gymnastic exercises or through carelessness. The 13. case is the same with weakness and mutilation; for no person would blame a man who is born blind, or who is blind from disease, or a blow, but would rather pity him; but everybody would blame the man who is blind from drunkenness, or any other intemperance. Now of the faults of the body, those which are in our own power are blamed, but those which are not in our own power are not blamed. And if this is true, it will follow that in the case of faults of every other description those which are blamed must be in our own power.

But if any one should say that all men aim at 14. the apparent good, but that they have not power over their own imagination, and that, according to the character of each individual, is the end which presents itself to him; if, as we have said, every person is in some way the cause of his own habit, he will be in some way the cause of his own imagination. But if no one is to himself the cause of his doing bad actions, but he does them 15. through ignorance of the end, thinking that by means he will have what is best; and that the aiming at the end by which he judges well, and will choose the true good, is not a matter of choice, but that it is necessary for a man to be born with it, as with the faculty of sight; and he is well gifted by nature, who is born with this good faculty; (for he will have a most honourable and excellent thing, and one which he cannot get or learn from any other person, but which he must have just as he has it by nature, and to have this well and excellently by nature constitutes perfect and true natural goodness;) if this be true, how can virtue be more voluntary than vice? for to both the good and the bad man alike the end is, by nature, or in some way apparent and laid down; and referring everything else to this, they act accordingly. Whether then the end does not appear 16. by nature to every man of one kind or other, but the light in which it presents itself depends in reason.
some measure upon himself; or whether the end is by nature fixed, and from the good man’s performing the means voluntarily, virtue is voluntary; in both cases vice is just as voluntary as virtue; for the bad man is just as much a voluntary agent in his actions as the good man. If then, as is said, the virtues are voluntary, (for we are in some sense joint causes of our habits, and from our being of a certain character, we propose to ourselves the same kind of end,) the vices must be voluntary also; for they are just as much so as the virtues. Now about the virtues we have spoken generally; we have said in outline, as it were, that they are mean states, and that they are habits; we have stated from what things they derive their origin, and that these things they are themselves apt to practise; that they are in our own power, that they are voluntary, and that they are under the direction of right reason.

But the actions and the habits are not in the same manner voluntary; for we are masters of our actions from the beginning to the end, since we know the particulars; but we are masters only of the beginning of our habits; but the addition of particulars we are not aware of, as we are in the case of sicknesses; but because it was in our power to make this or that use of particulars in the first instance, on this account they are voluntary. Let us then take up the virtues again separately, and state what they are, what their subjects are, and how they are virtues; and it will be at the same time clear how many there are: and first of course.

CHAP. VI.

The definition of Courage.

1. Now that courage is a mean state on the subjects of fear and confidence has been already made appa-
rent: but it is evident that we fear things terrible; and these are, to speak generally, evils; and therefore people define fear "the expectation of evil." Fear. Now we fear all evils, as disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, and death. But the brave man does not appear to have to do with all evils; for some it is right and good to fear, and not to fear them is disgraceful, as, for example, not to fear disgrace; for he who fears this is a worthy and modest man, and he who does not fear it is shameless. But by some people he is called brave, metaphorically; for he bears some resemblance to the brave man; for the brave man too is fearless. But poverty, perhaps, and disease, and all those things which do not happen from vice, or our own fault, it is not right to fear; but yet the man who is fearless in these things is not brave. But him, too, we call so, from the resemblance; for some who in war are cowards, are liberal, and behave with courage under pecuniary losses. Nor yet is a man a coward if he is afraid of insult to his children and wife, or of envy, or anything of this kind; nor is he brave if he feels confidence when about to be scourged. What sort of fearful things, then, has the courageous man to do with; the greatest? For no man is more capable than he is to undergo terrible things; but death is the most terrible of all things; for it is a limit; and it is thought that to the dead there is nothing beyond, either good or bad. And yet the brave man does not appear to have to do with death in every form; as at sea, and in disease. With what kinds of death, then? Is it with the most honourable? But those that occur in war are of this kind, for in war the danger is the greatest and most honourable. The public honours that are awarded in states and by monarchs attest this.

Properly, then, he who in the case of an honour—

* Aristotle is here alluding to the severities of the Lacedaemonian law.
* Mors ultima linea rerum.—Hor. See on this subject, note, Book I. chap. i.
able death, and under circumstances close at hand which cause death, is fearless, may be called courageous; and the dangers of war are, more than any others, of this description. Not but that the brave man is fearless at sea, and in sickness; but not from the same cause as seamen; for the brave give up all hope of safety, and are grieved at such a kind of death; but seamen are sanguine, because of their experience. Moreover, brave men show manliness in cases where there is room for exerting themselves, and in which death is honourable; but in such deaths as those above-mentioned there is neither one of these conditions nor the other.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Brave Man, and those who are in the extremes on either side of Bravery.

1. But the terrible is not to all persons the same; and there is something which we say is beyond the power of man to bear; this, therefore, is terrible to every man, at least to every man of sense. But those which are within the power of man to bear differ in magnitude, and in being some greater and some less; and circumstances which cause confidence differ likewise. But the brave man is fearless, as becomes a man; therefore at such things he will feel fear; but he will bear up, as far as right and reason dictate, for the sake of what is honourable; for there is this same end to all the virtues. But it is possible for these things to be feared too much and too little, and, again, for things not terrible to be feared as if they were so. But of faults, one is that the thing itself is not right; another, that the manner is not right; another, that the time is not right, and so on; and the case is similar with respect to things that cause confidence. Now he who bears bravely, and
who fears what he ought, and from the right mo-
Brave man
tive, and in the right manner, and at the right
defined.
time, and feels confidence in like manner, is brave.
For the brave man suffers and acts just as the
nature of the case demands, and right reason war-
rants.

But the end of every energy is that which is ac-
cording to the habit; and courage is that which is
honourable in the case of the brave man; such
therefore is his end; for everything is defined by
its end. For the sake, therefore, of what is honour-
able, the brave man bears and performs those things
which belong to courage. But of those who are in
the extremity of excess there are two kinds, one who
is excessive in fearlessness, who is not named (and
we have before stated, that many of these extremes
are not named); but he (if, as is said of the Celts,6
he fears nothing, neither earthquake nor waves) may
be called mad or insensate. The other, who is ex-
cessive in his confidence in terrible circumstances,
is rash; and the rash man is thought to be arro-
gant, and a pretender to courage. He then wishes
to seem what the courageous man is in terrible cir-
cumstances; wherever he can, therefore, he imitates
him. Most of these, therefore, are at once bold and
cowardly; for though they are bold in these cases,
yet they do not bear up under circumstances of
terror. But he who is excessive in fear is a cow-
ard; for he has all the attendant characteristics of
fearing what he ought not, and as he ought not,
and so forth; besides, he is deficient in confidence;
but where he is called upon to bear pain, he more
especially shows that he is in excess. Now the
coward is desponding, for he fears everything; but
the brave man is just the reverse, for confidence
belongs to the sanguine temper. With the same sub-
jects, therefore, are conversant the characters of the

* Aristotle makes similar mention of the Celts (Eudem.
Eth. iii. i.):—ολον οι Κέλτοι πολεν τε εύμαχα δελα όπως
λακανίας. See also Άλιαν, Var. Hist. xii. 23; Strabo, ii.
p. 293 (Cardwell).
coward, the rash, and the brave man, but they are
differently disposed with respect to them; for the
two first are in excess and defect; the other is in
the mean, and as he ought to be; the rash are pre-
cipitate, and though beforehand they are full of
eagerness, yet in the midst of dangers they stand
aloof; the brave are in action full of spirit, but
beforehand tranquil. As we said, therefore, courage
is a mean state with respect to subjects of con-
fidence and terror; i.e. in those which have been
specified; and it chooses and bears up, because it is
honourable to do so, or because it is disgraceful not
to do so. But to die, and thus avoid poverty or
love, or anything painful, is not the part of a brave
man, but rather of a coward; for it is cowardice to
avoid trouble; and the suicide does not undergo
death because it is honourable, but in order to avoid
evil. Such, then, is the nature of courage.

CHAP. VIII.

Five other Forms of Courage.

1. There are, besides this, five other forms of courage
spoken of: first, the political, for it is most like
true courage; for citizens seem to undergo dangers,
on account of the rewards and punishments enacted
by law, to avoid reproach and to obtain distinction.
2. And for this reason those nations appear to be the
most valiant, among whom cowards are disgraced,
and brave men honoured; and it is characters of
this kind that Homer makes the heroes of his
poems, as Diomede and Hector,—"Polydamas will
be the first to load me with reproach." And
Diomede says, "For Hector will one day say, when
speaking among the Trojans, The son of Tydeus
beneath my hand." But this most nearly resem-

*See Hom. II. xxii. 100, or Pope's translation, line 140; and viii. 148, or Pope, line 179.
bles the courage before mentioned, because it arises from virtue; for it arises from shame, and the desire of what is honourable, that is, distinction, and from shunning reproach, which is disgraceful. But one might class with these those who are compelled by their commanders to fight; but they are worse, inasmuch as they do it, not from shame, but from fear, and in order to avoid, not what is disgraceful, but what is painful; for those who have power over them compel them, as Hector says, "Whomsoever I shall find crouching far away from the battle, it shall not be in his power to escape the dogs;" and those who issue orders to them, and strike them if they retreat, do the same; also those who draw up their men in front of trenches, or things of the kind, for they all use compulsion: a man must therefore be brave, not because he is compelled, but because it is honourable to be so.

Again, experience on every subject appears to be a kind of courage; whence even Socrates thought that courage was a science. Now some people are experienced in one thing, and some in another; and in warlike matters soldiers are experienced; for there seem to be many things in war new to

There are two passages in the Iliad which bear a close resemblance to this; one in which Agamemnon is speaking (Il. ii. 391; Pope, 466); the other in which the words are Hector's (Il. xv. 348; Pope, 396).

Herodotus, in his account of the battle of Thermopylae, (vii. 223), says that the Persian officers stood behind the troops with whips, and with them drove the men onwards against the enemy.

The moral theory of Socrates was, that as virtue was the only way to happiness, and no one could be willingly his own enemy, so no one could do wrong willingly. Hence, whoever did wrong did it through ignorance of right, and therefore virtue resolved itself into science (ἐπιστήμη). Courage, therefore, being a virtue, would be, according to this theory, a science likewise.

It is doubtful whether the reading here should be ἐπίδια (things new), or ἐπίδα (groundless terrors). The following expressions,—inaia belii (Tacit. Hist. ii. 69), and scis enim dici quodam πανικά, dici item τὰ ἐπίδα τοῦ πολίμου (Cic. ad Attic. v. 20), support the latter reading. On the other hand,
other men, with which soldiers, more than any one else, have become acquainted. They therefore appear courageous, because all other people are not aware of the nature of these things; besides, through their experience they are better able to do, and not to suffer, and to protect themselves, and to wound others, because they are able to use dexterously their arms, and because they have such arms as are best adapted for offence and defence.

6. In battle, therefore, they are like armed men against unarmed, and like professional wrestlers against amateurs; for in conflicts of this kind, it is not the bravest men, but those who have the greatest strength, and who are in the best state of body, who make the best fighters. Now regular troops become cowardly when the danger surpasses their experience, and when they are inferior in numbers or equipments; for they are the first to fly; but a native militia stands its ground, and dies, which happened in the Hermæum; for to them flight is disgraceful, and death is preferable to such safety; while the others only expose themselves to danger at the beginning, under the idea that they are superior; but when they discover the true state of the case they fly, because they fear death more than disgrace. But this is not the character of the courageous man.

7. Again, some people refer anger to courage; for those who are borne on by anger, like wild beasts, against those who have wounded them, are thought to be courageous; because courageous men have the appearance of being under the influence of anger;

νομίσαντες οὖν ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ καίριον τοῦ πολέμου, ε. τ. λ.
(Thucyd. iii. 30), is in favour of the former. And this, Camerarius, Cardwell, and Michelet prefer. Bekker, however, adopts the latter reading.

* The Greek scholiast informs us that the Hermæum was an open space in the city of Coronæa, in Bœotia. Here the Coronæans, assisted by some Bœotian auxiliary troops, fought an engagement with Nonarchus the Phociæan, who had got possession of the citadel. In this battle the native troops stood their ground, and were all killed to a man; the auxiliaries fled, on hearing of the death of one of their generals.
for anger is a thing which above all others is apt to rush into dangers; whence Homer also says—

——“it infused strength into his boul.”
——“it aroused his fury and rage.”
——“he breathed stern fury thro’ his nostrils.”
——“his blood boiled.”

For all such signs as these seem to denote the rousing and awakening of anger. Now brave men 9. act for the sake of what is honourable; and anger co-operates with them; but beasts act from pain; for it is owing to their being struck or frightened; at least when they happen to be in a wood or a marsh, they do not attack. Now it is not courage in them to rush into danger, because they are impelled by pain or rage, without foreseeing anything of the danger they incur. Since, according to such an idea, even asses would be brave when they are hungry; for even when they are beaten they do not leave their pasture; and adulterers also do many acts of daring through lust. Therefore those who from pain or rage are urged forward into danger are not brave. But that form of courage 10. which owes its origin to anger, appears to be more physical than the other forms; but when deliberate preference and the proper motive are added, it becomes real courage. And men who are angry suffer pain, and when they have have satisfied their vengeance they feel pleasure; but those whose courage is owing to this feeling, are fond of fighting, but not really courageous; for they do not act from the motive of the honourable, nor according to the suggestion of reason, but in obedience to passion, and yet they bear a strong resemblance to real courage.

Nor yet are the sanguine courageous; for they 11. feel confidence in dangers, because they have been victorious many times and over many opponents; but they resemble the courageous, because

* The fourth quotation does not occur in either the Iliad or Odyssey, but in Theocritus, Id. xx. 15. — Michele. Tά πολίτες, are forces composed of citizens (πολίται). Oi στρατιώται, are hired auxiliaries, or mercenaries.
both are apt to feel confidence; but courageous men are apt to feel confidence from the above-mentioned causes, and men of sanguine temperament because they believe themselves superior, and expect that no evil will happen to them; and this is the case with drunken men; for they become sanguine; but when things happen contrary to their expectation, they fly. Now it was said to be the part of the brave man to withstand everything which is or which appears to be terrible to man, because it is honourable to do so, and disgraceful not to do so. And therefore, also, it appears to be characteristic of a brave man to be fearless and imperturbable in cases of sudden danger, than in those which are previously expected; for it arises more from habit, and less from preparation; for in the case of things previously expected, a man might prefer them from calculation and reason, but in things unexpected, from habit.

14. Again the ignorant appear courageous, and are not far removed from the sanguine; but they are worse, inasmuch as they make no estimate at all of the danger, whilst the others do; for which reason they stand their ground for awhile. But men who have been deceived fly, as soon as they discover that the case is different from what they suspected; as was the case with the Argives when they fell among the Lacedæmonians, mistaking them for Sicyonians. We have now given the character of the really brave, and of those who are only apparently so.

CHAP. IX.

Of certain features peculiar to Courage.

1. But though courage is conversant with confidence and fear, it is not equally conversant with both, but has more to do with fearful things: for he who
in these cases is undisturbed, and who feels as he ought in them, is more truly brave than he who feels as he ought on subjects of confidence. Now men are called brave for bearing painful things; and hence it follows also that courage is attended with pain, and is justly praised; for it is more difficult to bear painful things than to abstain from pleasant things. Not but that the end in courage is pleasant, but it is kept out of sight by the accompanying circumstances: just as is the case in the gymnastic exercises; for, to pugilists, the end for which they act, namely, the crown and the honours, is pleasant; but the being beaten is painful, at least, if they are made of flesh, and all toil is painful; and because the painful circumstances are numerous, the motive, which is a small matter, appears to have nothing pleasant in it.

Now, if in the case of courage this be equally true, death and wounds will be painful to the brave man, and against his will; but he will bear them because it is honourable to do so, and because it is disgraceful not to do so. And in proportion as he is nearer the possession of all virtue and happiness, he will be more pained at death; for to such a man as this, more than to any other, it is worth while to live, and he will knowingly be deprived of the greatest goods: and this is painful; but he is not the less brave; but perhaps he is even more brave, because in preference to these advantages he chooses the honour to be obtained in war. Consequently, it is not possible to energize pleasantly in the case of all the virtues, except so far as that they attain to their end. And perhaps there is no reason why those soldiers who are not of this character, but are less brave, and have no other good quality, should not be the best fighters: for these men are ready to face dangers and hazard life for the chance of great profit. Of courage, therefore, let so much have

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* Because pain is sharper and more bitter than the mere loss of pleasure.
been said; but it is not difficult, from what has been said, to comprehend, in outline, at least, what it is.

CHAP. X.

Of Temperance and Intemperance.

1. But, after this, let us speak of temperance; for these two, courage and temperance, seem to be the virtues of the irrational parts of the soul. Now, we have said that temperance is a mean state on the subject of pleasures; for it has not the same, but less connection with pains; and with the same intemperance appears to be conversant likewise. But let us now distinguish the kinds of pleasures which are the subject of it.

2. Let pleasures be divided into those of the soul, and those of the body; as, for example, the love of honour, the love of learning; for, in both these cases, a man takes pleasure in that which he is apt to love, while his body feels nothing, but rather his intellect; but those who have to do with pleasures of this kind are neither called temperate nor intemperate. Nor are those called temperate nor intemperate who have to do with the other pleasures which do not belong to the body; for, as to those who are fond of fables, and telling long stories, and those who pass their days idly in indifferent occupations, we call them triflers, but not intemperate; nor yet do we call those intemperate who are too much grieved at the loss of money or friends.

3. Temperance must therefore belong to bodily pleasures; but not to all even of these. For those who are delighted at the pleasures derived from sight, as with colour, and form, and painting, are neither called temperate nor intemperate, and yet it would seem to be possible for a man to be pleased even with these as they ought, or too much, or too little. The same thing holds good in cases
of hearing; for no person calls those who are extravagantly delighted with songs or acting intemperate, nor does he call those who take proper pleasure in them temperate; nor yet in cases of smell, except accidentally; for we do not call those who are pleased with the smell of fruit, or roses, or aromatic odours, intemperate, but rather those who delight in the smell of perfumes and viands; for the intemperate are pleased with these, because by them they are put in mind of the objects of their desire. And one might see even others besides intemperate people, who when hungry take delight in the smell of meat; but taking delight in these things is a mark of the intemperate man, for to him these things are objects of desire. But even other animals perceive no pleasure through the medium of these senses, except accidentally; for dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them, although the smell caused the sensation. Neither does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in eating it; but he perceived from the lowing that the ox was near; and therefore he appears to be pleased at this; and likewise he is not delighted at merely seeing or finding a stag or wild goat, but because he will get food. Therefore temperance and intemperance belong to those pleasures in which other animals participate; whence they appear slavish and brutal; and these are touch and taste. Now they seem to have little or nothing to do with taste; for to taste belongs the judging of flavours; as those who try wines do, and those who prepare sauces; but the intemperate do not take much or indeed any pleasure in these flavours, but only in the enjoyment, which is caused entirely by means of touch, and which is felt in meat, in drink, and in venereal pleasures. Wherefore Phil xenus, the son of Eryxias, a glutton, wished 7 Because neither the gratification of sight, nor smell, nor hearing, is the final cause to animals, but the satisfying hunger, the means of doing which are announced by the senses. Compare Hom. Iliad, ii. 23.—Michelet.
that he had a throat longer than a crane's; because he was pleased with touch, the most common of senses, and the one to which intemperance belongs; and it would appear justly to be deserving of reproach, since it exists in us, not so far forth as we are men, but so far forth as we are animals. Now, to delight in such things as these, and to be better pleased with them than anything else, is brutal; for the most liberal of the pleasures of touch are not included, those, namely, which arise from friction and warmth in the gymnastic exercises; for the touch in which the intemperate man takes pleasure belongs not to the whole body, but to particular parts of it.

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CHAP. XI.

Different kinds of Desires.

1. But of desires, some appear to be common, and others peculiar and acquired; as, for example, the desire of food is natural; for every man desires, when hungry, meat or drink, or sometimes both; and a young man in his prime, Homer says, desires the nuptial couch; but it is not every man who feels this or that desire, nor do all feel the same. Therefore this appears to be peculiarly our own; not but that it has something natural in it, for different things are pleasant to different people, and some things are more pleasant universally than others which might be selected at random. In the natural desires, then, few err, and only on one side, that of excess; for to eat or drink anything till a man be overfilled is exceeding the natural desire in quantity; for the object of natural desire is the satisfaction of our wants. Therefore these are called belly gods, because they satisfy their wants more than they ought: people of excessively slavish dispositions are apt to do this. But in the case of peculiar pleasures many people err, and frequently;
for people who are called lovers of these things, are so called either from being pleased with improper objects, or in improper degree, or as the vulgar are, or in an improper manner, or at an improper time; but intemperate persons are in the excess in all these particulars; for they are pleased with some things that ought not to please them, because they are hateful; and if any of these things are proper objects of delight, they are delighted with them either more than they ought, or as the vulgar are.

It is clear, therefore, that excess in pleasures is intemperance, and blameable. But as to pains, a man is not, as in the case of courage, called temperate for bearing them, nor intemperate for not bearing them; but a man is called intemperate for feeling more pain than he ought at not obtaining pleasant things; and (so the pleasure is the cause of the pain;) but the temperate man is called so from not feeling pain at the absence of and the abstaining from pleasure. Now, the intemperate man desires all things which are pleasant, or those which are not so, and is led by his desire to choose these things in preference to others; for which reason he feels pain both on account of his failure in obtaining, and his desire to obtain; for desire is accompanied by pain; but it seems absurd to be pained through pleasure.

But there are, in fact, none who fall short on the subject of pleasure, and who delight less than they ought in it; for such insensibility is not natural to man; for all other animals discriminate between the things which they eat, and like some, and dislike others. But if any one thinks nothing pleasant, and sees no difference between one thing and another, he would scarcely be a man; but this character has no name, because it is never found.

But the temperate man is in the mean in these matters; for he is not pleased, but rather annoyed, at the principal pleasures of the intemperate man; nor is he pleased with any improper objects, nor
excessively with anything; nor is he pained at their absence; nor does he feel desire, except in moderation, nor more than he ought, nor when he ought not, nor in any case improperly. But he feels moderate and proper desire for all those pleasant things which conduce to health, or a sound habit of body; and he feels the same desire for those other pleasures which do not hinder these, which are not contrary to the honourable, nor beyond his means; for he who feels otherwise sets too high a price upon such pleasures. But this is not the character of the temperate man; but he feels them according to the suggestions of right reason.

CHAP. XII.

That Intemperance appears more Voluntary than Cowardice.

1. But intemperance seems more voluntary than cowardice; for one arises from pleasure, and the other from pain; one of which is to be chosen, and the other to be avoided. And pain puts a man beside himself, and disturbs his natural character; whereas pleasure has no such effect. It is, therefore, more voluntary, and for this reason more deserving of reproach; for it is easier to become accustomed to resist pleasures, because they frequently occur in life; and in forming the habits there is no danger; but the case of things formidable is just the contrary.

2. And it would appear that cowardice is not equally voluntary in the particular acts; for cowardice itself is not painful; but the particular circumstances through pain put a man beside himself, and cause him to throw away his arms, and to do other disgraceful things; and therefore it appears to be compulsory. In the case, however, of the intemperate man, on the contrary, his particular acts are voluntary; for they are committed in obe-
dience to his lusts and desires; but the whole habit is less voluntary; for no one desires to be intemperate. We apply the term intemperance to children's faults also; for there is some resemblance between the two cases; but which use of the word is derived from the other, matters not for our present purpose. But it is evident that the latter meaning was derived from the former; and the metaphor seems to be by no means a bad one: for whatever desires those things which are disgraceful, and is apt to increase much, requires chastisement; and this is especially the case with desires and children; for children live in obedience to desire, and in them the desire of pleasure is excessive. If, therefore, it is not obedient, and subject to rule, it will increase greatly; for the desire of pleasure is insatiable, and attacks the foolish man on all sides; and the indulgence of desire increases the temper which is congenial to it, and if the desires are great and strong, they expel reason also. Hence it is necessary that they should be moderate and few, and not at all opposed to reason: and this state is what we call obedient and disciplined; for as a child ought to live in obedience to the orders of his master, so ought that part of the soul which contains the desires, to be in obedience to reason. It is therefore necessary for that part of the soul of the temperate man which contains the desires, to be in harmony with reason; for the honourable is the mark at which both aim; and the temperate man desires what he ought, and as he ought, and when he ought; and thus reason also enjoins. Let this suffice, therefore, on the subject of temperance.
BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Liberality and Illiberality.

1. Let us next speak of liberality. Now it appears to be a mean on the subject of possessions; for the liberal man is praised, not for matters which relate to war, nor for those in which the temperate character is exhibited, nor yet for his judgment, but in respect to the giving and receiving of property; and more in giving than receiving. But by property we mean everything, of which the value is measured by money. Now, the excess and defect on the subject of property are prodigality and illiberality; the term illiberality we always attach to those who are more anxious than they ought about money; but that of prodigality we sometimes use in a complex sense, and attach it to intemperate people, for we call those who are incontinent, and profuse in their expenditure for purposes of intemperance, prodigal; therefore they seem to be the most wicked, for they have many vices at once. Now, they are not properly so called, for the meaning of the word prodigal is the man who has one single vice, namely, that of wasting his fortune; for the man who is ruined by his own means is prodigal, and the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining one's self, since life is supported by means of property. This is the sense, therefore, that we attach to prodigality. But it is possible to make a good and bad use of everything which has use. Now, money is one of the useful things; and that man makes the best use of everything who possesses the virtue which relates to it, and,
Therefore, he who possesses the virtue that relates to money will make the best use of it, and the possessor of it is the liberal man.

But spending and giving seem to be the use of money, and receiving and taking care of it are more properly the method of acquiring it; hence it is more the part of the liberal man to give to proper objects than to receive from proper persons, or to abstain from receiving from improper persons; for it belongs more to the virtue of liberality to do than to receive good, and to do what is honourable than to abstain from doing what is disgraceful. And it is clear that doing what is good and honourable belongs to giving, and that receiving good and abstaining from doing what is disgraceful, belongs to receiving; and thanks are bestowed on the giver, and not on him who abstains from receiving, and praise still more so; and abstaining from receiving is more easy than giving, for men are less disposed to give what is their own than not to take what belongs to another; and givers are called liberal, while those who abstain from receiving are not praised for liberality, but nevertheless they are praised for justice; but those who receive are not praised at all. But liberal men are more beloved than any others, for they are useful, and their usefulness consists in giving.

But actions according to virtue are honourable, and are done for the sake of the honourable; the liberal man, therefore, will give for the sake of the honourable, and will give properly, for he will give to proper objects, in proper quantities, at proper times; and his giving will have all the other qualifications of right giving, and he will do this pleasantly and without pain; for that which is done according to virtue is pleasant, or without pain, and by no means annoying to the doer. But he who gives to improper objects, and not for the sake of the honourable, is not to be called liberal, but something else; nor yet he who gives with pain, for he would prefer the money to the performance of an
honourable action, and this is not the part of a liberal man. Nor yet will the liberal man receive from improper persons, for such receiving is not characteristic of him who estimates things at their proper value; nor would he be fond of asking, for it is not like a benefactor, readily to allow himself to be benefited; but he will receive from proper sources; for instance, from his own possessions; not because it is honourable, but because it is necessary, in order that he may have something to give; nor will he be careless of his own fortune, because he hopes by means of it to be of use to others; nor will he give at random to anybody, in order that he may have something to give to proper objects and in cases where it is honourable to do so.

9. It is characteristic of the liberal man to be profuse and lavish in giving, so as to leave but little for himself, for it is characteristic of him not to look to his own interest. But the term liberality is applied in proportion to a man’s fortune, for the liberal consists not in the quantity of the things given, but in the habit of the giver; and this habit gives according to the means of the giver. And there is nothing to hinder the man whose gifts are smaller being more liberal, provided he gives from smaller means. But those who have not been the makers of their own fortune, but have received it by inheritance, are thought to be more liberal, for they are inexperienced in want, and all men love their own productions most, as parents and poets. But it is not easy for the liberal man to be rich, since he is not apt to receive or to take care of money, but rather to give it away, and to be careless of it for its own sake, and only to care for it for the sake of giving away. And for this reason people upbraid fortune, because those who are most deserving of wealth are the least wealthy. But this happens not without reason, for it is impossible for a man to have money who takes no pains about getting it, as is the case in other things.

12. Yet the liberal man will not give to improper
persons, nor at improper times, and so forth, for if he did, he would cease to act with liberality; and if he were to spend money upon these things, he would have none to spend upon proper objects, for, as has been observed, the man who spends according to his means, and upon proper objects, is liberal, but he who is in the excess is prodigal. For this reason we do not call kings prodigal, for it does not appear easy to exceed the greatness of their possessions in gifts and expenditure.

Liberality, therefore, being a mean state on the subject of giving and receiving money, the liberal man will give and expend upon proper objects, and in proper quantities, in small and great matters alike, and this he will do with pleasure; and he will receive from proper sources, and in proper quantities; for, since the virtue of liberality is a mean state it both giving and receiving, he will in both cases act as he ought; for proper receiving is naturally consequent upon proper giving, and improper receiving is the contrary. Habits, therefore, which are naturally consequent upon each other are produced together in the same person, but those that are contrary clearly cannot. But if it should happen to the liberal man to spend in a manner inconsistent with propriety and what is honourable, he will feel pain, but only moderately and as he ought, for it is characteristic of virtue to feel pleasure and pain at proper objects, and in a proper manner. And the liberal man is ready to share his money with others; for, from his setting no value on it, he is liable to be dealt with unjustly, and he is more annoyed at not spending anything that he ought to have spent, than pained at having spent what he ought not; and he is no friend of Simonides. But the prodigal man even in these cases acts wrongly, for he neither feels pleasure nor pain, where he ought nor as he ought. But it will be more clear to us as we proceed.

14. But we have said that prodigality and illiberality are the excess and the defect, and that they are conversant with two things, giving and receiving, for we include spending under giving. Prodigality, therefore, exceeds in giving, and not receiving, and falls short in receiving; but illiberality is deficient in giving, but excessive in receiving, but only in cases of small expenditure. Both the characteristics of prodigality, therefore, are seldom found in the same person; for it is not easy for a person who receives from nobody to give to everybody, for their means soon fail private persons who give, and these are the very persons who seem to be prodigal. This character now would seem considerably better than the illiberal one; for he is easily to be cured by age and by want, and is able to arrive at the mean; for he has the qualifications of the liberal man; for he both gives and abstains from receiving, but in neither instance as he ought, nor well. If, therefore, he could be accustomed to do this, or could change his conduct in any other manner, he would be liberal, for he will then give to proper objects, and will not receive from improper sources; and for this reason he does not seem to be bad in moral character, for it is not the mark of a wicked or an ungenerous man to be excessive in giving and not receiving, but rather of a fool. But he who is in this manner prodigal seems far better than the illiberal man, not only on account of the reasons already stated, but also because he benefits many people, while the other benefits nobody, not even himself.

15. Why prodigality is better than illiberality.

16. But the majority of prodigals, as has been stated, also receive from improper sources, and are in this respect illiberal. Now, they become fond of receiving, because they wish to spend, and are not able to do it easily, for their means soon fail them; they are, therefore, compelled to get supplies from some other quarter, and at the same time, owing to their not caring for the honourable, they receive without scruple from any person they can; for they are anxious to give, and the how or the whence they
get the money matters not to them. Therefore 17.
their gifts are not liberal, for they are not honour-
able, nor done for the sake of the honourable, nor
as they ought to be done; but sometimes they
make men rich who deserve to be poor, and will
give to men of virtuous characters nothing, and to
flatterers, or those who provide them with any
other pleasure, much. Hence the generality of pro-
digals are intemperate also; for, spending money
carelessly, they are expensive also in acts of in-
temperance, and, because they do not live with a
view to the honourable, they fall away towards
pleasures. The prodigal, therefore, if he be without
the guidance of a master, turns aside to these vices;
but if he happen to be taken care of, he may pos-
sibly arrive at the mean, and at propriety.

But illiberality is incurable, for old age and im-
becility of every kind seem to make men illiberal,
and it is more congenial to human nature than pro-
digality; for the generality of mankind are fond of
money rather than of giving, and it extends very
widely, and has many forms, for there appear to
be many modes of illiberality; for as it consists in
two things, the defect of giving, and the excess
of receiving, it does not exist in all persons entire,
but is sometimes divided; and some exceed in re-
cieving, and others fall short in giving. For those
who go by the names of parsimonious, stingy, and
niggardly, all fall short in giving; but do not desire
what belongs to another, nor do they wish to
receive, some of them from a certain fairness of
character, and caution lest they commit a base
action; for some people seem to take care of
their money, or at least say that they do, in order
that they may never be compelled to commit a
diagraceful action. Of these also is the cummin-

* How often do we find the most profuse and extravagant
persons guilty of the most illiberal actions, and least scrup-
ulous as to the means of getting money! This union of the
two extremes in the same individual is exemplified in the
character of Catiline, whom Sallust describes as being "Alieni
appetens, sui profusus."
suffer, and every one of similar character, and he
derives his name from being in the excess of unwil-
ingness to give. Others, again, through fear abstain
from other persons’ property, considering it difficult
for them to take what belongs to other people, with-
out other people taking theirs. They therefore are
satisfied neither to receive nor give. Again, in re-
ceiving, some are excessive in receiving from any
source, and any thing; those, for instance, who ex-
cercise illiberal professions, and brothel-keepers, and
all persons of this kind, and usurers, and those who
lend small sums at high interest; for all these re-
ceive from improper sources, and in improper quan-
tities. And the love of base gain appears to be
common to them all; for they all submit to re-
proach for the sake of gain, and even for small
gain. For we do not call those illiberal who receive
great things from improper sources, as tyrants, who
lay waste cities, and pillage temples, but rather
we call them wicked, impious, and unjust. But the
gamester, the clothes-stealer, and the robber, are of
the illiberal class, for they are fond of base gain;
for, for the sake of gain, both of them ply their
trades, and incur reproach. Clothes-stealers and
robbers submit to the greatest dangers for the sake
of the advantage they gain, and gamesters gain from
their friends, to whom they ought to give. Both,
therefore, are lovers of base gain, in that they desire
to gain from sources whence they ought not; and
all such modes of receiving are illiberal. With
reason, therefore, is illiberality said to be contrary
to liberality; for not only is it a greater evil than
prodigality, but also men are more apt to err on this
side than on the side of the prodigality before men-
tioned. Respecting liberality, therefore, and the
vices which are opposed to it, let thus much have
been said.
CHAP. II.

Of Magnificence and Meanness.

But it would seem that the subject of magnificence is the next to be discussed; for this likewise is a virtue on the subject of money; but it does not, like liberality, extend to all acts that pertain to money, but only those which involve great expenditure. And in these it surpasses liberality in greatness; for, as its name signifies, it is appropriate expenditure in great matters; but greatness is a relative term; for the expense of the office of trierarch and of the chief of a sacred embassy is not the same. Propriety therefore depends upon the relation of the expense to the expender; the object of the expense; and the quantity expended. But he who in trifling, or in moderate matters, spends with propriety, is not called magnificent; as in the line, “I often gave to the wandering beggar;” but he who expends with propriety in great matters is so called; for the magnificent man is liberal; but it does not follow any more for that, that the liberal man should be magnificent. Of this habit the defect is called meanness; the excess, bad taste and vulgar profusion, and all other names which are applied to excess, not on proper, but improper objects. But we will speak of them hereafter.

The magnificent man resembles one who possesses knowledge, for he is able to discover what is How

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* The τρωπάρτιοι were those rich citizens at Athens, on whom was imposed the public burden of furnishing and equipping a trireme; the Στρωποί were those who were sent on any embassy for sacred purposes, such as to consult an oracle, or attend a solemn meeting, &c. On the λιτωνώρια of the Athenians, see Dr. Smith’s Dictionary of Antiquities.

4 See Hom. Odyss. xvi. 420.

* The Greek word is βασανοεία. This vice is called in the Magn. Mor. i. 27, σαλακωνία; and in Eudem. Eth. ii. 3. δαπανήμα.
appropriate, and to incur great expense in accordance with it; for, as we said in the beginning, the habit is defined by the energies, and by the acts of which it is the habit. The expenses of the magnificent man, therefore, are great and appropriate; such also are his works; for so will his expense be great, and be appropriate to his work. So that the work ought to be worthy of the expense, and the expense worthy, or even more than worthy, of the work. Now the magnificent man will incur such expenses for the sake of the honourable; for this is common to all the virtues; and besides, he will do it with pleasure and with profuseness; for exact accuracy is mean; and he would be more likely to consider how he could do the thing most beautifully or most appropriately, than how much it would cost, or how he might do it at the smallest price.

Consequently the magnificent man must necessarily be liberal also; for the liberal man will spend what he ought, and as he ought; but in these cases greatness is characteristic of the magnificent man. Since, then, liberality belongs to these subjects, magnificence will, even with the same expense, make its work more magnificent; for the excellence of a possession and a work is different; for a possession is most excellent when it is of the greatest value, and would fetch most money, as gold; but a work, when it is great and honourable; for the contemplation of a work like this causes admiration, and the magnificent causes admiration. The excellence of a work, therefore, is magnificence in greatness.

Now all those things which we call honourable, are included under the term expenses, as, for example, those that relate to the gods, offerings, temples, and sacrifices; likewise all those that relate to anything divine; and those which, being done for the public good, are objects of laudable ambition; as if men think that a person ought to be splendid in the offices of choragus, or trierarch, or public entertainer. But in all cases, as has been said, there must be a reference to the rank and
property of the person who expends; for the expense must have proper relation to these things and not only be appropriate to the work, but to the doer of the work also. Hence a poor man cannot be magnificent, for he has not property from which he can expend large sums with propriety; and the poor man who attempts it is a fool; for it is inconsistent with his rank, and with propriety; but excellence consists in doing it rightly. But magnificent actions become those, to whom magnificent property belongs previously, either by their own means, or their ancestors, or any with whom they are connected; they also become the nobly born, the famous, and so on; for all these have greatness and dignity. Such, then, is the character of the magnificent man as near as possible, and in such expenses is magnificence displayed; for these are the greatest and most had in honour.

But of private expenses, those are the most magnificent which only happen for once; as, for example, a wedding, and anything of that kind; or anything in which the whole city, or the principal people, take an interest, and those which relate to the reception and dismissal of strangers, and to honorary gifts and recompenses; for the magnificent man is not inclined to spend upon himself, but upon the public; but gifts bear some resemblance to offerings. It is also characteristic of the magnificent man to furnish his house in a manner becoming his wealth; for this is an ornament to him; and to be more disposed to spend money on such works as are lasting; for these are the most honourable; and in every case to attend to propriety; for the same things are not suitable to gods and men, nor to a temple and a tomb. And in the case of expenses, everything that is great in its kind, is magnificent, and that which is great in a great kind, is most magnificent; and next to that, that which is great in another kind. And there is a difference between that which is great in the work, and that which is great in the expenditure; for a
most beautiful ball or oil-bottle is magnificent as a gift to a child, but the price of it is trifling and illiberal. Hence it is the part of the magnificent man to do what he does, of whatever description it be, magnificently; for this is not easily surpassed, and has a due reference to the expense. Such, then, is the character of the magnificent man.

13. But he who is in excess, and is vulgarly profuse, is in excess, as we have said, in spending improperly; for in small expenses he will spend large sums, and be inconsistently splendid; for instance, he will entertain his club-fellows with a marriage feast; and when furnishing a chorus for a comedy, will introduce a purple robe into the parode, like the Megareans; and all this he will do, not for the sake of the honourable, but to display his wealth, imagining that by this means he shall be admired; and where he ought to spend much, he will spend little, and where he ought to spend little, much.

14. But the mean man in all cases will be in the defect, and though he may have spent very large sums, will spoil the beauty of the whole for the sake of a trifle; and whatever he does, he will do with hesitation, and will calculate how to spend least money; and this he will do in a complaining spirit, and will always think that he does more than he has occasion to do. These two habits are vices; nevertheless they do not bring reproach upon those guilty of them, from their neither being hurtful to their neighbour, nor very disgraceful to themselves.

1 See Hom. Odys. i. 225.

"But say, you jovial troop so gaily dress'd,
Is this a bridal or a friendly feast?"

* The πάρος was the first speech of the whole chorus in a Greek tragedy. It was so named as being the passage of the chorus-song, sung whilst it was advancing to its proper place in the orchestra, and therefore in anapestic or marching verse. The στάσιμον was chanted by the chorus when standing in its proper position. See Smith's Dict. Antiq. p. 983.
CHAP. III.

Of Magnanimity and Little Mindedness.

Magnanimity, even from its very name, appears to be conversant with great matters. First let us determine with what kind of great matters. But it makes no difference whether we consider the habit, or the man who lives according to the habit. Now, the magnanimous man appears to be he who, being really worthy, estimates his own worth highly; for he who makes too low an estimate of it is a fool; and no man who acts according to virtue can be a fool, nor devoid of sense. The character before-mentioned, therefore, is magnanimous; for he whose worth is low, and who estimates it lowly, is a modest man, but not a magnanimous one; for magnanimity belongs to greatness, just as beauty exists only with good stature; for little persons may be pretty, and well proportioned, but cannot be beautiful. He who estimates his own worth highly, when in reality he is unworthy, is vain; but he who estimates it more highly than he deserves, is not in all cases vain. He who estimates it less highly than it deserves, is little-minded, whether his worth be great or moderate, or if, when worth little, he estimates himself at less; and the man of great worth appears especially little-minded; for what would he xoPro?

Magnanimity as described by Aristotle cannot be consistent with the humility required by the Gospel. The Christian knows his utter unworthiness in the sight of God, and therefore cannot form too low an estimate of his own worth. Nevertheless that there is such a virtue as Christian magnanimity is abundantly shown in the character of St. Paul. The heathen virtue of magnanimity constituted a marked feature in the character of a virtuous Athenian, and was doubtless also, as Zell observes, a strong feature in the character of Aristotle himself.

1 The Greeks considered a good stature a necessary characteristic of beauty.—See the Rhetoric, I. v., also Hom. Odys. xiii. 239.
have done if his worth had not been so great?

5. The magnanimous man, therefore, in the greatness of his merits, is in the highest place; but in his proper estimation of himself, in the mean; for he estimates himself at the proper rate, while the others are in the excess and defect. If, therefore, the magnanimous man, being worthy of great things, thinks himself so, and still more of the greatest things, his character must display itself upon some one subject in particular.

6. Now, the term value is used with reference to external goods; and we must assume that to be of the greatest value which we award to the gods, and which men of eminence are most desirous of, and which is the prize of the most honourable acts; and such a thing as this is honour; for this is the greatest of external goods. The magnanimous man, therefore, acts with propriety on subjects of honour and dishonour. And, even without arguments to prove the point, it seems that the magnanimous are concerned with honour, for great men esteem themselves worthy of honour more than anything else; for it is according to their desert. But the little-minded man is in the defect, both as regards his own real merit and the magnanimous man's dignity; but the vain man is in the excess as regards his own real merit, but is in the defect as regards that of the magnanimous man.

7. The magnanimous man, if he is worthy of the highest honours, must be the best of men; for the better man is always worthy of the greater honour, and the best man of the greatest. The truly magnanimous man must therefore be a good man; and it seems, that whatever is great in any virtue belongs to the magnanimous character; for it can in nowise be befitting the magnanimous man to swing his arms and run away, nor to commit an act of

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Magnanimous man conversant with honour (τιμή), which is the greatest of external goods.

The magnanimous man a good man.

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1 The word here translated honour is τιμή, which signifies, not the abstract principle τὸ καλὸν, but honourable distinction; hence it is called an external good, for it is conferred on us by others.

1 The phrase in the original παρασιπαντα φεύγων has the
injustice; for what could be the motive to base
cconduct to him to whom nothing is great? And if
we examine the particulars of the case, it will ap-
pear ridiculous that the magnanimous man should
not be a good man; and he could not even be de-
serving of honour, if he were a bad man; for honour
is the prize of virtue, and is bestowed upon the good.

Magnanimity, then, seems to be, as it were, a kind of
ornament of the virtues; for it makes them
greater, and cannot exist without them. And for
this reason it is difficult to be really magnanimous;
for it is impossible, without perfect excellence and
goodness. The magnanimous character, therefore,
is principally displayed on the subject of honour
and dishonour. And in the case of great instances
of honour, bestowed by the good, he will be moder-
rately gratified, under the idea that he has ob-
tained what is his due, or even less than he de-
serves; for no honour can be equivalent to perfect
virtue. Not but that he will receive it, because
they have nothing greater to give him; but honour
from any other persons, and on the score of trifles,
he will utterly despise; for these he does not de-
serve; and likewise he will despise dishonour; for
he cannot justly deserve it.

The magnanimous character is, therefore, as has 9.
been said, principally concerned with honours; not To wealth.
but that in wealth and power, and all good and bad
fortune, however it may come to pass, he will behave
with moderation; and not be too much delighted
at success, nor too much grieved at failure; for he
will not feel thus even at honour, though it is the
greatest thing of all; for power and wealth are
eligible because of the honour they confer; at any
rate, those who possess them desire to be honoured
on account of them. To him, therefore, by whom
honour is lightly esteemed, nothing else can be im-
portant; wherefore magnanimous men have the 10.
appearance of superciliousness. Instances of good Success

same signification as the Latin phrase _demissis manibus fugere;
_t. e. to fly very rapidly._

H 2
fortune also appear to contribute to magnanimity; for the nobly born are thought worthy of honour, and those who possess power and wealth, for they surpass others; and everything which is superior in goodness is more honourable. Hence, such things as these make men more magnanimous; for by some people they are honoured. But in reality the good man alone is deserving of honour; but he who has both is thought more worthy of honour; but those who, without virtue, possess such good things as these, neither have any right to think themselves worthy of great things, nor are properly called magnanimous; for magnanimity cannot exist without perfect virtue. But those who possess these things become supercilious and insolent; for without virtue it is difficult to bear good fortune with propriety; and being unable to bear it, and thinking that they excel others, they despise them, while they themselves do anything they please; for they imitate the magnanimous man, though they are not like him; but this they do wherever they can. Actions according to virtue they do not perform, but they despise others. But the magnanimous man feels contempt justly; for he forms his opinions truly, but the others form theirs at random.

The magnanimous man neither shuns nor is fond of danger, because there are but few things which he cares for; but to great dangers he exposes himself, and when he does run any risk, he is unsparing of his life, thinking that life is not worth having on some terms. He is disposed to bestow, but ashamed to receive benefits; for the former is the part of a superior, the latter of an inferior; and he is disposed to make a more liberal return for favours; for thus the original giver will have incurred an additional obligation, and will have received a benefit. He is thought also to recollect those whom he has benefited, but not those from whom he has received benefits; for the receiver is inferior to the giver: but the magnanimous man wishes to be superior, and the benefits which he confers he hears
of with pleasure, but those which he receives with pain. Thetis therefore says nothing to Jupiter about the benefits she has conferred upon him, nor do the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians, but only about those which they have received. 

Again, it is characteristic of the magnanimous man to ask no favours, or very few, of anybody, but to be willing to serve others; and towards men of rank or fortune to be haughty in his demeanour, but to be moderate towards men of middle rank; for to be superior to the former is difficult and honourable, but to be superior to the latter is easy; and among the former there is nothing ungenerous in being haughty; but to be so amongst persons of humble rank is bad taste, just like making a show of strength to the weak.

Another characteristic is, not to go in search of honour, nor where others occupy the first places; and to be inactive and slow, except where some great honour is to be gained, or some great work to be performed; and to be inclined to do but few things, but those great and distinguished. He must also necessarily be open in his hatreds and his friendships; for concealment is the part of a man who is afraid. He must care more for truth than for opinion. He must speak and act openly; for this is characteristic of a man who despises others; for he is bold in speech, and therefore apt to despise

See Hom. II. i. 503; where Thetis only hints at any benefits which she may have conferred on Jupiter, but does not dwell upon them at length or enumerate them.

"If e'er, O father of the gods! she said,
My words could please thee, or my actions aid."

Pope, i. 652.

Callisthenes, who wrote a history (as we learn from Diodorus, xiv. 117) commencing from the peace of Artaxerxes, says that the Lacedaemonians, when invaded by the Thebans, sent for aid to Athens, and said that they willingly passed over the benefits which they had conferred on the Athenians, but remembered those the Athenians had conferred upon them. Xenophon, however (Hell. VI. v. 53), relates that they made mention of the good offices that they conferred upon each other. It has been supposed by some that both these examples are instances of Aristotle's having quoted from memory, and thus having fallen into error.
others, and truth-telling, except when he uses dissimulation; but to the vulgar he ought dissemble.

17. And he cannot live at the will of another, except it be a friend; for it is servile; for which reason all flatterers are mercenary, and low-minded men are flatterers. He is not apt to admire; for nothing is great to him. He does not recollect injuries; for accurate recollection, especially of injuries, is not characteristic of the magnanimous man; but he rather overlooks them. He is not fond of talking of people; for he will neither speak of himself, nor of anybody else; for he does not care that he himself should be praised, nor that others should be blamed. He is not disposed to praise; and therefore he does not find fault even with his enemies, except for the sake of wanton insult. He is by no means apt to complain or supplicate help in unavoidable or trifling calamities; for to be so in such cases shows anxiety about them. He is apt to possess rather what is honourable and unfruitful, than what is fruitful and useful; for this shows more self-sufficiency. The step of the magnanimous man is slow, his voice deep, and his language stately; for he who only feels anxiety about few things is not apt to be in a hurry; and he who thinks highly of nothing is not vehement; and shrillness and quickness of speaking arise from these things. This, therefore, is the character of the magnanimous man.

19. He who is in the defect is little-minded; he who is in the excess is vain. But these do not seem to be vicious, for they are not evil-doers, but only in error; for the little-minded man, though worthy of good things, deprives himself of his deserts; but yet he resembles one who has something vicious about him, from his not thinking himself worthy of good things, and he seems ignorant of himself, for otherwise he

20. *Epecurso* is a dissembler, one who says less than he thinks, and is opposed to ἀληθής. *Epecuria*, dissimulation, especially an ignorance purposely affected to provoke or confound an antagonist,—irony, used by Socrates against the Sophists. See Scott and Liddell's Lexicon. See another sense, in which *Epecuria* is used in the 7th chapter of this book.
would have desired those things of which he was worthy, especially as they are good things. Yet such men as these seem not to be fools, but rather idle. And such an opinion seems to make them worse; for each man desires those things which are according to his deserts; and they abstain even from honourable actions and customs, considering themselves unworthy; and in like manner from external goods.

But vain men are foolish, and ignorant of themselves, and this obviously; for, thinking themselves worthy, they aspire to distinction, and then are found out; and they are fine in their dress, and their gestures, and so on; and they wish their good fortune to be known, and speak of it, hoping to be honoured for it. But little-mindedness is more opposed to magnanimity than vanity, for it is oftener found, and is worse. Magnanimity, therefore, as we have said, relates to great honour.

CHAP. IV.

Of the nameless Virtue which is conversant with the desire of Honour.

There seems to be another virtue conversant with the same habit, as was stated in the earlier part of our treatise, which would appear to bear the same relation to magnanimity, which liberality does to magnificence; for both these have nothing to do with what is great, but dispose us as we ought to be disposed towards what is moderate and small. And as in receiving and giving money there is a mean habit, an excess, and a defect; so in the desire of honour also, there is the "more and the less" than we

* See Book II. ch. vii.

* An ambiguity might result from the difficulty of distinguishing in English between τὸ καλὸν and τιμή. The former is the abstractedly honourable, the morally beautiful,—in Latin, "honestum;" the latter is honourable distinction conferred on us by others.
ARISTOTLE'S

ought, as well as the proper source, and the proper
manner; for we blame the lover of honour as de-
siring honour too much, and from improper sources;
and the man who is destitute of the love of honour,
as one who does not deliberately prefer to be
honoured even for honourable things; and some-
times we praise the lover of honour as manly and
noble; at other times, him who is destitute of the
love of honour, as moderate and modest; as we
said before. But it is clear, that as the expression,
"lover of anything," is used in more senses than
one, we do not use the term lover of honour always
with the same signification; but when we praise
him, we mean that he loves honour more than most
men; and when we blame him, that he loves it
more than he ought. But since the mean state
has no name, the extremes seem to contend for
the middle place, as being vacant; but wherever
there are an excess and defect, there is also a
mean. And men desire honour both too much
and too little, so that it is possible to desire it as
they ought. At any rate, this habit is praised,
being a nameless mean state on the subject of
honour. But compared with love of honour, it
appears to be the absence of all love for it; and
compared with this, it appears to be love of honour.
Compared with both, therefore, it in some sense has
the nature of both; and this seems to be the case
with the other virtues also. But in this case the
extremes seem opposed, because the mean has no
name.

Προαιρετικός is translated throughout this work "deliberate preference," as expressing most literally the original. It implies preference, not from mere impulse, but on principle, as a matter of moral choice—as the act of a moral being.

The word in the original is σωφρονίς. Considered as a moral virtue, σωφροσύνη signifies temperance,—the virtue, as Aristotle says, σωφρόνες ἡ ἰδέα, which preserves the vigour of the intellect. Here it signifies modesty, the virtue of a
sober and well-regulated mind.
CHAP. V.

Of Meekness and Irascibility.

But meekness is a mean state on the subject of angry feelings. But because the mean has no ἡμέρας name, and we can scarcely say that the extremes have any, we give to the mean the name of meekness, though it declines towards the defect, which has no name. But the excess might be called a species of irascibility; for the passion is anger, and the things that cause it are many and various. He, therefore, who feels anger on proper occasions, at proper persons, and besides in a proper manner, at proper times, and for a proper length of time, is an object of praise. This character will therefore be the meek man, in the very points in which meekness is an object of praise; for by the meek man we mean him who is undisturbed, and not carried away by passion, but who feels anger according to the dictates of reason, on proper occasions, and for a proper length of time. But the meek man seems to err rather on the side of defect; for he is not inclined to revenge, but rather to forgive. But the defect, whether it be a kind of insensibility to anger, or whatever it be, is blamed. The defect for those who do not feel anger in proper cases, are thought to be fools, as well as those who do not feel it in the proper manner, nor at the proper time, nor at the proper persons; for such an one seems to have no perception, nor sense of pain; and from his insensibility to anger, he is not disposed to defend himself; but it is like a slave to endure insults offered to one's self, and to overlook them when offered to one's relations. But the excess takes place in all the categories; for it is possible the excess to be angry with improper persons, on improper occasions, too much, too quickly, or too long; yet all these circumstances are not united in the same
person; for it is impossible that they should be; for the evil destroys itself, and if entire, becomes intolerable.

5. Irascible men, therefore, are easily angered, with improper objects, on improper occasions, and too much; but their anger quickly ceases, and this is the best point in their character. And this is the case with them, because they do not restrain their anger, but retaliate openly and visibly, because of their impetuosity, and then they become calm. The choleric, who are disposed to be angry with everything, and on every occasion, are likewise in excess; whence also they derive their name. But the bitter are difficult to be appeased, and retain their anger a long time, for they repress their rage; but there comes a cessation, when they have retaliated; for revenge makes their anger cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain. But if they do not get revenge, they feel a weight of disappointment: for, owing to its not showing itself, no one reasons with them; and there is need of time for a man to digest his anger within him. Persons of this character are very troublesome to themselves, and to their best friends.

6. But we call those persons ill-tempered who feel anger on improper occasions, too much, or too long, and who do not become reconciled without revenge or punishment. But we consider the excess to be more opposite to the mean than the defect, for it occurs more frequently; for revenge is more natural to man than meekness: and the ill-tempered are worse to live with than any. But the observation which was made in the former part, is clear from what we are now saying; for it is difficult to determine with accuracy the manner, the persons, the occasions, and the length of time for

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* Etymologists have doubted whether the composition of ἀκρόχολος be ἄρος or ἄροσ, or ἀροσ, but this observation of Aristotle shows that in his opinion the word is derived from ἄρος, an extreme.

† Hoc est coniosis ac sedare perturbationem.—Feliciæus.
which one ought to be angry, and at what point one ceases to act rightly, or wrongly. For he who transgresses the limit a little is not blamed, whether it be on the side of excess or deficiency: and we sometimes praise those who fall short, and call them meek; and we call the irascible manly, as being able to govern. But it is not easy to lay down a precise rule as to the extent and nature of the transgression, by which a man becomes culpable; for the decision must be left to particular cases, and to the moral sense. Thus much, however, is clear, that the mean habit is praiseworthy, according to which we feel anger with proper persons, on proper occasions, in a proper manner, and so forth: and the excesses and defects are blameable; a little blameable when they are only a little distance from the mean; more blameable when they are further; and when they are very far, very blameable. It is clear, therefore, that we must hold to the mean habit. Let the habits, therefore, which relate to anger have been sufficiently discussed.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Social Virtue and its Contraries.

But in the intercourse of life and society, and the interchange of words and actions, some people appear to be men-pleasers; who praise everything with a view to give pleasure, and never in any case take the opposite side, but think they ought to give no pain or annoyance to those in whose society they happen to be; others, contrary to these, who oppose everything, and are utterly careless of giving pain, are called cross and quarrelsome. That these habits are blameable, is evident; and likewise that the mean habit between them is praiseworthy, according to which a man will approve and disapprove of proper
3. objects, and in a proper manner. There is no name assigned to this habit, but it most resembles friendship; for he who acts according to the mean habit is such as we mean by the expression, "a kind and gentle friend," if we add thereto the idea of affection; while this habit differs from friendship, in being without passion and affection for those with whom one has intercourse; for it is not from being a friend or an enemy that he approves or disapproves in every case properly, but because it is his nature; for he will do it alike in the case of those whom he knows, and those whom he does not know, and to those with whom he is intimate, and to those with whom he is not intimate, except that he will always do it properly; for it is not fit in the same way to pay regard to, or to give pain, to intimate friends and strangers.

4. Generally, therefore, we have said, that in his intercourse he will behave properly; and referring his conduct to the principles of honour and expediency, he will aim at not giving pain, or at giving pleasure. For he seems to be concerned with the pleasures and pains that arise in the intercourse of society; and in all of these in which it is dishonourable or inexpedient to give pleasure, he will show disapprobation, and will deliberately prefer to give pain. And if the action bring upon the doer disgrace or harm, and that not small, and the opposite course of conduct only slight pain, he will not approve, but will disapprove of it highly. But his manner of intercourse will be different with persons of rank, and with ordinary persons, and with those who are more or less known to him; and in all other cases of difference he will act in like manner, awarding to each his due: and abstractedly preferring to give pleasure, and cautious about giving pain, but yet attending always to the results, I mean to the honourable and the expedient, if they be greater than the pain. And for the sake of giving great pleasure afterwards, he will inflict small pain. Such, then,
is he who is in the mean, but it has not a name. 6. But of those who give pleasure, he who aims at being pleasant, without any further object, is a man-pleaser; he who does it that some benefit may accrue to him in money or that which money purchases, is a flatterer. But as for him who gives pain and always disapproves, we have said that he is morose and quarrelsome. But the extremes appear opposed to each other, because the mean has no name.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Truthful, and those in the Extremes.

The mean state on the subject of arrogance is con- cerned with almost the same object matter as the last; this also has no name. But it would be no bad plan to go through and enumerate such habits as these; for we should have a more accurate knowledge of what relates to moral character, when we have gone through them individually; and we should believe that the virtues are mean states, if we saw at one comprehensive view that the position was true in every instance. Now, in social intercourse, those persons who associate with others for the purpose of giving pleasure, and those who do it for the purpose of giving pain, have been treated of. But let us speak of those who are true, and those who are false, in their words, their actions, and their pretensions.

Now, the arrogant man appears inclined to pre- tend to things honourable, which do not belong to him, and to things greater than what belong to him: the falsely modest, on the other hand, is apt to deny what really does belong to him, or to make it out to be less than it is. But he who is in the mean is, as it were, a real character, truthful in his actions and his words, and ready to allow that he possesses what he really possesses, without
making it greater or less. But it is possible to do all these things with or without a motive. But every one, except he acts with a motive, speaks, acts, and lives, according to his character. But falsehood, abstractedly, is bad and blameable, and truth honourable and praiseworthy; and thus the truthful man being in the mean, is praiseworthy; while the false are both blameable; but the arrogant man more so than the other. But let us speak about each separately: and first, about the truthful; for we are not speaking of him who speaks truth in his agreements, nor in matters that relate to injustice or justice; for this would belong to another virtue; but of him who in cases of no such consequence observes truth in his words and actions, from being such in character.

5. But such a man would appear to be a worthy man; for the lover of truth, since he observes it in matters of no consequence, will observe it still more in matters of consequence; for inasmuch as he who is cautious of falsehood for its own sake, will surely be cautious of it as being disgraceful; and such a man is praiseworthy. But he declines from the truth rather on the side of defect; for this appears to be in better taste, because excesses are hateful.

6. But he who makes pretensions to greater things than really belong to him, without any motive, resembles a base man, for otherwise he would not have taken pleasure in the falsehood; but still he appears foolish rather than bad. But if it be with a motive, he who does it for the sake of glory or honour is not very blameable, as the arrogant man; but he who does it for the sake of money is more dishonourable.

7. But the character of the arrogant man does not consist in the power of being so, but in the deliberate preference to be so; for he is arrogant, just as the liar, from the habit, and from his being of this character. Those, therefore, who are arrogant for the sake of honour, pretend to such things as are followed by praise or congratulation; those who are so for the sake of gain pretend to such
things as their neighbours reap the advantage of, and of which the absence in themselves may escape notice, as that they are skilful physicians or soothsayers; wherefore most men pretend to such things as these, and are thus arrogant; for they possess the qualities which we have mentioned.

But the falsely modest, who speak of themselves as on the side of defect, seem more refined in character; for they are not thought to speak for the sake of gain, but to avoid that which is troublesome to others. These, too, more than other men, deny that they possess honourable qualities; as Socrates also did. But those who pretend to things of small importance, and which they evidently do not possess, are called cunning and consequent, and are very contemptible. And false modesty appears sometimes to be arrogance; as the dress of the Lacedemonians; for too great defect, as well as excess itself, looks like arrogance. But those who make a moderate use of false modesty, and in cases where the truth is not too obvious and plain, appear polished. But the arrogant seems to be opposed to the truthful character, for it is the worse of the two extremes.\*\v

* If ὁσόφος is here a substantive, it must be an attack upon the Sophists as pretenders to wisdom which they did not possess. The preceding passage renders this not improbable, for one great difference between the Sophists and the philosophers, who were, like Plato and Aristotle, opposed to them, was that they taught for gain. This their opponents thought unworthy of the dignity of a philosopher. The teaching of Socrates professed to be, as Aristotle asserts below, directly opposed to anything like pretension, hence the εἰπώρεια, which was one characteristic of it. On this subject Michelet refers to an essay of Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil., tom. ii. pp. 53-57. For an able and elaborate defence of the Sophists, and most interesting observations on the teaching of Socrates, see Grote’s Hist. of Greece, vol. viii. pp. 67 and 68.

\* Βαγκοπάνονόφος, a rogue who puts a good face on the worst case.—Liddell and Scott.
CHAP. VIII.

Of gracef ul or polished Wit, and its contrary.

1. But since there are periods of relaxation in life, and in them sportive pastime is admissible, in this case also there seems to be a certain method of intercourse consistent with propriety and good taste, and also of saying proper things and in a proper manner; and likewise a proper manner of hearing. But there will be a difference in point of the persons among whom we speak, or whom we hear. But it is clear that on these subjects there is excess and defect. Those, therefore, who exceed in the ridiculous appear to be buffoons and vulgar, always longing for something ridiculous, and aiming more at exciting laughter than speaking decently, and causing no pain to the object of their sarcasm. But those who neither say anything laughable themselves, nor approve of it in others, appear to be clownish and harsh; but those who are sportive with good taste are called men of graceful wit (εὔραπελοί, from εὖ, well, and ἐρήμω, to turn), as possessing versatility, for such talents seem to be the gestures of the moral character; and the character, like the body, is judged of by its gestures. But since what is ridiculous is on the surface, and the generality of mankind are pleased with sport, and even with overmuch jesting, even buffoons are called men of graceful wit, as though they were refined; but from what has been said, it is clear that they differ from them, and differ considerably.

2. But tact peculiarly belongs to the mean habit; and it is the part of a clever man of tact to speak and listen to such things as befit a worthy man and a gentleman; for in sport there are some things which it is proper for such a man to say and to listen to. And the sportiveness of the gentleman differs from that of the slave, and that of the
educated from that of the uneducated man: and a person might see this difference from the difference between old and recent comedies; in the old ones obscenity constituted the ridiculous; in the modern ones innuendo; and there is considerable difference between these in point of decency.

Must we, then, define the man who jests with propriety as one who says such things as are not unbecoming a gentleman; or who takes care not to give pain to his hearer, but rather to give pleasure; or is such a thing as this incapable of definition? for different things are hateful and pleasant to different people. The things which he will say he will also listen to; for it is thought that a man would do those things which he would bear to hear of. Now, he will not do everything that he will listen to; for a scoff is a sort of opprobrious expression; and there are some opprobrious expressions which are forbidden by legislators; and perhaps there are things at which they ought to have forbidden men to scoff. Now, the refined and gentlemanly man will so behave, being as it were a law to himself; and such is he who is in the mean, whether he be called a man of tact, or of graceful wit.

But the buffoon cannot resist what is ridiculous, and spares neither himself nor anybody else, if he can but raise a laugh; and this he will do by saying such things as the gentleman would not think of saying, or sometimes even of listening to. But the clownish man is in all such companies useless, for he contributes nothing, and disapproves of everything. But recreation and sport appear to be necessary in life.

Now, these just mentioned are the mean states in the social intercourse of life; they all refer to the interchange of certain words and actions, but they differ, in that one relates to truth, and others to the social virtues.

The dramatic literature of our own country, as well as that of Athens, furnishes a valuable index to the progress of refinement and moral education.
intercourse of life. pleasure. But of those that relate to pleasure, one is concerned with sport, the other with the other intercourse of life.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Sense of Shame.

1. But it is not proper to speak of the sense of shame as a virtue, for it is more like a passion than a habit; it is therefore defined as a kind of fear of disgrace; but in its effects it resembles very nearly the fear that is experienced in danger; for those who are ashamed grow red, and those who fear death turn pale. Both, therefore, appear to be in some sort connected with the body; and this seems characteristic of a passion rather than a habit. But this passion befits not every age, but only that of youth; for we think it right that young persons should be apt to feel shame, because from living in obedience to passion they commit many faults, and are restrained by a sense of shame. And we praise those young persons who are apt to feel shame; but no man would praise an older person for being shame-faced; for we think it wrong that he should do anything to be ashamed of; for shame is no part of the character of the good man, if, indeed, it be true that it follows unworthy actions; for such things he ought not to do. But whether the things be in reality or only in opinion disgraceful, it makes no difference; for neither ought to be done; so that a man ought not to feel shame.

2. Moreover, it is a mark of a bad man to be of such character as to do any of these things. But to be of such character as to feel shame in case he should do any such action, and for this cause to think himself a good man, is absurd; for shame follows only voluntary actions; but the good man will never do bad actions voluntarily. But shame may be hypothetically a worthy feeling; for if a man
were to do such a thing, he would be ashamed; but this has nothing to do with the virtues: but though shamelessness, and not to be ashamed to do disgraceful actions, be bad, yet it is not on this account a virtue for a man who does such things to be ashamed. Neither is continence, properly speaking, a virtue, but a kind of mixed virtue; but the subject of continence shall be fully discussed hereafter. But now let us speak of justice.
BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

Of Justice and Injustice.

1. But we must inquire into the subject of justice and injustice, and see what kind of actions they are concerned with, what kind of mean state justice is, and

* This book is almost identically the same with the fourth book of the Eudemean Ethics. A passage in Plato's treatise De Legibus, p. 757, quoted by Brewer, p. 167, shows how far the views of the great master and his distinguished pupil coincided on this subject of particular justice. As far as regarded universal justice, the theory of Plato was as follows: — He considered the soul a republic (De Rep. iv.), composed of three faculties or orders. (1.) Reason, the governing principle. (2.) The irascible passions. (3.) The concupiscible passions. When each of these three faculties of the mind confined itself to its proper office, without attempting to encroach upon that of any other; when reason governed, and the passions obeyed, then the result was that complete virtue, which Plato denominated justice. Under the idea of universal justice will be comprehended the "justitia expletrix," and "justitia attributrix," of Grotius; the former of which consists in abstaining from what is another's, and in doing voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced to do; the latter, which consists in proper beneficence, and which comprehends all the social virtues. This latter kind has been by some termed "distributive justice," but in a different sense from that in which the expression is used by Aristotle. — (A. Smith, Mor. Sent. Part VII. 2.) With respect to particular justice, distributive justice takes cognizance of the acts of men, considered in relation to the state, and comprehends what we call criminal cases. Corrective justice considers men in relation to each other, and comprehends civil cases. Aristotle has also treated the subject of justice and injustice, though in a less scientific manner, in his Rhetoric, Book I. cc. xii. xiii. xiv., to the translation of which, in this series, together with the accompanying notes, the reader is referred.
between what things "the just," that is, the abstract principle of justice, is a mean. But let our investigation be conducted after the same method as in the case of the virtues already discussed. We see, then, that all men mean by the term justice that kind of habit from which men are apt to perform just actions, and from which they act justly, and wish for just things; and similarly in the case of injustice, that habit from which they act unjustly, and wish for unjust things. Let these things, therefore, be first laid down as it were in outline; for the case is not the same in sciences and capacities as in habits; for the same capacity and science seems to comprehend within its sphere contraries; but one contrary habit does not infer the other contrary acts: for instance, it is not the case that, from the habit of health, the contrary acts are performed, but only the healthy ones; for we say that a man walks healthily when he walks as a healthy man would walk. Hence a contrary habit is often known from its contrary; and the habits are often known from the things connected with and attendant upon them; for if the good habit of body be well known, the bad habit becomes known also; and the good habit is known from the things which belong to it, and these things from the good habit; for if the good habit of body be firmness of flesh, it necessarily follows that the bad habit of body is looseness of flesh; and that which is likely to cause the good habit of body is that which is likely to cause firmness of flesh.

But it, generally speaking, follows, that if the one of two contraries be used in more senses than one, the other contrary is likewise used in more senses than one: for instance, if the just is so used, so also is the unjust. But justice and injustice seem to be used in more senses than one; but because of their justice and injustice

The same habit cannot have to do with contraries, whereas the same science can, e.g. the habit of health can only produce healthy action, but the science of healing can, if abused, produce unhealthiness.
have more than one signification, which, however, is scarcely observable, ἔδει τὴν ὅμοιοτητα.

6. The just man is νόμιμος and ἴσος; the δίκαιον is νόμιμον and ἴσον; therefore the ἀδίκον is παράνομον and ἄνισον.

All lawful things are just.

close affinity, their homonymy escapes notice, and is not so clear to be understood, as in the case of things widely differing; for the difference in species is a great difference: for instance, both the bone under the neck of animals, and that with which they lock doors, are called by the same Greek word κλεῖς. Let us, then, ascertain in how many senses the term unjust man is used. Now, the transgressor of law appears to be unjust, and the man who takes more than his share, and the unequal man; so that it is clear that the just man also will mean the man who acts according to law, and the equal man. The just will therefore be the lawful and the equal; and the unjust the unlawful and the unequal. But since the unjust man is also one who takes more than his share, he will be of this character with regard to goods; not, indeed, all goods, but only those in which there is good and bad fortune; and these are absolutely always good, but relatively not always.

7. Yet men pray for and pursue these things; they ought not, however; but they ought to pray that absolute goods may be goods relatively to themselves, and they ought to choose those things which are good to themselves.č

8. But the unjust man does not always choose too much, but sometimes too little, in the case of things absolutely bad, but because even the smaller evil appears to be in some sense a good, and covetousness is for what is good, for this reason he appears to take more than his share. He is also unequal; for this includes the other, and is a common term.

9. But since the transgressor of law is, as we said, unjust, and the keeper of law just, it is clear that all

č See Juven. Sat. x.:—

"Say, then, shall man, deprived all power of choice,
Ne'er raise to Heaven the suppliant voice?
Not so; but to the gods his fortunes trust:
Their thoughts are wise, their dispensations just.
What best may profit or delight they know,
And real good for fancied bliss bestow:
With eyes of pity they our frailties scan;
More dear to them, than to himself, is man."

Gifford's Transl. 507.
lawful things are in some sense just; for those things which have been defined by the legislative science are lawful: and each one of these we assert to be just. But laws make mention of all subjects, with a view either to the common advantage of all, Object of or of men in power, or of the best citizens; according to virtue, or some other such standard. So that in one way we call those things just which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the social community. But the law directs the performance of the acts of the brave man; for instance, not to leave his post, nor to fly, nor to throw away his arms; and the acts of the temperate man; for instance, not to commit adultery or outrage; and the acts of the meek man; for instance, not to assault or abuse; and in like manner, in the case of the other virtues and vices, it enjoins one class of actions, and forbids the other; a well-made law does it well, and one framed off-hand and without consideration badly.

This justice, therefore, is perfect virtue, not absolutely, but relatively. And for this reason justice often appears to be the most excellent of the virtues; and neither the evening nor the morning star is so admirable. And in a proverb we say, "In justice all virtue is comprehended." And it is more than any others perfect virtue, because it is the exercise of perfect virtue; and it is perfect, because the possessor of it is able to exercise his virtue towards another person, and not only in reference to himself; for many men are able to exercise virtue in their own concerns, but not in matters which concern other people. For this reason, the saying of Bias seems to be a good one, "Power will show the

4 This distinction is drawn in order to make the assertion applicable to the circumstances both of democratical and aristocratical states. Οἱ ἄριστοι, the best citizens, i.e. the aristocracy.

5 There is no doubt that this is a proverbial saying, but whence it comes is doubtful; by some it has been attributed to Euripides, by others, on the authority of Theophrastus, to Theognis.—Zell.
13. man;" for the man in power is at once associated with and stands in relation to others. And for this same reason justice alone, of all the virtues, seems to be a good to another person, because it has relation to another; for it does what is advantageous to some one else, either to the head, or to some member of the commonwealth. That man, therefore, is the worst who acts viciously both as regards himself and his friends; and that man is the best who acts virtuously not as regards himself, but as regards another; for this is a difficult task.

14. This kind of justice, therefore, is not a division of virtue, but the whole of virtue; nor is the contrary injustice a part of vice, but the whole of vice. But the difference between virtue and this kind of justice is clear from the preceding statements; for the habits are the same, but their essence is not the same; but so far as justice in this sense relates to another, it is justice; so far as it is such and such a habit, it is simply virtue.

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CHAP. II.

Of the nature and qualities of Particular Justice.

1. But that justice which is a part of virtue is the object of our investigation; for (as we say) there is such a kind of justice: and, likewise, that injustice which is a part of vice: and this is a proof that there is; for he who energizes according to the other vices acts unjustly, but does not take more than his share; as the man who through fear has thrown away his shield, or through moroseness has used abusive language, or through illiberality has refused to give pecuniary assistance; but whenever a man takes

" Virtue and universal justice are substantially the same, but in the mode of their existence they differ; or, in other words, the same habit, which, when considered absolutely, is termed virtue, is, when considered as a relative duty, termed universal justice.
more than his share, he does so frequently not from any one of these vices, still less from all of them, but still from some vice (for we blame him); namely from injustice. There is, therefore, some other kind of injustice, which is as a part to a whole, and some "unjust," which is related to that "unjust" which transgresses the law, as a part to a whole. Again, if one man commits adultery for the sake of gain, and receives something for it in addition, and another does so at some cost for the gratification of his lusts, the latter would seem to be intemperate rather than taking more than his share; and the former unjust, but not intemperate: it is clear, at any rate, that he committed the crime for the sake of gain. Again, in all other acts of injustice it is possible always to refer the action to some specific vice: for instance, if a person has committed adultery, you may refer it to intemperance; if he has deserted his comrade's side in the ranks, to cowardice; if he has committed an assault, to anger; but if he has gained anything by the act, you can refer it to no vice but injustice. So that it is evident that there is another kind of injustice besides universal injustice, which is a part of it, and is called by the same name, because the generic definition of both is the same; for the whole force of both consists in relation; but one is conversant with honour, money, safety, or with whatever justice. common term would comprehend all these; and its motive is the pleasure arising from gain; whilst the other is conversant with all things with which a justice. good man is concerned. It is clear, therefore, that there are more kinds of justice than one, and that there is another kind besides that which is universal virtue: but we must ascertain its generic and specific character.

Now, the "unjust" has been divided into the un- lawful and the unequal; and "the just" into the lawful and the equal. Now, the injustice before mentioned is according to the unlawful. But since the unequal and the more are not the same, but
different, that is, that one bears to the other the relation of a part to a whole, for everything which is more is unequal, but it is not true that everything which is unequal is more; and in the same way the unjust and injustice are not the same, but different in the two cases; in the one case being as parts, in the other as wholes; for this injustice of which we are now treating is a part of universal injustice; and in like manner particular justice is a part of universal justice; so that we must speak of the particular justice and the particular injustice; and in like manner of the particular just, and the particular unjust. Let us, then, dismiss that justice and injustice which is conversant with universal virtue, the one being the exercise of universal virtue with relation to another, and the other of universal vice; and it is clear that we must dismiss also the just and unjust which are involved in these; for one may almost say that the greater part of things lawful are those the doing of which arises from universal virtue; for the law enjoins that we live according to each particular virtue, and forbids our living according to each particular vice; and all those lawful things which are enjoined by law in the matter of social education are the causes which produce

universal virtue. But as to private education, according to which a man is good absolutely, we must hereafter determine whether it belongs to the political or any other science; for it is not perhaps entirely the same thing in every case to be a good man and a good citizen. But of the particular justice, and of the particular just which is according to it, one species is that which is concerned in the

The generic word "unequal" comprehends under it the specific ones "more" and "less," and therefore is to them as a whole to its parts. Hence it is to be observed that the words "whole" and "part" are used in their logical relation: for, logically, the genus contains the species; whereas, metaphysically, the species contains the genus: e.g. we divide logically the genus "man" into "European, Asiatic," &c., but each of the species, European, &c., contains the idea of man, together with the characteristic difference.
distributions of honour, or of wealth, or of any of those other things which can possibly be distributed among the members of a political community; for in these cases it is possible that one person, as compared with another, should have an unequal or an equal share; the other is that which is corrective in transactions between man and man. And of this there are two divisions; for some transactions are voluntary, and others involuntary: the voluntary are such as follow; selling, buying, lending, pledging transactions, borrowing, depositing of trust, hiring; and they are so called because the origin of such transactions is voluntary. Of involuntary transactions, some are secret, as theft, adultery, poisoning, pandering, enticing away of slaves, assassination, false witness; others accompanied with violence, as assault, imprisonment, death, robbery, mutilation, evil-speaking, contumelious language.

CHAP. III.

Of Distributive Justice.

But since the unjust man is unequal, and the unjust is unequal, it is clear that there is some mean of the unequal; and this is the equal; for in every action in which there is the more and the less equal, there is the equal also. If, therefore, the unjust be unequal, the just is equal; but this, without argument,

1 The word συνάλλαγμα, here rendered "transactions," must not be understood as being limited to cases of obligations voluntarily incurred, but as comprehending all cases of obligation which exist in the dealings between man and man, whether moral, social, or political. A συνάλλαγμα ἱκούσιον may be either verbal or written; if written, it may be (1.) συνθήκη, which term is generally used of political agreements or conventions; (2.) συγγράφη, a legal bond; (3.) συνέδραμον, an instrument in the case of a pecuniary loan. See Rhet. 1. xv.

1 χρήσις is that contract which the Roman jurists term "commodatum."—Michelet.
must be clear to everybody. But since the equal is a mean, the just must also be a kind of mean. But the equal implies two terms at least; the just, therefore, must be both a mean and equal, it must relate to some things and some persons. In that it is a mean, it must relate to two things, and these are the more and the less; in that it is equal, to two things, and in that it is just to certain persons.

2. It follows, therefore, that the just must imply four terms at least; for the persons to whom the just relates are two, and the things that are the subjects of the actions are two. And there will be the same equality between the persons and between the things; for as the things are to one another so are the persons, for if the persons are unequal, they will not have equal things.

3. But hence arise all disputes and quarrels, when equal persons have unequal things, or unequal persons have and have assigned to them equal things. Again, this is clear from the expression “according to worth;” for, in distributions, all agree that justice ought to be according to some standard of worth, yet all do not make that standard the same; for those who are inclined to democracy consider liberty as the standard; those who are inclined to oligarchy, wealth; others, nobility of birth; and those who are inclined to aristocracy, virtue. Justice, therefore, is something proportionate; for proportion is the property not of arithmetical numbers only, but of number universally; for proportion is an equality of ratio, and implies four terms at least. Now it is clear, that disjunctive proportion implies four terms; but continuous proportion is in four terms also; for it will use one term in place of two, and mention it twice; for instance, as A to B, so is B to C; B has therefore been mentioned twice. So that if B be put down twice, the terms of the proportion are four.

4. Moreover, the just also implies four terms at least, and the ratio is the same, for the persons and the things are similarly divided. Therefore, as the term

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A to the term B, so will be the term C to the term D; and therefore, alternately, as A to C so B to D. So that the whole also bears the same proportion to the whole which the distribution puts together in pairs; and if it puts them together in this way, it puts them together justly.¹ The conjunction, therefore, of A and C and of B and D is the just in the distribution; and this just is a mean, that is, a mean between those things which are contrary to proportion; for the proportionate is a mean, and the just is proportionate. But mathematicians call this kind of proportion geometrical, for in geometrical proportion it comes to pass that the whole has the same ratio to the whole which each of the parts has to the other; but this proportion is not continuous, for the person and the thing are not one term numerically. But the unjust is that which is contrary to proportion; there is one kind, therefore, on the side of excess, and one on the side of defect; and this is the case in acts, for he who acts unjustly has too much, and the man who is treated unjustly too little good. But in the case of evil, the same thing happens inversely, for the less evil compared with the greater becomes a good; for the less evil is more eligible than the greater, and the eligible is good, and the more eligible a greater good. This, therefore, is one species of the just.

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CHAP. IV.

Of Justice in Transactions between Man and Man.

But the other one is the corrective, and its province is all transactions, as well voluntary as involuntary. In corrective justice arithmetical

¹ A : B :: C : D.
Alternando, A : C :: B : D.
Componendo, A + C : B + D :: A : B.
Alternando, A + C : A :: B + D : B.
property is always according to the proportion before mentioned. For if the distribution be of common
property, it will be made according to the proportion which the original contributions bear to each
other; and the unjust which is opposed to this just is contrary to the proportionate. But the just which
exists in transactions is something equal, and the unjust something unequal, but not according to
geometrical but arithmetical proportion; for it matters not whether a good man has robbed a bad man,

2. or a bad man a good man, nor whether a good or a bad man has committed adultery; the law looks to
the difference of the hurt alone, and treats the persons, if one commits and the other suffers injury, as
equal, and also if one has done and the other suffered hurt. So that the judge endeavours to make
this unjust, which is unequal, equal; for when one man is struck and the other strikes, or even when
one kills and the other dies, the suffering and the doing are divided into unequal parts; but then he
endeavours by means of punishment to equalize them, by taking somewhat away from the gain. For
the term "gain" is used (to speak once for all) in such cases, although in some it may not be the exact
word, as in the case of the man who strikes a blow, and the term "loss" in the case of the man who
suffers it; but when the suffering is measured, the expressions gain and loss are used.

4. So that the equal is the mean between the more
and the less. But gain and loss are one more, and
the other less, in contrary ways; that is, the more
of good and the less of evil is a gain, and the
contrary is a loss. Between which the mean is
the equal, which we call the just. So that the
just which is corrective must be the mean be-
tween loss and gain. Hence it is that when men
have a quarrel they go to the judge; but going to

5. the judge is going to the just; for the meaning
of the word judge is a living personification of the
just; and they seek a judge as a mean; some call
them mediators, under the idea that if they hit
the mean, they will hit the just; the just, therefore, is a kind of mean, because the judge is.

But the judge equalizes, and, just as if a line had been cut into two unequal parts, he takes away from the greater part that quantity by which it exceeds the real half, and adds it to the lesser part; but when the whole is divided into two equal parts, then they say that the parties have their own when they have got an equal share. But the equal is the mean between greater and less, according to arithmetical proportion. For this reason also it is called δίκαιον, because it is δίχα (in two parts), just as if a person should call it δίχαον (divided in two), and the δίκαιον is so called, being as it were δίκαιον (a divider). For when two things are equal, and from the one something is taken away and added to the other, this other exceeds by twice this quantity; for if it had been taken away from the one, and not added to the other, it would have exceeded by once this quantity only; it would therefore have exceeded the mean by once this quantity, and the mean would have exceeded that part from which it was taken by once this quantity. By this means, therefore, we shall know both what it is right to take away from him who has too much, and what to add to him who has too little. For the quantity by which the mean exceeds the loss must be added to him who has the loss, and the quantity by which the mean is exceeded by the greater must be taken away from the greatest.

For instance, the lines AA, BB, CC, are equal to each other; from the line AA, let AE be taken, or its equal CD, and added to line CC; so that the whole DCC exceeds AE by CD and CZ; it therefore exceeds BB by CD. But these terms, loss and gain.

The following figure will explain Aristotle's meaning:

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  E
 A------\-----A
  B
  Z
 C------\-----C------D
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gain, take their rise from voluntary barter; for the
having more than a man’s own is called gaining,
and to have less than he originally had, to suffer
loss; as in selling and buying, and all other trans-
actions in which the law affords protection. But
when the result is neither more nor less, but the
condition of parties is the same as before, they say
that men have their own, and are neither losers nor
gainers. So that the just is a mean between gain
and loss in involuntary transactions, that is the
having the same both before and after.

CHAP. V.

Of Retaliation.*

1. Some people think that retaliation is absolutely
just, as the Pythagoreans said; for they simply
defined justice as retaliation to another. But reta-
iliation does not fit in either with the idea of dis-
tributive or corrective justice; and yet they would
have that this is the meaning of the Rhadamanthian
rule, “If a man suffers what he has done, straightforward justice would take place:” for in many
points it is at variance; as for example, if a man
in authority has struck another, it is not right that
he should be struck in return; and if a man has
struck a person in authority, it is right that he
should not only be struck, but punished besides.

* The law of retaliation, “lex talionis,” or commutative
justice, differs in the following respect from distributive and
corrective justice. As we have seen, distributive justice pro-
ceeds on the principle of geometrical proportion,—corrective
justice on that of arithmetical; commutative justice, on both.
For instance, we first compare the commodities and the per-
sons geometrically; as the builder is to the shoemaker, so is
the number of shoes to the house. Next we give the shoe-
maker a house, which renders the parties unequal. We then
restore the equality arithmetically, by taking away from the
shoemaker the equivalent to the house reckoned in shoes, and
restoring it to the builder.
Again, the voluntariness and involuntariness of an action make a great difference. But in the intercourse of exchange, such a notion of justice as retaliation, if it be according to proportion and not according to equality, holds men together. For by proportionate retaliation civil society is held together; for men either seek to retaliate evil (for otherwise, if a man must not retaliate, his condition appears to be as bad as slavery) or to retaliate good (for otherwise there is no interchange of good offices, and by these society is held together); and for this reason they build the temple of the Graces in the public way, to teach that kindness ought to be returned, for this is peculiar to gratitude; for it is right to return a service to the person who has done a favour, and then to be one's self the first to confer the next. But diametrical conjunction causes proportionate return; for example, let the builder be A, the shoemaker B, a house C, and a shoe D; the builder

The temples of the Graces were usually built in the ἄγορα. This was the case at Sparta; and Pausanius informs us that it was also the case at Orchomenos and Olympia. The Graces, therefore, must be reckoned amongst the θεοὶ ἄγοραι. Cicero says,—"Oportet quoque in civitate bene instituta templum esse Gratiarum, ut meminerint homines gratias esse referendas."

The following figure will explain what is meant by diametrical conjunction:

In commercial intercourse, A takes so many D's as are equal to C, and B takes in exchange C, and this equalization is effected either by direct barter, or by means of the common measure, money. Respecting "value," and the subjects connected with it, the student is referred to any treatises on political economy. Aristotle treats of the relation which subsists between demand ('χρεία) and value in the Politics, I. iii.
therefore ought to receive from the shoemaker some of his work, and to give him some of his own in return. If, therefore, there be proportionate equality in the first instance, and then retaliation take place, there will be the state of things which we described; if not, there is no equality, nor any bond to hold commercial dealings together: for there is no reason why the work of one should not be better than the work of the other; these things, therefore, must be equalized; and this is true in the case of the other arts also; for they would be put an end to, unless equality were observed between the dealer and the person dealt with, both as regards quantity and quality. For commercial intercourse does not take place between two physicians, but between a physician and an agriculturist, and generally between persons who are different, and unequal; but it is necessary that these be made equal. Therefore it is necessary that all things, of which there is interchange, should be in some manner commensurable. And for this purpose money came into use; and it is in some sense a medium, for it measures everything; so that it measures excess and defect; for example, it measures how many shoes are equal to a house or to a certain quantity of food. As therefore the builder to the shoemaker, so must be the number of shoes to the house or the food; for if this be not the case, there will be no interchange, nor commerce. But this proportion cannot exist, unless the things are in some manner equal. It is therefore necessary that all things should be measured, as was before said, by some one thing.

Now, demand is in reality the bond which keeps all commercial dealings together. For if men wanted nothing, or not so much, there would not be any, or not so much commerce. But money is as it were the substitute for demand; and hence it has the name νόμιμα, because it is not so by nature, but by law (νόμος), and because it is in our own power to change it, and render it useless.
There will, therefore, be retaliation, when equalization has taken place. As, therefore, the agriculturist to the shoemaker, so is the work of the shoemaker to that of the agriculturist. But when they make an exchange, it is necessary to bring them to the form of a proportion, for otherwise one extreme will have both excesses of the mean. But when they have their own rights they are equal, and able to deal with one another, because this equality is able to take place between them. Let the agriculturist be A, the food C, the shoemaker B, and his work made equal to the agriculturist's work D. But if it had been impossible for them to have made this mutual return, there would have been no commercial intercourse between them. Now that demand, being as it were one thing, is the bond which, in such circumstances, holds men together, is proved by the fact that when two men have no need of one another (nor one has need of the other) they do not have commercial dealings together: as they do when one is in need of what another has (wine, for instance), giving in return corn for exportation. They must, therefore, be made equal.

But with a view to future exchange, if we have at present no need of it, money is, as it were, our surety, that when we are in need we shall be able to make it; for it is necessary that a man who brings money should be able to get what he requires. But even money is liable to the same objection as other commodities, for it is not always of equal value; but, nevertheless, it is more likely to remain firm. Therefore all things ought to have a measure of value; for thus there will always be exchange, and if there is this, there will be commerce. Money, therefore, as a measure, by making things commensurable, equalizes them; for there could be no commerce without exchange, no exchange without equality, and no equality without the possibility of being commensurate. Now, in reality, it is impossible that things so widely different should become commensurable, but it is suffi-
ciently possible as far as demand requires. It is necessary, therefore, that there be some one thing; and this must be decided by agreement. Wherefore it is called money (νόμισμα); for this makes all things commensurable, for all things are measured by money. Let a house be A, ten minae B, a bed C. Now, A is half B (supposing a house to be worth or equal to five minae), and the bed is a tenth part of B, it is clear, therefore, how many beds are equal to a house, namely, five. But it is clear that this was the method of exchange before the introduction of money; for it makes no difference whether five beds, or the price of five beds, be given for a house. Now we have said what the just and what the unjust are. But this being decided, it is clear that just acting is a mean between acting and suffering injustice; for one is having too much, and the other too little. But justice is a mean state, but not in the same manner as the before-mentioned virtues, but because it is of a mean, and injustice of the extremes. And justice is that habit, according to which the just man is said to be disposed to practise the just in accordance with deliberate preference, and to distribute justly, between himself and another, and between two other persons; not so as to take more of the good himself, and give less of it to the other, and inversely in the case of evil; but to take an equal share according to proportion; and in like manner between two other persons. But injustice, on the contrary, is all this with respect to the unjust; and this is the excess and defect of what is useful and hurtful, contrary to the proportionate. Wherefore injustice is both excess and defect, because it is productive of excess and defect; that is, in a man's

* On the subject of Greek money, see the articles and tables in Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities.

* The other virtues are mean habits between two extremes; e.g., courage is a mean between rashness and cowardice; justice, on the other hand, is not in the mean between two extremes, but its subject-matter (τὸ δίκαιον) is a mean between too much and too little.
own case excess of what is absolutely good, and de-
flect of what is hurtful; but in the case of others,
his conduct generally is the same: but the violation
of proportion is on either side as it may happen.
But in the case of an unjust act, the defect is the 15.
being injured, and the excess to injure. Now, re-
specting justice and injustice, and the nature of
each, as also respecting the just and the unjust, let
the manner in which we have treated the subject be
deemed sufficient.

CHAP. VI.

Of Political and Economical Justice.¹

But since it is possible for him who does unjust 1.
acts to be not yet unjust, by the commission of
what sort of unjust acts does a man become at once
unjust in each particular kind of injustice? as, for
example, a thief, an adulterer, or a robber? or is this
question of no consequence? for a man might have
connection with a woman, knowing perfectly who
she is, and yet not at all from deliberate preference,
but from passion. He therefore commits an unjust 2.
act, but is not unjust; just as he is not a thief, but
he has committed theft; nor an adulterer, but he
has committed adultery; and in like manner in all
other cases. Now, the relation which retaliation 3.
bears to justice has been already stated. But it
ought not to escape our notice, that the abstract
and political just is the just of which we are in
search; but this takes place in the case of those Political
who live as members of society, with a view to self-
justice.

¹ From the discussion of the subject of moral justice, Aris-
totle proceeds to that of political, and states that, according to
its principles, he who commits an unjust action is not necessary a morally unjust man: as he might have acted not of
deliberate purpose (which is essential to a moral act), but
from impulse or passion. In morals, regard is paid to the
intention, in civil wrongs we only look to the action done, and
the damage or wrong inflicted.—See Michelet's Com. p. 177.
sufficiency, and who are free and equal either proportionately or numerically. So that all those who are not in this condition have not the political just in relation to one another, but only a kind of just, so called from its resemblance. For the term just implies the case of those who have laws to which they are subject; and law implies cases of injustice; for the administration of law is the decision of the just and the unjust. Now, injustice always implies an unjust act, but an unjust act does not always imply injustice. Now, to act unjustly means to give to one's self too great a share of absolute goods, and too small a share of absolute evils.

5. This is the reason why we do not suffer a man to rule, but reason; because a man rules for himself, and becomes a tyrant. But a ruler is the guardian of the just; and if of the just, of equality also. But since a man seems to get no advantage himself if he is just (for he does not award too much absolute good to himself, except it be proportionately his due), for this reason he acts for others; and hence they say, as was before also observed, that justice is another man's good. Some compensation must therefore be given; and this is honour and prerogative: but all those who are not content with theirs become tyrants. But the just in the case of master and slave, and father and child, is not the same as these, but similar to them; for there is not injustice, abstractedly, towards one's own; a possession and a child, as long as he be of a certain age, and be not separated from his father, being as it were a part of him; and no man deliberately chooses to hurt himself; and therefore there is no injustice towards one's self; therefore there is neither the political just nor unjust; for political justice was stated to be according to law, and in the case of those between whom laws naturally exist; and these were said to be persons to whom there belongs equality of governing and being governed.

6. For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil.—Rom. xiii. 3; see also 1 Pet. ii. 14.
Hence, the just exists more between a husband and wife than between father and child, or master and slave; for this is economic justice; but this, \( \text{οἶκωνομοκόν} \), too, differs from political justice.\(^\footnote{1}\)

### CHAP. VII.

**Of Natural and Legal Justice.**

Of the political just, one part is natural,\(^\footnote{1}\) and legal. The natural is that which everywhere is equally valid, and depends not upon being or not being received. But the legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but which, when enacted, is no longer; as the price of ransom\(^\footnote{v}\) being fixed at a mina, or the sacrificing a goat, and not two sheep;\(^\footnote{w}\) and further, all particular acts of legislation; as the sacrificing to Brasidas,\(^\footnote{z}\) and all those matters which are the subjects of decrees.\(^\footnote{v}\) But to some persons all just things 2.

\(^1\) It is frequently Aristotle's practice to examine different existing theories, and to show how far his own coincides with them. Hence, as justice was divided into political and economic, his object is to show that the justice which he has treated of comes under the division of political justice. It cannot belong to the economic, as it assumes the existence of two persons; whereas a man's wife or children, or servants, are considered as parts of himself.

\(^2\) See the Rhetoric, Book I. xiii., in which he quotes Antigone's defence of her determination to bury Polynices, as an example of natural justice. Legal justice is that which is established by the law of the land, or arbitrarily and conventionally; e.g. killing a man is naturally unjust,—killing a bare, conventionally or legally.

\(^v\) The price of redemption was different at different periods. Accianoli says, that in the Peloponnesian war it was fixed at one mina; Herodotus (Book VI. lxxix.) states, that the Peloponnesians fixed two minae as the ransom of a prisoner of war.

\(^w\) Herodotus (II. xiii.). All who sacrifice to the Theban Zeus, or who belong to the province of Thebes, abstain from offering sheep, and sacrifice goats; it is probable that Aristotle is alluding to this Egyptian custom.

\(^z\) See Thucydides, Book V. xi., where the historian speaks of the hero-worship offered to Brasidas by the Amphipolitans.

\(^v\) The decree (\( \text{ψηφουμα} \)) was an act of the legislature passed
appear to be matters of law, because that which is natural is unchangeable, and has the same power everywhere, just as fire burns both here and in Persia; but they see that just things are subject to change. This is not really the case, but only in some sense; and yet with the gods perhaps it is by no means so; but with us there is something which exists by nature; still it may be argued, everything with us is subject to change, yet nevertheless there is that which is by nature and that which is not.

3. Of things contingent, what is natural, and what is not natural, but legal, and settled by agreement (even granting that both are alike subject to change), is evident; and the same distinction will apply to all other cases; for, naturally, the right hand is stronger than the left; and yet it is possible for some people to use both equally. But that justice which depends upon agreement and expediency, resembles the case to measures; for measures of wine and corn are not everywhere equal; but where men buy they are larger, and where they sell again smaller. And in like manner, that justice which for a temporary purpose, whereas a law (νόμος) is perpetual.—See also c. x., and Polit. IV. iv.

* This Greek proverb is said to have originated from the circumstance, that the Greeks came in contact with Persia almost exclusively among foreign nations. Compare Cic. de Repub. iii.: "Jus enim de quo querimus, civile est, aliquod naturale nullum; nam si esset, ut calida et frigida et amara et dulcia, sic essent justa et injusta cadem omnibus." This was the opinion of the Pyrrhonists, and was afterwards supported by Carneades, the founder of the new academy. On the opinions of the Sophists on this subject, see Plato de Leg. p. 889; Gorgias, p. 482; Republic. v. 338; Protag. p. 337; Thevet. p. 172.—Brewer, p. 195.

** The text here followed is that of Bekker: that of Cardwell is somewhat different; but, nevertheless, whichever reading is adopted, the meaning of the passage will still be the same. Michelet gives the following Latin paraphrase: "Jus apud Deos est immutabile, jus apud homines mutabile omne; sunt tamen nihilominus hominum jura quaedam naturalia, quaedam non." He adds, that he considers Bekker's reading the true one: for further discussion of this passage the reader is referred to his Commentary, p. 182.

*** It is difficult to say whether Aristotle here alludes to a
is not natural, but of man's invention, is not everywhere the same; since neither are all political constitutions, although there is one which would be by nature the best everywhere; but there can be but one by nature best everywhere.

Every principle of justice and of law has the relation of a universal to a particular; for the things done are many; but each principle is singular; for it is universal. There is a difference between an unjust act and the abstract unjust, and between a just act and the abstract just; for a thing is unjust partly by nature, or by ordinance. But the same thing, as soon as it is done, becomes an unjust act; but before it was done it was not yet an unjust act, but unjust; and the same may be said of a just act. The common term for a just γημα. act is more correctly δικαιοπράγημα, and δικαίωμα is the correction of an unjust act. But of each of these, what and how many species there are, and with what subjects they are conversant, must be ascertained afterwards.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Three Kinds of Offences.

Now, since the abstract just and unjust are what they have been stated to be, a man acts unjustly and justly whenever he does these things voluntarily; but when he does them involuntarily, he neither acts unjustly nor justly, except accidentally; for they do acts which accidentally happen to be just or unjust. But an unjust act and a just act are decided by the voluntariness and involuntari-
An action is determined by its being done voluntarily or involuntarily.

3. ness of them; for whenever an act is voluntary it is blamed; and at the same time it becomes an unjust act: so that there will be something unjust which is not yet an unjust act, except the condition of voluntariness be added to it. I call that voluntary, as also has been said before, which (being in his own power) a man does knowingly, and not from ignorance of the person, the instrument, or the motive; as of the person he strikes, the instrument, and the motive of striking, and each of those particulars, not accidentally, nor by compulsion; as if another man were to take hold of his hand, and strike a third person; in this case he did it not voluntarily, for the act was not in his own power. Again, it is possible that the person struck should be the father of the striker, and that the striker should know him to be a man, or be one of the company, and yet not know him to be his own father. Let the same distinction be applied in the case of the motive, and all the other particulars attending the whole act. Consequently, that which is done through ignorance, or if not done through ignorance, is not in a man’s own power, or is done through compulsion, is involuntary. For we both do and suffer many things which naturally befall us, not one of which is either voluntary or involuntary; as, for example, growing old, and dying.

4. Also by the degree of knowledge, and by the motive.

5. Accident.

6. But the being done accidentally may occur in the case of the unjust as well as of the just; for a man might return a deposit involuntarily, and through fear, and yet we must not say that he does a just act, or acts justly, except accidentally. And in like manner we must say that that man accidentally does an unjust act, and acts unjustly, who upon compulsion, and against his own will, refuses to return a deposit. But of voluntary acts, some we do from deliberate preference, and others not. We do those from deliberate preference which we do after previous deliberation; and we do those not from deliberate preference which we do without previous deliberation. Now, since there are three kinds of
hurts in the intercourse of society, those which are done in ignorance are mistakes, i.e. whenever a man does the mischief to a different person, in a different manner, with a different instrument, or from a different motive from what he intended; for perhaps he did not intend to strike, or not with this instrument, or not this person, or not for this purpose, but something different to his purpose happened; as, for example, he did not intend to wound, but merely to prick; or he did not mean to wound this person, or not in this manner.

When, therefore, the hurt takes place contrary to expectation, it is an accident; when not contrary to expectation, but without wicked intent, it is a mistake; for a man makes a mistake when the principle of causation is in himself; but when it is external, he is unfortunate. But when he does it knowingly, but without previous deliberation, it is an unjust act, as all those things which are done through anger, and the other passions, which are necessary or natural; for by such hurts and such mistakes they act unjustly, and the actions are unjust; still the doers are not yet on this account unjust or wicked; for the hurt did not arise from depravity. But when any one acts from deliberate preference, he is then unjust and wicked. Hence, very properly, acts done through anger are decided not to proceed from premeditation; for he who acts through anger is not the originator, but he who angered him. Again, even the question is not one of fact, but of justice; for anger is felt at apparent injustice. For there is no dispute, as in the case of contracts, respecting the fact (in which case one of the two must be vicious, unless they do it from forgetfulness), but, agreeing about the fact, 

See the Rhetoric, I. xiii. Properly there are four kinds of hurts:—

1. δύταν παραλόγως ἡ βλάσπη γίνεται—Causa.
2. δύταν μη παραλόγως, ἀνίμν δι' ἑαυτᾶς—Culpa.
3. δύταν εἰς μὲν μὴ προευκλίησας δι᾽—Doitus indirectus.
4. δύταν εἰ προαιρετικοῖς—Doitus directus.—Michelet.

See definition of anger in Rhet. Book II.
they dispute on which side is the justice of the case. But he who plotted against the other is not ignorant, so that the one thinks himself injured, but the other does not think so. If a man has done harm from deliberate preference, he acts unjustly; and he who in such acts of injustice acts unjustly is forthwith unjust whenever his acts are contrary to the proportionate and the equal act.

13. In like manner, too, the just man is he who on deliberate preference acts justly; but he acts justly, provided he only acts voluntarily. But of involuntary actions, some are pardonable, and others unpardonable; for all those acts which are done, not only ignorantly, but through ignorance, are pardonable; but all which are done not through ignorance, but ignorantly, through passion neither natural nor human, are unpardonable.

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CHAP. IX.

Of being Injured, and that no one can be injured with his own consent.

1. But it might be questioned whether sufficiently accurate distinctions have been made on the subject of receiving and committing injustice. First, whether it be, as Euripides has absurdly said, "He slew my mother; the tale is short; willing he slew her willing; or unwilling he killed her willing." For is it really true, or is it not true, that a person can with his own consent be injured? or is not being injured altogether involuntary, just as committing

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Human passions are ἀγαθή, φόβος, ἀγάμα, grief, fear, pity; the natural appetites are πέπων, δίψα, hunger and thirst. We are inclined to pardon him who acts at the instigation of these; e.g. we readily make allowance for a starving man who steals a loaf to satisfy the cravings of his hunger.

Michaelis Ephesius, and a scholiast, quoted by Zell, attribute these lines to the Bellerophon, but it is much more probable that they are derived from the Alcmene.—Brewer.
injury is altogether voluntary? or are all cases this way or that way, just as committing injury is entirely voluntary; or are some cases voluntary and others involuntary?

And the same question arises in the case of being justly dealt with; for all just acting is voluntary, so that it is reasonable to suppose that the receiving of unjust or just treatment should be similarly opposed with respect to the question of voluntariness or involuntariness. But it would seem absurd, in the case of being justly dealt with, that it should be altogether voluntary; for some people are justly dealt by without their consent. The truth is, even the following question might be raised, whether he who has suffered an injury is necessarily injured, or whether the case is not the same in suffering as in acting? for in both cases it is possible to participate in what is just accidentally. But it is clear that it is the same in unjust actions; for doing unjust actions is not synonymous with being unjust, and suffering unjust actions is therefore not the same with being injured; and in the case of acting justly and being justly dealt by, the case is similar, for it is impossible to be unjustly dealt by when nobody acts unjustly, or to be justly dealt by when nobody acts justly.

But if acting unjustly simply means hurting any one voluntarily, and the expression "voluntary" means knowing the person, the instrument, and the manner, and if the incontinent man hurts himself voluntarily, then he would be injured voluntarily, and it would be possible for a man to injure himself; but this likewise is one of the disputed points, whether it is possible for a man to injure himself. Again, a man might, through incontinence, be voluntarily hurt by another person acting voluntarily, so that it would be possible for him to be

Acciaioli says, that Aristotle distinguishes eight conditions of just and unjust actions; viz. injuriam agere, injuriam pati; jus agere, jus pati; inexactum agere, inexactum pati; iustum agere, iustum pati.
voluntarily injured. Or is the definition incorrect, and must we add to the statement that he who hurts must know the person, the instrument, and the manner, the condition that it must be against the other's will? Then it follows, that a person can be voluntarily hurt and suffer acts of injustice, but that no one can be voluntarily injured; for no one, not even the incontinent man, wishes to be injured, but he acts against his wish; for no one wills what he does not think good, but the incontinent man does what he thinks that he ought not to do. But he who gives away his own property (as Homer says that Glauce gave to Diomede "golden arms for brazen, the price of a hundred oxen for the price of nine") is not injured, for the act of giving is in his own power; but being injured is not in a man's own power, but there must be an injurer. With respect to being injured, therefore, it is plain that it is not voluntary.

Of the questions we proposed, two yet remain to be discussed: first, whether he who has awarded the larger share contrary to right valuation, or he who has it, commits the injury; secondly, whether it is possible for a man to injure himself; for, if the truth of the first question be possible, and it is the distributor, and not he who gets too great a share, then, if a man knowingly and voluntarily gives to another a greater share than to himself, this man injures himself; and moderate men seem to do this, for the equitable man is apt to take too small a share. Or is it that this is never absolutely the case? for perhaps he got more of some other good, as of reputation, or of the abstract honourable. Besides, the difficulty is solved by the definition of the term "acting unjustly," for he suffers nothing against his wish; so

*For Diomede's brass arms, of mean device,*  
*For which nine oxen paid (a vulgar price),*  
*He gave his own, of gold divinely wrought,*  
*A hundred beees the shining purchase bought."

*Pope's Hom. II. vi. 292.*
that for this reason at least he is not injured, but if he suffers anything, it is only hurt.

Moreover, it is clear that the distributor, and not 11. he who gets too much, acts unjustly; for he does not act unjustly to whom the abstract unjust attaches, but he to whom attaches the acting voluntarily; and the voluntariness attaches to him in whom is the origin of the act, which in this case is in the distributor, and not in the receiver. Again, since the 12. expression "to do a thing" is used in many senses, and in one sense inanimate things, and the hand, and a slave at his master's bidding, may kill; the doer in these cases does not act unjustly, but does unjust things. Again, if a man decided through 13. ignorance, he is not unjust according to the legal idea, nor is his decision unjust; but it is in some sense unjust, for there is a difference between legal and abstract justice. But if he has knowingly made an unjust decision, he himself gets some advantage, either in the way of favour or of revenge. The case 14. is just the same if a man participates in an act of injustice, and he who from such participation passes an unjust judgment is considered to be a gainer; for, even in the other cases, he who adjudged the field did not get the field, but money.

But men suppose, that to act unjustly is in their 15. Wheet own power, and for this reason they think that to act justly is also easy. But this is not the case; for to have connection with a neighbour's wife, and to assault a neighbour, and to give away money with one's hand, is easy, and in one's own power; but to do this with a particular disposition is neither easy nor in one's own power. In like manner, men think 16. that there is no wisdom in knowing things just and things unjust, because it is not difficult to comprehend the cases of which the laws speak; but these are not just acts except accidentally—when, indeed, they are done in a certain manner, and distributed in a certain manner, they become just. But this is a more laborious thing than to know what things are wholesome, since even in that
sort of knowledge it is easy to know honey, wine, and hellebore, and burning and cutting; but to know how to apply them for the purposes of health, and to whom, and at what time, is as difficult as to be a physician.

17. For this very same reason it is supposed that acting unjustly belongs to the just man as much as acting justly, because the just man would be no less, or rather more able to do each of these things; for he might have connection with a woman, and commit an assault, and the brave man might throw away his shield and turn and run away.

18. But it is not merely doing these things (except accidentally), but doing them with a particular disposition, that constitutes the being a coward or an unjust man; just as it is not performing or not performing an operation, nor giving or not giving medicine, that constitutes medical treatment or healing, but doing it in this particular way. But just acts are conversant with the case of those who participate in things absolutely good, and who can have of these too much or too little; for some beings perhaps cannot possibly have too much, as, for example, the gods perhaps; to others, again, no part of them is useful, but all injurious, as to those who are incurably wicked; others, again, are benefited to a certain extent; for which reason justice is conversant with man.

CHAP. X.

Of Equity, and the Equitable Man.\textsuperscript{12}

1. The next thing to speak of is the subject of "the equitable" and equity, and the relation that the

\textsuperscript{12} 'Ἀρείστης ἄρθρος, are not only mental goods, but also riches, honours, and all things instrumental to virtue, which are in themselves absolutely good, but become evil by the abuse of them.—Michelet.

\textsuperscript{12} On the subject of equity see also Rhet. I. xiii.
equitable bears to the just, and equity to justice; for when we examine the subject, they do not seem to be absolutely the same, nor yet generally different. And we sometimes praise “the equitable,” and the man of that character; so that we even transfer the expression, for the purpose of praise, to other cases, showing by the use of the term “equitable” instead of “good,” that equity is better. Sometimes, again, if we attend to the definition, it appears absurd that equity should be praiseworthy, when it is something different from justice; for either justice must be not good, or equity must be not just, that is, if it is different from justice; or, if they are both good, they must be both the same.

From these considerations, then, almost entirely arises the difficulty on the subject of the equitable. But all of them are in one sense true and not inconsistent with each other; for “the equitable” is just, being better than a certain kind of “just”; and it is not better than “the just,” as though it were of a different genus. Just and equitable, therefore, are identical; and both being good, “the equitable” is the better. The cause of the ambiguity is this, that “the equitable” is just, but not that justice which is according to law, but the correction of the legally just. And the reason of this is, that law is in all cases universal, and on some subjects it is not possible to speak universally with correctness. In those cases where it is necessary to speak universally, but impossible to do so correctly, the law takes the most general case, though it is well aware of the incorrectness of it. And the law is not, therefore, less right; for the fault is not in the law, nor in the legislator, but in the nature of the thing; for the subject-matter of human actions is altogether of this description.

When, therefore, the law speaks universally, and something happens different from the generality of cases, then it is proper that where the legislator falls short, and has erred, from speaking generally, to correct the defect, as the legislator would himself
direct if he were then present, or as he would have legislated if he had been aware of the case. Therefore the equitable is just, and better than some kind of "just," not indeed better than the "absolute just," but better than the error which arises from universal enactments.

7. And this is the nature of "the equitable," that it is a correction of law, wherever it is defective owing to its universality. This is the reason why all things are not according to law, because on some subjects it is impossible to make a law. So that there is need of a special decree: for the rule of what is indeterminate, is itself indeterminate also; like the leaden rule in Lesbian building; for the rule is altered to suit the shape of the stone, and does not remain the same; so do decrees differ according to the circumstances. It is clear, therefore, what "the equitable" is, and that it is just, and also to what "just" it is superior. And from this it is clear what is the character of the equitable man; for he who is apt to do these things and to do them from deliberate preference, who does not push the letter of the law to the furthest on the worst side, but is disposed to make allowances, even although he has the law in his favor, is equitable; and this habit is equity, being a kind of justice, and not a different habit from justice.

CHAP. XI.

That no Man injures himself.

1. But the answer to the question, whether a man is able to injure himself or not, is clear from what has

"Michael Ephesius says,—"The Lesbians did not build with stones, arranged so as to form a plane surface, but alternately projecting and retiring."—Michelet. See also, Rhet. I. i.

"This is the meaning of the well-known proverb,—"Summum jus summa injuria."
been already said. For one class of things just is that which is enjoined by law, according to virtue, in the universal acceptation of the term; as, for example, it does not command a man to kill himself; and whatever it does not command, it forbids. Again, whenever a man does hurt contrary to law, provided it be not in retaliation, he voluntarily injures: and he acts voluntarily who knows the person, the instrument, and the manner. But he who kills himself through rage voluntarily does a thing contrary to right reason, which the law does not allow. He therefore commits injustice, but against whom? is it against the state, and not against himself? for he suffers voluntarily; and a person cannot be injured with his own consent. Therefore, also, the state punishes him, and there is a kind of disgrace attached to the suicide, as acting unjustly towards the state. Again, in that kind of injustice according to which he who only acts unjustly, and not he who is entirely wicked, is called unjust, it is impossible for a man to injure himself; for this kind is different from the other; for he who is in this sense unjust, is in some sort wicked, like the coward; not as being wicked in the fullest sense of the term. So that he does not injure himself even in this way; for if he did, it would be possible that the same thing should be taken from and given to the same person; but this is impossible; but the just and the unjust must always imply the existence of more persons than one. Again, an injury must be voluntary, proceeding from deliberate preference, and the first of two hurts; for he

The Greeks recognized the principle that it was the duty of their state to support the sanctions of virtue by legislative enactments; the moral education of the people formed part of the legislative system. Hence the rule which Aristotle states, "Quæ lex non jabet vetat." The principles of our law, on the contrary, are derived from the Roman law, which confines itself in all cases to forbidding wrongs done to society. Hence the rule with us is exactly the contrary, "Quæ lex non vetat permittit."—See Michelet's Notes, p. 195.
who retaliates because he has suffered, and inflicts the very same hurt which he suffered, does not seem to act unjustly; but he who injures himself is at once and in the same matter both agent and patient.

5. Again, if this were the case, it would be possible to be voluntarily injured. And besides, no one acts unjustly without committing particular acts of injustice; but no man commits adultery with his own wife, nor breaks into his own house, nor steals his own property. But the question of injuring one's self is finally settled, by the decision we made on the subject of being voluntarily injured.

6. It is also plain, that both to be injured and to injure are bad; for one implies having less, the other having more, than the mean; and the case is like that of the wholesome in the science of medicine, and that which is productive of a good habit of body in gymnastics. But yet to injure is the worse of the two; for to injure involves depravity, and is culpable; and either perfect and absolute depravity, or something like it; for not every voluntary act is necessarily joined with injustice; but to suffer injustice is unconnected with depravity and injustice. Absolutely, then, to suffer injustice is less bad, but there is no reason why it should not accidentally be worse. But science cannot take notice of this; for science calls a pleurisy a worse disorder than a bruise from a fall; and yet the contrary might accidentally be the case, if it should happen that the man bruised was, owing to his fall, taken prisoner by the enemy, and put to death. But, metaphorically speaking, and according to some resemblance, there is a kind of "just," not, indeed, between a man and himself, but between certain parts of himself; but it is not "just" in the universal acceptation of the term, but such as belongs to a master or head of a family; for the rational part of the soul has this relation to

9. the irrational part. Now, looking to these points, it seems that there is some injustice towards one's
self, because it is possible, in these cases, to suffer something contrary to one's own desires. Precisely, therefore, as there is some kind of "just" between the governor and the governed, so there is between these parts of the soul also. With respect to justice, therefore, and the rest of the moral virtues, let the distinctions drawn be considered sufficient.
BOOK VI.

CHAP. I.

That it is necessary to define right Reason.*

1. But since we happen to have already said that we ought to choose the mean, and not the excess or defect; and since the mean is as right reason b determines, let us discuss this point. In all the habits already mentioned, just as in everything else, there is a certain mark which he who possesses reason looks at, sometimes slackening, at others making more intense his gaze; and there is a definite boundary of the mean states, which we assert to be between the excess and the defect, and to be in obedience to right reason.

3. But this statement, although it is true, is by no means clear; for in all other studies which are the subjects of science, it is quite true to say, that we ought not to labour too much or too little, nor to be

* Aristotle does not attempt to analyze all the intellectual virtues, nor indeed is this to be expected in a treatise which is practical rather than theoretical,—ethical, and not metaphysical. The proper place for the consideration of these is his treatise "de Anima." His great object in this book is to ascertain the connection between the intellectual and moral virtues.

b Right reason (ὁ δρόθας λόγος) is that faculty of the soul which takes cognizance of truth and falsehood, both moral and scientific. All the virtues, therefore, both moral and intellectual, will be joined with right reason; the moral virtues being joined with right reason on practical subjects, which is the same as prudence (φρόνησις). The superiority of Aristotle's system in a practical point of view over that of Plato and Socrates, is clear from the following consideration, amongst others, that the latter thought all the virtues "sciences," and λόγος, whereas Aristotle held them all to be according to "reason" (λόγον), and the moral virtues to be according to "reason on practical subjects."
idle too much or too little, but in the mean, and according to the direction of right reason; yet he who only knows this would not possess any more of the knowledge which he requires; he would not, for instance, know what applications ought to be made to the body, if a person were to tell him, that they are those which the science of medicine orders, and which the person acquainted with that science makes use of. Hence, it is necessary with respect to 4. the habits of the soul also, not only that this should be stated truly, but that it should also be determined what right reason is, and what is the definition of it. Now, we made a division of the virtues of the soul, and said that part of them belonged to the moral character, and part to the intellect. The moral virtues, we have thoroughly discussed; but let us in the same manner discuss the remainder, after having first spoken about the soul.

There were before said to be two parts of the soul,—the rational and the irrational; but now we must make the same kind of division in the case of the rational part; and let it first be laid down, that there are two divisions of the rational part; one, by which we contemplate those existing things, the principles of which are in necessary matter; the other, by which we contemplate those, the principles of which are contingent. For the contemplation of objects which differ in kind there are corresponding parts of the soul differing in kind also, and naturally adapted to each; if it is from a kind of resemblance and affinity that they obtain the knowledge of them. Let one of these be called the scientific, and the other the reasoning part; for deliberating

* In this division of the rational soul (λόγον ίχων κυρίως και έν αύτῷ) into two parts, the scientific (ιστημονικόν) and reasoning (λογιστικόν), it must not be forgotten that "reason" is used in its limited sense; namely, that it is restricted to the faculty which takes cognizance of moral truth, and is synonymous with deliberation.—See Book I. xiii.; also Arist. de Animâ, iii. 9, s. 3. The faculty by which the mind contemplates eternal and immutable matter, the scientific part (ιστημονικόν), or νοῦς, is termed in German, Verunft;
and reasoning are equivalent. But no person deliberates upon necessary matter; so that the reasoning part must be one division of the rational part. We must therefore ascertain which habit is the best of each of these two parts; for this is the virtue of each; but the virtue has reference to its peculiar work. 

CHAP. II.

That Truth is the peculiar work of all Intellect.

1. Now, there are three principles in the soul which have power over moral action and truth: Sensation, Intellect, and Appetite; but of these, sensation is the principle of no moral action; and this is clear from the fact that beasts possess sensation, but do not participate in moral action. But pursuit and avoidance in appetite are precisely what affirmation and denial are in intellect. So that since moral virtue is a habit together with deliberate preference, and deliberate preference is appetite, together with deliberation, it is necessary, for these reasons, that the reasoning process be true, that which contemplates contingent matter (τὸ λογιστικὸν), or διάνοια, is Verstand.—See Michelet.

* Genus is ascertained by considering the matter on which each art, &c. is employed: this the schoolmen called subjectum materiale,—.delta. The differentia by considering its effect or object; this is the subjectum formale. Truth, therefore, is the subjectum formale, or object-matter; necessary or contingent matter the subjectum materiale, or subject-matter.—See Brewer, p. 221.

* The word in the original, which is here translated "intell.- lect," is νοῦς, and is used in its most comprehensive sense; not in the limited sense in which it is used in chapter vi. By sensation (αἰσθησις) is meant the perception of the external senses.

* The Greek word is διάνοια, which properly means "the movement of the intellect (νοῦς) on outward in the investigation of truth;" but here, as in some other places, it is used loosely as synonymous with νοῦς.
and the appetite correct, if the deliberate preference is good; and that the one affirm, and the other pursue, the same things. This intellect, therefore, and this truth are practical.

Of the intellect, which is contemplative, and not practical, or productive; truth and falsehood constitute the goodness and the badness; for this is the work of every intellectual faculty; but of that part of it which is both practical and intellectual, truth, which is in agreement with right desire.

The deliberate preference, therefore, by which we are moved to act, and not the object for the sake of which we act, is the principle of action; and desire and reason, which is for the sake of something, is the origin of deliberate preference; hence deliberate preference does not exist without intellect and reason, nor without moral habit; for a good course of action and its contrary cannot exist without intellect and moral character.

Intellect of itself is not the motive principle of any action, but only that intellect which is for the something, and is practical; for this governs the intellect which produces also; for every person that makes anything, makes it for the sake of something; and the thing made is not an end absolutely, but it has reference to something, and belongs to some one: but this is not the case with the thing practised; for excellence of action is the end, and appetite is for this. Wherefore deliberate preference is either intellect influenced by appetite, or appetite influenced by intellect; and such a principle is man. But nothing past is the object of Man the deliberate preference; as no one deliberately prefers that Troy should have been destroyed; for a man does not deliberate about what has happened, but what is future and contingent. But what is past does not admit of being undone; therefore Agathon rightly says, "Of this alone even God is deprived, the power of making things that are past.\"
7. never to have been." 3 Truth, therefore, is the work of both the intellectual parts of the soul; and those habits by which each part will best arrive at truth must be the virtues of them both.

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CHAP. III.

Of the Five Intellectual Virtues, and Science in particular.

1. BEGINNING, therefore, from the commencement, let us speak of these things again. Let the habits, therefore, by which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation, or denial, be five in number; and these are Art, Science, Prudence, Wisdom, and Intuition; for it is possible to be deceived by supposition and opinion. Now, the nature of science is evident from this consideration (if it is necessary to speak accurately, and not to be led by resemblances), that we all suppose, that what we know scientifically is necessary matter.

2. But contingent matter, as soon as it is beyond the province of contemplation, may exist or not, with-

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5 Non tamen irritum
Quodcumque retro est, efficiet; neque
Distinget insectumque reddet,
Quod fugiens semel hora vexit.—Hor.

3 The five habits here spoken of have been arranged by Brewer, as follows, according to the kind of truth which each has for its object. See on this and other points connected with this part of the subject, his able introduction to the Ethics, Book V.

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<tr>
<th>Abstract truth.</th>
<th>Practical or moral truth.</th>
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<td>1. νοῦς.</td>
<td>2. ἰσιστήμη.</td>
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These united make up 5. σοφία.
out our being aware of it. The subject of science, therefore, has a necessary existence; therefore, it is eternal; for things that absolutely¹ exist from necessity, are all eternal, and things eternal are both uncreated and indestructible. Again, all science is thought to be taught, and the subject of science to be acquired by learning. But all learning is derived from things previously known, as we also stated in the Analytics; and is derived partly from induction, and partly from syllogism. Now, induction is the origin of the universal; but a syllogism is deduced from universals. There are, therefore, some principles, from which a syllogism is deduced, which are not themselves syllogistically established, they are therefore established by induction.¹ Science, therefore, is a demonstrative habit, and to this definition we must add the other parts, which we have given in the Analytics; for whenever a man is convinced of anything, and the principles are known to him, he knows it scientifically; for unless he knows the principles even better than the conclusion, he will only possess science accidentally. Let science, therefore, have been defined after this manner.

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CHAP. IV.

Of Art.

Of contingent matter, one species is that which is made, and the other that which is practised. Now making and practice differ from each other; but

¹ There are, according to Aristotle, two kinds of necessity,—absolute (ἀξιός) and hypothetical (ἐν ὑποθέσεις). The former is in its own nature immutable and eternal, the latter only conditionally so; as, for instance, to use the illustration of Eustathius, a man is of necessity sitting so long as he is sitting. —Brewer.

¹ By the observation of a number of particular facts we arrive at a universal principle, which can be used as one of the premises of a syllogism. This process is induction.—See Arist. Rhet. Book I. c. i.; also Whatcley's Logic.
these points have been proved in our exoteric discourses: so that the practical habit, together with reason, differs from the productive habit together with reason: nor are they included one under the other: for neither is practice making, nor making practice. But since house-building is an art, and the same thing as a habit of making joined with reason, and there is no art which is not a habit of making joined with reason, nor any such habit which is not an art, an art and a habit of making joined with reason must be one and the same thing.

3. All art is conversant with three processes,—Production, Contrivance, and Contemplation; in order that something may be produced, the existence and non-existence of which are contingent, and the principle of which is in the doer, and not in the thing done; for art is not concerned with things that exist or originate necessarily or naturally; for these things have their origin in themselves. But since making and practice are different things, it is necessary that art should relate to making, and not to practice. And in some sense chance and art are conversant with the same subjects, as Agathon also says, "Art loves chance, and chance loves art." Art, therefore, as has been said, is a certain habit of making joined with true reason; and absence of art, on the contrary, is a habit of making joined with false reason, in contingent matter.

CHAP. V.

Of Prudence, or moral Wisdom.

1. We should best understand the subject of prudence, if we were first to consider whom we call prudent. Now it seems to be the mark of the prudent...
man to be able to deliberate well respecting what is good and expedient for himself; not in particular instances, as what sort of things are good for his health or strength, but what is good and expedient for living well. And a sign of this is, that we call men prudent on any particular subject, when they reason well, with a view to obtain some good end, in subjects where art is not concerned. So that generally he who is apt to deliberate, is prudent. But no one deliberates about things that cannot possibly be otherwise than they are, nor about things which do not admit of being done by himself. So that if science is with demonstration, and there is no demonstration in matters the premises of which are contingent (for such conclusions must all be contingent likewise), and it is not possible to deliberate on necessary matter, then prudence cannot be science, or art; it is not science, because the subject-matter of moral action is contingent; it is not art, because the nature of practice differs from that of making. It remains, therefore, that it is a true habit joined with reason, which is practical on the subjects of human good and evil; for the end of making is something different from this, but the end of practice is not; for goodness of practice is itself the end.

For this reason we think Pericles, and those like him, prudent men, because they were able to perceive what was good for themselves, and for mankind; and we think that this is the character of those who understand economics and politics. Hence likewise we give to temperance its appellation ἁγροσοφία, as preserving prudence; for it pre-

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1 I have followed the text of Bekker, in enclosing the second clause in the parenthesis; Michelet, however, considers that this ought not to be the case.

2 The end of ποίησις is the thing made, the end of πράξις is to gain skill, and to acquire the habit of making.

3 This derivation is given by Plato in the Cratylus, § 62. There are few truths more self-evident or more important than this, that temperance and virtue have a tendency to preserve, whilst intemperance and vice inevitably pervert and
serves moral ideas: for the pleasant and the painful do not destroy or pervert all ideas; for instance, that a triangle has or has not its interior angles equal to two right angles, but only the ideas which relate to moral conduct. Now the motives of moral conduct are the principles of moral conduct; but to him who has been corrupted through pleasure, or pain, the principle will immediately be invisible, and the knowledge that he ought to choose and to do everything for the sake and on account of this; for vice has a tendency to destroy the principle. So that it necessarily follows that prudence is a true habit joined with reason, practical on the subject of human goods.

Moreover there are degrees of excellence in art, but not in prudence. And in art, he who voluntarily errs is the better man; but in prudence he is worse, just as is the case in the virtues; it is plain, therefore, that it is a virtue, and that it is not art. And since there are two parts of the soul which have reason, it must be the virtue of one; namely, the part which forms opinions: for both opinion destroy the moral sense, and the knowledge of the principles of right and wrong. Although, owing to the intimate and close connection between the mind and the body, vicious indulgence of the passions will sometimes weaken the intellectual powers; yet it will not deprave and distort the power of apprehending scientific truth; and there is no impossibility in a vicious man being a good mathematician. But vice will inevitably and certainly destroy the moral judgment, and make us think evil good, and good evil. As in the case of revealed truth, a blessing is promised to obedience to that law of virtue under which we are born:—"He that doeth my will shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God;" so in the case of moral truth, the heart is to the way to the understanding.

* See Seneca's Epistles, xv. "Vis scire quam dissimilis sit aliarum artium conditio et hujus? In illas excusatius est voluntate pecorae quam casa; in hac maxima culpa est sponte delinquere. Quod dico tale est. Grammaticus non erubescit si soleciuum sciens facit, erubescit si nesciens. At in hac arte vivendi turpior volentium culpa est."

* This is the same part of the soul which Aristotle has already called τὸ λογιστικὸν; for when it is employed upon contingent matter it arrives not at truth absolutely, but opinion. Stability and permanence are characteristic of
and prudence take cognizance of contingent subjects. But yet it is not only a habit joined with reason: and a proof of this is, that there is a possibility of forgetting a habit of this kind, but no possibility of forgetting prudence.

CHAP. VI.

Of Intuition.

But since science is a supposition, formed upon universals, and on things necessarily existent, and there are principles of the subjects of demonstration, and of all science (for science is joined with habit περὶ reason), the habit which takes cognizance of the ἀρχῶν principles of that which is the subject of science cannot be science, or art, or prudence. For the subject of science is capable of demonstration; but these two habits are conversant with contingent matter. Consequently neither is wisdom conversant with these; for it is the part of the wise man to have demonstration on some subjects. If, then, the means by which we arrive at truth, and are never deceived on subjects immutable and contingent, are science, prudence, wisdom, and intuition, and it is impossible to be any one of the first three, I mean prudence, wisdom, and science; it remains that intuition must be the habit which takes cognizance of the principles of science.

virtuous energies, as contrasted with those of science; as our virtuous principles are developed and called into action every hour of our lives; and hence we cannot forget them, as we can the subjects of scientific knowledge.—See Book I. c. x.

1. The following is Aristotle's definition in the Magna Moralia (i. 35) of νοῦς, which I have translated "Intuition;" i.e. the habit which apprehends without any reasoning process. "Ο νοὺς ἵστη περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν νοημῶν καὶ τῶν δινῶν ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιστήμη τῶν μετ' ἀποδείξεως δινῶν ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ ἀρχαί ἀναπόδεικτοι."
CHAP. VII.

Of Wisdom.

1. But in the arts we attribute wisdom to those who are most accurately skilled in the arts: for example, we call Phidias a wise worker in stone, and Polyclitus a wise statuary, in this use of the word, meaning nothing more by wisdom than that it is the excellence of art. But we think that some are universally wise; and not wise only in some particular art; as Homer says in his Margites, "Him the gods made neither a digger, nor a ploughman, nor wise in any other way."

2. So that it is clear that wisdom must be the most accurate of all the sciences. The wise man must therefore not only know the facts which are deduced from principles, but must also attain truth respecting the principles themselves. So that wisdom must be intuition and science together, and science of the most honourable subjects, having as it were a head; for it is absurd if a person thinks political science, or prudence, the best thing pos-

* Σοφία in its particular application to the arts signifies skill; in its general signification the term is used to express the habit which apprehends both the principles of science and the deductions derived from them by demonstrations; for this reason it is said to be composed of νοῦς and ἴσωτήμη. The following are instances given by Muretus of different applications of the word σοφία:—Homer (II. xv. 412) attributes to a skilful shipbuilder πᾶσαν σοφίαν. Xenophon called skilfully-seasoned dishes σοφίσματα. Athenæus applies the word to musical skill; and hence Cicero says, in his Tusculan Disputations (Book I.), "Summam eruditionem Græci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus." The term was also applied to poets. Thus Plato in the Phædrus calls Anacreon ὁ σοφός, and Cicero in the oration for Milo calls poets "Hominem sapientissimi."

* Aristotle mentions the Margites of Homer in the Poetic, § 7: besides the genuine poem, a spurious one appeared in later times.
sible, unless man is allowed to be the most excellent of all created things. If, then, what is wholesome and good is different in the case of a man and a fish, but what is white, and straight, is always the same; all will allow, that wisdom is always the same, but prudence different in different cases. For they would say, that, considering every point well with a view to self, is prudent, and to prudence they would commit the decision of these matters. Hence men say that some brutes even are prudent; and from all, namely, which appear to have a faculty of providing for their own sustenance. But it is plain that wisdom and the science of social life cannot be the same: for if men will call that wisdom which refers to what is expedient for themselves, there will be many kinds of wisdom: for there is not one single one which takes cognizance of the good of all animals, but a different one for each: unless, indeed, there is but one medical treatment for beings of all kinds. But if it be said that man is the best of all living creatures, it makes no difference; for there are other things of a much more divine nature than man: to take, for instance, those which are most plainly so, the elements of which the world is composed. From what has been said, therefore, it is clear that wisdom is science and intuition united, upon subjects the most honourable by nature.

As Socrates held the virtues to be sciences, and Plato taught that φρόνησις was the contemplation of the Ἰδέα, it became necessary that Aristotle should carefully distinguish σοφία and φρόνησις. He therefore tells us that the end of the latter is practical truth, of the former theoretical truth; that the latter is conversant with particulars as well as universals, because in all moral action the important part is the practical application; whereas the former is conversant with universals only. The practical application he calls afterwards (c. viii.) the extreme (τὸ ῶξαραν), and (c. xi.) the minor premiss. It has often been observed with truth, that the syllogistic process is confined to the conviction of the intellect, but that in whatever cases we act as moral and rational beings, we act upon a syllogism. In this we are distinguished from the inferior animals, who act from instinct.
6. For this reason men call Anaxagoras, and Thales, and others of this description, wise, but not prudent, when they see that they are ignorant of what is expedient for themselves. And they say that they are acquainted with subjects which are superfluous, and wonderful, and difficult, and divine, but yet useless, because they do not study the subject of human good. But prudence is concerned with human affairs, and those subjects about which it is possible to deliberate. For this, that is, to deliberate well, we say is the work of the prudent man especially.

7. But no one deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise than they are, nor about those of which there is not some end, and this end a good capable of being the subject of moral action. But absolutely the good deliberator is he, who is skilful in aiming at the best of the objects of human action. Nor yet is prudence limited to universals only, but it is necessary to have a knowledge of particulars also: for prudence is practical, and practice turns upon particulars. Therefore some who have no theoretical knowledge, are more practical than others who have it; those, for example, who derive their skill from experience. For if a man should know that light meats are easy of digestion, and are wholesome, without knowing what meats are light, he will never produce health; but he who knows nothing more than that the flesh of birds is light and wholesome, will be more likely to produce it. But prudence is practical, so that it is good to have both, or if not both, it is better to have this. But there must be in prudence also some master virtue.
CHAP. VIII.

Of the different parts of Prudence.

Now political prudence, and prudence, are the same; but of prudence which is conversant with the state, one division, which is, as it were, a kind of master-prudence, is legislative; a second, which is particular, is called by the common name political; but this is practical; for a decree, as being the last thing, is the subject of action. Hence men say that practical statesmen alone regulate the state; for these alone act, like artificers. But the prudence which refers to one's self and the individual appears to be most properly prudence: and this species of bears the common name of prudence. But of those three divisions, one is economical, the second legislative, and the third political; and of this last there are two sub-divisions, one the deliberative, the other the judicial.

Now there must be a certain species of knowledge, namely, the knowing what is good for one's self; but on this question there is great difference.

- Practical statesmen manage the detail, and therefore are more properly said to regulate the state, as a mason, properly speaking, builds the house, and not the architect.

The divisions of prudence may be denominated personal, economical, legislative, administrative, executive.
of opinion; and he who knows his own concerns, and employs himself in them, is thought to be prudent, but politicians appear busy-bodies. Therefore Euripides says, “How can I be prudent, I who had it in my power without trouble, by being numbered among the multitude of the army, to share alike? For Zeus hates those who are busy-bodies, and do too much.”* For men seek what is good to themselves, and think that this is what they ought to do: from this opinion, therefore, arose the idea that such people as these are prudent; and yet perhaps it is not impossible to attain one’s own good without economical, nor without political prudence. But still, it is an obscure subject, and one which requires investigation, how one ought to manage one’s own affairs.

This is an evidence of the truth of what we have said, that young men become geometricians and mathematicians, and wise in things of this kind; but it is thought that a young man cannot become prudent. The reason of this is, that prudence is conversant with particulars, and the knowledge of particulars is acquired by experience alone; but a young man is not experienced; for length of time causes experience. One might study this question also, why a child can become a mathematician, but not wise, i.e. a natural philosopher?* Is it because the former subjects are derived from abstraction, whilst the principles of the latter are learnt from experience? And the latter subjects young men enunciate, though they are not persuaded of their truth; but the reality of the former is evident. Again, errors in deliberation are either in the universal, or the particular; for the error is, not knowing, either that all heavy waters are bad, or that this water is heavy.

* These lines are said to be taken from a lost tragedy of Euripides, entitled “the Philoctetes.”

* Σοφὸς ἡ φιλοκός in the original. It is clear, therefore, that φιλοκός is the explanation of the preceding word σοφὸς, and that the two together denote one acquainted with natural philosophy.
It is clear that prudence is not science; for Prudence prudence, as has been said, is of the extreme; for this is the subject of moral action. Prudence is therefore opposed to intuition: for intuition is of those principles respecting which there is no reasoning; but prudence is of the extreme, of which there is no science, but only perception, not that perception which takes cognizance of particular objects, but such perception as that by which we perceive the extreme in mathematics, a triangle for instance; for it will stop there. But this is rather perception than prudence; but still it is of a different kind from sensual perception.

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CHAP. IX:

Of good Deliberation.

Investigation and deliberation differ, for delibera-
tion is a kind of investigation. But it is necessary to ascertain the genus of good deliberation, whether it is a kind of science, opinion, happy conjecture, or what not. Now it certainly is not science; for men do not investigate subjects which they know; but good deliberation is a kind of deliberation; and he who deliberates investigates and reasons. Nor yet is it happy conjecture; for this is something unconnected with reason, and

Prudence (φρόνησις) is not science (ἐπιστήμη), because science is conversant with universals, whereas prudence is conversant with particulars. These particulars are extremes (ἐξαιρέσεις), since they are the last results at which we arrive before we begin to act. The faculty which takes cognizance of them is perception (αἰσθήσεις); not the perception of the five external senses, but that internal perception which is analogous to them, and which is popularly called common sense. Hence we can see the difference between prudence and intuition (νοῦς); for the extremes of which intuition takes cognizance, are the first undemonstrable principles (ἀρχαι, πρῶτοι δοκιμαζόμενοι), such as the axioms, definitions, &c. in mathematical science. The intuition (νοῦς), therefore, here spoken of, is the pure intellectual intuition, not practical or moral intuition.
quick; but we deliberate for a long time, and say, that it is right to execute quickly what we have resolved upon, but to deliberate slowly. 3 Again, sagacity is a different thing from good deliberation; and sagacity is a kind of happiness of conjecture. Therefore no kind of good deliberation is opinion. Now since he who deliberates badly, erra, but he who deliberates well, deliberates correctly, it is plain, that good deliberation is a kind of correctness. It is not correctness either of science or of opinion; for there is no correctness of science, because there is no error: and truth is the correctness of opinion; besides, everything of which there is opinion has been already defined.

4. Still, however, good deliberation cannot be without reason. It remains, therefore, that it is the correctness of the intellect, moving onwards in the investigation of truth, i.e. διάνοια, for it is not yet an assertion; but opinion is not investigation, but is at once an assertion. But he who deliberates, whether he does it well or ill, investigates something and reasons. But good deliberation is a sort of correctness of deliberation; therefore we must inquire what is the nature, and what the subject-matter, of deliberation.

5. Since the term correctness is used in more senses than one, it is plain that good deliberation is not every kind of correctness; for the incontinent and depraved man will from reasoning arrive at that which he proposes to himself to look to; so that he will have deliberated rightly, and yet have arrived at

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* Βουλομένοι βραδίως, ἵνα τίλιμ ἐξ ῥαξίως.—Iocrate.

** In the later Analytics, i. 34, ἄγχινοια is defined εὑροχία τις ἐν διαίνοια χρόνῳ τοῦ μίσου. A happy conjecture, without previous consideration, of the middle term.

*** Good deliberation is (1) not a correctness of science, because there is no such thing as incorrectness of it; (2) it is not a correctness of opinion (δόξα), because (a) the correctness of δόξα is truth; because (b) δόξα is an assertion (φάσις), and not an investigation (ζητήσις).

**** Such I take to be the meaning of this difficult passage, which has been so misunderstood by the majority of commentators. See on διάνοια, note, p. 145.
great evil. Whereas good deliberation seems to be a good thing; for good deliberation is only such a correctness of deliberation as is likely to arrive at good. But it is possible to arrive at even this by a false syllogism; and to be right as to what one ought to do, but wrong as to the means, because the middle term is false. So that even this kind of deliberation, by which one arrives at a proper conclusion, but by improper means, is not quite good deliberation. Again, it is possible for one man to be right after deliberating for a long time, and another man very soon. So that even this is not quite good deliberation; but good deliberation is that correctness of deliberation, which is in accordance with the principle of utility, which has a proper object, employs proper means, and is in operation during a proper length of time.

Again it is possible to deliberate well both absolutely, and relatively to some specific end; and that is absolutely good deliberation which is correct with reference to the absolutely good end, and that is a specific kind of good deliberation which is correct with reference to some specific end. If, therefore, to deliberate well is characteristic of prudent men, good deliberation must be a correctness of deliberation, in accordance with the principle of expediency having reference to the end, of which prudence is the true conception.

CHAP. X.

Of Intelligence.

INTELLIGENCE, and the want of intelligence, according to which we call men intelligent, and wanting in intelligence, are neither universally the same as science or opinion, for then all men would be intelligent; nor is intelligence any one of the particular sciences, as medicine is the science of things wholesome; or
2. as geometry is the science of magnitudes. Nor is intelligence conversant with things eternal and immutable, nor with everything indifferently which comes to pass; but it is conversant with those things about which a man would doubt and deliberate. Wherefore it is conversant with the same subjects as prudence, yet prudence and intelligence are not the same; for the province of prudence is to order (for its end is what it is right to do, or not to do); but the province of intelligence is only to decide; for intelligence, and good intelligence, are the same thing; for intelligent people, and people of good intelligence, are the same. But intelligence is neither the possessing, nor the obtaining, of prudence; but just as learning, when it makes use of scientific knowledge, is called intelligence, thus the word intelligence is also used when a person makes use of opinion, for the purpose of making a decision, and making a proper decision, on the subjects of prudence, when another person is speaking; for the terms well and properly are identical. And hence the name of intelligence, by which we call intelligent people, was derived, namely, from that intelligence which is displayed in learning; since for the expression "to learn," we often use the expression "to understand."

CHAP. XI.

Of Candour.

1. But that which is called candour, with reference to which we call men candid, and say that they possess candour, is the correct decision of the equitable man. But this is a sign of it; for we say that the equitable man, above all others, is likely to entertain a fellow-feeling, and that in some cases it is equitable

Intelligence is that faculty which forms a judgment on things; candour that which judges of persons.
to entertain it. Now fellow-feeling is the correct \( \Sigma νυγρωμα \) discriminating candour of the equitable man; and that is correct which is the candour of the truthful man. But all these habits reasonably tend to the same point; for we speak of candour, intelligence, prudence, and perception, referring to the same characters the possession of candour, of perception, of prudence, and of intelligence; for all these faculties are of the extremes, and of particulars. And it is in being apt to decide on points on which the prudent man decides, that intelligence, kind feeling, and candour, are displayed. For equitable considerations are common to all good men in their intercourse with others. But all matters of moral conduct are particulars and extremes; for the prudent man ought to know them, and intelligence and candour are concerned with matters of moral conduct, and these are extremes.

Intuition is of the extremes on both sides; for intuition, and not reason, takes cognizance of the first principles, and of the last results: that intuition which belongs to demonstration takes cognizance of the immutable and first principles; that which belongs to practical subjects takes cognizance

"Intuition (νοῦς), as we have seen above, properly signifies the faculty which takes cognizance of the first principles of science. Aristotle here, whether analogically or considering it a division of the same faculty, it is difficult to say, applies the term to that power which we possess of apprehending the principles of morals, of seeing what is right and wrong by an intuitive process, without the intervention of any reasoning process. It is what Bishop Butler calls "our sense of discernment of actions as morally good or evil." In this twofold use of the term νοῦς there is no real inconsistency, because it is evidently, as Mr. Brewer says, p. 247, note, "the same faculty, whether employed upon the first principles of science or of morals." Every moral agent acts upon a motive (οὐ Νυκα), whether good or bad. This motive is, in other words, the principle upon which we act, and is the major premiss of the practical syllogism (συλλογισμὸς τῶν πρακτῶν). But the minor premiss of the practical syllogism bears relation to the major, of a particular to a universal; therefore as universals are made up of particulars, it follows that the origin (δρφή) of the motive or principle is the minor premiss."
of the last result of contingent matters, and of the minor premise; for these (i.e. minor premises) are the origin of the motive; for universals are made up of particulars. Of these, therefore, it is necessary to have perception; and perception is intuition. Therefore these habits have been thought to be natural; and although no man is naturally wise (σοφός), he is thought to have candour, intelligence, and intuition, naturally. A sign of this is, that we think that these qualities naturally accompany certain ages; and that one particular age possesses perception and candour, as though nature were the cause of it.\footnote{The meaning of this passage is as follows: It has been held that a disposition to form a candid judgment of men and things, an ability to comprehend and grasp the suggestions of other minds, independently of the power of reasoning out conclusions for ourselves; and, lastly, a moral sense of right and wrong, by which we have a perception of the principles of moral action, are natural gifts; as a sign or evidence of this, it has been observed that these faculties are more especially developed at particular periods of life, in the same way that physical properties are. But σοφία, i.e. scientific knowledge, which is based upon demonstration, and is in fact a demonstrative habit, must for this reason be the result of an active exercise of the perceptive and reasoning powers, and therefore cannot be natural, but must be acquired.}

6. Therefore intuition is at once the beginning and the end; for demonstrations have extremes both for their origin and their subjects.\footnote{That is, demonstrations have for their origin and foundation first principles, of which intuition takes cognizance, and the object of demonstration is to arrive at conclusions which come under the province of intuition likewise.} So that we ought to pay attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, no less than to their demonstrations; for because they have obtained from their experience an acuteness of moral vision, they see correctly. What, therefore, is the nature of wisdom and of prudence, what the objects of both, and the fact that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul, has been stated.
CHAP. XII.

On the utility of Wisdom and Prudence.

The question might be asked, how are these habits useful? for wisdom does not contemplate any of the means by which a man will become happy; for it relates to no production. Prudence, indeed, has this property; yet with a view to what is there and "σοφία." any need of it, if it is the knowledge of the things which are just, and honourable, and advantageous to man, and these are what the good man practises? But we are not at all the more apt to practise them because we know them, that is, if the virtues are habits; just as we are not more apt to be healthy from the knowledge of wholesome things, nor of things likely to cause a good habit of body (that is, the things which are so called not because they cause the habit, but because they result from it); for we are not at all more apt to put in practice the arts of medicine or gymnastics, merely because we know them.

But it may be said, if we must not call a man prudent on these grounds, but only for becoming virtuous, it would not be at all useful to those who are already good; again, it would not be useful to those who do not possess prudence; for it will make no difference to them whether they possess it themselves, or obey others who possess it; for it would be quite sufficient for us, just as in the case of

\[ \text{This sentence which I have enclosed in a parenthesis is intended to explain the sense in which Aristotle uses the terms \textit{υγιεία} and \textit{ευκτικό}. A passage in the Topics, I. xiii. 10. illustrates this:—} \]

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{υγιείαν \ λίγεται} & \quad \text{τὸ \ μὲν \ υγιείας \ ποιητικών. (1.)} \\
\text{τὸ \ δὲ ... \ φυλακτικών. (2.)} \\
\text{τὸ \ δὲ ... \ σημαντικών. (3.)}
\end{align*} \]

Now as the symptoms or evidences of health are the results of the healthy habit or condition, the sense in which the term is used here is the third.—See Chase’s note, p. 225
health; for when we wish to be well, we do not begin to learn the art of medicine. But besides, it would appear absurd, if, though it is inferior to wisdom, it is, nevertheless, to be superior to it; for that which produces, always rules and directs in each particular case. On these subjects, therefore, we must speak, for hitherto we have only raised questions about them.

4. First, then, let us assert, that wisdom and prudence must be eligible for their own sakes, since they are the virtues, one of each part of the soul, even if neither of them produces any effect. Secondly, they do really produce an effect, although not in the same way as medicine produces health, but as health is the efficient cause of healthiness, so is wisdom the efficient cause of happiness; for being part of virtue in the most comprehensive sense of the term, it causes, by being possessed, and by energizing, a man to be happy. Again, its work will be accomplished by prudence and moral virtue; for virtue makes the end and aim correct, and prudence the means. But of the fourth part of the soul, that is, the nutritive, there is no such virtue; for the performance or non-performance of moral action is not in any case in its power.

To answer the objection, that we are not at all more likely to practise honour and justice on account of prudence, we must begin a little further back, making this our commencement. Just as we say that some who do just actions, are not yet just; those, for instance, who do what is enjoined by the laws involuntarily, or ignorantly, or for some other cause, and not for its own sake, though nevertheless they do what they ought and what a good man ought to do; in the same manner, it seems, that a man must do all these things, being at the same time of a certain disposition, in order to be good; I mean, for instance, from deliberate preference, and for the sake of the acts themselves.

7. Virtue, therefore, makes the deliberate preference correct; but it is not the part of virtue, but of
some other faculty, to direct aright those things which must be done with a view to that principle. But we must stop and speak on these subjects with more clearness.

Now, there is a certain faculty which is called \( \Delta \iota \nu \nu \o \nu \zeta \) cleveness; the nature of which is to be able to do, and to attain, those things which conduce to the aim proposed. If, therefore, the aim be good, the cleveness is praiseworthy; but if it be bad, it becomes craft; therefore we call prudent men clever, and not crafty. Now prudence is not the same as this faculty, nor is it without this faculty. But the habit is produced upon this eye, as it were, of the soul, not without virtue, as we have already stated, and as is manifest. For the syllogisms of

Cleveness \( \Delta \iota \nu \nu \o \nu \zeta \) is, according to Aristotle, a natural faculty, or aptness, which, in itself, is neither good nor bad; it may be either used or abused,—if abused, it is craft \( \pi \a \nu \o \u \rho \gamma \i \a \) . It is capable of being cultivated and improved, and when perfected it becomes \( \phi \o \nu \zeta \zeta \zeta \i \zeta \zeta \). As cleveness thus perfected by the addition of moral virtue becomes prudence, so natural virtue, with Aristotle, who believes that man is endowed, becomes perfect virtue by the addition of prudence. Not that Aristotle believed that man was capable of actually attaining such a height of perfection: he evidently believed that it was beyond human power. It is the theoretical standard which he proposes to the Ethical student for him to aim at, and to approach as near as his natural powers will permit him. Thus, Revelation, whilst it teaches us the corruption of human nature, bids us be perfect even as our Father which is in heaven is perfect.

Aristotle's theory of the existence of natural virtue bears a close resemblance to Bishop Butler's idea of the constitution of human nature as laid down in his first three sermons and the preface to them:—"Our nature is adapted to virtue as much as the nature of a watch is adapted to measure time. Nothing can possibly be more contrary to nature than vice. Poverty and disgrace, tortures and death, are not so contrary to it. Every man is naturally a law to himself, and may find within himself the rule of right, and obligations to follow it."

The original word here translated craft is \( \pi \a \nu \o \u \rho \gamma \i \a \) . As \( \Delta \iota \nu \nu \o \nu \zeta \), which signifies cleveness, generally is, when directed to a good end, subject to the restrictions of sound and upright moral principles; so when these are removed, it degenerates into \( \pi \a \nu \o \u \rho \gamma \i \a \), which signifies equal ability, but in addition, an unscrupulous readiness to do everything whatever. This is implied in its etymology.
moral conduct have as their principle, i.e. their major
premiss: since such and such a thing is the end
and the chief good, i.e. anything. For let it be for
the sake of argument, anything; but this is not
visible except to the good man; for depravity dis-
torts the moral vision, and causes it to be deceived
on the subject of moral principles. So that it is
clearly impossible for a person who is not good to
be prudent.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Virtue proper.

1. We must again investigate the subject of virtue. For
virtue admits of relation of the same kind as that
which prudence bears to cleverness; that is, the
two kinds of virtue are not identically the same, but
similar; such is the relation which exists between
natural virtue and virtue proper. For all men
think that each of the points of moral character
exists in us in some manner naturally; for we possess
justice, temperance, valour, and the other virtues,
2. immediately from our birth. But yet we are in
search of something different, namely, to be pro-
perly virtuous, and that these virtues should exist
in us in a different manner; for natural habits
exist in children and brutes, but without intellect
they are evidently hurtful. Yet so much as this is
evident to the senses, that as a strong body which
moves without sight meets with great falls, from
the want of sight, so it is in the present instance:
but if it gets the addition of intellect, it acts much
better. Now the case of the habit is similar, and
under similar circumstances will be properly virtue.
So that, as in the case of the faculty which forms
opinions, there are two forms, cleverness and pru-
dence; so in the moral there are likewise two,
natural virtue and virtue proper; and of these,
virtue proper is not produced without prudence.
Therefore it has been said that all the virtues are prudences. And Socrates, in one part was right in his inquiry, but in the other wrong. For in that he thought that all the virtues are prudences, he was wrong; but in that he said that they are not without prudence, he was right. And this is a sign; for now all men, when they define virtue, add also that it is a habit, according to right reason, stating also to what things it has reference; now that is right reason which is according to prudence. All men, therefore, seem in some way to testify that such a habit as is according to prudence, is virtue. But it is necessary to make a slight change; for virtue is not only the habit according to, but in conjunction with, right reason; and prudence is the same as right reason on these subjects. Socrates, therefore, thought that the virtues were "reasons," i.e. reasoning processes; for he thought them all sciences; but we think them joined with reason.

It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that it is impossible to be properly virtuous without prudence, or prudent without moral virtue. Moreover, the argument by which it might be urged that the virtues are separate from each other, may in this way be refuted, for (they say) the same man is not in the highest degree naturally adapted for all: so that he will have got one already, and another not yet. Now this is possible in the case of the natural virtues; but in the case of those from the possession of which a man is called absolutely good, it is impossible; for with prudence, which is one, they will all exist together. It is 6.

This view of the practical nature of φρόνησις, and of its being inseparable from moral virtue, so that if a man possesses perfect prudence, it develops itself in perfect obedience to the moral law; and the perfection of the one implies the perfection of the other also, is analogous to the relation which exists between faith and obedience in Christian ethics. A living faith necessarily brings forth good works, and by them a living faith is as evidently known as a tree is discerned by its fruits. He, therefore, who possesses true faith possesses all virtue; and in proportion to the imperfection of obedience is the imperfection of faith.
clear, too, even if prudence were not practical, there would be need of it, because it is the virtue of one part of the soul, and because the deliberate preference cannot be correct without prudence, nor without virtue; for the one causes us to choose the end, and the other to put in practice the means; yet it has not power over wisdom, nor over the superior parts of the soul; just as medicine is not better than health; for it does not make use of it, but sees how it may be produced. It gives directions, therefore, for its sake, but not to it. Besides, it would be the same kind of thing as if one should say, that the political science has power over the gods, because it gives directions respecting all things in the state.
BOOK VII.

CHAP. I.

Of a kind of Heroic Virtue, and of Continence, and in like manner of their contraries.

After what has been already said, we must make another beginning, and state, that there are three forms of things to be avoided in morals—vice, incontinence, brutality. The contraries of two of these are self-evident: for we call one virtue, the other continence: but, as an opposite to brutality, it would be most suitable to name the virtue which is above human nature, a sort of heroic and divine virtue, such as Homer has made Priam attribute to Hector, because of his exceeding goodness—

—— "Nor did he seem
The son of mortal man, but of a god."

a It is not very easy to see at first the connection between the four remaining books and the preceding six. The following is the explanation given by Muretus. In the commencement of the sixth book Aristotle has taught that two conditions are requisite to the perfection of moral virtue: first, that the moral sense (ὁ νοῦς ὁ πρακτικός) should judge correctly; next, that the appetites and passions should be obedient to its decisions. But though the moral judgment should be correct, the will is generally in opposition to it. If in this conflict reason is victorious, and compels the will, though reluctant, to obey, this moral state is continence; if, on the contrary, the will overcomes the reason, the result is incontinence. It was essential to a practical treatise to treat of this imperfect or inchoate virtue, as well as to discuss the theory of moral perfection. The case is somewhat analogous to that of physical science, in which we first lay down theoretically the natural laws without reference to the existence of any impediments, and then modify our theory by calculating and allowing for the effects of perturbations and resistances.

b II. xxiv. 258.
2. So that if, as is commonly said, men become gods because of excess of virtue, the habit, which is opposed to brutality, would evidently be something of that kind: for just as there is no vice or virtue in a brute, so also there is not in a god: but in the one case there is something more precious than virtue; and in the other something different in kind from vice.

3. But since the existence of a godlike man is a rare thing (as the Lacedaemonians, when they admire any one exceedingly, are accustomed to say, He is a godlike man), so the brutal character is rare amongst men, and is mostly found amongst barbarians. But some cases arise from disease and bodily mutilations: and those who go beyond the rest of mankind in vice we call by this bad name. Of such a disposition as this we must make mention subsequently: of vice we have spoken before.

4. We must, however, treat of incontinence, and softness, and luxury, and of continence and patience: for we must neither form our conceptions of each of them as though they were the same habits with virtue and vice, nor as though they were belonging to a different genus. But, as in other cases, we must first state the phenomena; and, after raising difficulties, then exhibit if we can all the opinions that have been entertained on the subject of these passions; or if not all, the greatest number, and the most important; for if the difficulties are solved, and the most approved opinions left, the subject will have been explained sufficiently.

5. It is a common opinion, then, first, that continence and patience belong to the number of things good and praiseworthy; but incontinence and effeminacy to that of things bad and reprehensible. That the continent man is identical with him who

* In the tenth book, c. viii., it will be seen that Aristotle proves that the gods cannot possess any virtuous energies, except that of contemplation.

** See the description of the cannibalism of the inhabitants of Coptus and Tentyra, Juv. Sat. xv.

* * * See the fifth and sixth chapters of this book.
abides by his determination; and the incontinent, with him who departs from his determination. That the incontinent man, knowing that things are bad, does them at the instigation of passion; but the continent man, knowing that the desires are bad, refuses to follow them in obedience to reason. That the temperate man is continent and patient: but some think that every one who is both continent and patient is temperate; others do not. Some call the intemperate man incontinent, and the incontinent intemperate, indiscriminately; others assert that they are different. As to the prudent man, sometimes it is said that it is impossible for him to be incontinent; at other times, that some men both prudent and clever are incontinent. Lastly, men are said to be incontinent of anger, and honour, and gain. These are the statements generally made.

CHAP. II.

Certain Questions respecting Temperance and Intemperance.

A QUESTION might arise, how any one forming a right conception is incontinent. Some say, that if he has a scientific knowledge, it is impossible: for it is strange, as Socrates thought, if science exists in the man, that anything else should have the mastery, and drag him about like a slave. Socrates, indeed, resisted the argument altogether, as if incontinence did not exist: for that no one forming a right conception acted contrary to what is

* Aristotle (Magna Moral.) says, that in the opinion of Socrates no one would choose evil, knowing that it was evil: but the incontinent man does so, being influenced by passion, therefore he thought there was no such thing as incontinence. This doctrine of Socrates doubtless originated, firstly, from his belief that man’s natural bias and inclination was towards virtue, and that therefore it was absurd to suppose he would pursue vice except involuntarily or ignorantly. Secondly, from his doctrine that the knowledge of the principles and laws of morality was as capable of certainty and accuracy as those of mathematical science.
best, but only through ignorance. Now, this account is at variance with the phenomena; and we must inquire concerning this passion, if it proceeds from ignorance, what manner of ignorance it is; for that the incontinent man, before he is actually under the influence of passion, thinks that he ought not to yield, is evident. There are some who concede one point, but not the rest; for that nothing is superior to science they allow: but that no one acts contrary to what they think best they do not allow: and for this reason they say, that the incontinent man is overcome by pleasures, not having science, but opinion. But still, if it is opinion, and not science, nor a strong conception, which opposes, but a weak one, as in persons who are doubting, the not persisting in this in opposition to strong desires is pardonable: but vice is not pardonable, nor anything else which is reprehensible.

3. Perhaps, then, it may be said that it is prudence which opposes, for this is the strongest. But this is absurd; for then the same man will at once be prudent and incontinent: but not a single individual would assert that it is the character of the prudent man willingly to do the most vicious things. Besides this, it has been shown before that the prudent man is a practical man; for he has to do with the practical extremes, and possesses all the other virtues.

4. Again, if the continent character consists in having strong and bad desires, the temperate man will not be continent, nor the continent temperate; for excess does not belong to the temperate man, nor the possession of bad desires. But, nevertheless, the continent man must have bad desires; for if the desires are good, the habit, which forbids him to follow them, is bad: so that continence would not be in all cases good; and if they are weak and not bad, there is nothing grand in overcoming them; and if they are both bad and weak, there is nothing great in doing so.

5. Again, if continence makes a man inclined to
adhere to every opinion, it is bad; as, for instance, the 2nd point if it makes him inclined to adhere to a false one: and if incontinence makes him depart from every opinion, some species of incontinence will be good; as, for instance, the case of Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles; for he is praiseworthy for not adhering to what Ulysses persuaded him to do, because he felt pain in telling a lie. Again, the sophistical argument, called "ψευδόμενος," causes a difficulty: for because they wish to prove paradoxes, in order that they may appear clever when they succeed, the syllogism, which is framed, becomes a difficulty: for the intellect is as it were in bonds, insomuch it does not wish to stop, because it is not satisfied with the conclusion; but it cannot advance, because it cannot solve the argument. And from one mode of reasoning it comes to pass that folly, together with incontinence, becomes virtue; for it acts contrary to its conceptions through incontinence; but the conception which it found was, that good was evil, and that it ought not to be done: so that it will practise what is good, and not what is evil.

Again, he who practises and pursues what is pleasant from being persuaded that it is right, and after deliberate choice, would appear to be better than the man who does so not from deliberation, but from incontinence; for he is more easily cured, because he may be persuaded to change; whereas to the incontinent man the proverbial expression is applicable,

"When water chokes, what is one to drink after?"

1 This fallacy is denominated by Cicero "Mentiens." The author of it is said to have been Eubulides, the Milesian. The following is the form of it: "When I lie, and say that I lie, do I lie or do I speak the truth? Thus, e. g., Epimenides, the Cretan, said that all his countrymen were liars; did he then speak the truth? If you say he did, it may be answered, that he told a lie, inasmuch as he himself was a Cretan; if you say he did not, it may be answered, that he spoke the truth, for the same reason."

8 This proverb is applicable to the argument in the follow-
For if he had been persuaded to do what he does, he might have been re-persuaded, and thus have desisted; but now, although persuaded, nevertheless he acts contrary to that conviction.

9. Again, if there are incontinence and continence on every object-matter, who is he who is simply called incontinent? for no one is guilty of every species of incontinence; but there are some whom we call incontinent simply. The difficulties, then, are somewhat of this nature; and of them we must remove some, and leave others; for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth.

CHAP. III.

How it is possible for one who has Knowledge to be Incontinent.

1. First, then, we must consider whether men are incontinent, having knowledge or not, and in what way having knowledge. Next, with what sort of objects we must say that the continent and incontinent have to do; I mean, whether it is every pleasure and pain, or some particular ones. Thirdly, whether the continent and patient are the same or different. And in like manner we must consider all other subjects which are akin to this speculation.

2. The beginning of the discussion is, whether the continent and incontinent differ in the object, or in the manner: I mean, whether the incontinent man is incontinent merely from being employed in this particular thing; or whether it is not that, but in the manner; or whether it is not that, but the result of both. Next, whether incontin-
nence and continence are on every object-matter or not: for he that is called simply incontinent, is not so in everything, but in the same things with which the intemperate is concerned: nor is he so from having reference to these things absolutely (for then it would be the same as intemperance), but from having reference to them in a particular manner: for the intemperate is led on by deliberate choice, thinking that he ought always to pursue present pleasure: the incontinent does not think so, but nevertheless pursues it.

Now as to the question whether it be a true opinion, and not science, in opposition to which men are incontinent, makes no difference as to the argument: for some who hold opinions, do not feel any doubt, but think that they know for certain. If then those, who hold opinions, because their convictions are weak, will act contrary to their conception, more than those who have knowledge, then knowledge will in nowise differ from opinion: for some are convinced of what they think, no less than others are of what they know: Heraclitus is an instance of this. But since we speak of knowing in two ways (for he that possesses, but does not use his knowledge, as well as he that uses it, is said to have knowledge), there will be a difference between the having it, but not using it, so as to see what we ought not to do, and the having it and using it.

Again, since there are two kinds of propositions, universal and particular, there is nothing to hinder one who possesses both from acting contrary to knowledge, using indeed the universal, but not the particular; for particulars are the subjects of moral action. There are also two different applications of the universal—one to the person and one to the

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a Heraclitus, although he said that all his conclusions rested on opinion, not on knowledge, still defended them as pertinaciously, and believed their truth as firmly as other philosophers, who asserted that theirs were founded on knowledge.—Giphanius.
thing: as, for instance, a person knows that dry food is good for every man, and that this is a man or that such and such a thing is dry; but as to whether this is such and such a thing, either he does not possess the knowledge or does not use it. In these two cases the difference will be inconceivably great, so much so, that in one case knowledge involves no absurdity, but in the other a very great one.

8. Again, it is possible to possess knowledge in a different manner from those above mentioned; for we see the habit differing in the possessing but not using knowledge, so that in a manner he has it and has it not; such as the person who is asleep, or mad, or drunk. Now, those who are under the influence of passion are affected in the same way; for anger, and sensual desires, and so forth, evidently alter the bodily state, and in some they even cause madness. It is evident, therefore, that we must say, that the incontinent are in a similar condition to these. But the fact of their uttering sentiments which must have proceeded from knowledge is no proof to the contrary, for those who are under the influence of these passions recite demonstrations and verses of Empedocles; and those who have learnt

The great difficulty which commentators have found in explaining this confessedly obscure passage appears to me to arise from this; they have not observed that the expressions τὸ καθάλου ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, and τὸ καθάλου ἢ ὁ τοῦ πράγματος, do not describe two different kinds of universals, but the universal as related to two different kinds of particulars; e.g., to the major premiss, “All dry meats are good for man,” may be attached two different kinds of minors; either, “This is a man,” or “Such and such a thing is dry.” The relation of the major to the minor in the first case is τὸ καθάλου ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, and it would appear absurd to conceive that any one could go wrong. In the second case the relation is τὸ καθάλου ἢ ὁ τοῦ πράγματος, and here there is no absurdity. We cannot help knowing that this is a man,—we may not know that such and such a thing is dry.

As rational beings, we all act on a syllogistic process. It is generally found that even in the case of lunatics the reasoning is correct, though the premisses are false,—the premisses being influenced by the delusions under which they labour.

How often do we find that the giving utterance to good
for the first time string sentences together, but do not yet understand them, for they must grow with their growth, and this requires time; so that we must suppose the incontinent utter these sentiments in the same manner in which actors do.

Again, one might consider the cause physically. There is one opinion upon universals, and another upon those particulars which are immediately under the dominion of sensation; and when one opinion is formed out of the two, the soul must necessarily assert the conclusion, and if it is a practical matter must immediately act upon it: for instance, if it is right to taste everything sweet, and this is sweet, as being an individual belonging to this class, then he who has the power and is not prevented, when he puts these two together, must necessarily act. When, therefore, one universal opinion exists in us, which forbids us to taste; and another that everything sweet is pleasant, and this particular thing is sweet; and the last universal energizes, and desire happens to be present; the first universal tells us to avoid this particular thing, but desire leads us to pursue it; for it is able to act as a motive to each of the parts of man's nature. So that it comes to pass that he in a manner acts incontinently from reason and from opinion: not that the latter is opposed to the former naturally, but accidentally; for it is the desire, and not the opinion, which is opposed to right reason. So that for this reason brutes are not in-

moral sentiments is quite consistent with hypocrisy; and that the use of a particular system of religious phraseology is no sure indication of a truly Christian temper and character. In such cases as these the characters of Charles Surface and Mawworm furnish us with a valuable moral lesson.

The subject is here said to be treated physically, because the argument is founded upon the nature of the soul, its parts, functions, &c. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say "physiologically."

The word in the original (παραγωγικός) is here translated "practical matter," because it is used as opposed to άριστος; just as in English we oppose the words practical and theoretical.
continent, because they have no universal conceptions, but only an instinct of particulars and memory.

13. But as to how the ignorance is put an end to, and the incontinent man again becomes possessed of knowledge, the account to be given is the same as that of a man drunk or asleep, and is not peculiar to this passion; and this account we must hear from physiologists. But since the last [i.e., the particular] proposition is an opinion formed by the perceptive faculties, and influences the actions, he, who is under the influence of passion, either does not possess this, or possesses it not as though he had knowledge, but merely as though he repeated, like a drunken man, the verses of Empedocles. And this is the case, because the last proposition is not universal, and does not appear to be of a scientific character in the same way that the universal does.

14. And that which Socrates sought seems to result: for the passion does not arise when that, which appears properly to be knowledge, is present; nor is this dragged about by the passion; but it is, when that opinion is present which is the result of sensation. On the question, therefore, of acting incontinently with knowledge, or without, and how is it possible to do so with knowledge, let what has been said be considered sufficient.

CHAP. IV.

With what sort of subjects he who is absolutely incontinent has to do.

1. We must next consider, whether any one is absolutely incontinent, or whether all are so in particular cases; and if the former is the case, with reference to what sort of things he is so. Now that the continent and patient, the incontinent and effeminate, are so with respect to pleasures and pains,
is evident. But since some of those things which produce pleasure are necessary, and others, though chosen for their own sakes, yet admit of excess, those which are corporeal are necessary: I mean those which relate to the gratification of the appetite, and such corporeal pleasures as we have stated to be the object of intemperance and temperance; others are not necessary, but chosen for their own sakes; I mean, for instance, victory, honour, wealth, and such like good and pleasant things. Now those, who are in excess in these, contrary to the right reason which is in them, we do not call simply Incontinent, but we add, incontinent of money, of gain, of honour, or anger, but not simply incontinent; as if they were different, and called so only from analogy; just as to the generic term man we add the difference, "who was victor at the Olympic games;" for in this case the common description differs a little from that which peculiarly belongs to him. And this is a sign: incontinence is blamed, not only as an error, but also as a sort of vice, either absolutely, or in some particular case: but of the other characters no one is so blamed. But of those who indulge in carnal pleasures, with respect to which we call a man temperate and intemperate, he, who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, and avoids the excesses of things painful, as hunger and thirst, heat and cold, and all things which have to do with touch and taste, not from deliberately preferring, but contrary to his deliberate preference and judgment, is called incontinent simply, without the addition, that he is so in this particular thing; anger, for example.

A sign of it is this: men are called effeminate in these, but in none of the others: and for this reason we class together the incontinent and intemperate.

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As we distinguish an Olympic victor from other men by the addition of this differential property to the common term man; so we distinguish simple from particular incontinence by adding to the word "incontinent" the difference "of anger," &c.
perate, and also the continent and temperate, but not any of the others, because the former are in a manner conversant with the same pleasures and pains. They are indeed concerned with the same, but not in the same manner; for the temperate and intemperate deliberately prefer them, the others do not.

6. Therefore we should call him who pursues excesses and avoids moderate pains, not from desire, or, if at all, a slight desire, more intemperate than he who does so from strong desire; for what would the former have done, if he had been influenced in addition by youthful desire, and excessive pain at the want of things necessary? But since some desires and pleasures belong to the class of those which are honourable and good (for of things pleasant, some are eligible by nature, some the contrary, and others indifferent, as, for instance, according to our former division, the pleasures connected with money, and gain, and victory, and honour), in all such pleasures, and in those which are indifferent, we are not blamed for feeling, or desiring, or loving them, but for doing this somehow in excess. Therefore all who are overcome by, or pursue, what is by nature honourable and good, contrary to reason, are blamed; as for example, those who are very anxious, and more so than they ought to be, for honour, or for their children and parents (for these are goods, and those, who are anxious about them, are praised); but, nevertheless, there may be excess even in the case of these, if any one, like Niobe, were to fight against the gods, or were to act like Satyrus surnamed Philopater, with respect to his duty to his father; for he was thought to be excessively foolish.

7. There is therefore no depravity in those cases for the reason given, that each belongs to the class of things which are by nature chosen for their own

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8. Excess even in pleasures naturally good is blamed.  

9. It is not actually μοχθηρία.

* The yielding to slight temptations shows greater depravity than the giving way to strong ones. A similar maxim is laid down in the Rhet. I. xiv., with respect to acts of injustice.
sakes; but still the excesses are bad and to be avoided. So also there is no incontinence; for incontinence is not only to be avoided, but it belongs also to the class of things blameable. But from the similarity of the affection, we use the term incontinence, with the addition of the idea of relation: just as we call a man a bad physician and a bad actor, whom we would not absolutely call bad. As, therefore, in these instances we would not call them so absolutely, because each is not really a vice, but we call them so from analogy; so in the other case it is clear that we must suppose that only to be incontinence and continence, which has the same object-matter with temperance and intemperance. In the case of anger, we use the term analogically; and therefore we call a man incontinent, adding "of anger," just as we add "of honour," or "of gain."

CHAP. V.

Of Brutality, and the forms of it.

But since some things are pleasant by nature (and 1. of these, some are absolutely so, others relatively to different kinds of animals and men), others are pleasant not from nature, but some owing to bodily injuries, others from custom, and others from natural depravity, in each of these we may observe corresponding habits. I mean by brutal habits, 2. for instance, the case of that woman, who, they say, Examples of Ἐρωτήμ. of Ἡδία.  

*See Hor. de Arte Poet. v. 340.

"Nea pranse Lamiae vivum puerum extrahat alio"
rippled up women with child, and devoured the children; or the practices, in which it is said that some savages about Pontus delight, such as raw meat, or human flesh, or in giving their children to each other for a feast; or what is said of Phalaris.

3. These are brutal habits. Others originate in some people from disease and madness; such was the case of him who sacrificed and ate his mother, and of him who ate his fellow-slave's liver. Others arise from disease and custom; as the plucking of hair and biting of nails, and further the eating coals and earth; to which may be added unnatural passion; for these things originate sometimes from nature, sometimes from custom; as in the case of those who have been corrupted from childhood.

4. Those in whom nature is the cause, no one would call incontinent; as no one would find fault with women for the peculiarities of their sex; and the case is the same with those who are through habit diseased. Now to have any of these habits is out of the limits of vice, as also is brutality. But when one has them, to conquer them or to be conquered by them is not absolutely [continence or] incontinence, but only that which is called so from resemblance; in the same manner as we must say of him who is affected in this way with respect to anger, that he is incontinent of anger, not simply incontinent: for as to every instance of excessive folly, and cowardice, and intemperance, and rage, some of them are brutal, and some proceed from disease; for he, whose natural constitution is such, as to fear everything, even if a mouse squeaks, is cowardly with a brutish cowardice; as he who was afraid of a cat was cowardly from disease. And of fools, those who are irrational by nature, and live only by sensual instincts, are brutish, like some tribes of distant barbarians; but others are so from disease; for instance, epilepsy, or insanity.

5. But it is possible only to have some of these

*Some that are mad, if they behold a cat.*

Shak. Merch. of Ven.
occasionally, and not to be overcome by them; I
mean, for instance, if Phalaris had restrained him-
self, when he felt a desire to eat a child, or for
unnatural pleasures. It is possible also not only to
have, but to be overcome by them. As, therefore,
in the case of depravity, that which is human, is
simply called depravity: and the other kind is called
so with the addition that it is brutish or caused
by disease, but not simply so: in the same manner
it is clear that incontinence is sometimes brutish,
and sometimes caused by disease; but that is only
called so simply, which is allied to human intem-
perance. Therefore that incontinence and conti-
nence are only concerned with the same things as
intemperance and temperance, and that in other
things there is another species of incontinence, called
so metaphorically and not absolutely, is plain.

CHAP. VI.

That Incontinence of Anger is less disgraceful than Incon-
tinence of Desire.

Let us now consider the fact, that incontinence of 1.
anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire.
For anger seems to listen somewhat to reason,
but to listen imperfectly; as hasty servants, who
before they have heard the whole message, run
away, and then misunderstand the order; and dogs,
before they have considered whether it is a friend,
if they only hear a noise, bark: thus anger, from a
natural warmth and quickness, having listened, but
not understood the order, rushes to vengeance. For 2.
reason or imagination has declared, that the slight
is an insult; and anger, as if it had drawn the in-
ference that it ought to quarrel with such a person,
is therefore immediately exasperated. But desire,
if reason or sense should only say that the thing is

* Compare with this chapter, Arist. Rhet. II. ii.; and Bishop
Butler's Sermon upon Resentment.
3. pleasant, rushes to the enjoyment of it. So that anger in some sense follows reason, but desire does not; it is therefore more disgraceful; for he that is incontinent of anger, is, so to speak, overcome by reason; but the other is overcome by desire, and not by reason.

4. Again, it is more pardonable to follow natural appetites, for it is more pardonable to follow such desires as are common to all, and so far forth as they are common. But anger and asperity are more natural than excessive and unnecessary desires. It is like the case of the man who defended himself for beating his father, because, said he, my father beat his father, and he again beat his; and he, also (pointing to his child) will beat me, when he becomes a man; for it runs in our family. And he that was dragged by his son, bid him stop at the door, for that he himself had dragged his father so far. Again, those who are more insidious, are more unjust. Now the passionate man is not insidious, nor is anger, but is open; whereas desire is so, as they say of Venus,

   "Cyprian goddess, weaver of deceit."

And Homer says of the Cestus,

   "Allurement cheats the senses of the wise."

So that if this incontinence is more unjust, it is also more disgraceful than incontinence in anger, and is absolute incontinence, and in some sense vice.

5. Again, no one commits a rape under a feeling of pain; but every one, who acts from anger, acts under a feeling of pain; whereas he that commits a rape, does it with pleasure. If, then, those things are more unjust with which it is most just to be angry, then incontinence in desire is more unjust; for there is no wanton insolence in anger. Consequently, it is plain, that incontinence of desire is more disgraceful than that of anger, and that continence and incontinence are conversant with bodily desires and pleasures. But we must understand

* Hom. II. xiv. 214; Pope's transl. line 243—252.
the different forms of these; for, as has been said at the beginning, some are human and natural, both in kind and in degree; others are brutal; and others arise from bodily injuries and disease; but temperance and intemperance are only conversant with the first of these. For this reason we never call beasts temperate or intemperate, except metaphorically, or if any kind of animals differ in some respect entirely from another kind in wantonness and mischief, and voracity; for they have no deliberate choice, nor reason; but are out of their nature, like human beings who are out of their mind.

But brutality is a less evil than vice, though more formidable; for the best principle has not been destroyed, as in the human being, but it has never existed. It is just the same, therefore, as to compare the inanimate with the animate, in order to see which is worse; for the viciousness of that which is without principle is always the less mischievous; but intellect is the principle. It is therefore almost the same as to compare injustice with an unjust man; for it is possible that either may be the worse; for a vicious man can do ten thousand times as much harm as a beast.

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CHAP. VII.

On the difference between Continence and Patience, and between Incontinence and Effeminacy.

With respect to the pleasures and pains, the 1. desires and aversions which arise from touch and taste (with which intemperance and temperance have already been defined as being conversant), it is possible to be affected in such a manner, as to give way to those which the generality overcome; and it is possible to overcome those to which the generality give way. Whoever, then, is so affected as regards pleasure, is either incontinent or conti-
ment; and as regards pain, either effeminate or patient. But the habits of the generality are between the two, although they incline rather to the worse. Now since some pleasures are necessary, while others are not so, or only up to a certain point, whilst their excesses and defects are not necessary; the same holds good with desires and pains; he who pursues those pleasures which are in excess, or pursues them to excess, or from deliberate preference, and for their own sakes, and not for the sake of any further result, is intemperate; for this man must necessarily be disinclined to repentance, so that he is incurable; for the impenitent is incurable. He that is in the defect, is the opposite; he that is in the mean, is temperate. The case is similar with him who shuns bodily pains, not from being overcome, but from deliberate preference.

3. Of those who act without deliberate preference, one is led by pleasure; another by the motive of avoiding the pain which arises from desire; so that they differ from each other. But every one would think a man worse, if he did anything disgraceful when he felt no desire, or only a slight one, than if he felt very strong desires; and if he struck another without being angry, than if he had been angry; for what would he have done, had he been under the influence of passion? Therefore, the intemperate is worse than the incontinent. Of those then that have been mentioned, one is rather a species of effeminacy, the other is incontinent. The continent is opposed to the incontinent, and the patient to the effeminate; for patience consists in resisting, continence in having the mastery; but to resist and to have the mastery differ in the same way as not being defeated differs from gaining a victory. Therefore, also, continence is more eligible than patience.

4. Continence better than patience. Effeminacy.

5. He who fails in resisting those things against which the generality strive and prevail, is effeminate and self-indulgent (for self-indulgence is a spe-
cies of effeminacy); he who drags his robe after him, that he may not be annoyed with the pain of carrying it; and who, imitating an invalid, does not think himself a wretched creature, although he resembles one who is. The case is the same with 6. continence and incontinence; for it is not to be wondered at, if a man is overcome by violent and excessive pleasures or pains; but it is pardonable, if he struggles against them (like the Philoctetes of Theodectes, when he had been bitten by the viper, or the Cercyon of Carcinus in the Alope; and like those, who, though they endeavour to stifle their laughter, burst out, as happened to Xenophonatus); but it is astonishing, if any one is overcome by and cannot resist those which the generality are able to resist, and this not because of their natural constitution, or disease, as for example, effeminacy is hereditary in the Scythian kings; and as the female sex differs from the male.

He, too, who is excessively fond of sport, is 7. thought intemperate; but in reality he is effeminate; for sport is a relaxation, if it is a cessation from toil; and he who is too greatly given to sport, is of the number of those who are in the excess in this respect. Of incontinence, one species 8. is precipitancy, another is weakness; for the weak, Division of inconti-

To allow the robe to drag along the ground was amongst the Greeks a sign of indolence and effeminacy. Amongst the Asiatics, trains were worn; hence Homer says, Il. vi. 442 (Pope's transl. 563):—

"And Troy's proud dames, whose garments sweep the ground."

On the contrary, the expression well-girded (ἀναγνίφθη στιξωτοκ) was synonymous with an active man. "To gird the loins" is a phrase familiar to every one.

Theodectes was an orator and tragic poet, a pupil of Isocrates, and a friend of Aristotle. To him Aristotle addressed his Rhetoric. There were two Carcini, one an Athenian, the other an Agrigentine. It is uncertain to which this tragedy should be attributed. Carcinus is mentioned with praise, both in the Rhetoric and Poetic. Of Xenophonatus nothing certain is known. The mention here made of the Scythian kings refers to a passage in Herodotus (Book I. c. cv.), where he speaks of the punishment inflicted on that nation for spoiling the temple of Venus in Ascalon.
when they have deliberated, do not abide by their determinations, owing to passion; but the precipitate, from not having deliberated at all, are led by passion. For some (just as people, who have tickled themselves beforehand, do not feel the tickling of others), being aware of it previously, and having foreseen it, and roused themselves and their reason beforehand, are not overcome by the passion, whether it be pleasant or painful. And it is the quick and choleric who are most inclined to the precipitate incontinence; for the former from haste, and the latter from intensity of feeling, do not wait for reason, because they are apt to be led by their fancy.

CHAP. VIII

The difference between Incontinence and Intemperance.

1. The intemperate, as has been said, is not inclined to repent; for he abides by his deliberate preference; but the incontinent, in every case, is inclined to repent. Therefore the fact is not as we stated in the question which we raised above: but the former is incurable, and the latter curable; for depravity resembles dropey and consumption amongst diseases, and incontinence resembles epilepsy; for the former is a permanent, the latter not a permanent vice. The genus of incontinence is altogether different from that of vice; for vice is unperceived by the vicious; but incontinence is not.

* Intemperance is perfect vice, incontinence, imperfect. In the intemperate, therefore, the moral principle is destroyed, the voice of conscience silenced, the light which is within him is become darkness. He does not even feel that he is wrong; he is like a man suffering from a chronic disease, which is so much the more dangerous and incurable because it is painless. Pain has ceased, mortification, so to speak, has begun. The incontinent man, on the other hand, feels the pangs of remorse, hears the disapproving voice of conscience, experiences unceasing, the “sorrow which worketh repentance;” his disease is acute, and may be cured.
Of the characters themselves, the precipitate are better than those who have reason, but do not abide by it; for these last are overcome by a weaker passion, and are not without premeditation, as the others are: for the incontinent resembles those who are intoxicated quickly, and with a little wine, and with less than the majority. Consequently that incontinence is not vice, is evident: but perhaps it is so to a certain extent: for the one is contrary, the other according to deliberate preference. Not but that they are similar in their acts: as Demodocus said of the Milesians; "the Milesians are not fools, but they act like fools;" and so the incontinent are not unjust, but they act unjustly. But since the one is such, as to follow those bodily pleasures, which are in excess, and contrary to right reason, not from being persuaded to do so; but the other is persuaded to it, because his character is such, as inclines him to pursue them; therefore, the former is easily persuaded to change, but the latter is not. For as to virtue and depravity, one destroys, and the other preserves the principle: but in moral action the motive is the principle, just as the hypotheses are in mathematics. Neither in mathematics does reason teach the principles, nor in morals, but virtue, either natural or acquired by habit, teaches to think rightly respecting the principle. Such a character, therefore, is temperate, and the contrary character is intemperate.

But there is a character, who from passion is precipitate contrary to right reason, which passion so far masters, as to prevent him from acting according to right reason; but it does not master him so far, as to make him one who would be persuaded that he ought to follow such pleasures without restraint. This is the incontinent man; better than the intemperate, and not vicious absolutely; for the best thing, i.e. the principle, is preserved. But there is another character opposite to this; he that abides by his opinions, and is not precipitate, at least. not
through passion. It is evident, then, from the above considerations, that one habit is good, the other bad.

CHAP. IX.

The Difference between the Continent and those who abide by their Opinion.

1. Is he, then, continent, who abides by any reason and any deliberate preference whatever, or he who abides by the right one? and is he incontinent who does not abide by any deliberate preference, and any reason whatever, or he who abides by false reason and wrong deliberate preference? on which points we raised a question before; or is he that abides or does not abide by any whatever accidentally so, but absolutely he who abides or does not abide by true reason and right deliberate preference? For if any one chooses or pursues one thing for the sake of another, he pursues and chooses the latter for its own sake, but the former accidentally. By the expression “for its own sake” we mean “absolutely.” So that it is possible that the one adheres to, and the other departs from, any opinion whatever; but absolutely the true one.

2. But there are some who are apt to abide by their opinion who are commonly called obstinate; as, for example, those who are difficult to be persuaded, and who are not easily persuaded to change: these bear some resemblance to the continent, in the same way that the prodigal resembles the liberal, and the rash the brave; but they are different in many respects. For the one (that is, the continent) is not led by passion and desire to change; for the continent man will be easily persuaded under certain circumstances; but the other not even by reason; since many feel desires, and are led by pleasures. The obstinate include the self-willed, and the uneducated, and the clownish; the self-willed are ob-
stinate from pleasure and pain; for they delight in gaining a victory, if they are not persuaded to change their opinion; and they feel pain if their decisions, like public enactments, are not ratified. So that they resemble the incontinent more than the continent.

There are some who do not abide by their opinions, but not from incontinence; for instance, Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes of Sophocles; it was on account of pleasure that he did not abide by it; still it was an honourable pleasure; for to speak truth was honourable to him, and he had been persuaded by Ulysses to speak falsely: for not every one that does anything from pleasure is intemperate, or vicious, or incontinent, but he who does it for the sake of disgraceful pleasure.

Since there is such a character as takes less delight than he ought in bodily pleasures, and does not abide by reason, he who is in the mean between that and the incontinent is the continent: for the incontinent, in consequence of some excess, does not abide by reason; and the other, in consequence of some defect; but the continent abides by it, and does not change from either cause. Now if continence is good, both the opposite habits must be bad, as they appear to be: but because the one is seen in few cases and rarely, in the same manner as temperance is thought to be the only opposite to intemperance, so is continence to incontinence. But since many expressions are used from resemblance, this is the reason for the expression “the continence of the temperate man”: for the continent man is one who would do nothing contrary to reason for the sake of bodily pleasures, and so is the temperate; but the former possesses, the latter does not possess, bad desires: and the latter is not one to be pleased contrary to reason, but the former is one to feel pleasure, though not to be led by it. The case is the same with the incontinent and intemperate; they are different, but both pursue bodily pleasures: the one thinking that he ought, the other not thinking so.
CHAP. X.

That it is not possible for the same Man to be at once Prudent and Incontinent.

1. It is impossible for the same man to be at once prudent and incontinent: for it has been shown that a prudent man is at the same time good in moral character. Again, a man is not prudent from merely knowing, but from being also disposed to act; but the incontinent is not disposed to act.

There is nothing to hinder the clever man from being incontinent: and therefore some men now and then are thought to be prudent, and yet incontinent, because cleverness differs from prudence in the manner which has been mentioned in the earlier part of this treatise (Book VI. c. xii.), and resembles it with respect to the definition, but differs with respect to deliberate preference.

2. The incontinent therefore is not like one who has knowledge and uses it, but like one asleep or drunk; and he acts willingly; for he in a manner knows both what he does and his motive for doing it; but he is not wicked; for his deliberate preference is good; so that he is half-wicked, and not unjust, for he is not insidious. For one of them is not disposed to abide by his deliberations; and the choleric is not disposed to deliberate at all. Therefore, the incontinent man resembles a state which passes all the enactments which it ought, and has good laws, but uses none of them, according to the jest of Anaxandrides,

"The state willed it, which careth nought for laws;"

but the wicked man resembles a city which uses laws, but uses bad ones. Incontinence and conti-

* Anaxandrides was a comic poet, of Rhodes, who was starved to death by the Athenians, for writing a poem against them.—See Athenæus, IX. c. xvi.
nence are conversant with the excess over the habit of the generality; for the one is more firm and the other less, than the generality are able to be. But the incontinence of the choleric is more curable than that of those who have deliberated, but do not abide by their deliberations; and that of those who are incontinent from custom, than those who are so by nature; for it is easier to change custom than nature. For the reason why it is difficult to change custom is, because it resembles nature, as Evenus says:  

"Practice, my friend, lasts long, and therefore is  
A second nature, in the end, to man."  

What, then, continence is, and what incontinence, 5. and patience, and effeminacy, and what relation these habits bear to one another, has been sufficiently explained.  

1 Evenus was an elegiac poet of Paros.  
2 The four concluding chapters of this book, as printed in the Greek, are considered spurious, it being most improbable that Aristotle would have treated of the subject of pleasure here in an imperfect manner, and again fully in the tenth book. The opinion of Casaubon is that these chapters were improperly transferred to this place from the Eudemian Ethics. They are therefore omitted.
BOOK VIII.

CHAP. I.

Of Friendship.

1. It would follow next after this to treat of friendship; for it is a kind of virtue, or joined with virtue. Besides, it is most necessary for life: for without friends no one would choose to live, even if he had all other goods. For to the rich, and to

Friendship, although, strictly speaking, it is not a virtue, is, nevertheless, closely connected with virtue. The amiable feelings and affections of our nature, which are the foundation of friendship, if cultivated and rightly directed, lead to the discharge of our moral and social duties. It is also almost indispensable to the highest notions which we can form of human happiness. On these accounts the subject is appropriately introduced in a treatise on Ethics. But friendship acquires additional importance from the place which it occupied in the Greek political system. As, owing to the public duties (λειτουργίαι) which devolved upon the richer citizens, magnificence (μεγαλοπρία) was nearly allied to patriotism; as, again, to make provision for the moral education of the people was considered one of the highest duties of a statesman, so friendships, under which term were included all the principles of association and bonds of union between individuals, involved great public interests. "The Greeks," says Mr. Brewer, "had been accustomed to look upon the friendships of individuals, and the ἵστασις which existed in different forms among them, as the organs, not only of great political changes and revolutions in the state, but as influencing the minds and morals of the people to an almost inconceivable extent. The same influence which the press exerts amongst us, did these political and individual unions exert amongst them." Many occasions will of course occur of comparing with this book the Laelius of Cicero.

Nam quis est, pro deo atque hominum fidem! qui velit, ut neque diligat quenquam, nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis, atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere?—Cic. Lael. xv. 52.
those who possess office and authority, there seems to friendship be an especial need of friends; for what use is there to virtue in such good fortune, if the power of conferring benefits is taken away, which is exerted principally and in the most praiseworthy manner towards friends! or how could it be kept safe and preserved without friends? for the greater it is, the more insecure is it. And in poverty and in all other misfortunes men think that friends are the only refuge. It is also necessary to the young, in order to keep them from error, and to the old, as a comfort to them, and to supply that which is deficient in their actions on account of weakness; and to those in the vigour of life to further their noble deeds, as the poet says,

"When two come together," &c.

Hom. II. x. 224.

For they are more able to conceive and to execute. It seems also naturally to exist in the producer towards the produced; and not only in men, but also in birds, and in most animals, and in those of the same race, towards one another, and most of all in human beings: whence we praise the philanthropic. One may see, also, in travelling, how intimate and friendly every man is with his fellowman.

Friendship also seems to hold states together, and

Adversas res ferre difficile esset, sine eo, qui filias gravius etiam, quam tu ferret. Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.

—Læl. vi. 22.

4 The whole passage is thus translated by Pope:——

"By mutual confidence, and mutual aid,
Great deeds are done, and great discoveries made;
The wise new prudence from the wise acquire,
And one brave hero fans another's fire."

Pope, Hom. II. x. 265.


Quod si hoc apparat in bestiis, primum ut se ipsæ diligant, deinde ut requirant atque appetant, ad quas se applicent ejusdem generis animantes. — Læl. xxi. 81. See also Theocrit. ir. 31.
6. Legislators appear to pay more attention to it than to justice; for unanimity of opinion seems to be something resembling friendship; and they are most desirous of this, and banish faction as being the greatest enemy. And when men are friends, there is no need of justice: but when they are just, they still need friendship. And of all just things that which is the most so is thought to belong to friendship. It is καλόν.

7. But there are not a few questions raised concerning it; for some lay it down as being a kind of resemblance, and that those who resemble one another are friends; whence they say, “Like to like,” “Jackdaw to jackdaw,” and so on: others, on the contrary, say that all such are like potters to one another. And on these points they carry their investigation higher and more physiologically. Euripides says,

“The earth parch’d up with drought doth love the rain:
The lowering heavens when filled with moisture love
To fall to earth.”

Heraclitus also thought that opposition is advantageous, and that the most beautiful harmony arises from things different, and that everything is pro-

This is true upon the same principle which is the foundation of the Christian maxim, “Love is the fulfilling of the law.”

See Hom. Od. xvii. 218:

“The good old proverb does this pair fulfil,
One rogue is usher to another still.
Heaven with a secret principle endued
Mankind, to seek their own similitude.”—Pope.

The proverb οἱραμος οἱραμἰν κοτίς, is from Hesiod, Works and Days, 25. It is equivalent to our own proverb—“Two of a trade can never agree.”—See also Arist. Rhet. Book II. c. iv.

The whole passage may be found in Athenæus’s Deipnios. XIII.

Heraclitus of Ephesus held that all things were produced “ex motu contrario rerum contrariarum.”
duced by strife. Others, and especially Empedocles, held contrary opinions, for they held—that like is fond of like.

Now, let the physiological questions be passed over, for they do not belong to our present consideration. But as for all the questions which have to do with man, and refer to his moral character and his passions, these let us consider; as, for instance, whether friendship exists between all, or whether it is impossible for the wicked to be friends: and, whether there is only one species of friendship, or more; for those who think there is only one, because it admits of degrees, trust to an insufficient proof: for things differing in species admit of degrees; but we have spoken of this before. Whether friendship can exist among the wicked. Whether it of more kinds than one.

CHAP. II.

What the Object of Love is.

Perhaps we might arrive at clear ideas about these matters if it were known what the object of love is: for it is thought to be not everything which is loved, but only that which is an object of love; and this is the good, the pleasant, or the useful. That would be thought to be useful, by means of which some good or some pleasure is produced: so that the good and pleasant would be objects of love, considered as ends. Do men, then, love the good, or that which is good to themselves? for these sometimes are at variance. The case is the same with the pleasant. Each is thought to love that which is good to him-

1 Compare what Cicero says of Empedocles, in the Laelius, c. vii.:—“Agrigentinimum quidem doctum quaedam carminibus Gracis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent, quasque moverentur, ea contrabere amicitiam, dissipare concordiam.”

2 The scholiast says that the passage in which this subject was before spoken of must have been lost, but it probably refers to Eth. Book II. c. viii.
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self; and absolutely the good is an object of love, but relatively to each individual, that which is so to each.

2. Now, each loves not that which is in reality good to himself, but that which appears so; but this will make no difference; for the object of love will be that which appears to be good. But since there are three motives on account of which men love, the term friendship cannot be used to express a fondness for things inanimate: for there is no return of fondness, nor any wishing of good to them. For it is perhaps ridiculous to wish good to wine; but if a man does so, he wishes for its preservation, in order that he himself may have it. But we say that men should wish good to a friend for his sake; and those who wish good to him thus, we call well-disposed, unless there is also the same feeling entertained by the other party; for good-will mutually felt is friendship; or must we add the condition, that this mutual good-will must not be unknown to both parties? For many feel good-will towards those whom they have never seen, but who they suppose are good or useful to them; and this same feeling may be reciprocated. These, then, do indeed appear well-disposed towards one another; but how can one call them friends, when neither knows how the other is disposed to him? They ought, therefore, to have good-will towards each other, and wish each other what is good, not without each other’s knowledge, and for one of the motives mentioned.

Definition.

CHAP. III.

On the different kinds of Friendship.

1. But these motives differ in species from one another; therefore the affections do so likewise, and the

*Compare Rhet. II. iv.
friendships; consequently there are three species of friendship, equal in number to the objects of love, since in each there is a return of affection, and both parties are aware of it. But those who love one another wish what is good to one another, according to the motive on account of which they love. Now, those who love one another for the sake of the useful, do not love each other disinterestedly, but only so far forth as there results some good to themselves from one another. The case is the same with those who love for the sake of pleasure, for they do not love the witty from their being of such a character, but because they are pleasant to them; and, therefore, those who love for the sake of the useful love for the sake of what is good to themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure love for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not so far forth as the person loved exists, but so far forth as he is useful or pleasant.

These friendships, therefore, are accidental; for the person loved is not loved for being who he is, but for providing something either good or pleasant; consequently such friendships are easily dissolved, if the parties do not continue in similar circumstances; for if they are no longer pleasant or useful, they cease to love. Now the useful is not permanent, but becomes different at different times; therefore, when that is done away for the sake of which they became friends, the friendship also is dissolved; which clearly shows that the friendship was for those motives. Such friendship is thought mostly to be formed between old men; for men at such an age do not pursue the pleasant, but the useful; and it is found amongst those in the prime of life and in youth who pursue the useful.

But such persons do not generally even associate with one another, for sometimes they are not pleasant; consequently they do not need such intimacy,

* See on characters of the young and the old Arist. Rhet. Lib. II. cc. xii. xiii.; also Hor. de Art. Poet., and Ter. Adelph. V. iii.
unless they are useful to each other; for they are pleasant so far as they entertain hopes of good. Amongst friendships of this kind is ranked that of hospitality. The friendship of the young is thought to be for the sake of pleasure; for they live according to passion, and mostly pursue what is pleasant to themselves and present; but as they grow older, their idea of what is pleasant also becomes different; therefore they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so; for their friendship changes together with what is pleasant; and of such pleasure as this the change is rapid. Young men also are given to sexual love; for the principal part of sexual love is from passion and for the sake of pleasure; therefore they love and quickly cease to love, changing often in the same day; but they wish to pass their time together and to associate, for thus they attain what they sought in their friendship.

The friendship of the good and of those who are alike in virtue is perfect; for these wish good to one another in the same way, so far forth as they are good; but they are good of themselves; and those who wish good to their friends for the friends' sake are friends in the highest degree, for they have this feeling for the sake of the friends themselves, and not accidentally; their friendship, therefore, continues as long as they are good; and virtue is a permanent thing. And each is good absolutely and also relatively to his friend, for the good are both absolutely good and also relatively to one another; for to each their own actions and those which are like their own are pleasant, but the actions of the good are either the same or similar.

Such friendship as this is, as we might expect, permanent, for it contains in it all the requisites for friends; for every friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure, either absolutely or to the person loving, and results from a certain resemblance. In this

Virtus, virtus inqua, et conciliat amicitias et conservat; in ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia.—Cic. Lei. xxvii.
friendship, all that has been mentioned exists in the parties themselves, for in this there is a similarity, and all the other requisites, and that which is absolutely good is also absolutely pleasant; but these are the principal objects of love, and therefore the feeling friendship, and friendship itself, exists, and is best, in these more than in any others.

It is to be expected that such would be rare, for there are few such characters as these. Moreover, it requires time and long acquaintance, for, according to the proverb, it is impossible for men to know one another before they have eaten a stated quantity of salt together, nor can they admit each other to intimacy nor become friends before each appears to the other worthy of his friendship, and his confidence. Those who hastily perform offices of friendship to one another are willing to be friends, but are not really so unless they are also worthy of friendship, and are aware of this; for a wish for friendship is formed quickly, but not friendship. This species of friendship, therefore, both with respect to time and everything else, is perfect, and in all respects the same and like good offices are interchanged; and this is precisely what ought to be the case between friends.

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CHAP. IV.

That the Good are Friends absolutely, but all others accidentally.

Friendship for the sake of the pleasant bears a resemblance to this, for the good are pleasant to one another; so also that which is for the sake of the useful, for the good are useful to one another. Between these persons friendships are most permanent when there is the same return from both to equality caused permanence.

* Verumque illud est quod dicitur multis modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit.—Cic. Let. xix.
both, for instance, of pleasure. And not only so, but a return from the same cause, for instance, in the case of two persons of easy pleasantry; and not as in the case of the lover and the person beloved, for these do not feel pleasure in the same things, but the one in seeing the beloved object, and the other in receiving attention from the lover; but when the bloom of youth ceases, sometimes the friendship ceases also, for the sight of the beloved object is no longer pleasant to the one, and the other does not receive attention; many, however, continue friends if from long acquaintance they love the character, being themselves of the same character.

3. Those who in love affairs do not interchange the pleasant but the useful are both friends in a less degree, and less permanently; but those who are friends for the sake of the useful dissolve their friendship when that ends; for they were not friends to one another but to the useful.

4. Consequently, for the sake of pleasure and the useful, it is possible for the bad to be friends with one another, and the good with the bad, and one who is neither good nor bad with either; but for the sake of one another, evidently only the good can be friends, for the bad feel no pleasure in the persons themselves, unless so far as there is some advantage. The friendship of the good is alone safe from calumny, for it is not easy to believe any one respecting one who has been proved by ourselves during a long space of time; and between such persons there is confidence and a certainty that one's friend would never have done wrong; and everything else which is expected in real friendship. In the other kinds of friendships there is nothing to hinder such things from occurring; consequently, since men call those friends who are so for the sake of the useful, just as states do (for alliances seem to be formed between states for the sake of advan-

* Nunquam Scipionem, ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim; nihil audivi ex eo ipse, quod nollem.—Cic. 
Lael. xxvii.
tage), and also those who love one another for the sake of pleasure, as children do, perhaps we also ought to say that such men are friends, but that there are many kinds of friendship; first and principally, that of the good so far forth as they are good, and the others from their resemblance; for so far forth as there is something good or similarity of character, so far they are friends; for the pleasant is a kind of good to those who love the pleasant.

These two latter kinds do not combine well, nor do the same people become friends for the sake of the useful and the pleasant; for two things which are accidental do not easily combine. Friendship, therefore, being divided into these kinds, the bad will be friends for the sake of the pleasant and the useful, being similar in that respect; but the good will be friends for the friends’ sake, for they will be so, so far forth as they are good; the latter, therefore, are friends absolutely, the former accidentally, and from their resemblance to the latter.

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CHAP. V.

Certain other distinctive Marks which belong to the Friendship of the Good.

As in the case of the virtues some are called good 1. according to the habit, others according to the energy of it, so is it also in the case of friendships; for some take pleasure in each other, and mutually confer benefits by living together; but others being asleep or locally separated, do not act, but are in a state so as to act in a friendly manner; for difference of place does not absolutely dissolve friendship, but only the exercise of it. But if the absence is long, it 2.

1 Fritsch compares ξυς (habit) with the German das Verhalten, and ἴνα (energy) with die Verwirklichung, Wirklichkeit.
seems to produce a cessation of friendship; and hence it has been said,

"Want of intercourse has dissolved many friendships."

But the aged and the morose do not appear suited for friendship, for the feeling of pleasure is weak in them, and no one can pass his time with that which is painful or not pleasant, for nature is especially shown in avoiding what is painful and desiring what is pleasant. But those who approve of one another, without living together, seem rather well inclined than friends, for nothing is so characteristic of friendship as the living together; for the needy desire assistance, and the happy wish to pass their time together, since it least of all becomes them to be solitary. But it is impossible for men to associate together if they are not pleasant, and if they do not take pleasure in the same things; which seems to be the case with the friendship of companions.¹

3. Without intercourse it becomes εύνοια.

4. The friendship of the good, then, is friendship in the highest degree, as has been said frequently; for that which is absolutely good or pleasant is thought to be an object of love and eligible, and to each individual that which is so to him; but the good man is an object of love and eligible to the good, for both these reasons. Fondness² is like a passion, and friendship like a habit; for fondness is felt no less towards inanimate things, but we return friendship with deliberate choice, and deliberate choice proceeds from habit. We also wish good to those whom we love for their sakes, not from passion but from habit; and when we love a friend, we love that which is good to ourselves; for the good man, when he becomes a friend, becomes a good to him whose friend he is. Each, therefore, loves that which is good to himself, and makes an equal return both in wish and in kind, for equality is said

¹ By ἵππος ἡφία Aristotle means that intimacy which exists between those who have grown up together, and been accustomed to each other's society from boyhood.

² Amor, ex quo amicitia nominatur, est ad benevolentiam jungendam.—Cic. Lec. viii.
proverbially to be friendship. These conditions, therefore, exist mostly in the friendship of the good.

CHAP. VI.

Certain other distinctive marks which belong to Friendship.

In the morose and the aged friendship less frequently 1. arises, inasmuch as they are more ill-tempered, and take less pleasure in society; for good-temper and sociality seem to belong to friendship, and to produce it in the greatest degree. Therefore young men become friends quickly, but old men do not; for they never become friends of those in whom they do not take pleasure; nor in like manner do the morose. But such men as these have good-will 2. towards one another; for they wish what is good, and supply each other's wants; but they are not friends at all, because they do not pass their time together, nor take pleasure in each other; and these conditions are thought especially to belong to friendship.

To be friends with many, is impossible in perfect friendship; just as it is to be in love with many at once; for love appears to be an excess; and such a feeling is naturally entertained towards one object. And that many at once should greatly please the same person is not easy, and perhaps it is not easy to find many persons at once who are good. They must also become acquainted with one another, and be on intimate terms, which is very difficult. For the sake of the useful and the pleasant, it is possible to please many; for many are of that character, and the services required are performed in a short time. Of these, that which is for the sake of 4. the pleasant is most like friendship, when the same

* See Milton's Par. Lost, viii. 333:—

"Among unequals what society
Can sort, what harmony, or true delight?"
good offices are done by both, and they take pleasure in one another, or in the same things; of which description are the friendships of the young; for there is more liberality in them. That which is for the sake of the useful, is the friendship of tradesmen.

5. The happy do not want useful but pleasant friends, for they wish to have some persons to live with; and they bear anything painful for a short time only; nor could any one bear it constantly, not even good itself, if it were painful to him; hence they seek for pleasant friends. Perhaps also they ought to seek such as are good, and good also to themselves: for thus they will have all that friends ought to have.

6. Those who are in authority seem to make use of different kinds of friends; for some are useful to them, and others pleasant; but the same men are not generally both; for they do not seek for friends who are pleasant and good as well, nor such as are useful for honourable purposes: but they wish for men of wit, when they desire the pleasant, and they wish for clever men to execute their commands: and these qualities are not generally united in the same person. But we have said that the good man is at once pleasant and useful; but such a character does not become the friend of a superior, unless the latter is surpassed by the former in virtue; otherwise the person who is inferior in power, does not make a proportionate return; but such men are not usually found.

7. All the friendships, therefore, which have been mentioned consist in equality: for the same things result from both parties, and they wish the same things to each other; or else they exchange one thing for another, such as pleasure for profit. But that these friendships are less strong and less permanent has been mentioned; they seem also from their similarity and dissimilarity to the same thing to be, and yet not to be, friendships; for from their resemblance to that which is formed for virtue's sake, they appear friendships; since one contains the pleasant,
and the other the useful, and both of these exist in the former also. But from the former being free from complaints, and lasting, whereas these rapidly change, and differ in many other respects, they appear not to be friendships, from their want of resemblance to true friendship.

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**CHAP. VII.**

*Respecting Friendship between Persons who are Unequal.*

There is another species of friendship, where one of the parties is superior; as that of a father for his son, and generally an older for a younger person, and a husband for his wife, and a governor for the governed. But these differ from one another; for the case is not the same between parents and children, as between governors and the governed; nor is the feeling of a father for his son the same as that of a son for his father, nor of a husband for his wife, as of a wife for her husband; for the perfection and office of each of these is different; therefore the motives of their friendship are different. Consequently their affections and their friendships themselves are different; hence the same offices are not performed by each to the other, nor ought they to be required. But when children pay to their parents what is due to those who begat them, and parents to their children what is due to them, the friendship in such cases is lasting and sincere. But in all friendships, where one party is superior, the affection also ought to be proportionate; as, for example, that the better person should be loved in a greater degree than he loves, so also the more useful person, and in like manner in every other case. For when the affection is proportional, then there is in a manner an equality; which seems to be the property of friendship.

The equal does not seem to be the same in justice.
as in friendship; for equality in proportion to merit holds the first place in justice, and equality as to quantity the second; but in friendship, that which relates to quantity is first, and that which relates to merit is second. This is evident, if there is a great distance between the parties in virtue, or vice or wealth, or anything else: for they are then no longer friends, and they do not even expect it.

4. This is most evident in the case of the gods; for they are most superior in all goods: it is also evident in the case of kings; for they who are very inferior do not presume to be friends with them; nor do the worthless presume to be so with the best or wisest men. In the case of such persons as these, there can be no exact definition how far they may be friends; for though we may take away much from one party, still the friendship continues; but when one is very far removed from the other, as from a god, it continues no longer. Hence also a question arises whether friends wish their friends the greatest goods, for instance, that they should become gods: for then they would no longer be their friends; and therefore they would not be goods to them: for friends are goods. If, therefore, it has been rightly said, that a friend wishes his friend good for that friend's sake, he ought to continue, relatively to that friend, the same as he was before. He will, therefore, wish him to have the greatest goods which he can have being a man: though perhaps not every good; for each wishes goods for himself more than to any one else."

"Great difference of opinion exists amongst commentators as to the way in which this passage ought to be translated; the following paraphrase will explain that translation which appears to me the only one consistent with the argument, and at the same time grammatical. If a friend wished his friend to become a god, he would be wishing him to be so far removed as that he would cease to be a friend. Consequently, as friends are goods, in wishing such change of circumstances as would deprive him of his friendship, he is really wishing to deprive his friend of a good. Now, if a friend wishes good to his friend for that friend's sake, of course he will not wish their relative position to be altered in such a way as to put an end to
CHAP. VIII.

That Friendship seems to consist in loving more than in being loved.

Most men, from the love of honour, are thought to wish to be loved, rather than to love; therefore the generality are fond of flattery; for the flatterer is an inferior friend, or pretends to be so, and to love rather than to be loved: and being loved seems to bear a close resemblance to being honoured, of which most men are desirous. They do not, however, seem to choose honour for its own sake, but accidentally; for the generality delight in being honoured by those in power, because of hope; for they think that they shall obtain from them whatever they want. Thus they delight in honour, as a sign of future favours. But those who are desirous of receiving honour from good men and men who know their worth, are anxious to confirm their own opinion of themselves: thus they delight in the idea that they are good, trusting to the judgment of those who say so. But they delight in being loved for its own sake; therefore to be loved might seem to be better than to be honoured, and friendship might seem eligible for its own sake.

But it really seems to consist in loving, rather than being loved. A proof of this is, that mothers delight in loving; for some give their children to be nursed, and, knowing that they are their children, love them, though they do not seek to be loved in return, if both cannot be; but it seems sufficient to them if they see them doing well: and they love their children, even if the latter, from ignorance, cannot repay to their mother what is due. But since friendship consists more in loving, and those who love their friends are praised, to love seems to be the excel-

their friendship. He would, therefore, only wish his friend such goods as are consistent with his friend remaining a man.
ence of friends. So that the parties between whom this takes place proportionately are lasting friends, and the friendship of such is lasting. In this manner those who are unequal, may also be the greatest friends; for they may be equalized. But equality and similarity constitute friendship, and particularly the similarity of those who are alike with respect to virtue; for as they possess stability in themselves, they also possess the same towards each other, and neither ask nor render base services, but, so to speak, they even prevent it: for it is the characteristic of the good neither to commit faults themselves, nor to suffer their friends to commit them. The wicked have no stability; for they do not continue consistent even with themselves; but they become friends for a short time, taking delight in each other’s wickedness. The useful and the pleasant continue friends longer than these; for they continue as long as they furnish pleasure and profit to one another.

6. The friendship which is for the sake of the useful appears generally to be formed out of opposite elements; for instance, it arises between a poor man and a rich one, an uneducated and a learned man; for whatever a needy person wants, being desirous of that, he gives something else in return. Under this head one might bring the lover and the beloved, the beautiful and the ugly. Hence, also, lovers sometimes appear ridiculous if they expect to be loved as much as they love: when they are equally suitable objects of love, they may perhaps expect it; but when they possess no qualification of the kind, it is ridiculous. But perhaps the opposite never desires its opposite for its own sake, but accidentally; and the desire is for the mean, for that is a good: for example, what is dry desires not to become moist, but to arrive at the mean; so also what is warm, and everything else in the same way. Let us, however, leave these considerations as foreign to our purpose.
CHAP. IX.

Respecting Political or Social Friendship.

Friendship and the just appear, as was said at first, to be conversant with the same things, and between the same persons; for in every community there seems to exist some kind of just and some kind of friendship. Thus soldiers and sailors call their comrades friends, and so likewise those who are associated in any other way. But as far as they have anything in common, so far there is friendship; for so far also there is the just. And the proverb, that the property of friends is common, is correct; for friendship consists in community: and to brothers and companions all things are common;* but to others, certain definite things, to some more, to others less; for some friendships are stronger, and others weaker.

There is also a difference in the just; for it is not the same between parents and children as between brothers; nor between companions as between citizens; and so on in every other friendship. Acts of injustice, therefore, are different between each of these, and are aggravated by being committed against greater friends; for instance, it is more shameful to rob a companion of money than a fellow-citizen, and not to assist a brother than a stranger, and to strike one's father than any one else. It is the nature of the just to increase together with friendship, as they are between the same parties, and of equal extent. All communities seem like parts of the political community; for men unite together for some advantage, and to provide themselves with some of the things needful for life. Political community seems also originally to have been

* In the same way the early Christian brotherhood had all things in common.
formed, and still to continue, for the sake of advantage; for legislators aim at this, and say that what is expedient to the community is just.

Now all other communities desire advantage in particular cases; as, for example, sailors desire that for which they make their voyage,—money, for instance, or something of that kind; soldiers that which belongs to war,—either money, or victory, or the taking of a city; and in like manner people of the same tribe and borough seek each their own advantage. Some communities seem to have been formed for the sake of pleasure; such as bacchanalian revels and clubs: for these were formed for the sake of sacrifice and associating together. All these seem to be included under the social community; for this does not aim at mere present expediency, but at that which influences the whole of life; hence sacrifices are instituted and honours paid to the gods in such assemblies, and men are themselves furnished with opportunities of pleasant relaxation; for the ancient sacrifices and general meetings seem to have been held as first-fruits after the gathering in of harvest; for the people had most leisure at that time. All communities, therefore, seem to be parts of the political community; and similar friendships will accompany such communities.

CHAP. X.

Of the three forms of Civil Government, and the Deflections from them.

1. There are three forms of civil government, and as many deflections, which are, as it were, corruptions

7 Compare Hor. Ep. II. i. 139.
* If this chapter is compared with the eighth chapter of the first book of the Rhetoric, it will be found that this subject is treated more scientifically and with greater accuracy in the Ethics than in the Rhetoric. The reason of this evidently is,
of them. The former are, Monarchy, Aristocracy, Monarchy. and a third, on the principle of property, which it Aristocracy seems appropriate to call a Timocracy; but the generality are accustomed to apply the term "polity" Timocracy, exclusively to this last. Of these, monarchy is the best, and timocracy the worst. The defection from 2. monarchy is tyranny; for both are monarchies: Tyranny. but there is the greatest difference between them; for the tyrant looks to his own benefit, the king to that of his subjects; for he is not a king who is not independent, and who does not abound in all goods; but such an one as this wants nothing else; and consequently he would not be considering what is beneficial to himself, but to his subjects; for he that does not act so, must be a mere king chosen by lot. But tyranny is the opposite to this; for a tyrant pursues his own peculiar good. And it is 3. more evident on this ground, that it is the worst form of all; for that is worst, which is opposite to the best. But the transition from kingly power is to tyranny; for tyranny is a corruption of monarchy, and a bad king becomes a tyrant.

The transition from aristocracy is to oligarchy, 4. through the wickedness of those in power, who dis- Oligarchy. tribute the offices of the state without reference to merit, give all or most good things to themselves, and the offices of state constantly to the same people, setting the highest value upon wealth: consequently a few only are in power, and the bad instead of the best. The transition from timocracy is to 5. democracy; for they border upon one another, since Democracy a timocracy naturally inclines to be in the hands of that a discussion on the different forms of government forms an essential part of the former treatise; whereas it only belongs accidentally to the latter. It is only necessary for the orator to know the nature and principles of government as they are found practically to exist. The Ethical student, on the contrary, should know what they ought to be in theory as well as what they really are in their practical developments. These considerations will account for the different modes of treatment which Aristotle has adopted in his two treatises.

That is, a king who owes his dignity to his good fortune, and not to any merits of his own.
the multitude, and all who are in the same class as to property are equal. But democracy is the least vicious, for its constitutional principles are but slightly changed. Such, then, are the principal changes in forms of government; for thus they change the least and in the most natural manner.

6. One may find resemblances, and as it were, examples of these, even in private families; for the relation of a father to his sons wears the form of monarchy: for the father takes care of the children. Hence, also, Homer calls Jupiter father; 16 for the meaning of a kingdom is a paternal government. But in Persia the authority of a father is tyrannical; for they use their sons like slaves.

7. The authority of a master over his slaves is also tyrannical; for in that the benefit of the master is consulted. This, therefore, appears right, but that of the Persians is wrong; for the power of those who are in different circumstances ought to be different. The relation of a man to his wife seems to be aristocratical; for the husband governs because it is his due, and in those things which a husband ought; and whatever is suitable for the wife he gives up to her. When the husband lords it over everything, it changes into an oligarchy; for he does this beyond what is his right, and not only so far forth as he is superior. But sometimes women, when they are heiresses, govern. Thus they govern not according to merit, but because of wealth and influence, as in oligarchies.

8. The relation which subsists between brothers is like a timocracy; for they are equal; except so far as they differ in age. Therefore, if there is a great disparity in their ages, the friendship is no longer like that of brothers. A democracy takes place mostly, in families where there is no master (for there all are equal); and wherever the ruler is weak, and each member acts as he likes.

"Πατὴρ ἄρα ἡμῶν ἢ θεῶν ἡμῶν,"—"Father of gods and men"
—Hom. Ἱέραμισ.
CHAP. XI.

Of the friendship which exists under each form of Government.

In each of these forms of government there is evidently a friendship, coextensive with "the just" in each. Friendship between a king and his subjects consists in conferring superior benefits; for he does good to his subjects, if he is good and takes care of them, that they may be well off, as a shepherd takes care of his sheep; whence also Homer calls Agamemnon "the shepherd of the people." Such also is paternal friendship; but it exceeds the former in the greatness of the benefits which it confers; for the father is the cause of the son's existence, which is esteemed the greatest thing, and also of food and of education. The same things are also ascribed to ancestors; for a father is by nature the governor of his sons, and ancestors of their descendants, and a king of his subjects. These friendships imply superiority; whence also parents receive honour; therefore also the just is not the same between the two parties, but according to proportion; for thus also must the friendship be.

Between husband and wife there is the same friendship as in an aristocracy; for their relation is according to merit, and the greater is given to the better person, and to each that which is suitable. The just also subsists between them in the same way. The friendship of brothers is like the friendship of companions; for they are equal and of the same age; and such persons generally have the

"Wherever the expression "the just" occurs, it must be remembered that its signification is "the abstract principle of justice."

"d The Christian student need not be reminded how often this metaphor is made use of in Holy Scripture to describe the relation in which our heavenly King stands to his kingdom the Church."
4. same feelings and the same moral character. The friendship of a timocracy is therefore like this; for citizens think themselves equal and equitable; consequently, the government is held by all in turn, and equally. The friendship also in a timocracy is of the same kind. But in the deflections, as there is but little of “the just,” so also there is but little friendship, and least of all in the worst. For in a tyranny there is no friendship, or very little; for between those parties, where the ruler and the ruled have nothing in common, there is no friendship; for there is no principle of justice. The case, in fact, is the same as between a workman and his tool, the soul and the body, a master and his slave; for all these are benefited by the users. But there is no friendship nor justice towards inanimate things, neither is there towards a horse or an ox, nor towards a slave, so far forth as he is a slave; for there is nothing in common; since a slave is an animated tool, and a tool is an inanimate slave.

5. So far forth, therefore, as he is a slave, there is no friendship towards him, but only so far forth as he is a man; for it is thought that there is some sort of justice between every man, and every one who is able to participate in a law and a contract; and therefore that there is some sort of friendship so far forth as he is a man. Hence friendship and the just exist but to a small extent in despotic governments; but in democracies they are found to a considerable extent; for there are many things in common to those who are equal.

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CHAP. XII.

Of the friendship which subsists between companions and relations and the members of a family.

1. The essence, therefore, of every friendship is community, as has been said already; but one might, perhaps, make an exception in the case of th-
between relations and of that between companions. The friendships between citizens and fellow-tribemen, and fellow-sailors, and such like, more resemble those which depend upon community; for they seem as it were to exist in accordance with some agreement. Amongst these also one might classify the friendship of hospitality. That also between relations seems to have many forms, and to depend entirely upon the paternal friendship. Parents love their children as being a part of themselves; children love their parents as being themselves something which owes its existence to them. Now, parents know their offspring better than the offspring knows that it comes from them; and the original cause is more intimately connected with the thing produced, than the thing produced is with that which produced it; for that which proceeds from a thing, belongs to the thing from which it proceeded, as a tooth, or hair, or anything whatsoever, belongs to the possessor of it; but the original cause does not at all belong to what proceeds from it, or, at least, it belongs in a less degree. On account of its duration, also, the love of parents exceeds that of children; for the former love them as soon as ever they are born; but the latter love their parents in process of time, when they have acquired intelligence or perception: from this, also, it is evident why mothers feel greater love than fathers.

Parents then love their children as themselves; for that which proceeds from them, becomes by the separation like another self; but children love their parents, as being sprung from them. Brothers love one another, owing to their being sprung from the same parents; for identity with the latter produces identity with each other. Whence the expressions, "the same blood," "the same root," and so on. They are, therefore, in some sense the same, even though the individuals are distinct. The being educated together, and being of the same age, greatly contributes to friendship; for men like
those of their own age, and those of the same character are companions. Hence also the friendship of brothers resembles that of companions. The friendship between cousins and other relations is owing to the same cause; for it is owing to their being sprung from the same stock; some are more, others less warmly attached, according as the parent stock is nearer or further off. The friendship which children feel towards parents, and men towards gods, is as it were towards something good and superior; for they have conferred on them the greatest benefits; since they are the cause of existence and of support, and of education when brought into existence. Such a friendship as this involves pleasure and profit, more than that between strangers, inasmuch as they live more together. There is contained also in the friendship between brothers, all that is in that between companions; and more so between the good, and in general between those who are alike, inasmuch as they are more connected, and love one another immediately from their birth; and inasmuch as those are more similar in disposition, who come from the same stock, and have been nurtured together, and educated similarly; and the trial, which is the result of time, is here the longest and most certain.

7. The duties of friendship are analogous in all other relationships. Between husband and wife, friendship is thought to exist by nature; for man is by nature a being inclined to live in pairs rather than in societies, inasmuch as a family is prior in point of time and more necessary than a state, and procreation is more common to him, together with animals."

``Nam quum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant libidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjuge est; proxima in libris: deinde una domus, communia omnia. —Cic. de Off. I. From this chapter, as well as from what Aristotle afterwards says of self-love, we may see how clear an idea he entertained of the progressive and gradually expansive nature of human sympathies. Their source he held to be a reasonable self-love, their simplest and earliest development conjugal affection; they next embrace within their sphere.
To other animals, therefore, community proceeds thus far only; but human beings associate not only for the sake of procreation, but for the affairs of life; for the duties of husband and wife are distinct from the very first, and different. They, therefore, assist one another, throwing into the common stock their private resources. For this reason, also, the useful and the pleasant are thought to exist in this friendship: it may also be formed for virtue's sake, if they are good; for there is a virtue of each, and they may take delight in this. But children are thought to be a bond; and therefore those who have no children sooner separate; for children are a common good to both; and that which is common is a bond of union. But the inquiry how a man is to live with his wife, and, in short, a friend with his friend, is plainly in no respect different from the inquiry, how it is just that they should: for the case is evidently not the same between friends, as between strangers, companions, and fellow-travellers.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the disputes which arise in friendships formed for the sake of utility.

Since there are three kinds of friendship, as was said at the beginning of the book, and since in each of them some are friends on an equality, and others are in the relation of superiors to inferiors; (for parents, children, kindred, and the whole circle of our domestic relations; and, still extending, include all who are natives of the same country with ourselves. And when we find that he considered that even a slave, so far forth as he is a man, is not without the pale of friendly regards, it is not improbable that, though the men of his age were not capable of such liberal philanthropy, still the philosopher could imagine the existence of a brotherly kindness and affection wide enough to comprehend the whole society of the human race.
the good become friends, and the better become friends with the worse: as also do the pleasant, and those who are friends for the sake of the useful, forming an equality by mutual benefits, although they differ:) those who are equal ought to maintain their equality, by equality in their love and everything else; and the unequal should be friends, by one making a return proportionate to the superiority of the other party. Accusations and complaints arise in the friendship for the sake of the useful, and in that only, or mostly so, as might be expected; for those who are friends for virtue's sake, are anxious to benefit each other; for such is the property of virtue and friendship; and when they are struggling for this, there are no complaints or quarrels; for no one dislikes one who loves and benefits him; but if he is a man of refinement, he returns the kindness. And he who is superior to the other, since he obtains what he wants, cannot complain of his friend; for each is aiming at the good.

3. Nor do they arise at all in friendships formed for the sake of pleasure; for both parties obtain at once what they want, if they take pleasure in living together; and he would appear ridiculous, who complained of another not giving him pleasure, when it is in his power to cease to live with him. But the friendship for the sake of the useful is fruitful in complaints; for since each makes use of the other for his own benefit, they are constantly wanting the greater share, and think that they have less than their due, and complain that they do not receive as much as they want, although they deserve it; and those who confer benefits cannot assist them as much as the receivers require.

4. But it seems that, in like manner as the just is twofold (for one kind is unwritten and one according to law), so also the friendship for the sake of the useful, is partly moral and partly legal. Now complaints arise chiefly when men do not make a return in the same kind of friendship which they formed.
at first; now legal friendship is upon settled terms, one kind of it altogether mercenary, from hand to hand; the other kind more liberal, as it allows time, but it is still settled by mutual consent what return is to be made: in this kind the obligation is evident, and does not admit of dispute, but it allows a friendly delay in the payment; hence in some countries there are no actions at law allowed in these cases, but it is thought that those who have made any contract upon the faith of another, should be satisfied with that.

Moral friendship is not upon settled terms, but each party gives, or does anything else to the other as to a friend. But he expects to receive what is equal, or more, as if he had not given, but lent; and if the contract is not fulfilled on the terms or in the manner in which he made it, he will complain. This happens because all, or the greatest number, wish what is honourable; but upon deliberation they choose what is profitable: now it is honourable to confer benefits, not with the intention of receiving again; but it is profitable to receive benefits. He, therefore, who is able, must return the value of what he has received, and that voluntarily: for we must not make a man our friend against his will, but we must act as if we had made a mistake at the beginning, and as if we had received a kindness from one, from whom we ought not; for we have not received it from a friend, nor from one who conferred it for the sake of friendship: we must therefore repay it, as much as if we had received the benefit upon settled terms; and a man would be ready, if he had the means, to repay the kindness; and if he had not, the giver would not even expect it. So that if he is able, he must repay it: but he should consider at first by whom he is benefited, and upon what terms, in order that he may or not submit to the obligation on these terms.

But it admits of a question, whether we ought to measure the return by the benefit done to the
value of the receiver, and make it according to that; or by the kindness of him who confers it. For the receivers say that they have received such things from those who conferred them as were trifling to them, and which they might have received from others, thus deprecating the favour: the others, on the contrary, say that they were the greatest favours they had to bestow, and favours which could not have been received from any others, and that they were conferred in time of danger, or such like exigencies. Is not, therefore, the benefit of the receiver the measure in friendship for the sake of the useful? for he is the person in want, and the other assists him, as if hereafter to receive an equivalent: the assistance therefore is as great as the benefit which the other receives: and consequently he must repay as much as the fruit which he has reaped from it, or more; for that is more honourable. But in friendships for the sake of virtue there are no complaints; and the deliberate preference of the conferrer seems to be the measure; for the essential part of virtue and moral character consists in the deliberate preference.

In friendship δὲ ἄρτη, the προσέλογος of the conferrer is the measure.

CHAP. XIV.

On the complaints which arise in unequal friendships.

1. Differencies also arise in friendships where one party is superior; for each expects to receive more: and when this takes place, the friendship is dissolved: for the superior thinks that it is his due to have more, because more is assigned to the good man; and in like manner he thinks so who renders the greater assistance; for they say that an useless person should not have an equal share, since it becomes a tax, and not friendship, if the fruits of the

* The word here translated “tax” is in the original λαστονργία. The λαστονργία were public burthens imposed.
friendship are not in proportion to the good offices done. For they think, that as in pecuniary partnerships those who contribute more, receive more, so also it ought to be in friendship.

But the needy and the worse character argue the contrary way; for they say, that it is the duty of a good friend to assist the needy; for what advantage is there, they say, in being the friend of a good or powerful man, if we are to reap no advantage from it? Now, the claim of each party seems to be right, and it seems that each ought to give to each a greater share out of the friendship, but not of the same thing: but the superior should receive a greater share of honour, the needy a greater share of gain; for honour is the reward of virtue and kindness, and gain is an assistance to indigence. The case also is evidently the same in political communities; for he who confers no benefit on the community, is not honoured; for that which is public property is given to the public benefactor, and honour is public property. Now we cannot receive both money and honour from the public stock; for no one submits to a less share of everything. Consequently to him who is content with less money, the state gives honour; and to him who prefers gifts, money; for proportion equalizes and preserves friendship, as has been said.

On these terms, then, must the unequal associate; and he, who has received benefit as regards money or virtue, must make a return in the shape of honour, repaying whatever he is able; for friendship requires what is possible, not what is exactly due; this not being possible in every case, for instance, in the honours paid to the gods and to parents; for no one can ever make an adequate return; but he, who pays attention to them to the

The rule observed in states.

upon the richer citizens of Athens by way of taxation. See on the subject, Smith's Dictionary of Antiquities, in loco.

33: And consequently the state would not submit to part with both money and honour to the same individual.
5. extent of his ability, is considered good. Hence also it would be thought unlawful for a son to disown his father, but lawful for a father to disown his son: for he that is in debt, ought to pay; but there is nothing which a son can do equivalent to the benefits received, so that he is always a debtor; and creditors have power to send away their debtors;

6. consequently a father has. At the same time perhaps it would be thought that no father would separate himself, unless the son were excessively depraved; for independently of the natural feeling of affection, it is natural to man not to reject the assistance which a son might afford; nevertheless, if the son is depraved, he would avoid assisting his father, or at least would not be anxious to do so. For most men wish to receive benefits, and avoid conferring them, as unprofitable. Let so much then suffice on these matters.
BOOK IX.

CHAP. I.

Of what kind are the preservatives of Friendship.

In all cases of dissimilar friendship, proportion 1.
equalizes and preserves the friendship, as has been
stated; for example, in the political friendships, the
shoemaker receives a return for his shoes according
to their value, and the weaver, and every one else.
In these instances a common measure is provided,
namely, money; everything therefore is referred to
this, and is measured by it. In the friendship of 2.
love, the lover sometimes complains, that although
he loves exceedingly, he is not loved in return,
when it may happen that he possesses nothing
which can be the object of love; and frequently
the person loved complains, that the other having
promised everything at first, now performs nothing.
Such cases as this occur, when the lover loves the
beloved object for pleasure's sake, and the latter
loves the former for the sake of the useful, and
these qualifications do not exist in both. For as 3.
the friendship was formed on these motives, a sepa-
ration takes place, as soon as ever they do not obtain
that for which they loved; for it was not the per-
sons that they loved, but something belonging to
them, which is not permanent; and therefore the
friendships are not permanent. But a friendship
founded upon moral character, as it is felt for its
own sake, continues, as has been stated.

Differences also arise, when the parties receive 4.
some other thing than that of which they were de-

* In the Greek ἀναρωσίδεις, dissimilar in species, that is,
when two parties become friends, each from a different motive.
sirous; for it is the same as getting nothing, when they do not get what they desired. The case is like that of him who made promises to the harper, and the better he performed the more he promised; and when in the morning he claimed the performance of these promises, he said he had repaid him pleasure for pleasure. Now if each party had wished this, it would have been sufficient; but if the one wishes entertainment, the other gain, and the one received what he wished, the other not, the exchange cannot be fair. For each fixes his mind on that which he happens to want, and for the sake of that will give what he does give. But who is to fix the value? the person who first gives? or he who first receives? for he who gives, seems to leave it to the other to fix the value: which they say is what Protagoras did; for when he gave any lessons, he ordered the learner to fix how much he thought the knowledge was worth, and so much he received. In such transactions, some persons approve of the principle, “Let a friend be content with a promised payment.”—Hes.

6. Op. et Di. v. 368. But those who receive the money beforehand, and then perform none of their promises, because they were so extravagant, are with justice complained of; for they do not fulfil their agreements. And this, perhaps, the Sophists are obliged to do, because no one would give a piece of silver for what they know. These, therefore, because they do not perform that for which they received pay, are justly complained of.

7. Whenever there is no agreement made about the service performed, as has been stated, those who confer a favour freely for the sake of the persons themselves on whom they confer it, cannot com-

The story to which Aristotle refers is thus related by Plutarch. Dionysius, the tyrant, hearing a famous harper, promised him a talent. The next day, when the harper demanded the performance of his promise, he replied, “Yesterday, during the time that I was delighted with your singing, I delighted you with hopes, so that you have received your reward,—delight for delight.”
plain; for friendship which is founded on virtue is of this kind. The return must be made according to the deliberate intention; for it is this which characterizes a friend and virtue. It seems also that those who have intercourse with one another in philosophy must act thus; for the value of it is not measured by money, and no equivalent price can be paid. But perhaps, as in the case of our duty to the gods and our parents, that which is in our power is sufficient.

Where the act of giving is not of this kind, but for the sake of something, perhaps it is best that a return should be made, which seems to both parties to be proportionate. If this cannot be, it would seem not only necessary that he who first receives should settle it, but also just: for in proportion to the benefit which one received, or to the cost at which he would have purchased the pleasure, will be the equivalent which the other ought to receive in return; for in things bought and sold this seems to be done: and in some places there are laws forbidding suits upon voluntary contracts; as if it was right, when we have trusted any one, to settle with him, as we dealt with him originally: for they think that it is more just for him to fix the value who was trusted, than for him to do so who trusted him; for men do not in general put the same value upon things which they have received, as they did when they were wishing to receive them; for what belongs to us, and what we give away, seems to each of us to be very valuable. But, nevertheless, the return is made with reference to such a standard of value as the receiver would fix: though, perhaps, he ought not to value it at so much as it seems worth when he has got it, but according to what he valued it at before he got it.
CHAP. II.

Of cases of Relative Duties.

1. Such questions as the following cause a difficulty; for instance, whether we ought to perform services of every kind to our father, and obey him in everything? or whether, when sick, we should obey a physician, and choose a general on account of his military skill? In the same manner must we serve a friend rather than a good man? and must we rather repay a favour to a benefactor than give to a companion, supposing that we cannot do both?

2. To determine all these points accurately is not easy; for they contain many and various differences as to their being great or small, honourable or necessary. But that we are not to bestow everything upon the same person needs no proof: and, generally, we must rather requite kindnesses, than give to companions, in the same manner as we ought rather to pay a debt to a creditor, than give to a companion.

3. But perhaps this is not always the case: for instance, must a person who has been ransomed from robbers do the same in return to him who ransomed him, whoever he may be? or should he repay him though he has not been taken prisoner, but demands payment as a debt? or should he ransom his father rather than the other? for it would be thought that he ought to ransom his father even in preference to himself.

4. As we stated, therefore, in general a debt should be repaid: but if a gift surpasses a debt in being honourable, or necessary, we should defer to this consideration; for sometimes the making a return for a favour previously conferred is not even equal;

* In this chapter, says Michelet, we have the commencement of those casuistical ethics, to which, first the Stoics, afterwards the Jesuits, and lastly the German philosophers, Kant and Fichte, were so strongly attached.
when, for instance, the other conferred it, knowing that the person was good; but the latter has to repay it to one whom he thinks wicked. For sometimes a man must not lend in return to him who lent to him; for the latter, thinking that he should be repaid, lent to him being a good man: but he cannot hope to be repaid by a wicked man. If, then, the circumstances are really such as I have stated, the claim is not equal; or if they are not so really, but the parties think that they are, it would not be thought that they acted strangely. Therefore, as we have frequently stated, assertions respecting feelings and actions admit of exact definition only in proportion to the object-matter.

Now that we must not perform the same service to everybody, nay, even not to our father, in the same manner that we do not sacrifice everything to Jupiter, is obvious. But since different services are due to parents, and brothers, and companions, and benefactors, we must give to each their own, and that which is suitable to them. In fact, men seem to act in this way; for they invite relations to marriages, since the family to which they belong is common to them, and consequently acts which have to do with the family; and, for the same reason, they think that it is more suitable for relations than other persons to meet at funerals. And it would seem that we ought to assist our parents, in preference to all other persons, in supporting them; being, as it were, their debtors; and that it is more honourable to assist the authors of our existence in that respect than ourselves. We should also give honour to our parents, as to the gods; but not every kind of honour; for we do not give the same to father and mother: nor, again, do we give a father the honour of the man of science, or the general, but the honour of a father, and we act in the same way in the case of a mother. We should also give to every old man the honour becoming his age, by rising up in his presence, and giving him the place of honour, and such like.
marks of respect. To companions and brothers we should give liberty of speech, and a partnership in everything we have. To our relations, and members of the same tribe, and fellow-citizens, and every one else, we should always endeavour to give what belongs to them, and to compare the claims of each with respect to relationship, or virtue, or acquaintance. Now, between relations the decision is easy; but between different people it is more difficult: we should not, however, for that reason, give up the attempt, but as far as it is possible distinguish between them.

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CHAP. III.

On the cases in which Friendship may or may not be dissolved.

1. There is a difficulty in the question, whether or no we should dissolve friendship with those who do not continue the same as they originally were. Is there, then, in the case of those who became friends on account of the useful or the pleasant, when they no longer possess those qualities, nothing strange in dissolving the connection? for they were friends only for those qualities, upon the failure of which it

2. is natural to cease to feel friendship. But a man might fairly complain if another, who loved him really for the sake of the useful or the pleasant, pretended that it was on account of his character; for, as we stated at first, most differences in friendships arise when the parties are not friends on the ground on which they think they are. When, therefore, a man is deceived, and has fancied that he was loved for his character when the other did not at all act as if it was so, he has himself to blame. But when he is deceived by the profession of the other, he has to complain of the deceiver, and even more so than of those who counterfeit money, inasmuch as
the crime is committed with regard to an object of greater price.

But if he admits him to his friendship, as being a good man, and then he becomes wicked, or is thought to be so, must he still love him? or is this impossible, since not everything is an object of love, but only the good? We are not obliged, then, to love a wicked man, nor ought we; for we must not be lovers of wickedness, nor assimilate ourselves to the bad: and it has been stated that like is friendly to like. Must we, then, immediately dissolve the connection? or not with all, but only with those who are incurable on account of their wickedness? and should we not rather assist those who admit of improvement in character than in property, inasmuch as it is better, and belongs more peculiarly to friendship? But, still, he who dissolves the friendship would not be thought to do anything extraordinary; for it was not such an one as he, that he was a friend to: when, therefore, he is unable to recover the friend so estranged from him, he withdraws.

But if the one continues the same, while the other

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4 Disparas enim mores disperas studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob ullam aliam causam boni improbis, improbi bonus amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potesset esse, morum studiorumque distantia.—Cic. Lati. xx.

5 Primum danda opera est, nec qua amicorum dissidia sint; sin tale aliquid eveniet, ut extinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae esse videantur.—Cic. Lati. xxi.

Compare the Christian rule:—“If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him. And if he trespass against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent; thou shalt forgive him.”—St. Luke, xvii. 3, 4. “Moreover, if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican.”—St. Matt. xviii. 15—17.
becomes better, and widely different in virtue, must the latter still consider the former as his friend? or is that not possible? The case is plainest when the difference becomes very great, as in friendships contracted from childhood; for if one continues a child in intellect, and the other becomes a man of the highest character, how can they be friends, when they no longer take pleasure in the same things, nor sympathize in joy and grief together? For these feelings will not exist in them towards each other. But without these it has been stated that they could not be friends; for it is impossible that they can live together: and we have treated of all this already.

6. Must he, then, feel no otherwise towards him than if he had never been his friend? or ought he to remember their past intimacy, and just as we think that a man should confer favours on friends rather than on strangers, ought he in like manner to bestow something upon those who were his friends for the sake of past friendship, when the separation does not take place because of excessive wickedness?

CHAP. IV.

That the Good Man is a Friend to himself, but the Bad Man neither to himself nor others.

1. The feelings of friendship towards friends, and those which distinguish the different kinds of friendship, seem to be derived from the feelings of a man towards himself; for a friend is defined as being one who wishes and does to another the good, or the apparent good, for the other's sake: or, one who wishes his friend to exist and to live for that friend's own

The qualities which are popularly held to be the developments of friendship are beneficence, benevolence, and sympathy; these no one but a good man can entertain towards himself. If, therefore, all feelings of friendship are derived from the feelings of a man towards himself, none but the good can be really friends.
sake, which is the feeling of mothers towards their children, and of those friends who have come into collision. Others define a friend, one who passes his time with, or chooses the same things, as another; or, one who sympathizes in joy and sorrow with his friend: this latter definition applies mostly to the case of mothers. In some one of these ways all men define friendship.  

Now each of these feelings exists in the good man towards himself; and in all others, so far forth as they fancy themselves to be good; for virtue and the virtuous man seem, as has been stated, to be a standard to each; since he agrees in opinion with himself, and desires the same things with all his soul. Hence, he wishes for himself what is good, or what appears so, and practise it; for it is characteristic of the good man to labour for what is good, and for his own sake; for it is for the sake of his intellectual part, which is thought to constitute each man's self.  

Again, he wishes himself to live and be preserved, and particularly that part by which he thinks: for existence is a good to the virtuous man: and each one wishes good to himself; and no one, were he to become another person, would wish his former self to possess everything: for the Deity now possesses the chief good; but he possesses it because he is what he is. And the thinking principle—or at least that rather than any other principle—must be taken to be each man's self. Again, such a man wishes to pass his life with himself; for he does this pleasantly to himself; since the recollection of the past is pleasant, and the hopes of the future are good; but such recollections and hopes are pleasant. Moreover, he has abundant subjects for his intellect to contemplate. He also sympathizes most with himself in joys and sorrows; for the same thing is con-

1. Compare Arist. Rhet. II.: also the saying of Terence, "Idem velle et idem nolle, ea demum firma est amicitia."
2. Thus Cicero (Somn. Scip. c. 6) writes: "Nec enim tu is, quae forma ists declarat: sed mens cajusque, is est quisque; non ea figura, que digito demonstrari potest."
stantly painful or pleasant, and not sometimes one thing and sometimes another; for he is without repentance, if we may so speak.\footnote{Chase compares to this passage, “God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent.” —Numbers, xxiii. 19. Compare also, “Sapientis est proprium, nihil quod pomerite possit facere.”—Cic. Tusc. v. 28.} Consequently, from the good man having all these feelings towards himself, and feeling towards his friend as he does towards himself (for his friend is another self), friendship also is thought to consist in some one of these feelings, and they are thought to be friends in whom they reside.

6. But as to the question whether there is or is not friendship towards one's self, let it be dismissed for the present. But friendship may be thought to exist in this case, inasmuch as it is one in which there are two or more of the above-mentioned qualifications; and because excess of friendship seems to resemble that of a man towards himself. The feelings spoken of, however, plainly exist in many, although they are bad men. Do they, then, partake of them so far as they are pleasing to themselves, and suppose themselves to be good? for assuredly they do not exist, nor even appear to exist, in any who are utterly bad and impious: indeed, they scarcely exist in the bad at all; for the bad are at variance with themselves; and they desire one thing, but wish for another, as for example, the incontinent; for instead of what seems to them to be good, they choose the pleasant, which is hurtful. Others, again, from cowardice and indolence, abstain from doing what they think best for themselves. As for those who have committed many atrocious crimes through depravity, they hate and fly from life, and destroy themselves.

The vicious, also, seek for persons with whom they may pass their time, and fly from themselves; for they call to mind many unpleasant subjects, and expect others of the same kind when they are by themselves; but when they are with others, they
forget them; and since they possess no amiable qualities, they have no friendly feeling towards themselves. Therefore, such men do not sympathize with themselves in joy or sorrow; for their soul is divided, as it were, by faction, and one part from depravity feels pain, because it abstains from something, while the other part feels pleasure; and one draws him this way, another that, just as if they were dragging him asunder. But though it is impossible to feel pain and pleasure at the same time, yet after a little time he feels pain at having been pleased, and wishes that these things had not been pleasant to him; for bad men are full of repentance. It is plain, then, that the bad man has no friendly disposition even to himself, because he has in him nothing amiable. If, then, such a condition as this is excessively wretched, he should anxiously flee from wickedness, and strive to be good; for by this means a man may have friendly feelings towards himself, and become a friend of another.

CHAP. V.

On Good-will.

Good-will resembles friendship, and yet it is not friendship; for good-will is felt towards those whom we do not know, and without their being aware of it; but friendship is not: all this has been said before. Nor yet is it affection; for good-will has no intensity, nor desire: but both of these accompany affection. Affection too is formed by intimacy; but good-will may be sudden; as comes to pass in the case of antagonists; for we wish them well, and partake in their wishes, but we would not assist them at all; for, as we have stated, we feel good-will suddenly, and our love is superficial. It seems, then, to be the beginning of friendship; in the same manner as the pleasure derived from sight is the
beginning of love: for no one feels love, unless he is first pleased with personal appearance: but he that takes pleasure in the personal appearance is not necessarily in love, except he longs for the object when absent, and desires its presence. In the same manner, then, it is impossible to be friends without good-will. But those who have it are not necessarily friends; for they only wish good to those for whom they have good-will; but they would not assist them at all, nor take any trouble about them.

4. So that one might call it, metaphorically, friendship in a state of inactivity; and say, that when it has continued some time, and arrived at familiarity, it becomes friendship, but not that for the sake of the useful or the agreeable: for good-will is not produced by those motives. For he who has received a benefit, returns good-will for what he has received, therein acting justly: but he who wishes any one to be prosperous, having some hope of profiting by his means, appears to be well-disposed, not to that other person, but rather to himself; in the same manner as he is not a friend, if he pays attention to him for the sake of some advantage. Upon the whole, good-will arises on account of virtue, or some goodness, when any one is seen to be honourable, or manly, or something of that kind: as we have stated is the case with antagonists.

CHAP. VI.

On Unanimity.

1. Unanimity also seems to be connected with friendship; hence it is not the same as unity of opinion; for that may exist between persons who are unacquainted with each other. Neither do we say, that they who think the same upon any subject whatever are unanimous; for instance, those who think the
same about the heavenly bodies; for unanimity upon these matters does not belong to friendship. But we say, that states have unanimity, when they think the same upon questions of expediency, and deliberately make the same choice, and execute what has been determined in common.

Consequently, men have unanimity upon practical matters; and amongst these, upon those which are important, and which are of mutual or common interest; for instance, states are unanimous when all agree that the magistrates should be elected, or that alliance should be made with Sparta, or that Pittacus should be Archon, when he wished it also himself. But when each party wishes himself to be in power, as the two brothers in the Phoenisses, they quarrel; for this is not unanimity, that each party should conceive the same idea, whatever it may be, but that their conceptions should fix upon the same object: for instance, when both the people and the better part agree for an aristocracy; for thus all obtain what they desire.

Unanimity then is plainly political friendship, as indeed it is said to be; for it is upon matters of expediency, and those which have a reference to life. But such unanimity exists between the good; for these are of one mind both with themselves and each other, being engaged, as we may say, upon the same subjects; for the counsels of such men as these continue firm, and do not ebb and flow, like the Eurus: and they wish what is just and expeditious; and this also they desire in common. But it

1 Pittacus, with the unanimous consent of the republic and his own also (for this is requisite to constitute perfect unanimity), was intrusted with the government for ten years: after which, although the state wished him to continue in office, he refused.—Cic.  
2 Compare Cicero pro Mur. xvi. :—“Quod fretum, quem Euripum tota motus, tantas, tam varias habere putatis agitationes fluctuum, quantas perturbationes et quantos actus habet ratio comitiorum.”—Michelet. Brewer also quotes here, Isaiah, lvii. 20: “The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest.”
is impossible for bad men to have unanimity, except to a slight extent; as it is impossible for them to be friends, since they are desirous of more than their share in what is profitable, but in labours and public services they take less. But when each party wishes the same things for himself, he searches minutely into the qualifications of his neighbour, and hinders him, and as they are not watchful for the public interest, it is sacrificed. The result, therefore, is that they quarrel, using force to one another, and not being willing themselves to do their duty.

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CHAP. VII.

That the Love of Benefactors is stronger than that of those benefited.

1. Benefactors are thought to love those whom they have benefited, more than they who have received favours love those who have conferred them; and as though this were contrary to what we might expect, it is made a subject of inquiry. Now, the opinion of the generality is, that the one party are debtors, and the other creditors; consequently, in the same manner as in the case of debts, the debtors wish their creditors not to live, but those who have lent are careful for the health of their debtors; so also they think that those who have conferred favours, wish the receivers of them to live, as though in that case they would receive them back again, while the other party does not care about repaying them.

2. Now, Epicharmus perhaps would say that they hold this language, because they look to the bad side of human nature: yet still it seems like human nature; for the generality are forgetful, and are more desirous of receiving than conferring benefits. But the real reason it would appear is more natural, and the case does not resemble that of lenders; for
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they have no fondness towards the other party, but only a wish for their preservation, for the sake of receiving a return.

Those who have conferred favours, are fond of and love those who have received them, even if they neither are, nor are likely to be, useful to them; which also is the case with workmen; for every one loves his own work, more than he could be loved by the work, were it to become animated. This perhaps is most the case with poets; for they love their own poems above measure, having a parental affection for them. Such then seems to be the case of benefactors; for he who has received a kindness is a work of theirs; consequently they love him more than the work loves the producer of it. The reason of this is, that existence is an object of choice and love to all; but we exist by energy; for we exist by living and acting. He then who has produced a work, in a certain sense exists by the energy; hence he loves the work, because he loves his own existence. But this is natural; for the work shows by energy that which existed only in power.

At the same time, also, the result of the action is honourable to the benefactor, so that he takes pleasure in the person in whom that exists: but to the receiver there is nothing honourable in relation to his benefactor; but if there is anything, it is advantage: and this is less agreeable, and less an object of love. In the case of a present act, the energy is pleasant; in that of a future act, the hope; in that of a past act, the memory: but the pleasure resulting from the energy is the greatest, and most an object of love. To the benefactor, therefore, the work continues; for that which is honourable, is permanent: but as regards the receiver, the useful soon passes away. The recollection also of honourable things is pleasant; but of useful things, not generally so, or in a less degree. The expectation, however, of advantage seems to be the contrary of this.
8. The feeling of affection also resembles production; but the being loved is like something passive; those, therefore, who are superior in the active conferring of a kindness, love, and all the feelings of friendship accompany. Again, all feel greater love for what they have acquired with labour; as those who have earned their money, love it more than those who have inherited it. Now, to receive favours seems to be without labour; but to confer them is laborious. For this reason also mothers are more fond of their children than fathers are; for the bringing them forth is more painful, and they feel more convinced that they are their own. The same also would seem peculiarly to belong to benefactors.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Self-love.

1. It admits of a question whether a man should love himself best, or another: for we are apt to

\* Thus Euripides, —

"The pangs of labour are a powerful bond,
And every mother dotes upon her child."

And, again,—

"The mother loves her child more than the father;
For she knows it is hers, he only thinks so."

\* The preface to Bishop Butler's Sermons, as well as the first and eleventh sermons, furnish a valuable commentary on the place which a reasonable self-love occupies amongst moral duties, its relation to benevolence or the love of others, and the difference between it and selfishness, which are often confused one with the other. "Self-love," says Bishop Butler, "in its due degree, is as just and morally good, as any affection whatever." "Benevolence is so perfectly coincident with it, that the greatest satisfaction to ourselves depends upon our having benevolence in a due degree: and self-love is one chief security of our right behaviour towards society." How consistent is this view with His doctrines, who has made regard to ourselves the standard by which to measure our love to others, and has said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."
censure those who love themselves best: and as if should love it were disgraceful, we call them selfish. The bad man also seems to do everything for his own sake, and the more so the more wicked he is. They therefore complain of him, as doing nothing without reference to himself: but the good man acts from honourable motives, and the better he is, the more he acts from honourable motives, and for his friend's sake; and he passes over his own interest. But facts are at variance with these remarks, and that not unreasonably: for it is a common saying, that a man should love his greatest friend best. Now he is the best friend, who wishes another good for that person's sake, even if nobody knows it; but this and every other feeling which enters into the definition of a friend, exists most of all in a man with regard to himself; for we have stated, that from himself proceed all the feelings of friendship which he has for others. All the proverbs agree in this: such as "one soul:" and "the property of friends is common:" and "friendship is equality:" and "the knee is nearer than the shin:" for all these feelings exist mostly with reference to a man's self; for he is the best friend to himself; and therefore he must love himself best.

But the question is reasonably asked, which of these two must we follow, since both seem worthy of credit? Perhaps, then, we should divide and distinguish such conclusions as these, and show how far, and in what respect each is true. If, then, we can understand in what sense each uses the word self-love, perhaps the point would be plain. Those, therefore, who use it as a reproach, call those men self-lovers, who give to themselves the greater share of money, or honour, or bodily pleasures; for the generality of men are grasping after these, and extremely anxious about them, as if they were the best things; whence, also, they are objects of contention. Those, therefore, who are covetous of these things, gratify their desires, and, in short, their
6. passions, and the irrational part of the soul. But the generality are of this kind: whence, also, the appellation has arisen, from the generality, which are bad. Consequently reproof is justly cast upon those who are selfish in this sense. But that the generality are accustomed to call those self-lovers, who give such things as these to themselves, is quite plain. For if any one is constantly anxious that he himself more than any other person should do what is just, or temperate, or anything else in accordance with virtue, and in short is always for gaining something honourable for himself, no one would call such a man a self-lover, nor blame him.

7. And yet such a character as this would seem to be more than any other a self-lover; for he gives to himself what is most honourable, and the greatest goods, and gratifies the authoritative part of himself, and obeys it in everything. And as that part, which has most authority, seems especially to constitute the state, and every other system, so it constitutes a man; and therefore he who loves this part and gratifies it, is especially a self-lover.

8. So also a man is called continent or incontinent, according as the intellect has authority or not, as if this constituted each individual. And men think that what they do with reason, they do themselves, and voluntarily, more than any other things. That this, therefore, especially constitutes the individual, is quite plain, and that the good man especially loves this. Therefore he must be especially a self-lover, after a different manner from the person who is reproached for it, and differing in as great a degree, as living in obedience to reason differs from living in obedience to passion, and as desiring the honourable differs from desiring what seems to be advantageous.

9. Now, all approve of and praise those who are particularly earnest about performing honourable actions: and if all contended for what is honourable, and strove to perform the most honourable acts, there would be to every one generally what is
right and proper, and to each individually the greatest goods; at least if virtue is such as we have described it. So that the good man must necessarily be a self-lover; for he will be delighted in performing honourable acts himself, and will benefit others. But the wicked man ought to be so: for he injures both himself and his neighbours, by following evil passions. To the wicked man, therefore, what he ought to do, and what he does, are at variance; but the good man does what he ought to do; for all intellect chooses what is best for itself; and the good man obeys his intellect. It is true also of the good man, that he performs many acts for his friends and his country, nay, even if it is his duty to die for them: for he will give up money and honours, and, in short, all the good things which others contend for, if he can secure to himself that which is honourable. For he would prefer being pleased for a short time exceedingly, than for a long time slightly; and to live one year honourably, than many years in the ordinary manner; and to perform one honourable and great act, rather than many small ones. Those who die for their country, this perhaps actually befalls: they choose something highly honourable for themselves, and they would give up money on condition that their friends should receive more of it: for the friend receives the money, and he himself the honour; so he gives the greater good to himself. The same rule holds good with respect to honourable distinctions and offices; for he gives up all these to his friend; since this is honourable to himself and praiseworthy. With reason, then, he is thought to be a good man, for choosing what is honourable in preference to everything else. It is possible, also, that he may give up the performance of these actions to his friend, and that it may be more honourable for him to be the cause of a friend's doing a thing, than to do it himself. In all praiseworthy things, therefore, the good man seems to give himself the greater share of what is honour-
able. In this sense, therefore, one ought to love one’s self, as has been stated; but in the way that the generality do, one ought not.

CHAP. IX.

That even the Happy Man will need good friends.

1. But a question also arises about the happy man, whether he will need friends or no: for it is commonly said that those who are prosperous and independent, do not need friends, since they have all goods already, and therefore that, being independent, they require nothing more: but that a friend, being another self, provides what a man is unable to provide of himself. Hence comes the saying,—

When fortune gives us good, what need of friends?

2. And yet it seems an absurdity to attribute all goods to the happy man, and yet not to give him friends, which are thought to be the greatest of all external goods. And if it is more the part of a friend to confer than to receive favours, and to do good is characteristic of a good man and of virtue, and it is more honourable to benefit friends than strangers, the good man will want some persons to be benefited. Hence it has also been asked, whether there is a greater need of friends in adversity or prosperity: as in adversity we want persons to benefit us, so in prosperity we want persons whom we may benefit. And it is perhaps absurd to make the happy man a solitary being; for no one would choose to possess all goods by himself; since man is a social being, and formed by nature to associate: this, therefore, is the case with the happy man; for he possesses whatever is by nature a good. But it is evident that it is better to pass our time with friends and good men, than with strangers and anybody indiscriminately. The happy man, therefore, wants friends.
What, then, do the first-mentioned people say, and how far do they speak truth? is it not that the generality consider those only to be friends who are useful? The happy man will have no need of such friends as these, since he is in possession of all goods; nor, consequently, of those who are friends for the sake of the pleasant, or only in a small degree; for his life being pleasant, does not require any adventitious pleasure. But since he does not require such friends as these, he has been thought not to require friends at all. This perhaps is not true; for it was stated at the beginning that happiness is a kind of energy: and an energy is evidently produced, not merely possessed, like property. And if happiness consists in living virtuous and energizing, and the energy of the good man is friends.

And it is stated at the beginning; and if that which peculiarly belongs to us is of the number of pleasant things, and we can contemplate others better than we can ourselves, and their actions better than our own, then the actions of good men, when they are their friends, are pleasant to the good; for both possess what is naturally pleasant; and consequently the happy man will want such friends as these, if he deliberately prefers to contemplate virtuous actions, and those which are peculiarly his own. And the actions of the good man are such, when he is his friend. But it is thought that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now, to a solitary person life is burthensome: for it is not easy to energize constantly by one's self, but with and in relation to others it is easy. The energy, therefore, will be more continuous when it is pleasant in itself, which ought to be the case with the happy man; for the good man, so far forth as he is good, takes delight in actions according to virtue, and feels pain at those which are according to vice: just as the musician is pleased with beautiful melodies, but feels pain at bad ones. And there may be a kind of prac-
exercise of virtue from living with good men, as Theognis says.\footnote{The verses of Theognis are as follows:—

"With these eat and drink, with these
Sit, and please those whose power is great.
For from the good thou shalt learn good; but if with
the wicked
Thou mindest, thou wilt lose the intellect thou hast."}

8. If we examine the question more physiologically, it appears probable that the good friend is by nature an object of choice to the good man; for it has been stated, that what is good by nature, is in itself good and pleasant to the good man. But life is defined to consist, in animals, in the faculty of sensation, and in men, of sensation and intelligence;\footnote{The δυναμεις (faculties or capacities) of the whole animal and vegetable creation are ἔρωτικα, αλοθυτικα, ὧριτικα, συνεργικα, διανοητικα. Of these the first alone is possessed by vegetables. The first four by brute animals. The whole by man. \footnote{Aristotle is here referring to the Pythagorean theory as set forth in their co-ordinate catalogue of goods (see Book I.), in which the definite is classed amongst goods, the indefinite} and the faculty is referred to the energy, and properly consists in the energy. Life, then, seems to be properly the exercise of sensation or intellect; and life is one of the things which are good and pleasant absolutely; for it is something definite; and that which is definite partakes of the nature of the good;\footnote{Aristotle is here referring to the Pythagorean theory as set forth in their co-ordinate catalogue of goods (see Book I.), in which the definite is classed amongst goods, the indefinite} and that which is a good by nature, is a good also to the good man: and therefore it seems to be pleasant to all.

9. But we must not take a depraved and corrupt life, nor one passed in sorrow; for such a life as this is indefinite, just as the circumstances belonging to it are; which will be more evident in what is to follow upon the subject of pain. But if life itself is a good, it is also pleasant; and this seems likely to be the case from all desiring it, and particularly the good and happy: for to them life is most eligible, and their life is most happy. Now, he
that sees, perceives that he sees; and he that hears, that he hears; and he that walks, that he walks; and in every other case, in the same manner, there is some faculty which perceives that we are energizing; so that we perceive that we are perceiving, and understand that we are understanding. But this is the same as saying that we perceive or understand that we exist; for existence was defined to be perceiving, or understanding. Now, to perceive that one is alive, is of the number of those things which are pleasant in themselves: for life is a good by nature: and to perceive the good which is inherent in one's self is pleasant. But life is eligible, and particularly to the good, because existence is to them good and pleasant; for by the consciousness of that which is absolutely a good, they are pleased.

Now, the good man has the same relation to his friend as he has to himself; for a friend is another self; in the same manner, therefore, as to exist one's self is eligible to every one, so also is it for one's friend to exist, or nearly so. But existence was said to be eligible on account of the perception of that which is a good: and such a perception is pleasant in itself. We ought, therefore, to be conscious of the existence of our friend; and this would result from associating with him, and sharing his words and thoughts; for this would seem to be the meaning of the word society, when applied to men, and not, as in the case of cattle, the merely feeding in the same place. If, then, existence is in itself eligible

* The philosophy of Aristotle is the exact opposite of anything approaching to asceticism. The relation subsisting between a man and his friend is the same as that between him and another self. He is to love his friend as himself. The enjoyments of friendship are derived from as clear a consciousness of our friend's existence as we have of our own. The nourishment and support of friendship are intercourse, association, communion. Carry these principles a little further to their legitimate conclusion, and to what important results do they lead! Self-knowledge and the satisfaction of an approving conscience are the result of self-communion. Friendship, or, to speak more properly, love to God, is kept up by that intimate and close communion which the Christian is encouraged to hold with him.
to the happy man, being by nature something good and pleasant, and if the existence of a friend is nearly the same, then a friend must also be of the number of eligible things. But that which is eligible to a man, he ought to possess; or else he is deficient in that respect; he, therefore, that is to be happy will need good friends.

CHAP. X.

How many Friends a Man ought to have.

1. Must we then make as many persons our friends as possible? Or, as it seems to have been appropriately said in the case of hospitality,—

"Have neither many guests nor none."

Hesiod, Works and Days, 713.

So will the rule also apply in the case of friendship, that we should neither be without friends, nor yet have too many. The saying would seem to be suitable altogether to those who are friends for the sake of the useful: for it is troublesome to make a return of favours to a great many, and life is not long enough to do it. Consequently, more than what are sufficient for each particular kind of life, are superfluous, and an impediment to living well, and therefore there is no need of them. And a few friends for pleasure's sake are enough; like sweetening in our food. But with respect to the good, should we have as great a number as possible? Or is there some limit to number in friendship, as there is in a political community; for neither can there be a political community composed of ten people, nor is it any longer a political community when composed of a hundred thousand:1 but the

1 This limitation of the number of persons constituting a political community may at first appear strange to us, who are accustomed to the large and populous communities of modern times; but we must remember how very small was the num-
quantity is not perhaps some particular number, but only one between certain fixed limits. In the 4. case of friends, therefore, there is also some definite number; and perhaps it is the greatest number with whom one can associate; for this was thought to be the greatest sign of friendship. But that it is not possible for the same person to associate and continue in friendship with many, is plain. Besides, these must also be friends to each other, if all intend to pass their time with each other; and this is difficult in the case of a great number. It is also difficult to sympathize in pleasures and pains with many people; for it is likely to happen at the same time, that a man may be rejoicing with one friend, and grieving with another.

Perhaps, then, it is as well not to seek to have as 5. many friends as possible, but only as many as are sufficient for society; for it would seem impossible to be a very strong friend to many. Hence, also, it is impossible to be in love with many; for love is a kind of excess in friendship: and it is felt towards one object; and therefore excess in it can only be felt towards a few. So it seems to be in real fact: for in friendship between companions, many do not become friends; and those friendships which are most celebrated, are between two only.* Those who have many friends, and are familiar with everybody, are by no one thought to be friends, except in a political sense;" and these are called men-pleasers. In the above sense, then, a man may be a friend to many, even without being a man-pleaser, but really as a good man: but for

* The friendships of Saul and Jonathan, Damon and Pythias, Pylades and Orestes, and so forth.

* In a political sense, i.e. in the same sense in which a man may be said to have a love for his country. The feeling of patriotism is of a wider and more extensive kind, not so much a matter of personal attachment; or based, as friendship is, in personal qualities.
the sake of virtue and the persons themselves, it is impossible to be a friend to many; one must be content indeed to find a few such.

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CHAP. XI.

Whether Friends are more needed in Prosperity or in Adversity?

1. Is there greater need of friends in prosperity or in adversity? For they are sought for in both: since the unfortunate want assistance, and the fortunate want persons to live with and to benefit; for they wish to do good. It is more necessary to have them in adversity; whence in adversity there is need of useful friends; but it is more honourable to have them in prosperity; whence also the prosperous seek for good friends; since it is more desirable to benefit the good, and to live with them. Besides, the very presence of friends is pleasant both in prosperity and adversity; for those who are in pain feel relieved when their friends sympathize with them. Hence one might ask the question, whether they as it were share the burden; or whether perhaps it is not that, but that their presence being pleasant, and the idea of sympathy, make the pain less. Whether they feel relieved from this or any other cause, let us dismiss from our consideration; but what we stated is evidently the fact.

2. The presence of friends seems in a manner to cause a mixed feeling; for the fact of seeing friends is pleasant, and particularly to one in misfortune, and it becomes a kind of assistance, so as to prevent pain: since the sight and conversation of a friend is able to comfort us, if he has tact; for he knows the character of his friend, and what things give him pleasure and pain. But to perceive one's friend feeling pain at one's own misfortunes, is painful;
for every one avoids being the cause of pain to his friends. Therefore, those who are of a manly disposition are cautious how they let their friends share their pain; and unless a person is himself without sensibility, he cannot endure that his friends should feel pain on his account: nor does he at all call in fellow-mourners, because he is not given to mourning himself. But women and effeminate men delight in having people to mourn with them, and love them as friends and partners in affliction. But in every case we ought of course to imitate the best.

The presence of friends in prosperity makes us pass our time pleasantly, and makes us conscious that our friends are feeling pleasure at our good. Therefore, it would seem that we ought to invite friends to share our prosperity with alacrity; for it is an honourable thing to be ready to do good to others: but to share our adversity, we should invite them with reluctance, for we ought to share our misfortunes as little as possible: whence the saying,—

It is enough that I myself am unfortunate.

We should call them in especially, when they may render us great assistance, with a little trouble. We should perhaps, on the contrary, go to those who are in misfortune, without being called in, and with alacrity. For it becomes a friend to confer benefits, and particularly upon those who are in need, and did not ask it as a right: for in both cases it is more honourable and pleasant: but to those who are in prosperity, if it is to co-operate with them, we should go willingly; for this is the use of a friend: but if it is to enjoy their good fortune, we should go reluctantly; for it is not honourable to be anxious to receive assistance. But perhaps we must guard against appearing ungracious in our refusal; for this sometimes takes place. The presence of friends, then, is necessary under all circumstances.
CHAP. XII.

That the most desirable thing for friends is Intimacy.

1. Is it not the case, then, that as the sight of the beloved object is most desirable to lovers, and they choose that sense rather than the others, as if love derived from it especially its existence and its origin, so also society is most desirable to friends? for friendship is communion. And as we feel towards ourselves, so do we towards our friends; and with respect to ourselves, the perception of existence is desirable; it is the same, therefore,

2. with respect to our friends. But the energy of friendship consists in society; so that it is with reason that friends are desirous of it. And in whatever each thinks that existence consists, or on whatever account they choose life, in this they

3. wish to pass their time with their friends. Hence, some drink together, some dice together, others exercise and hunt together, or study philosophy together; each passing their time in the occupation which they like best of all things in life; for as they wish to live with their friends, they do and partake with them those things, by which they

4. think that they can live in intimacy. Therefore, the friendship of bad men becomes depraved: for they partake of what is bad, being unstable; and they become depraved, by growing like each other; but the friendship of good men is good, being

5. mutually increased by intercourse. Besides, men are thought to become better by energizing, and by correcting one another: for they receive an impress from each other in whatever they are pleased with: whence it is said,—

You will learn what is good from the good.

Of friendship, therefore, let so much be said. The next thing is to treat of the subject of pleasure.
BOOK X.

CHAP. I.

Of Pleasure.

After this, perhaps the next subject for discussion is pleasure; for it seems above everything else to be intimately connected with our nature. Hence, we educate the young, steering them, as it were, by pleasure and pain. It seems also to be of the greatest consequence towards laying the foundation of the moral character, that men should take delight in what they ought, and hate what they ought; for these feelings continue throughout life, carrying with them great weight and influence on the side of virtue and a happy life; for men deliberately choose what is pleasant, and avoid what is painful.

It would seem, then, that we ought by no means to pass over such subjects as these; especially as they involve much difference of opinion. For some say that pleasure is the chief good; others, on the contrary, that it is altogether bad; some of these last, perhaps, from a persuasion that it really is so; others, thinking that it is better in reference to human life, to declare pleasure to be among bad things, even if it be not so; because the mass of mankind have a propensity to it, and are slaves to

""The opinion that pleasure is the chief good had been much advanced by the efforts of Democritus, the Sophists, Aristippus, and others, and was entertained by many of the contemporaries of Aristotle and Plato. The dialogues of the latter are full of objections to this popular theory: but in none are they refuted with more care and labour than in the Philebus.""—Brewer. To this dialogue the ethical student is referred.
their pleasures; and therefore that it is right to draw them away to the opposite; by which means they would arrive at the mean. But perhaps this is not well said; for arguments about matters of feeling and action are less convincing than facts.

4. When, therefore, arguments are at variance with what is evident to the senses, they are despised, and are the destruction of the truth also; for if he who censures pleasure is ever seen to be desiring it, he appears to have a leaning towards it, as if all pleasure were of the same nature; for to draw nice distinctions is not the character of the multitude. True statements, therefore, seem not only to be the most useful for obtaining knowledge, but also for the regulation of life; for when they agree with facts, they are believed. Hence, men exhort those who understand them to live according to them. Enough, then, of such matters: let us now enumerate the doctrines which have been held on the subject of pleasure.

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CHAP. II.

Opinions held on the subject of Pleasure.

1. Eudoxus thought that pleasure was the chief good, because he saw all, both rational and irrational, seeking it; and in every case that which is

b The slightest inconsistency of conduct is fatal to the authority and influence of a moral teacher. If he warns his bearers against pleasure, and is then seen to devote himself to the pursuit of pleasure, even of an innocent kind, his arguments are ineffectual; and his warnings are unheeded, because the mass of mankind are unable to draw nice distinctions, and to distinguish between lawful and unlawful pleasures.

c Eudoxus was a native of Cnidus, who flourished about Ol. c. iii. (B.C. 366). He was a disciple of the geometrical Archytas, and subsequently of Plato, by whom he was accompanied in his travels to Egypt. He was the author of a work on astronomy, which was translated into verse by Aratus. See Matthiae’s History of Greek and Roman Lit., and Clinton’s Fasti, p. 366, note (e).
an object of choice is good, and that which is most prove that
so is the greatest good; consequently, he considered
that the fact of all having a bias towards the same
object proved that object to be the best for all;
because each finds what is good for himself, as he
does food; he argued, therefore, that what is good
to all, and what all aim at, was the chief good.

And his words were believed, more from the 2.
excellence of his moral character than for their
own sake; for he had the reputation of being
eminently temperate: it was therefore thought
that he did not use this language as being a friend
to pleasure, but that the case really was so. But 3.
he considered this doctrine to be no less evident
from considering the contrary of pleasure; for pain
is in itself an object shunned by all, and its contrary
is, in the same manner, an object chosen by all;
and that is especially an object of choice, which we
Third choose, not on account of anything else; but plea-
argument. sure is confessedly of this nature; for no one asks
for the sake of what he is pleased, as though he
knew that pleasure was eligible on its own account;
and pleasure, if added to any good whatsoever, Fourth
makes it more eligible; for instance, if added to
the act of justice or temperance; and good can
only be increased by the addition of itself.

This argument certainly seems to prove it to be 4.
amongst goods, but not more so than anything else;
for everything is more eligible when in conjunction
with another good, than when left alone. By a 5.
similar argument, indeed, Plato overthrows the idea
of pleasure being the chief good; because a plea-
sant life is more eligible when joined with prudence
than without; but if the union of the two is
better, pleasure simply cannot be the chief good;
for you can add nothing to the chief good which
will make it more eligible: and it is plain that
nothing else can be the chief good, which becomes
more eligible when joined to any of those things
which are eligible on their own account. What
is there, then, of this nature in which we can par-
ticipate? for such is the object of our inquiry. Those 6.
who insist that that is not a good which all aim at, must take care that what they say does not amount to nothing: for we assert that what all think, really be. And he who tries to overthrow this proof will not state any other more convincing; for if it had been said that irrational beings only sought pleasure, there might be something in the objection; but if rational beings also seek it, how can there be anything in what they say? And perhaps even in the inferior beings there is some natural good principle, superior to their general instincts, which aims at that good which is peculiarly suited to them.

7. Neither does what is said respecting the argument from the contrary appear to have any weight: for it is said that although pain be an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is a good; for evil is opposed to evil, and both are opposed to that which is neither good nor evil; in which they say what is by no means wrong in itself, but they do not happen to speak the truth in the case before us: for if both were evils, both must be objects of aversion; or if neither of them were, then neither would be; at least, they would be circumstances alike: but now it is evident that men avoid the one as an evil, and choose the other as a good: they are therefore opposed in the manner stated. 

The object of this chapter is as follows:—Aristotle is quite ready to allow that pleasure is a good, but not that it is the greatest good. Whilst, therefore, he is opposing Eudoxus, who held the latter opinion, he does not disagree with Plato, so far as he also is an opponent of Eudoxus, and denies that pleasure is the chief good. This, however, does not prevent him in the next chapter from objecting to and answering the arguments which Plato adduces to prove that pleasure is literally not a good, but an absolute evil. That it is an evil, is proved by Plato in the following syllogism:—

Whatever admits of more and less is indefinite—
  Pleasure admits of more and less—
Therefore pleasure is indefinite.

Whatever is indefinite is an evil—
  Pleasure is indefinite—
Therefore pleasure is an evil.
See the σύνεντης of the Pythagoreans.
CHAP. III.

Other Opinions on the subject of Pleasure.

Nor yet, because pleasure is not of the class of 1. qualities, is it for that reason not a good; for the energies of virtue are not qualities, nor is happiness. But it is said that good is definite, but pleasure indefinite, because it admits of degrees. Now, if this opinion is derived from the act of His second being pleased, the same thing will apply to justice and the other moral virtues (according to which it is evidently allowed that men become of a certain quality in each several virtue); for some men are just and brave in a greater degree: it is possible also to perform the acts of justice and temperance in a greater or less degree. But if what they say 3. applies to pleasure abstractedly, there is reason to fear that they do not state the cause, if pleasures are some unmixed, some mixed. But what reason is there why, as health, which is definite, admits of degrees, pleasure should not be definite and do so likewise? for there is not the same symmetrical arrangement in all men, nor in the same person

4 The arguments here refuted by Aristotle may be thus briefly stated:—(1.) All goods are qualities; pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good. (2.) Pleasure admits of degrees, therefore it is indefinite: now the Pythagoreans placed the indefinite (ἀφθαρσίας, ἀσυνέφρον) in their catalogue of evils. (3.) All motions are imperfect, and consequently all generation, which is a species of motion, is imperfect. But “good” is perfect; if, therefore, pleasure is a κίνδυνος, it is not a good. (4.) The same argument applies to ἀναπλήρως, which is a γίνους.

The following are the subdivisions of κίνδυνος given in the Categories, c. xi., and quoted by Chase in the notes to his translation.

"From not being to being.—Generation.
From being to not being.—Destruction.
From being to being more.—Increase.
From being to being less.—Decrease.
From being here to being there.—Change of place.
From being in this way to being in that way.—Alteration."
is there always the same, but although relaxed, still health continues up to a certain point, and differs in degree. It is possible, then, that the case of pleasure may be the same.

4. Assuming the chief good to be perfect, and motions and generations to be imperfect, they attempt to prove pleasure to be a motion and a generation. But it seems that what they say is not correct, and that it is not a motion: for quickness and slowness appear to belong to every motion; if not absolutely, as in the motion of the universe, yet relatively.

5. Now, neither of these conditions belongs to pleasure; for it is possible to become pleased quickly; as it is to become angry; but not to feel pleasure quickly, not even relatively; but it is possible to walk, or to grow, and so forth, quickly or slowly. It is possible, therefore, to change into a state of pleasure quickly or slowly; but to energize according to it quickly is not possible (by which expression I mean, “to be pleased”).

6. How also can it be a generation? for it appears that not anything is generated from anything; but from whatever it is generated, into that it is dissolved; and yet that which pleasure generates, pain destroys. And again, it is said that pain is a want of which that is according to nature, and that pleasure is the supplying of that want. But these are bodily affections; consequently, if pleasure is the supplying of that which nature requires, that must feel the pleasure in which the supply takes place; that is, the body must feel it. This does not seem to be the case; therefore, pleasure is not the supplying of a want; but when the supply has taken place, then a man will feel pleasure; and when the supply is cut off, he will feel pain. This opinion

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* Everything which is generated is dissolved into the elements out of which it was originally produced. This process, which is opposite to γίνεσθαι, is termed φθορά. Pleasure cannot therefore be a γίνεντο, because it produces nothing which can be dissolved into its original elements. In fact, on the contrary, the sensations which pleasure generate, pain, and not pleasure, destroys.
seems to have originated in the pains and pleasures of connected with food: for when men are in want, and have previously felt pain, they feel pleasure at having the want supplied.

This does not happen in all pleasures: for the pleasures of mathematical studies are without pain; and the pleasures of the senses, those which come by smelling are so: and so are sounds, and sights, and many recollections also, and hopes. Of what, then, will these be generations? for there have been no wants of anything to be supplied.

In answer to those who bring forward reprehensible pleasures, one might say, that these are not pleasant; for we must not think that because they are pleasant to ill-disposed persons, they are also pleasant in themselves, except to these particular persons; in the same way as we must not think those things wholesome, or sweet, or bitter, which are so to the sick: nor those white, which appear so to those who suffer from ophthalmia. Or should this be said, that pleasures are eligible, but not from these sources; just as wealth is eligible, but not to one who gets it by treason; or health, but not to one who gets it by eating all kinds of things? Or may it be said that pleasures differ in kind? for those which proceed from honourable sources differ from those which proceed from disgraceful ones; and it is impossible to feel the pleasure of the just man without being just, or that of the musician, without being musical: and so on in other cases.

But the difference which exists between a friend and a flatterer seems to prove either that pleasure is not a good, or that pleasures are different in kind; for the former seems to associate with a view to the good, the latter with a view to pleasure; and the latter is reproached, but the former is praised; as associating with a different motive.

Again, no one would choose to live, having the intellect of a child all his life long, taking pleasure in those things which please children, even if that pleasure were the highest possible; nor to take
delight in doing anything disgraceful, even if he
was never to feel pain for so doing. Besides, we
should be diligent about many things, even if they
brought no pleasure; as about seeing, remembering,
knowing, possessing virtue. But whether pleasures
are consequent upon these things of necessity or
no, makes no difference; for we should choose them,
even if pleasure did not result from them. Conse-
Conclusion. quently, that pleasure is not the chief good, nor
every pleasure eligible, seems to be evident: and
that some are eligible for their own sakes, differing
either in kind, or in the source from whence they
are derived. Let this, then, be sufficient as to the
opinions which have been entertained upon the
subject of pleasure and pain.

CHAP. IV.

What Pleasure is, and that it renders perfect every energy.

1. What the genus or species of pleasure is, will be-
come more evident if we resume the subject from
the beginning. For vision seems to be perfect at any
period of time;¹ for it is not in want of anything,
which by coming afterwards will make its species
perfect. But pleasure resembles this; for it is a
whole; and we cannot at any particular time re-
ceive pleasure, the species of which would be per-
fected if it lasted a longer time. Therefore it is
not a motion; for every motion takes place in time,
and has some end in view; as, for instance, the
motion of building: and it is perfect, when it has
produced what it aims at; or in the whole time of
its being built.² But in separate portions of the

¹ See Addison’s beautiful paper on the perfection of sight,
in the Spectator, No. 411.
² The reading here adopted of this somewhat obscure pas-
sage is that approved by Michelet, who says, with truth, that
it is the only reading which conveys any sense. The argument
is as follows:—Pleasure is perfect at any moment; whereas,
whole time, all the motions are imperfect, and differ in species from the whole motion, and from one another; for the putting of the stones together is different from the fluting of the column, and these again differ from the building of the whole temple. And the building of the temple is perfect: because it wants nothing towards the end proposed; but the construction of the foundation and the triglyph is imperfect: for each belongs only to a part. Consequently they differ in species; and it is not possible at any particular time to take a motion which is perfect in its species; but if ever we can, it must be in the whole time.

It is the same in walking, and every other motion. For if motion be the moving from one part of space to another, there must be also specific differences of motion; as flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only thus, but even in walking itself; for the whence and the whither are not the same in the whole stadium, and in part of the stadium, or in one part of it and the other. Nor is it the same thing to cross this line or that; for a person not only crosses a line, but a line in a particular place; and this is in a different place from that. We have treated accurately of motion in another place.\(^b\)

It seems, however, not to be perfect in every part of time, but that the greater number of motions are imperfect and different in species, if the whence and the whither constitute species. But the species of pleasure is perfect at any time whatsoever. It is plain, therefore, that pleasure and motion must be different from each other, and that pleasure, e.g. the act of building, is imperfect at the end of any portion of time, and not perfect until the whole time of building is completed. With respect to the architectural terms here used, the παγωτὴς is the base (the shoe as it were, in French le soc) of the column. Πάγωσις by some has been understood to mean the levelling or erecting the column, by others the measuring it with a wand. Its true meaning is the fluting; in French cremaillère.

\(^b\) In his Physics, Books III. and IV.
Sure is of the number of things entire and perfect. This also would appear from the fact of its being impossible to move except in time, but we may feel pleasure without reference to time; for that which is felt at any particular moment is something entire.

9. But from all this it is clear, that it is incorrectly said that pleasure is a motion or generation; for these terms are not applied to everything, but only to those things which are divisible and not entire: for there is no generation of vision, nor of a point, nor of a unit: nor is any one of these a motion or generation, nor consequently is there a motion or generation of pleasure; for it is something entire.

10. But since every perception energizes with reference to its object, and that energizes perfectly which is well-disposed with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it (for this more than anything else appears to be the nature of a perfect energy; and whether we say that the perception energizes, or that in which the perception resides, makes no difference: but in everything the energy is best of that which is well-disposed with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it): this must be the most perfect and the most pleasant: for pleasure is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of intellect and contemplation; but the most perfect is the most pleasant, and the most perfect is the energy of that which is well-disposed with reference to the best of all the objects which fall under it. Pleasure, therefore, perfects the energy: but pleasure does not perfect it in the same manner that the object and the perceptive faculty do if they are good; just as health and the physician are not in the same manner causes of a person being healthy.¹

12. But that there is a pleasure in every act of the per-

¹ The physician is what the logicians call the efficient cause, whilst health is the formal cause, of our being healthy. In like manner, the object is the efficient cause, pleasure the formal cause.
ceptive faculty is evident: for we say that sights and sounds are pleasant: and it is also evident that this is most so, when the perceptive faculty is the best, and energizes upon the best object. When the object perceived, and the faculty which perceives it, are of this nature, there will always be pleasure as long as there are an agent and a patient. Again, pleasure makes the energy complete, not as the inherent habit would, but as some end added to it; it is just what the freshness of youth is to those in the prime of life.

As long, therefore, as the object of perception or intellect be such as it ought to be, as also the faculty which judges or contemplates, there will be pleasure in the energy: for when the patient and the agent are similar, and correspond to one another, the same effect is naturally produced. Why, then, is no one continually pleased? is it that he becomes fatigued? for no human faculties have the power of energizing continually. Pleasure, therefore, cannot result, for it follows the energy.

But some things cause delight when they are new, and for the same reason they do not cause it in the same degree afterwards; for at first the intellect is awakened, and energizes intensely in them, as, in the case of sight, those do, who look steadfastly; but afterwards the energy is not of the same kind, but relaxed, and therefore the pleasure also becomes dulled. But one might imagine that all men seek pleasure, because all are desirous of life; and life is a kind of energy; and every one energizes upon and with those things which he loves best; as, for example, the musician, with his hearing upon music; the studious man, with his intellect, upon matters of speculation; and so on with the rest. But pleasure makes the energy perfect, and therefore it makes life perfect, which men desire. It is with reason, therefore, that they also desire pleasure; for it makes life, which is eligible, perfect to each one. But let the question, whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure, or

Pleasure perfects the energy, not as an inherent habit, but as an end added to it. It is not continuous.
pleasure for the sake of life, be dismissed for the present, for these seem to be intimately connected, and not to admit of separation; for without an energy pleasure is not produced, and pleasure perfects every energy.

CHAP. V.

That Pleasures differ in species.

1. Hence also pleasures seem to differ in species; for we think that things which differ in species are made perfect by different things: for such seems to be the case with natural and artificial productions, as animals and trees, and paintings and statues, and houses and furniture. And also we think that energies, which differ in species, are made perfect by things which differ in species. But the energies of the intellect differ from the energies of the senses, and each of these differ from one another in species; consequently the pleasures which perfect them differ.

3. This would also appear from the intimate connection subsisting between each pleasure and the energy which it perfects; for the appropriate pleasure contributes to increase the energy; for persons who energize with pleasure judge of everything and perform everything with a higher degree of accuracy; as those who take pleasure in geometry become geometers, and comprehend everything more distinctly. So also those who are fond of music, or fond of building, and so forth, make a progress in their peculiar employment, because they take pleasure in it. Pleasures, therefore, contribute to increase the energy; but what contributes to increase must be intimately connected; and things which are intimately connected with objects differing in species, must themselves also differ in species.
Again, this would appear still more plainly from the fact that pleasures arising from other sources are impediments to energies; for those who love music cannot pay attention to conversation if they hear any one playing, because they take more pleasure in music than in the energy in which they are engaged. The pleasure, therefore, which is attendant upon music, destroys the energy which was employed in conversation. It is the same in every other case, when a man is employed upon two subjects at once: for the pleasure of energy drives out the other; and if there is a great difference as to the pleasure, so much the more, so that he cannot energize at all upon the other. When, therefore, we take very great delight in anything, we cannot do anything else at all; and it is only when we are but moderately pleased with one thing, that we employ ourselves in another; just as persons who eat sweetmeats in the theatre do so most when the actors are bad. But since the pleasure properly belonging to them makes the energies accurate, and more lasting, and better, but the pleasures arising from anything else spoil them, it is evident that they are very distinct. For pleasures arising from something else produce nearly the same effect as pains arising from the thing itself; for energies are destroyed by the pains which belong to them; for instance, if writing or reasoning is unpleasant and painful to any one, he does not write or reason, because the energy is painful. The contrary effect, therefore, is produced on energies by the pleasures and pains which properly belong to them: but those properly belong to the energy, which follow upon it independently of anything else. It has been said also, that pleasures arising from other objects produce nearly the same effect as pain; for they destroy the energy, but not in the same way.

But since energies differ in goodness or badness, and some are to be chosen, some to be avoided, and others neither, the pleasures also are related in the
same way; for there is a pleasure properly belonging to every energy. That, therefore, which is proper to the good energy is good, and that which is proper to the bad energy is bad; for the desires of honourable things are praiseworthy, the desires of disgraceful ones to be blamed. But the pleasures, which are contained in the energies, more properly belong to them than the desires; for the latter are distinct both as to time and nature; but the former follow closely upon the energies, and are so inseparable from them, that it is questionable whether the energy is not the same as the pleasure. It appears, however, that pleasure is not an operation of intellect or of the senses; for that would be absurd; but because they are not separated, they appear to some to be identical.

11. As, therefore, the energies are different, so are the pleasures. Now sight differs from touch in purity, and hearing and smelling differ from taste; their pleasures, therefore, differ in the same way; and the pleasures of the intellect differ from these, and each differs from the other. There seems to be a pleasure properly belonging to every animal, as there is to each its proper work; for it is that which is according to its energy. And if we examine each case separately by itself, this would seem to be the case, for the pleasures of a horse, of a dog, and of a man differ: as Heraclitus says, that an ass would prefer litter to gold; for food is pleasanter than gold to asses. The pleasures, therefore, of things which differ in kind are different also; but it is reasonable to expect that the pleasures of the same things should not differ. But they differ in no slight degree, at least in the case of men; for the same things give pain to some, and pleasure to others; and to some they are painful and objects of hate, to others pleasant and objects of love. The case is also the same in sweet things; for the same things are not thought sweet by a man in a fever, and a man in health; nor is the same thing thought warm by an invalid and by
a man in a good state of body: the same also is the case with everything else. But in all such instances, that is thought to be the truth which appears so to the good man.

If this is well said, as it appears to be, and if excellence, and the good man, so far forth as he is good, are the measure of everything: those must be pleasures which appear so to him, and those things pleasant in which he delights. But if what is disagreeable to him seems pleasant to any one, it is no wonder; for there are many things which deprave and injure men; but such things are not pleasant, except to those men, and to others who are so disposed. With respect to those pleasures which are confessedly disgraceful, it is evident that we must not call them pleasures except to the depraved. But of those pleasures which seem to be good, what particular one or what kind must we say is the pleasure of man? or is not this plain from the energies? for pleasures follow upon them. Whether, then, there be one or more energies of the perfect and perfectly happy man, the pleasures which perfect them must properly be said to be the pleasures of man; and the rest must be so in a secondary or even very inferior degree, just as the energies are.

CHAP. VI.

On Happiness.

Since we have spoken of the virtues, of the different kinds of friendships, and of pleasures, it remains that we should discuss the subject of happiness in outline, since we assumed this to be the end of

The original is ἀπλοτθης, for which we have no equivalent in English. We could use the expression "lower in an infinitesimal degree;" but we cannot say "a multesimal degree." This, however, would exactly express the signification of the Greek.

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\( \text{t} 2 \)
human actions. Therefore, if we recapitulate what has been said before, the argument will be more concise.

2. We have said that it is not a habit; for if it were, it might exist in a man who slept throughout his life, living the life of a plant, and suffering the greatest misfortunes. If, then, this does not please us, but if we must rather bring it under a kind of energy, as was said before; and if, of energies, some are necessary and eligible for the sake of something else, others are eligible for their own sakes; it is plain that we must consider happiness as one of those which are eligible for their own sakes, and not one of those which are eligible for the sake of something else; for happiness is in want of nothing, but is self-sufficient.

3. Now those energies are eligible for their own sakes, from which nothing more is sought for beyond the energy. But of this kind, actions done according to virtue seem to be: for the performance of honourable and good acts is amongst things eligible for their own sakes. And of amusements, those are eligible for their own sakes which are pleasant: for men do not choose these for the sake of anything else; for they are rather injured by them than benefited, since they neglect their persons and property. But the majority of those who are called happy fly to such pastimes as these; and, therefore, those who have a happy turn for such pastimes as these are in favour with tyrants; for they make themselves agreeable in those things which tyrants desire; and such are the men they want.

4. These things are thought to belong to happiness, because those who are in power pass their leisure in them. But such men are perhaps no proof; for neither virtue nor intellect consists in having power, and from these two good energies proceed; nor if

1 Necessary does not here imply necessary per se (innere Nothwendigkeit), but means and instruments necessary to the accomplishment of some end.—Michelet.
those, who have never tasted pure and liberal pleasure, fly to bodily pleasures, must we therefore think that these pleasures are more eligible; for children think those things which are esteemed by them the best. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose, that as the things which appear honourable to children and men differ, so also those which appear so to the bad and the good will differ likewise, and therefore, as we have very often said, those things are honourable and pleasant which are so to the good man. But to every man that energy is most eligible which is according to his proper habit; and, therefore, to the good man, that is most eligible which is according to virtue.

Consequently happiness does not consist in amusement; for it is absurd that the end should be amusement; and that men should toil and suffer inconvenience all their life long for the sake of amusement; for we choose everything, as we might say, for the sake of something else, except happiness; for that is an end. But to be serious and to labour for the sake of amusement appears foolish and very childish. But to amuse ourselves in order that we may be serious, as Anacharsis said, seems to be right: for amusement resembles relaxation. Relaxation, therefore, is not the end, for we have recourse to it for the sake of the energy. But the happy life seems to be according to virtue; and this is serious, and does not consist in amusement.

We say also that serious things are better than those which are ridiculous and joined with amusement; and that the energy of the better part and of the better man is more serious; and the energy of the better man is at once superior, and more tending to happiness. Besides, any person whatever, even a slave, may enjoy bodily pleasures no less than the best man; but no one allows that a slave partakes of happiness except so far as that he partakes of life: for happiness does not consist in such modes of passing life, but in energies according to virtue, as has been said already.
CHAP. VII.

On Contemplative Happiness.

1. If happiness be an energy according to virtue, it is reasonable to suppose that it is according to the best virtue; and this must be the virtue of the best part of man. Whether, then, this best part be the intellect, or something else—which is thought naturally to bear rule and to govern, and to possess ideas upon honourable and divine subjects; or whether it is itself divine, or the most divine of any property which we possess; the energy of this part according to its proper virtue must be perfect happiness: and that this energy is contemplative has been stated. This also would seem to agree with what was said before, and with the truth: for this energy is the noblest; since the intellect is the noblest thing within us, and of subjects of knowledge, those are noblest with which the intellect is conversant.

It is also most continuous; for we are better able to contemplate continuously than to do anything else continuously. We think also that pleasure must be united to happiness: but of all the energies according to virtue, that according to wisdom is confessedly the most pleasant: at any rate, wisdom seems to contain pleasures worthy of admiration, both in point of purity and stability: and it is reasonable to suppose that this mode of life should be pleasanter to those who know it than to those who are only seeking it. Again, that which is called self-sufficiency must be most concerned with contemplative happiness; for both the wise man and the just, and all others, need the necessaries of life; but supposing them to be sufficiently supplied with such goods, the just man requires persons towards whom and with whom he may act justly; and in like manner the temperate man, and the brave.
man, and so on with all the rest. But the wise man, if even by himself, is able to contemplate; and the more so the wiser he is; perhaps he will energize better, if he has co-operators, but nevertheless he is most self-sufficient. This would seem also to be the only energy which is loved for its own sake; for it has no result beyond the act of contemplation; but from the active energies, we gain more or less beyond the performance of the action.

Happiness seems also to consist in leisure; for we are busy in order that we may have leisure; and we go to war in order that we may be at peace. Now the energies of the active virtues are exerted in political or military affairs; and the actions with respect to these are thought to allow of no leisure. Certainly military actions altogether exclude it; for no one chooses war, nor makes preparations for war for the sake of war; for a man would be thought perfectly defiled with blood, if he made his friends enemies in order that there might be battles and massacres. The energy of the statesman is also without leisure; and besides the actual administration of the state, the statesman seeks to gain power and honours, or at least happiness for himself and his fellow-citizens, different from the happiness of the state, which we are in search of, clearly as being different.

If, then, of all courses of action which are according to the virtues, those which have to do with politics and war excel in beauty and greatness; and these have no leisure, and aim at some end, and are not chosen for their own sakes; but the energy of the intellect is thought to be superior in intensity, because it is contemplative; and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have a pleasure properly belonging to it; and if this increases the energy; and if self-sufficiency, and leisure, and freedom from cares (as far as anything human can be free), and everything which is attributed to the happy man, evidently exist in this energy; then this must be the perfect happiness of man, when it attains the
end of life complete; for nothing is incomplete of those things which belong to happiness.

10. But such a life would be better than man could attain to; for he would live thus, not so far forth as he is man, but as there is in him something divine. But so far as this divine part surpasses the whole compound nature, so far does its energy surpass the energy which is according to all other virtues. If, then, the intellect be divine when compared with man, the life also, which is in obedience to that, will be divine when compared with human life.

11. But a man ought not to entertain human thoughts, as some would advise, because he is human, nor mortal thoughts, because he is mortal: but as far as it is possible he should make himself immortal, and do everything with a view to living in accordance with the best principle in him; although it be small in size, yet in power and value it is far more excellent than all. Besides, this would seem to be each man's "self," if it really is the ruling and the better part. It would be absurd, therefore, if a man were to choose not his own life, but the life of some other thing. And what was said before will apply now; for that which peculiarly belongs to each by nature, is best and most pleasant to every one; and consequently to man, the life according to intellect is most pleasant, if intellect especially constitutes Man. This life, therefore, is the most happy.

* Compare what Cicero says respecting the Stoics (de Fin. V. iv.): "Vita autem debet esse quae maxime quidem illis placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitio posita rerum: quae qua deorum cett vita simillima, sapiens visum est dignissima, atque his de rebus et splendidia est eorum et illustris oratio."—Brewer.

* Compare Hor. Od. IV. vii.:

  "Immortalia tu spes, moneta annas, et alnum
  Quae rapit hora diem."
CHAP. VIII.

Continuation of the same subject.

But that life which is according to the other kind of virtue, occupies the second place in respect to happiness; for the energies according to it are belonging to human nature; for we do what is just and brave, and everything else which is in accordance with the virtues, one towards another, in our dealings and our needs, and in actions and passions of every kind, observing what is becoming to each. But all these appear to belong to human nature; in some points moral virtue even seems to be the consequence of our corporeal nature, and, in many, to be intimately connected with the passions. Prudence also is closely united to moral virtue, and moral virtue to prudence; if the principles of prudence are in accordance with the moral virtues, and the correctness of the moral virtues in accordance with prudence. But these are knit together with the passions, and must relate to the whole compound nature of man; and the virtues of the compound nature are human; and therefore the life according to them, and the happiness according to them, are human. But the happiness of the intellect is separate; and let it be enough to have said thus much about it, since extreme exactness is beyond the subject proposed.

Intellectual happiness also would seem to require external good in a small degree, or in a less degree than moral happiness. For let it be granted that both equally stand in need of the necessaries of life (even though he who is engaged in social duties

- Moral virtue chooses the right end; prudence directs us in the choice of the right means to that end; each is therefore imperfect without the other, and hence the intimate and inseparable union between the two of which Aristotle here speaks.
employs himself more about the body, and things of that kind, for there would be some little difference), yet with respect to the energies there will be a great difference; for the liberal man will want money in order to perform liberal acts, and the just man will want means to make returns, for wishes are uncertain, and even the unjust pretend that they wish to act justly; the brave man also will want power, if he is to perform anything according to his virtue; and the temperate man will want an opportunity to show his temperance. For, otherwise, how will he or any other character be known.

6. A question has arisen, whether the deliberate preference, or the actions themselves, have the greater influence over virtue, since it consists in both: now it is evident that its perfection must reside in both; but for the perfection of actions, many things are needed; and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But the contemplative man requires no such things, at least, to perform his energy; but they are, so to speak, impediments, at least they are so to his contemplation. So far forth as he is man, and associates with many, he chooses to perform acts of moral virtue; he will therefore require such things in order to maintain his character as a man.

7. That perfect happiness is a kind of contemplative energy, might be shown also from the following considerations; that we suppose the gods to be preeminently blessed and happy. But what moral actions can we attribute to them? shall they be just actions; or will it not appear ridiculous to represent them as making bargains, and restoring deposits, and so forth? Shall we, then, attribute to them courageous acts, making them undergo formidable things, and meet danger, because it is honourable? or liberal acts? But to whom will they give? and it is absurd to suppose that they have money, or anything of that sort. But if we say that they are temperate, what would that mean? is not the praise
absurd, because they have not bad desires? And if we went through every case, moral actions would seem insignificant, and unworthy of gods. But yet all suppose that they live, and therefore energize; for we do not imagine that they sleep like Endymion. To him, therefore, who lives, if we take away moral action, and still more so, production, what is left besides contemplation? So that the energy of the Deity, as it surpasses all others in blessedness, must be contemplative: and therefore, of human energies, that which is nearest allied to this must be the happiest.

A proof of this also is, that other animals do not partake of happiness which are deprived altogether of such an energy. For to the gods, their whole life is blessed; and to men, as far as there belongs to them some resemblance to such an energy: but no other animal is happy, because they in no way partake of contemplation. As far, therefore, as contemplation extends, so far does happiness; and whoever have more capacity for contemplation, have more happiness, not accidentally, but in the way of contemplation itself, for it is of itself valuable. So that happiness must be a kind of contemplation.

* How much more philosophical are the following observations of Bishop Butler on the happiness of heaven (Anal. Part I. c. v.):—“Nor is our ignorance, what will be the employment of this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance, what particular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity, amongst the members of it with regard to each other, any proof that there will be no sphere of exercise for those virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character which is formed by the daily practice of those virtues here, and which is a result from it. This at least must be owned in general, that, as the government established in the universe is moral, the character of virtue and piety must, in some way or other, be the condition of our happiness, or the qualification for it.”

* The story of Endymion is well known. Cicero alludes to it in his De Finibus, V. xx.:—“Itaque ne si jucundissimis quidem nos somnis usuos putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velitum dari: idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus.”
14. The happy man will need external prosperity, so far forth as he is man; for human nature is not sufficient of itself for contemplation; but the body must be in health, and it must have food and all other care and attendance. We must not however imagine that the person who is to be happy will want many and great goods, because we say that without external good he can be blessed; for self-sufficiency does not consist in excess, nor does action. But it is possible to perform honourable things without being lord of earth and sea; for a man may be able to act according to virtue with moderate means. We may see this plainly: for private individuals are thought to perform good acts no less than men in power, but even more so. And it is sufficient to have a competence, for the life of that man will be happy, who energizes according to virtue. Solon also perhaps gave a good description of the happy man, when he said, that in his opinion it was he who was moderately supplied with external goods, who had done the most honourable deeds, and lived temperately; for it is possible that men who have moderate possessions should do what they ought. Anaxagoras also seems to have conceived the happy man to be neither rich nor powerful, when he said, that he should not be surprised if he was thought absurd by the multitude: for they judge by externals, having a perception of such things only.

15. The opinions of wise men, therefore, seem to agree with what has been said; such statements, therefore, carry with them some weight. But we judge of truth, in practical matters, from facts and from life, for on them the decisive point turns; and we ought to try all that has been said by applying it to facts and to life; and if our arguments agree

*The meaning of this passage is, that Anaxagoras evidently did not think that riches or power constituted happiness; because, he said, that if he was asked who was a happy man, he should probably point out one whom the world would consider foolish and absurd.
with facts, we may receive them; but if they are at variance, we must consider them as mere words. He also who energizes according to intellect, and pays attention to that, and has it in the best state, is likely to be most beloved by the gods; for if any regard is paid to human affairs by the gods, as it is thought that there is, it is reasonable to suppose that they would take pleasure in what is the best and nearest allied to themselves: but this must be the intellect; and that they would be kind in return to those who love and honour this most, as to persons who pay attention to their friends, and who act rightly and honourably. But that all these qualities especially belong to the wise man, is quite clear; it is probable, therefore, that he is at the same time most dear to the gods, and most happy; so that even in this way the wise man must be the happiest man.

CHAP. IX.

That it is not sufficient to be acquainted with the Theory of Virtue, but to possess Virtue, and practise it.

If, then, we have spoken at sufficient length of these matters, and of the virtues, and also of friendship and pleasure, must we think that our original plan is completed? or is the end in practical matters, according to the common saying, not the contemplating and knowing all things, but rather the practising them? If so, it is not sufficient to know the theory of virtue, but we must endeavour to possess and employ it; or pursue whatever other means there may be of becoming good. Now, if mere treatises were sufficient of themselves to make men good, justly " would they have received many and great rewards," as Theognis says, and it would

* This chapter is the connecting link between the Ethics and Politics.

** The passage to which Aristotle alludes is as follows:—
3. be our duty to provide ourselves with them. But
the truth is, that they seem to have power to urge
on and to excite young men of liberal minds, and
to make a character that is generous and truly fond
of the honourable, easily influenced by virtue; but
that they have no power to persuade the multitude

to what is virtuous and honourable. For it is not
the nature of the masses to obey a sense of shame,
but fear: nor to abstain from vicious things because
it is disgraceful, but for fear of punishments; for
they live according to the dictates of passion, and
pursue their own peculiar pleasures, and the means
of gratifying them; they fly also from the contrary
pains; but of what is honourable and truly pleasant,
they have no idea, inasmuch as they never had a
taste for them. What reasoning, then, can effect a
change in such men as these? for it is not possible,
or at least not easy, to alter what has been for a
long time impressed upon the moral character; but
it is perhaps a great thing, if, when everything is
present by which we are thought to become good,
we can partake of virtue.

4. But it is thought that men become good, some
by nature, others by practice, others by teaching.
Now it is plain that whatever belongs to nature is
not in our own power, but exists by some divine
causes in those who are truly fortunate. But rea-
soning and teaching, it is to be feared, will not
avail in every case, but the mind of the hearer must
be previously cultivated by habits to feel pleasure
and aversion properly, just as the soil must, which
nourishes the seed. For he who lives in obedience
to passion, would not listen to reasoning which
turns him from it; nay, more, he would not under-
stand it. And how is it possible to change the
convictions of such a man as this? On the whole,
it appears that passion does not submit to reasoning,
but to force. There must, therefore, previously exist

"If to the sons of Æsculapius had been given
To cure the vices and bad hearts of men,
Many and great would their rewards have been."
a character in some way connected with virtue, loving what is honourable, and hating what is disgraceful. But to meet with right education in the path of virtue from childhood is difficult, unless one is brought up under such laws: for to live temperately and patiently is not pleasant to the majority, and especially to the young. Therefore, education and institutions ought to be regulated by law; for they will not be painful when they have become familiar.

Perhaps it is not sufficient that we should meet with good education and attention when young; but since when we arrive at manhood we ought also to study and practise what we have learnt, we should require laws also for this purpose: in short, we should want laws relating to the whole of life; for the masses are obedient to compulsion rather than to reason, and to punishments rather than to the principle of honour. Therefore, some think that legislators ought to exhort to virtue, and to urge men on by appealing to the principle of honour, since those who are good in their practice will obey when they are led; but to impose chastisements and punishments on those who are disobedient and naturally indisposed to virtue, and to banish altogether the incurable; because he who is good, and lives with regard to the principle of honour; will obey reason; but the bad man desires pleasure, and is corrected by pain, like a beast of

1 In the original, κατοκόρωνος, from κατάγω. Hence the signification of the word is, so disposed as to be restrained or kept in check by virtuous principles.

2 It is remarkable to observe how little practical benefit the moral philosophers of antiquity seem to have felt would be derived from their writings; what faint motives they could urge to influence the generality of mankind. For how far could the love of virtue in itself urge men to become virtuous, who had no taste for virtue? The very fact of loving virtue for virtue's sake, pre-supposes a proficiency in morals far beyond the general state of mankind. Some other motive was then clearly necessary for men sunk in vice as the heathen world, a powerful motive, which no heathen, no human philosophy, could supply.
11. Burthen. Therefore, it is a common saying, that the pains ought to be such as are most opposed to the pleasures which are loved.

12. Now, then, as has been said, he that is to be a good man must have been educated well, and have been made to form good habits, and thus continue to live under good institutions, and never practise what is bad, either involuntarily or voluntarily; and this is to be done by living in obedience to some intelligent principle, and some right regulation, which has the power of enforcing its decrees. But the paternal authority has no strength, nor compulsory force; nor, in short, the authority of any one man, unless he is a king, or some one of that sort; but the law does possess a compulsory power, since it is reason proceeding from a certain prudence and intelligence; and besides, men hate those individuals who oppose their appetites, even if they do it rightly; but the law is not odious when it prescribes what is good. In the city of Lacedæmon alone, with a few others, the legislator seems to have paid attention to education and institutions; whilst in most states such matters have been neglected, and each lives as he pleases, like the Cyclops,

"Administering the law for his children and wife."

13. Education the duty of the state.

14. It would therefore be best that the state should pay attention to education, and on right principles, and that it should have power to enforce it: but if neglected as a public measure, it would seem to be the duty of every individual to contribute to the virtue of his children and friends, or at least to make this his deliberate purpose.

15. From what has been said, it would seem that a man would be best able to do this if he made himself fit for legislation: for public systems of educa-

"Each rules his race, his neighbour not his care;
Headless of others, to his own severe."

Pope, Hom. Od. ix.

So also Juvenal (Sat. xiv.) describes a domestic tyrant as "Antipates trempi larus, ac Polyphemus."
tion are evidently made by the laws; and those are
good which are made by good laws. But, whether
these laws be written or unwritten would seem to
make no difference; nor whether they are those by
which one or many persons are to be educated, as
it makes no difference in music, in gymnastics, and
other branches of education. For in the same way that legal enactments and customs have authority
in states, so also the words of a father, and customs,
have authority in private families; and still greater
authority on account of the relationship, and the
benefits conferred: for children have a natural affection for their parents, and are naturally disposed
to obey. Moreover, private education differs from
public; as is the case in medicine; for universally
abstinence and rest are good for a man in a fever;
but to a particular individual perhaps they are not;
and the pugilist perhaps does not use the same style
of fighting with all. It would seem, therefore, that
the case of the individual might be studied with
greater accuracy, if the education was private; for
then each is more likely to meet with what suits him. But still a physician, or a gymnastic master,
or any other master, would take the best care of the
individual, if he knew the general rule, namely,
what is good for all men, or for all of a certain
class: for the sciences are said, and with truth, to
have to do with general rules.

Nevertheless, perhaps, there is nothing to hinder
one from taking good care of an individual, even if
one has no scientific knowledge, but only accurately
examines by experience what happens to each
individual; as some physicians seem to be the best
physicians to themselves, although they are not at all able to assist another. Perhaps it may be
thought that he who wishes to become skilled in
art, or fit to study any subject theoretically, should
no less have recourse to the universal, and make
himself acquainted with it, as far as may be; for
we have said that the sciences have to do with the
universal. And perhaps he who wishes to make the study
of legis-


men better by education, whether many or few, should endeavour to become fit for the duties of a legislator, if it is by laws that we become good. For to give a good disposition to any one, and to the particular person intrusted to him, is not in the power of every one, but if of any, it is in the power of him who possesses knowledge: as is the case in medicine and other arts, in which it is possible to study and become wise.

22. Should we not, then, after this, ascertain from what sources, and by what means, a man might become fitted for the duties of a legislator, or, as in other cases, must he learn the science of legislation from those who are skilled in politics? for it was supposed to be a part of political science. Or does the case of political science appear to be different from that of the other sciences and faculties? for in the others the same men seem to teach the faculties, and energize upon them; as, for example, physicians and painters. Now the sophists profess to teach politics, but not one of them is a practical politician; statesmen do this, who would seem to do it in consequence of a kind of faculty, and from experience rather than on any intellectual principle: for they do not seem to write or to speak upon such subjects (and yet it would perhaps be a more honourable employment than to make forensic speeches and public harangues): nor do they seem to make their own sons, or any others of their friends, politicians. But it is reasonable to suppose that they would do so if they could; for they could not have left any better legacy to their fellow-citizens, nor could they have wished any better thing for themselves than this faculty, nor consequently to their best friends.

24. However, experience seems to contribute not a little; for otherwise men would not become better politicians by being accustomed to political affairs. It seems, therefore, that those who are desirous of knowledge on political science, need also experience.

25. But those sophists who profess it, seem to be very
far from teaching it: for they do not at all know either what is its specific nature, nor what is its object-matter: for else they would not have assumed it to be the same with rhetoric, or even worse; nor would they have thought that it is easy to legislate, merely by making a collection of approved laws, because it is possible to select the best; as if this selection were not a work requiring intelligence; and as if a correct discrimination were not of the utmost importance here, just as it is in music. For the experienced form a right 27. judgment of works in every case, and understand by what means, or how they will be accomplished, and what sort of things harmonize with each other; but the inexperienced may be contented, if they are not ignorant whether the work is executed well or ill, as in the case of painting. Now, laws are, 28. as it appears, "the works" of political science. How then can a man from the study of these become fit for the duties of a legislator, or select the best? for it does not appear that men become physicians from studying prescriptions; and yet the authors endeavour to state not only the cases, but also in what manner they may be cured, and the proper mode of treatment, distinguishing the symptoms of each disease. But these are thought useful to the experienced; but to those who have no knowledge upon the subject, useless.

Perhaps, then, collections of laws and of constitutions would be useful to those who are able to study the theory, and to decide what is done well, or the contrary, or what kind of laws are suitable to certain cases: but to those who go through such collections without having formed a habit, the power of forming a correct judgment cannot belong, except it belongs to them spontaneously; but perhaps they might thus become more intelligent on these subjects. Since, therefore, all former writers have passed over without examination the

* Aristotle himself wrote a treatise on this subject, which is now lost to us.
30. Since legislation has been passed over by others, Aristotle proposes to write on the subject.

31. As a subject of legislation, it would perhaps be better for us to examine it ourselves, and, in short, the whole subject of politics, in order that the philosophy of human nature may, as far as is in our power, be completed. First, then, if anything has been well said by our predecessors on any particular point, let us endeavour to explain it: then from a comparison of the different forms of government, let us examine what kind of qualities preserve and destroy commonwealths, and each particular form of government, and for what reasons some are administered well, and others the contrary: for when these points are considered, we shall perhaps be better able to have a comprehensive view of what form of government is best, and how each is regulated, and what are its laws and institutions. Let us then make a commencement.

* Aristotle here prepares the reader for the three parts into which his Politics is divided. Namely:—(1.) Books I. II. (2.) III.—VI. (3.) VII. VIII.
QUESTIONS

to

THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

OF ARISTOTLE.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

Contrast the ethical system of Aristotle with that of Plato, and illustrate your assertions by quotations from his works.
Define the chief good.
Of what science does Aristotle consider the chief good to be the end?
What are the subdivisions of that science?
Of how many ethical treatises was Aristotle the author?
Name them, and state what you know respecting each.
Explain fully the terms ἐνέργεια, ἐργον, δύναμις, ἐξείς.
Show that the ends of the chief arts are superior to those of the subordinate arts.

CHAP. II.

Show the practical utility of the knowledge of the chief good.
Prove that the political, i.e. the science of social life, is the master science.
What arts are comprehended under it?
Show that Aristotle's doctrine of the subordination of ethics to politics harmonizes with the way in which the
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Greeks viewed the relation between an individual and the state.

CHAP. III.

What do you mean by an exact science?
Give instances in illustration.
Show that neither politics nor ethics are exact sciences.
On what does exactness depend?
Distinguish between necessary and contingent matter.
How are men qualified to judge of subjects?
Why is a young man not a fit student of ethics?
What do you mean by a young man?

CHAP. IV.

What is the good aimed at by the political science?
What is the name universally given to it?
Mention different theories respecting it.
Which of these is the Platonic theory?
Explain fully the difference between analytical and synthetical reasoning.
What is to direct us in the selection of either of these two methods?
Distinguish between empirical and scientific knowledge.
What previous education is necessary for the ethical student?
Quote the passage from Hesiod given in this chapter.

CHAP. V.

How many theories of happiness does Aristotle enumerate in this chapter?
Why does he enumerate so many?
Name them, and show their incorrectness.
Explain the terms esoteric, exoteric, encyclic, and acro- matic.
Give Cicero's definition (de Fin. V. v.), and show its incorrectness.
In what part of this treatise does Aristotle consider the contemplative life?
CHAP. VII.  
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.  

Why does he defer it so long?  
Explain the term βίαως.  
Show that wealth cannot be the chief good.

CHAP. VI.

Explain Plato’s doctrine of the ἴδεα.
Distinguish between ἴδεα and εἰδης.
Does Aristotle fully examine the truth or falsehood of Plato’s theory or not?
Distinguish between ἀρμθυμοι εἰδης, and συμελητοί.
Name the ten categories.
Give an account of Pythagoras and Speusippus.
What is meant by the συντοχία τῶν ἀγαθῶν?
How is the argument affected by the division of goods into two classes?
What are those classes? Give examples.
If in different things the definition of their goodness differs, how do you account for the common name?
After all, what is the principal objection to the ideal theory?
If the idea existed, would it be practically useful?

CHAP. VII.

Explain the meaning of deliberate preference (προαίρεσις).
“By a different path our argument has arrived at the same point.” Explain this.
How many degrees of finality are there?
Prove that happiness is final, "per se," and self-sufficient.
Explain self-sufficiency.
What is the ἵργον of any species.
What, therefore, is the ἵργον of man?
State the successive steps by which Aristotle builds up his definition of happiness.
Define happiness.
Explain the meaning of ἡμεῖς κέλευσιν.
By what methods are first principles obtained?
Explain the meaning of the term induction, taking the Rhetoric as your authority.

CHAP. VIII.

What is Aristotle's object in quoting prevalent opinions on the subject of happiness?
State those mentioned by him.
To what philosophers are they to be attributed?
To what sect of philosophers is the threefold division of goods due?
What sect adopted this division?
What three qualities are combined in Aristotle's notion of happiness?
Quote the Delian inscription.
How far is external prosperity necessary to happiness?

CHAP. IX.

What three questions does Aristotle discuss as to the source of happiness?
How does he settle that of its being of divine origin?
Does this illustrate his practical turn of mind?
Why does it not come by chance?
Prove that it is acquired by training.
Why cannot brutes be called happy?
How far can children be called so?

CHAP. X.

In what sense is the happiness of the dead consistent with Aristotle's theory?
What idea would you form of Aristotle's opinion respecting the condition of man after death, from this or any other part of his works?
Quote any passages from ancient authors which embody the prevalent views on this subject.
State the different steps in Aristotle's examination of Solon's saying.
CHAP. XIII.

What conclusion would you draw from this chapter generally as to Aristotle's opinion of the relation between happiness and the accidents of fortune?

What is the only source of wretchedness?

Explain the expression ἱκανός εὐχρηστημένος.

Distinguish between μακάριος and εὐδαίμων.

When we call men happy, with what reservation do we do so?

CHAP. XI.

What does Aristotle think of the degree in which the dead are affected by the good or ill-fortune of the living?

Does he think that their happiness is increased or diminished thereby?

How does he illustrate his opinion with reference to Greek tragedy?

Quote parallel passages from Horace and Cicero.

CHAP. XII.

To what class of things does happiness belong?

Can it be a capacity?

What are the characteristics of things praised?

Can happiness be of the number of these?

What objects are beyond praise?

What was Eudoxus's opinion, and how far did it agree with that of Aristotle?

Who was Eudoxus?

Distinguish between praise and encomium.

CHAP. XIII.

Why is it requisite to inquire into the nature of virtue?

Why of human virtue?

How does this lead to the necessity of an analysis of the nature of the soul?

How far is the investigation to be carried?

How many parts are there of the soul?

Are these necessarily physically divisible?

What are they?
QUESTIONS TO THE

What are the subdivisions of the irrational part?
With which of these is virtue concerned?
Whence arises a doubt as to the manner in which the division should be made?
Draw out tabular views of the divisions according as you adopt one or other principle.
Compare the Greek word ψυχή with the Latin words animus and anima.
How does the division of the soul lead to a division of virtues?

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

How many kinds of virtues are there?
How is each produced?
State the verbal argument of which Aristotle makes use here.
Mention any other verbal arguments which he uses.
Is the use of verbal arguments to be expected from the tenor of his philosophy?
By how many arguments does he prove that moral virtue is not a natural gift?
State them, and give some of the examples which he adduces in illustration.
Show how his argument bears on the question of education.

CHAP. II.

Show from examples the truth of Aristotle's assertion that this treatise is eminently practical.
What does he mean by οἱ Σωφρικοί ἐν τῷ ἐπειρατείᾳ ἀλλαὶ?
What relation does right reason (ὁρθὸς λόγος) bear to virtue generally?
In what part of his treatise does he enter upon the subject of right reason fully?
Why is it more appropriate there than here?
Why should the discussion of the moral virtues precede that of the intellectual? Why is it unadvisable to lay down particular rules of conduct? Would it interfere with our moral responsibility? Show by example that what is right is destroyed by excess and defect. Show how the moral habits, and the means of forming them, act reciprocally on each other.

CHAP. III.

What are the tests of habits being perfected? Prove that pleasures and pains are the object-matter of moral virtue. What Stoical doctrine respecting virtue is refuted in this chapter?

CHAP. IV.

What objection might be brought to Aristotle's theory of the formation of moral habits? State his answers to this objection.

(1.) By denying the fact.
(2.) By denying the parallelism of the cases.

What is the difference between the arts and the virtues? Distinguish between πρᾶγμα and πρᾶξις. Show how the one may be right and the other wrong. Give examples.
State the physical analogy by which Aristotle illustrates the uselessness of mere theorizing.

CHAP. V.

Define genus, species, differentia. Define and explain πάθη, ἔννομες, ἔξως. Prove that neither virtue nor vice can be a πάθος. Prove that they cannot be ἔννομες. What then is the genus of virtue? What mode of reasoning is adopted in this chapter?
CHAP. VI.

What is the signification of the term ἀρετή generally?
What as applied to man?
How many kinds of means are there?
Give examples of each.
Which is according to arithmetical proportion?
How does every one who possesses ἱερόμνημα act with respect to the mean?
Does the rule apply to both feelings and actions?
From these considerations deduce the differentia of virtue.
Apply the Pythagorean argument here mentioned to arrive at the same conclusion.
From the previous steps derive the definition of virtue.
Show how virtue can be both a mean and an extreme.
What actions and passions are incapable of a mean state?

CHAP. VII.

What advantage results from applying general statements to particular cases?
What does Aristotle allude to when he uses the term ἐγκατάστασις?
Apply the definition of virtue to the following particular cases:
1. Fear and confidence.
2. Pleasures and pains.
3. Giving and receiving.
4. Honour and dishonour (great).
5. Honour and dishonour (small).
6. Anger.
7. The social virtues.
   (a.) Truth.
   (b.) Relaxation.
   (c.) Friendliness.
Apply these statements to the cases of feelings.
   (a.) Shame.
   (b.) Indignation.
CHAP. VIII.

Explain and illustrate the opposition between the mean and the extremes; and between the extremes with regard to each other.
Show that the mean is not always equi-distant from the extremes.
How many reasons are there for this fact?
Illustrate one by the case of courage, and the other by the case of temperance.

CHAP. IX.

Why is virtue difficult of acquirement, and excellence rare, praiseworthy, and honourable?
State the practical rule which Aristotle here gives for attaining the mean.
Quote the illustrative passage from the Odyssey.
What practical rule will result from the knowledge of our natural propensity?
What bias must we especially guard against?
Quote the illustrative passage from the Iliad respecting Helen.
How much must after all be left to the moral sense?

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Why is it necessary to consider the subject of the voluntary and involuntary?
Why is it useful to legislators to do so?
How many kinds of involuntary actions are enumerated by Aristotle?
What other class is there which he has omitted?
Explain and illustrate the meaning of the expression "mixed actions."
Do mixed actions most resemble voluntary or involuntary actions? Why is this?
How many kinds of mixed actions are there?
What practical difficulty is there in judging of these actions?
Show that things pleasant and honourable are not compulsory.
What does Aristotle mean by non-voluntary actions?
What place does repentance occupy in Aristotle's theory?
Explain the difference between ἀγνοῶν and δὲ ἀγνοῶν.
When is ignorance pardonable, and when not?
Define τὸ ἔκοψιον.
Why are actions done through anger or desire voluntary?

CHAP. II.

Explain what is meant by deliberate preference; show that it is the principle of all moral action, and that it determines the character of every act.
What are the erroneous views respecting it mentioned by Aristotle?
Prove that it is not—
(1.) Desire.
(2.) Anger.
(3.) Volition.
(4.) Opinion either general or particular.
Give its real and nominal definitions.

CHAP. III.

Define what is the subject of deliberation.
Enumerate the four things which cannot come within its sphere.
About what matters then do we deliberate?
What is meant by the illustration that the diagonal and the side of a square are incommensurable?
Why do we deliberate about the arts more than about the sciences?
Are any arts excluded?
What division of the sciences did the Greeks adopt?
CHAP. V.]

ICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

Which of these divisions may be made the subjects of deliberation?
What is the office of deliberation?
Are ends or means its matter?
Describe the process of deliberation.
When do we cease to deliberate?
Apply the illustration given from Homer.
Does this remind you of the psychical theory of Plato?
Define προηθής.

CHAP. IV.

What is the object of volition?
What are the difficulties in the way of determining this question?
Solve these difficulties.
Compare the statement made respecting volition in Rhet. I. x
Mention the physical analogies adduced here by Aristotle.
How do good and bad men differ on this point?
How does pleasure influence volition?

CHAP. V.

State Socrates's opinion respecting the freedom of the will.
State the successive steps in the argument by which Aristotle proves that vice is voluntary.
What does the conduct both of legislators and individuals prove respecting their opinions on this question?
What does Bishop Butler say on this point in his chapter on Necessity?
Does the way in which ignorance is treated support Aristotle's view?
How is drunkenness and ignorance of the law dealt with?
What is the effect of wilful sin on the moral sense?
To what conclusion does this effect lead us in judging of confirmed habits of vice?
State any physical analogies in support of Aristotle's doctrine.
Answer the objection "that men have no control over
their imaginations, and therefore are not responsible for their opinions."
Answer the objection “that the aiming at the end is not a matter of choice.”
Show that such arguments prove too much.
Are acts and habits voluntary in the same manner or degree?

CHAP. VI.

Why does Aristotle discuss courage and temperance in this part of his treatise?
On what subjects is courage a mean state?
Has courage reference to evils of all kinds?
What kinds are excluded?
Why then is a man called brave with reference to these?
Are there any evils, which it is our duty not to fear, in which, nevertheless, a man is not called brave?
Are there any which a brave man ought to fear?
In what cases then will the brave man show courage?
In what kinds of deaths especially?
Does Aristotle take notice of moral courage?
What does Aristotle say of the courage of sailors?

CHAP. VII.

How many divisions are there of φοβία?
Name them.
In what ways are faults possible as regards fear and confidence?
What relation does the end bear to the habit?
Define “the brave man.”
What is the brave man’s motive?
Name the excess and defect.
Describe the characters of the rash and the coward.
Show that the three characters are all conversant with the same things.
What is Aristotle’s opinion of suicide?
Show by examples and quotations how far it agrees or disagrees with opinions generally prevalent in Greece.
CHAP. VIII.

How many imperfect forms of courage are there? Name them.
What are the motives to that which is called πολιτική?
Show by examples that this is the courage displayed by Homer's heroes.
Why does this kind most nearly resemble genuine courage?
Do those who are brave under compulsion belong to this class?
Explain and illustrate the courage which proceeds ἐκ τῆς ἐπειρας.
What was Socrates's opinion, and how does it bear upon his moral theory?
What was the affair in the Hermæum to which he alludes?
Show that by συμφος Aristotle means mere animal instinct.
Why are the sanguine brave?
How does the courage of the ignorant resemble that of the sanguine?
Illustrate any of these forms of courage by instances from either poets or historians.

CHAP. IX.

Show that courage has more to do with φοβερὰ than ἡμβαλία.
Show (1) that it is ἐπιλυσος.
Show (2) that it is more difficult to acquire than temperance.
Is a brave man less brave for feeling pain?
Is he more so for that reason?
How far does energizing with pleasure belong to all the virtues?

CHAP. X.

To what part of the soul do courage and temperance belong?
Define temperance and intemperance.
How many divisions of pleasure does Aristotle make?
Give examples of each.
State the subdivisions of the corporeal pleasures.
With what class of pleasures is temperance conversant?
Analyze the argument by which Aristotle arrives at this conclusion.
How is Aristotle's theory illustrated by the case of brute animals?
What distinction does Aristotle draw between the pleasures of touch, and to which does he limit the province of intemperance?

CHAP. XI.

State the divisions of ἐνεβομία.
In which of these is error rare, and in which frequent?
How far may both these classes of desires be said to be natural?
How is the temperate man affected with regard to pleasures?
How with regard to pains?
In this latter respect, distinguish between the temperate and the courageous man.
Why has the vice in the defect with respect to pleasure no name?
Describe the character of the temperate man.

CHAP. XII.

Which is more voluntary, intemperance or cowardice?
State the reasons.
Draw a distinction in both cases between the voluntariness of the habit and of the particular acts.
What analogy is there between ἀκαλασία and the faults of children?
What does Aristotle mean by an obedient and disciplined state?
What rules does he give for attaining this state?
BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Define liberality.
Show the correctness of this definition.
Define property.
What are the excess and defect of this virtue?
Is the term prodigality used in more senses than one?
Is liberality shown more in giving or in receiving?
Account for this.
For what virtue are those who abstain from receiving improperly rather commended?
What is the motive of the liberal man?
In what manner will he exercise this virtue?
Is the man who gives with pain a liberal man?
State some of the characteristics of the liberal man.

1. In respect to receiving.
2. In respect to giving.

In relation to what must we judge of a man's liberality?
Illustrate the answer to this question by examples.
What is Aristotle's opinion of those who make their own fortunes?
Is it easy for a liberal man to do so?
Distinguish between the liberal and prodigal man.

1. In giving.
2. In receiving.

Can monarchs be prodigal?
In what cases would the liberal man feel pain?
Why is Simonides used as an illustration of this subject?
Define and compare together prodigality and illiberality.
Why are both characteristics of prodigality seldom found in the same person?
Why is the prodigal man thought better than the illiberal?
Which does most harm socially, the miser or the spendthrift?
STATE some of the principal peculiarities in the character of the prodigal man.
Account for the union of profuseness and illiberality in the same person.
Why is illiberality incurable?
Mention the different modes of illiberality.
Are all called illiberal who receive gain from improper sources?
What distinctions then do you make?

CHAP. II.

Define magnificence.
Show in what it differs from liberality.
Show, by reference to the public duties of an Athenian citizen, the great importance of this virtue.
Give an account of the Athenian ἕτερον γλύτα.
On what does propriety depend?
Name the excess and defect.
Does magnificence imply ἔπιστροφή?
What is the motive?
Give examples of public and private magnificence.
Can a poor man be magnificent?
Describe the characters of the βάνανος and μυροπροφής.
What is the parode of a comedy?
Why are the Megareans introduced as an example here?

CHAP. III.

What is the object-matter of magnanimity?
Does Aristotle examine this virtue in the abstract or the concrete?
Does he pursue the same plan in any other cases?
Define the magnanimous man.
Define the modest man.
Name and define the excess and defect.
Contrast heathen and Christian magnanimity.
Mention examples of both.
Give some illustrations of the idea which the Greeks had of personal beauty.
Show how taste and the idea of beauty enter into their moral system.
Distinguish between τιμή and τὸ καλὸν.
In what way is the magnanimous man conversant with τιμή?
What does Aristotle mean by saying that magnanimity is κόσμος τῶν ἀρετῶν?
State some peculiarities in the character of the magnanimous man:

1. As to honour.
2. As to wealth.
3. As to courage.
4. As to liberality.
5. As to asking favours.
6. As to seeking honour.
7. As to truth.
8. As to friendship.
9. As to manners and conduct.
10. As to his gait, speech, &c.

Why are magnanimous men thought supercilious?
How does good fortune contribute to magnanimity?
What is the meaning of εἰρωνεία?
Is the magnanimous man ever εἰρων?
Describe the μυράλησος, and the χαῦρος.
Which is most opposed to the mean, and which is worse?

CHAP. IV.

What virtue is there which has to do with the same habit as the former?
Has Aristotle treated of it before?
What relation does it bear to magnanimity?
Illustrate this by referring to liberality.
Whence arises the difficulty of assigning a name to this virtue?
Why do the extremes assume the appearance of the mean?

CHAP. V.

Define meekness, and name the extremes.
Describe the character of the meek.
Is the defect blamed?
Show that the excess takes place in all the categories.
How many species are there of the excess? Name them, and distinguish between them. Which extreme is furthest from the mean? What milder terms do we apply to slight transgressions? How must the extent and nature of transgression be decided?

CHAP. VI.

Show, from what is known of Athenian life and manners, the importance of treating of the social virtues. Name the extremes. Will the term “politeness” designate the mean habit? Distinguish between the mean and friendship. What is the end and aim of the polite? Within what limits will he aim at giving pleasure? Distinguish between ἱδία and ἔθεσις.

CHAP. VII.

Describe the truthful character, and also the excess and defect. In what limited sense is the term truthfulness here used? Is truthfulness more shown in matters of great or of little moment? Distinguish between him who makes pretensions, with, and him who makes them without a motive. Show the possible connection between false modesty and arrogance. Give examples. Which is the worst of the two extremes?

CHAP. VIII.

Name and describe the social virtue in periods of relaxation. What is the etymological meaning of the term εὐπρεπεία? Name and describe the extremes. Why does one extreme sometimes get the credit of being the mean? What do you mean by tact?
Contrast the character, in respect to this virtue, of the educated and uneducated.
How is this difference illustrated by Athenian comedy?
What considerations will regulate the behaviour of him who jests with propriety?
Distinguish between the three social virtues.

CHAP. IX.

Define sense of shame.
Is it a passion or a habit?
To what period of life is it especially becoming?
Show that a sense of shame is no part of the character of a good man.
In what sense is shame a worthy feeling?
What kind of virtue is continence?
Where does he speak of it more fully?

BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

State Plato's theory of universal justice.
Show how far the views of Plato and Aristotle on the subject of justice coincide.
Define justitia expletrix and justitia attributrix.
When the latter of these is termed distributive justice, is the expression used in Aristotle's sense?
In what way has Aristotle treated the subject of justice in the Rhetoric?
How does he investigate the subject here?
Define justice and injustice.
What point of difference does Aristotle speak of as existing between capacities, sciences, and habits?
Does this furnish us with a means of ascertaining the nature of habits?
In how many senses are the terms just and unjust used?
Why is it difficult to distinguish between them?
State and explain these senses.
Distinguish between δικαιόμα and σωτήρια.
What is the object of laws?
Show that universal justice is perfect virtue, not absolutely, but relatively.
Show the difference between universal justice and perfect virtue.

CHAP. II.

Why is particular justice the object of Aristotle’s investigation?
Show how universal injustice differs from particular.
Show that all acts of particular injustice may be termed acts of ἁλεοντένια.
What are the subdivisions of particular justice?
How many sorts of transactions are there?
Give examples of each.

CHAP. III.

Show that a just act implies four terms at least.
Of what will those terms consist?
Which justice is Aristotle here considering?
According to what proportion is it?
How many sorts of geometrical proportion are there?
Which kind is here spoken of?

CHAP. IV.

Show that in corrective justice arithmetical proportion is to be observed.
How far are the persons to be considered?
In this justice, what is "the just" a mean between?
In what sense is the judge a mean?
How is the mean determined?
What is the etymology of δίκαιον?
Illustrate Aristotle’s theory by a diagram.
Account for the use of the term loss and gain.
CHAP. V.

What was the Pythagorean notion of justice?
Is it a correct one?
Show the difference between commutative justice and
distributive and corrective justice.
Show the necessity of observing analogy.
Explain, and illustrate by examples and by a diagram, the
meaning of the expression "diametrical conjunction."
Prove the necessity, in dealings between man and man, of
a common measure of value.
What is that common measure, and what its representative?
Why is money called νόμισμα?
What is the use of money with reference to future
exchange?
Is money, strictly speaking, an invariable standard?
In what respect does justice differ from the other virtues?
Define injustice.

CHAP. VI.

Distinguish between moral and political justice.
Show that, according to the principles of political justice,
an unjust act does not necessarily imply moral injustice.
How far does the idea of justice enter into the relations of
masters and servants, parents and children, &c.?

CHAP. VII.

What are the divisions of political justice?
Explain and illustrate each of them.
Prove the existence of natural justice, and refute the
objections.
Distinguish between ἄξιον and ἄξιον, also between
δίκαιον, δίκαιον, and δικαιοκράγημα.

CHAP. VIII.

What determines the justice and injustice of an act?
How does Aristotle here define and explain the term
"voluntary?"
QUESTIONS TO THE

How many kinds of βλέπω are there?
Is Aristotle's division quite correct?
State them, and give the corresponding Latin terms.
Describe and give examples of ἀνίχνημα, ἀμάρτημα, and ἀδίκημα.
Are acts done through anger unjust?
Give Aristotle's definition of anger in the Rhetoric.
Distinguish between human passions and natural appetites.
Are acts done under the influence of these pardonable or unpardonable?

CHAP. IX.

Can a man be injured with his own consent?
Is a man always injured when unjustly dealt with?
Can a man injure himself?
Illustrate this question by the case of Glaucus.
Does the giver of too much, or the receiver, commit the act of injustice?
Refute the following common errors:—
(1.) That as to act unjustly is always in our power, to act justly is so likewise.
(2.) That it is easy to know what is just and what is unjust.
(3.) That a just man can do an act of injustice.
In what sense does Aristotle use the expression ἄριστος ἄγιος here?

CHAP. X.

Distinguish between justice and equity.
How has Aristotle treated the subject of equity in the Rhetoric?
Show that justice and equity are not opposed.
Define equity, and show its superiority to justice.
In what does law fail of its object?
Why does it fail?
What is the use of equity?
Define the equitable man.
Explain the proverb "Summum jus, summa injuria."
CHAP. XI

Prove that a man cannot injure himself.
(1.) In universal justice.
(2.) In particular justice.
According to the principles of Greek law, "Quae lex non jubeat vetat;" according to those of ours, "Quae lex non vetat permittit;" account for this difference.
Why is it worse to do, than to suffer injustice?
Can the contrary be true accidentally?
Does this consideration come within the province of science?
Show that metaphorically a man can injure himself.

BOOK VI.

CHAP. I.

What is Aristotle's object in treating of the intellectual virtues?
What course does he consequently pursue?
Why is it necessary to examine the nature of ὀρθὸς λόγος?
Define right reason.
What connection is there between right reason and prudence?
Show from Aristotle's theory of the relation of reason to virtue, the practical superiority of his system to that of Plato and Socrates.
Whence arises the difficulty of examining the nature of right reason?
Divide the rational soul according to the matter with which it is conversant.
In this division, in what sense is λόγος used?
How are genus and differentia ascertained?
Distinguish between subjectum materiale and subjectum formale.
CHAP. II.

Name the three principles which influence moral action and truth.
Which of these is the principle of moral action?
In what sense are νοῦς and διάνοια here used?
Distinguish between νοῦς and διάνοια.
How do we discover the virtue of each part of the soul?
Show that truth is the ἴδιον of both parts.
Explain the relation which subsists between διάνοια, προαίρεσις, and ἡθική in moral action.
What matter comes within the province of deliberation?

CHAP. III.

Name the five intellectual habits.
Why are supposition and opinion excluded?
Arrange these habits in a table, according to their matter.
How many kinds of necessity are there according to Aristotle?
Distinguish between them.
How is science acquired?
From what two sources is all learning derived?
Explain syllogism and induction.
Define science.

CHAP. IV.

How many kinds of contingent matter are there?
Distinguish between ποιησις and πρᾶξις.
With what three processes is art conversant?
Explain the connection between art and chance.
Define ἐκπίνη and ἄρτοπος.

CHAP. V.

By what process does Aristotle arrive at the investigation of φρόνησις?
In what other cases has he pursued a similar one?
State the characteristics of the prudent man.
Distinguish between ἕρως and ἐπιστήμη.
Define it really and nominally.
Support Aristotle's definition by reference to general opinion.
Show the moral effect of intemperance.
Has intemperance any effect upon science?
What is the difference between prudence and art?
Of what part of the soul is prudence the virtue?
Which part does Aristotle here term ὡ δοξαστικῷ?
Why are virtuous energies more stable than those of science?
Has Aristotle alluded to this fact before?

CHAP. VI.

With what is νοῦς conversant?
Give Aristotle's definitions both here and in the magna moralia.
Show that the habit προ ἄφλιν cannot be science or art,
or prudence or wisdom.
What kind of reasoning is this called?

CHAP. VII.

What does σοφία signify when applied to the arts?
What is its general signification?
Give instances of different applications of the term.
How many kinds of σοφία are there?
Prove that it is the most accurate of all the sciences.
Of what two intellectual habits is it composed?
How does it differ from φρόνησις?
Why is it practically important to establish this difference?
Show how it differs from the political science.
Support the distinction drawn between wisdom and prudence by reference to general opinion.
Show that prudence has to do with particulars as well as universals.

CHAP. VIII.

How far are prudence and the political science similar,
and how far do they differ?
QUESTIONS TO THE

Name the different species of prudence.
Exhibit them in a table.
Can the prudence which relates to the individual be really separated from the other kinds?
Why can a young man be σοφός, but not φόνιμος?
Show how prudence differs from science and intuition.
What does Aristotle here mean by τὸ ἐγχαρῶν?
What faculty takes cognizance of these ἐγχαρα?

CHAP. IX.

What relation do deliberation and investigation bear to one another?
Show that εὐσυνία is not—

2. Happy conjecture.
Show what kind of an ὀπθόρης it is.
In how many ways may correctness be predicated?
Give Aristotle's definition of εὐσυνία.

CHAP. X.

Show that intelligence is neither science nor opinion.
With what subjects is it conversant?
How does it differ from prudence?
What is its province?
Is it exactly synonymous with judgment or not?

CHAP. XI.

Define candour, and distinguish it from intelligence.
Define συγγραφές, and state in what its correctness consists.
Explain the connection between candour and other intellectual habits.
Compare the sense in which ῥόξ is used here with that in which it has been used previously.
Is there any inconsistency in this twofold use of the term?
Explain the expression συλλόγιμος τῶν πρακτῶν.
Show that the minor premise is the origin of the motive.
Explain why the habits here discussed have been held to be natural.
Show the importance of attention to authority.
CHAP. XII.

State the objections which have been urged to the utility of wisdom and prudence.

What is meant by the objection that wisdom relates to no act of generation or production?

State the argument on which the objections are founded.

1. That prudence is useless to one who has virtue.
2. That it is so to one who has not yet attained it.

What illustration is here adduced?

In how many senses is ἵγειενον used?

In which of these significations is it used here?

What objection is founded on the relative importance of wisdom and prudence?

Refute these objections.

1. By showing that even if that which is alleged be granted, still the objection will not hold good.
2. By denying the allegation altogether.

Prove that prudence is inseparable from moral virtue.

Show the usefulness of prudence as regards the ἔργων.

Explain what is meant by δεινότης, state its relation to φρόνησις and πανοργία.

Exhibit the process of moral action in a syllogistic form.

Which part of this syllogism is capable of being discerned only by a good man?

CHAP. XIII.

Distinguish between natural virtue and virtue proper.

Show that the relation between them is the same as that between cleverness and prudence.

Show how far Socrates was right, and how far wrong, in his view of the connection between virtue and prudence.

What change must be made in the expression κατ' ἐφθών λόγον, and why?

In what sense may it be said with truth that the virtues are separable?

Is there any ambiguity in the use of the term φρόνησις in this chapter?
BOOK VII.

CHAP. I.

Explain the difference in the mode of treating the subject of virtue and vice here, and in the former books. Name the three things to be avoided in respect of morals, and also their opposites. Amongst whom is brutality chiefly found? What virtues and vices does Aristotle here propose to speak of? In what manner does he propose to treat of them? State the seven common opinions which he proposes for discussion.

CHAP. II.

What was Socrates's opinion respecting incontinence? Trace this opinion to the theory of virtue. Show that his system is at variance with what we see. How have some people endeavoured to modify the views of Socrates? Refute the doctrine that the incontinent man possesses only opinion, and not knowledge. Prove that he cannot possess prudence. Prove that continence and intemperance are incompatible. Prove that continence does not make a man abide by every opinion. How does the case of Neoptolemus illustrate this? Explain the sophistical argument ἵπποςμενος, and show how it is applicable as an illustration here. Show that, on the supposition that the continent abides by every opinion, the intemperate is better and more easily cured than the incontinent. What observation does Aristotle make on the seventh opinion enumerated?
CHAP. III.

State the three questions which Aristotle here especially proposes for investigation.
What two points does he consider it necessary first to determine?
State the comparison which he draws between the intemperate and the incontinent as the result of this investigation.
Why does it not matter whether a man acts contrary to a true opinion or to science?
Illustrate this from the example of Heraclitus.
Explain fully the four ways in which the incontinent acts contrary to knowledge.
Explain what is meant by the expressions τὸ καθόλου ἐφ' ἵαυτον and τὸ καθόλου ἐπὶ τοῦ πράγματος.
How do lunatics generally act?
Is the giving utterance to good moral sentiments a proof of virtuous character?
Is the reverse a proof of the contrary character?
In the fourth method which Aristotle discusses, why is the subject said to be treated physically?
Why cannot brutes be called incontinent?
From whom must we learn how the incontinent can regain knowledge?
Show how far the view elicited in this chapter is in harmony with that of Socrates.

CHAP. IV.

Which of the seven common opinions (c. i.) does Aristotle here discuss?
In order to this, what division does he make of the causes which produce pleasure?
Give examples of each.
To which class does he confine incontinence κατὰ μέρος?
For what reason is the vice in this case called incontinence?
Explain Aristotle's illustration of the ἀλμυτονίκης.
Describe the character of the ἁραχὴς ἅπλως.
What relation subsists between effeminacy and incontinence?
Which is worse to yield to, strong or slight temptations? Do you find a similar maxim in the Rhetoric with respect to injustice?
Why does he make another division of pleasures here?
In what pleasures does even excess never amount to μοχθορία?
Give examples.
Does incontinence (ἀστατίκη) exist in respect of them?

CHAP. V.

How does pleasure affect the consideration of the subject of brutality?
Give examples of Ἀρνώνη.
From how many causes is brutality produced?
Show that you cannot properly term brutality vicious.
Can brutal propensities be resisted and overcome?

CHAP. VI.

Prove that incontinence of appetite is worse than incontinence of anger.
What does Aristotle say in his Rhetoric on the subject of anger?
Illustrate this chapter by reference to Bishop Butler's sermon on resentment.
Show that anger acts according to the suggestions of reason.
Show that anger is more natural than desire.
Show that it is less insidious.
Support this by a quotation from Homer.
How is the fact, that pain, and not pleasure, accompanies anger, a proof of the point in question?
How does ἐρωτζη (wanton insolence) affect the consideration of the question?
What does Aristotle say of ἐρωτζη in the Rhetoric?
With which of the two divisions of bodily pleasures here given are temperance and intemperance conversant?
Can we speak of brute beasts or insane persons as temperate and intemperate?
Why can we not?
Can any comparison in point of badness be instituted between vice and brutality?

CHAP. VII.

What distinction does Aristotle draw between continence and patience?
What between intemperance and incontinence?
Is intemperance attended with an inclination to repentance?
Is it incurable?
Which is the worse, intemperance, incontinence, or effeminacy?
What does Aristotle mean by ἡπιοφύ?
In what way does he illustrate its nature?
In what case is incontinence pardonable?
Mention the subdivisions of incontinence.

CHAP. VIII.

Why are the ἔστηρικτοι less blameable than other incontinent persons?
How far is incontinence to be considered a vice?
Illustrate this by the saying of Demodocus.
Prove that the intemperate is incurable, but the incontinent not.

CHAP. IX.

Has the question "whether the continent is the same as he who adheres to his opinion" been proposed before?
In how many ways may it be considered?
State them accurately.
Show that from the first two an absurdity necessarily arises.
Show that from the third a fresh distinction between continence and incontinence may be deduced.
How far do the obstinate resemble, and how far do they differ from, the continent and incontinent?
What does Aristotle remark respecting those who do not abide by a bad resolve?
QUESTIONS TO THE

Is there any vicious defect on the subject of continence?
State Aristotle's concluding remarks on the relation of continence to temperance.

CHAP. X.

Prove the incompatibility of prudence and incontinence.
Prove that, owing to the difference between cleverness and prudence, the former is compatible with incontinence.
Prove that the incontinent is not unjust.
Give Aristotle's illustration here of the incontinent character.
Why are some species of incontinence more curable than others?

BOOK VIII.

CHAP. I.

How does the subject of friendship belong to ethics?
Would its connection with ethics be considered as important by a Greek more perhaps than by any other person?
Is friendship of great practical utility to the young?
Illustrate this from Homer.
Is it implanted in us by nature?
How far does it appear to be the bond of human society?
How far does it supply the place of justice?
Compare it with Christian love or charity.
Show from common opinion that it is honourable.
What proverbs have originated in supposing friendship to arise from similarity of character?
What from the reverse?
How far are both these theories reconcilable with the truth?
What physical theory is embodied in a passage of Euripides?
What were the opinions of Heraclitus and Empedocles?
Why does Aristotle dismiss the consideration of these questions?
What questions does he propose to examine?
CHAP. II.

How does he propose to commence the inquiry?
What are the objects of friendship?
When Aristotle speaks of good as one object, does he mean absolute or relative good?
What, then, are the three causes of friendship?
Why cannot the term friendship be applied to affection for inanimate things?
What do you call the feeling where there is no reciprocity?
Is any other condition necessary to friendship besides reciprocity?
Define the necessary conditions of friendship.

CHAP. III.

How many species of friendship are there?
Are two of these not really so?
Give your reasons for your statement.
Why are these two species of friendship easily dissolved?
Amongst whom is the friendship διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον usually found?
Why is this the case?
Amongst whom that διὰ τὸ ἡγεμών?
Why are the young fickle in friendship?
What does Horace say on this point?
To which species of friendship does that of hospitality belong?
Between whom does true friendship subsist?
On what is it based?
Describe true friendship.
Show that it has in it a principle of permanence.
Does it include under it the two false kinds?
Why is true friendship rarely found?
Why can it not be rapidly formed?

CHAP. IV.

Show that the two imperfect species are copies of the true.
Why is it more permanent than love?
Prove that it cannot subsist except between the good, whereas the other species can.
Why is it superior to calumny?
Why are the false kinds called friendship at all?
Are the two false kinds ever found combined?

CHAP. V.

What effect does absence produce on friendship?
Why are the old and morose ill-suited to friendship?
Show that intimacy is necessary in order to maintain friendship.
What remarks already made does Aristotle here briefly recapitulate?
Distinguish between φιλαρχία and φιλία.
Prove that when the good love their friend, they love that which is good to themselves.

CHAP. VI.

Can the old and ill-tempered feel εὐφροσύνα?
Why can you not entertain true friendship for a great number, whereas you can entertain the two other kinds?
Which of the two false kinds most resembles the true?
Why is this the case?
Which friendship do the happy and prosperous need?
How are men in power influenced in their choice of friends?
What considerations will regulate the friendship between a good man and a great man?

CHAP. VII.

Show that in the friendships hitherto treated of, equality between the parties has been considered.
Give instances of unequal friendships.
In these friendships, what will insure permanence?
Between parties who are unequal, on which side will the feeling be the stronger?
What contrast does Aristotle here draw between justice and friendship?
Show that even between persons unequal, equality in some sense must be produced.
Illustrate this by the case of the gods and of kings.
What question has arisen from the fact, that friendship ceases in cases of great inequality?

CHAP. VIII.

In our opinions of friendship, are we influenced by the desire of honour?
Is friendship generally thought to consist most in being the object of friendship or in feeling the sentiment?
How is this opinion supported by the case of mothers?
Why is there stability in the friendship of the good, and instability in that of the wicked?
Show that friendship ἐιά τὸ χρύσιμον is produced by the existence of contrary qualities.

CHAP. IX.

What is the relation which subsists between justice and friendship?
How is justice affected by the degree of friendship?
What is the principal object of political or civil society?
Show that all associations or communions are parts of this.
Illustrate by examples what is meant by συνωρίαι.
Show that corresponding friendships will accompany these several συνωρίαι.

CHAP. X.

How many kinds of political constitutions are there?
How many corruptions of them?
Name them all, and state which are the best and worst.
Give a definition of each, and state what is the end and object of each.
Compare the theory here given with that given in the Rhetoric, and account for the difference between them.
Explain how each of the forms passes into its corresponding corruption.
QUESTIONS TO THE

Give the parallels to those forms of government which exist in private life.

CHAP. XI

Show at greater length the parallelism between the justice and friendship which exists in each form of government and that which exists in the corresponding cases in private life.

Can friendship and justice exist in a despotism?
Can they exist at all, and if at all, how far, between a master and a slave?
Compare on these points despotisms and democracies.

CHAP. XII

On what does the friendship which subsists between relations depend?
Compare the grounds, motives, and degrees of filial and parental affection.
Why is the affection of mothers stronger than that of fathers?
What is the origin of fraternal love?
Why does it resemble that between companions?
What is the law of variation in friendship between relations?
Why does the friendship between relations include more of the ἀγαθος and χρησιμος than any others?
What is the origin of conjugal love or friendship?
On what is it based?
On what grounds does Aristotle consider children a bond of union between married persons?

CHAP. XIII

In which kind of equal friendships do disputes mostly arise?
For what reason?
Why are friends ἓν ἄγαθον not inclined to complain?
Why are disputes unusual between friends ἓν ἐνίοτε?
What are the subdivisions of friendship ἓν ἐν χρησιμον?
Show how they differ from each other, especially as regards the question of disputes.
What rule does Aristotle lay down to guide us in recognizing an obligation?
Is the standard of obligation to be the benefit conferred on the receiver, or the benevolence of the doer?
How is this question to be answered in the case of friendships ἰκα ρο ἀγαθον?

CHAP. XIV.

Whence do complaints originate in unequal friendships?
What is the view taken by the superior?
What argument is used by the inferior?
How does Aristotle settle the question between the two parties?
How does he illustrate it by the practice of states?
What rules does he lay down to regulate the intercourse of unequal friends?
What observations result from the above view of the subject respecting the parental and filial relations?

BOOK IX.

CHAP. I.

What is it which preserves and renders equal unequal friendships?
Give an illustration of this.
In the friendship of lovers, what complaints arise?
On what is this friendship founded, and therefore why is it liable to be dissolved, whereas the friendship founded on moral qualities is permanent?
What case of complaint is illustrated by the story of the musician?
Who then is to fix the rate of compensation?
What is said to have been the practice of Protagoras?
What does Aristotle say was the practice of the sophists, and why was it so?
What rule must be observed when no previous agreement has been made?
QUESTIONS TO THE

CHAP. II.

Give examples of other questions which arise in connection with this subject.
Show in what consists the difficulty of settling them.
Does the rule "to be just before you are generous" admit of exceptions?
State what they are, and examine them.
Show (1) that different persons have different claims, according to the relation in which they severally stand to us: and (2) that duties and obligations differ in the same way.
Give examples.
Does any difficulty arise from this circumstance?
How should we meet the difficulty?

CHAP. III.

On what grounds may friendships be dissolved?
Under what circumstances might a man justly complain of another for dissolving a friendship?
What is the common source of disagreement between friends?
What may we do in the case of being deceived as to character?
What is an absolute duty in such a case?
What is to be done if one party improves morally, and the other continues unchanged?

CHAP. IV.

Describe the relation which friendship bears to self-love.
State the definitions which are commonly given of a friend.
Show that a good man entertains all these characteristic feelings towards himself.

What does Aristotle say, with reference to this subject, of the intellectual principle in man?

How does he illustrate his view by reference to the case of a god?

Why is a good man fond of self-communion?

Does Aristotle enter into the question of whether a man can be a friend to himself?

What objection may be urged to Aristotle's theory?

How may it be answered?

Why cannot a bad man sympathize with, or be a friend to himself?

What is consequently our duty?

CHAP. V.

Show that good-will is neither friendship nor fondness.
Describe what it is, and illustrate by the case of pleasure as connected with love.

Show that it is necessary to friendship.

What may it be called metaphorically?

Into which species of friendship may it be improved?

Why does it not become either of the other two?

What is the origin in all cases of good-will?

CHAP. VI.

Distinguish between unanimity and oneness of opinion.

To agreement on what subjects does the latter term apply?

In what cases is the former term used?

Illustrate it from politics, and from the Phaedo.

Define unanimity, and prove your definition.

Amongst whom alone can it exist?

Why is it never found among the wicked?

CHAP. VII.

Compare the feelings of benefactors, and those whom they have benefited.
QUESTIONS TO THE

Is the result such as might have been expected?
How do most persons account for the existence of this result?
What would Epicharmus say of the account thus given?
What does Aristotle consider the true account?
Illustrate his view by the cases of poets and artisans.
By how many arguments does Aristotle prove his point?
State them all in order.

CHAP. VIII

What is the reason that self-love is blamed?
Distinguish between reasonable self-love and selfishness.
What does Bishop Butler say respecting self-love?
Show that facts contradict the view that self-love is always wrong.
Quote the proverbs which Aristotle adduces in support of his view.
Does the difference of opinion on this subject arise from the term self-love being used in different senses?
What is self-love understood to mean when it is blameable?
Is this the sense in which the term is generally used?
In what sense, however, is the term more correctly used?
Prove that this is the case.
In order to this, show that the intellectual principle constitutes each man's self.
What advantage results to society from real self-love?
Show that self-love is an absolute duty.
In cases of self-sacrifice, what motive acts upon our self-love?
How will this motive lead the good man to act under certain circumstances?

CHAP. IX

What idea is commonly entertained respecting the need of friends to a happy man?
What absurdity is involved in this opinion?
How can it be refuted by considering the nature of beneficence?
What question arises out of this consideration as to the comparative need of friends in prosperity and adversity? How does the nature of man contradict this commonly received opinion? Account for the existence of this opinion, and show how far it is correct.

Show from the definition and nature of happiness itself, that the happy man needs friends.

Show that they are necessary on the hypothesis that happiness implies pleasure.

Show that, if good, they improve virtue.

Prove the same fact from the pleasure which is derived from the consciousness and perception of existence.

CHAP. X.

What precept respecting hospitality may perhaps be considered as applicable to friendship? Does this precept certainly apply to the case of friendships διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον and διὰ τὸ ἱδυν; Why so?

Is any limit to be put to the number of virtuous friends? How is this illustrated by referring to political communities?

What practical rule is to guide us in limiting the number? What other fact ought we to keep in mind? Why is it difficult to sympathize with many? What lesson do all the well-known examples of friendship teach us on this point? By what name do we designate those who seem intimate with everybody?

In what way may a man be a friend to many, and yet not deserve the above name?

CHAP. XI.

Prove that friends are requisite both in prosperity and adversity. Why are they more necessary in adversity? Which kind are most wanted in prosperity, and which in adversity?
What is the reason that friendship diminishes the weight of affliction?
Does Aristotle pursue the investigation of this question to any length?
Is not the effect produced by the presence of a friend on a man under calamity of a mixed kind?
Under such circumstances, what is the conduct of the manly character?
What is our duty in such circumstances?
What are the advantages of friends when we are in prosperity?
How should we treat our friends when we are in adversity, and how when we are in prosperity?
What caution is requisite when we decline sympathy?
What is the general conclusion to which Aristotle comes?

CHAP. XII.

What is the chief bond of friendship?
Is the case the same in love?
How do men usually like to pass their time when in the society of their friends?
Hence, what effect is produced on the friendship of the wicked?
What on that of the good?
Quote a sentiment in support of your assertion.

BOOK X.

CHAP. I.

Give Aristotle's reasons for entering upon a discussion of the subject of pleasure.
What are the two opposite opinions usually entertained on this subject?
What are the grounds and motives for them?
What does Aristotle consider the proper course to pursue? How must the truth of theories be proved? To what difficulty is he liable who declaims against pleasure?

**CHAP. II.**

What was the opinion of Eudoxus? What were the grounds of it? How does he argue in favour of it? State his four arguments in support of his views. What was the reason that his views found favour? What objection is first made to his theory? Is there any similarity between this argument and that by which Plato proves that pleasure is not the chief good? How may the objection to the first position of Eudoxus be answered?

**CHAP. III.**

How many objections are made to his second position?—What are they? Answer the first by a counter objection, and the second, by drawing a distinction between pleasures. What is the objection on the ground that pleasure is a motion and a generation? How many kinds of motion are there, according to Aristotle? Answer the objection, by proving that pleasure is neither a motion nor a generation. Prove that pleasure is not a supplying a deficiency. Suppose base pleasures are brought forward, how would you answer this? Support your argument by analogy. What further illustrations may be adduced in support of the assertions, (1) that pleasure is not the chief good; (2) that neither every eligible thing is pleasant, nor every pleasure eligible?

**CHAP. IV.**

Explain what is meant by ἡλικία, by the example of sight.
Prove, then, that pleasure is a whole.
Show that for this reason it differs from a motion or a generation.
Give an illustration derived from architecture.
Give another, taken from the different kinds of motions.
In order to get at Aristotle's theory of pleasure, describe what he means by the best energy.
Prove that pleasure makes the energy perfect, and state the way in which it does so.
Explain how it is that we cannot feel pleasure continuously.
Prove that the love of pleasure is the consequence of the love of life.
Does Aristotle here enter upon the question whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure, or pleasure for the sake of life?

CHAP. V.

In proving that pleasures differ in species, show
(1.) That they perfect different productions and different energies.
(2.) That each energy is increased by its proper pleasures.
(3.) That the pleasures resulting from one kind of energy are a hinderance to other energies.
If we are engaged in two different energies at the same time, what becomes of the least pleasant?
When are we inclined to engage in two occupations at once?
Compare the effect of pleasures which are foreign to any energy with the pains proper to it; and give an example in illustration.
How are we to estimate the qualities of pleasures?
Which are most closely connected with the energies, the pleasures which attend thereon, or the desires which originate them?
Compare in point of purity the various pleasures of the intellect and the senses.
Show that different men, and the same men under different circumstances, entertain different ideas of pleasure.
Describe then fully true pleasure, and show how Aristotle investigates its nature.
CHAP. VI.

Why does Aristotle now return to the discussion of the subject of happiness?
What does he say that happiness is not? and why so?
What division does he make of energies?
To which of these classes does happiness belong?
Are any other energies besides virtuous energies eligible for their own sakes?
Are amusements of this number?
How comes it that amusements are sometimes mistaken for happiness?
Prove that amusement does not constitute happiness.
Prove that in reality amusement is not eligible for its own sake.
Why cannot bodily pleasure constitute happiness?

CHAP. VII.

Show that happiness must be an energy of the best part of our nature, whatever that be.
Prove that this energy is (1) contemplative, (2) continuous, (3) self-sufficient, (4) eligible for its own sake, (5) consistent with a state of perfect rest.
What energies are inconsistent with the idea of rest?
Show that the qualities above mentioned are united in the energy of the intellect, and in no other.
Why is the condition εν βίω τελειω added?
How far may men be considered capable of enjoying such happiness?
What, then, must be our earnest endeavour, if we would possess this happiness?
Prove that this happiness is most proper to man.

CHAP. VIII.

How far is moral virtue productive of happiness?
Does moral virtue depend at all upon a man's physical constitution?
Show the superiority of intellectual to moral virtue as regards external goods.
QUESTIONS TO THE

How does the example of the gods support Aristotle's view?
How does the case of the lower animals support it?
On what, then, will the degree of happiness depend?
But though contemplative happiness is independent of external goods, are they necessary to man?
To what extent are they necessary?
What argument may be drawn from the virtues observable in different classes of society?
Compare Aristotle's statements with those of Solon and Anaxagoras.
Although the opinions of the wise are evidences in Aristotle's favour, still what is the grand test?
Who is likely to be the greatest favourite of the gods?

CHAP. IX.

What is the general object of this chapter?
What is the proper end of all ethical investigations?
In what do moral precepts fail, and how far are they useful?
What motive has the strongest influence over the masses?
By how many means is it supposed that men are made virtuous?
How many of these are in our power?
To what influence does Aristotle attribute natural gifts?
Is any predisposition to virtue absolutely necessary, in order to learn?
How is that to be acquired?
Show the importance of a national system of education.
Is this system to be confined to the young, or to be far more comprehensive?
Hence, what views have been held respecting the duties of legislators in this respect?
Why is the authority of law preferable to the paternal authority?
Has any state laid down laws to enforce education?
If the state neglects this duty, what subject must private individuals study, in order to educate successfully?
What are the advantages of a system of private education over a public one?
Does this also show the importance of the knowledge of the principles of legislation?
Whence is this knowledge to be obtained?
To whom would the student apply in vain?
Why so?
Show the importance of a practical acquaintance with the subject.
State the errors into which the sophists have fallen.
Although collections of laws will not do everything, how far are they useful?
Why is it necessary for Aristotle to investigate the subject of legislation?
How does this lead him to undertake a treatise on politics?
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